He did not try to conquer Kiev. The reason he invaded Ukraine is he wanted to force Zelensky to the bargaining table, so they could get some sort of agreement on Ukrainian neutrality, Ukraine not being in NATO. — John J. Mearsheimer

It's beyond me how anyone can take this seriously.

Not only was there no way for Ukraine to join NATO with the Donbas conflict unresolved.

Launching a demonstrative attack on your neighbours capital to get them to not join a defensive alliance with your enemies must be the dumbest plan I've ever heard. "Hey look how easily we can threaten your capital and take your land. Better not get any protection, that'd be bad. Also we're going to retreat after loosing some of our best troops and a bunch of equipment, so you'll know we mean business".

It's beyond me how anyone can take this seriously. — Echarmion

That could very well be. What's your academic background?

If these are the deal-breaker conditions for a peace negotiation, is it completely irrational for Ukraine and its Western allies (like the United States) to resist peace talks, even assuming a COMPETENT and HARD TO BEAT Russia? Teach me your theory of rationality, I'm eager to learn from you. — neomac

No problem, I am happy to teach you.

First as I've already explained, it's completely irrational to refuse negotiating as the weaker party to a conflict. Not only are Russia's demands maybe their starting position and through negotiation you "talk them down" but Ukraine was also in a position to get concessions also from both Europe and the United States.

So if you don't negotiate you can't know what exactly is on offer. Perhaps Russia is offering some compensation for Crimea that makes a peace more palpable and so forth. Perhaps other European states that do not want a protracted war with Russia would also offer compensation that would make life better in Ukraine.

As for your point about deal breakers, if you mean giving up claim to Crimea or declaring neutrality are deal breakers, those are irrational deal breakers. If Ukraine has not military option to retake Crimea then maintaining that as a deal breaker is simply irrational, it is much more rational to seek to get as much compensation for recognizing reality that you have no hope of changing through military intervention. Likewise, if Ukraine has no hope of joining NATO anyways and no hope of defeating Russia in military terms, then the rational course of action is to seek as much compensation as possible for accepting neutrality.

The justification for Ukraine's refusal to negotiate and declaring delusional objectives and ultimatums, such as only being willing to negotiate once Russia leaves all of Ukraine, was the theory of victory that Russia would fall apart under the pressure of the war, Western sanctions and domestic opposition to the war.

None of that I would argue was rational for Ukraine to believe, but the US made quite clear that their theory was a protracted war with Ukraine, sanctions, blowing the up the pipelines, would weaken Russia long term. This is made quite clear by

“I like the structural path we’re on here,” Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham declared in July 2022. “As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person.” — Aaron Mate

Which makes clear the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one, but a good path for the US (what "we" refers to in this context).

And this is nothing new, using fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101.

For Ukraine, the point of maximum leverage was in the initial phase of the war (or even before the war) and the rational thing to do is negotiate when you are strongest.

The myth building undertaken by the United States that the time to negotiate is not at the start of the war but Russia is incompetent and weak and can be pushed back, was to encourage Zelensky to reject peace as well as reassure European allies that supporting Ukraine militarily is a worthwhile endeavor (rather than forcing Ukraine to accept a peace deal, which the Europeans could have done even without the United States). Some parties in Europe were of course as enthusiastic for Ukraine to fight the Russians as you could possibly be, but many people in Europe were skeptical.

Now, certainly your reply is that Ukraine really wants Crimea back and really wants to be in NATO, perhaps agreeing already with:

It's beyond me how anyone can take this seriously.

Not only was there no way for Ukraine to join NATO with the Donbas conflict unresolved.

Launching a demonstrative attack on your neighbours capital to get them to not join a defensive alliance with your enemies must be the dumbest plan I've ever heard. "Hey look how easily we can threaten your capital and take your land. Better not get any protection, that'd be bad. Also we're going to retreat after loosing some of our best troops and a bunch of equipment, so you'll know we mean business". — Echarmion

Of which the answer is literally right there in these statements.

Ukraine has no hope of actually joining NATO as @Echarmion literally states. Obviously it would have been nice for Ukraine to join NATO anytime before the war or even now and have other countries come and fight your battles.

... However since Ukraine has essentially zero hope of joining NATO, then what is rational is to try to seek compensation for recognizing what you can't have anyway. What is totally irrational is to fight a costly war to defend "the right to join NATO" even if you can't actually join NATO.

To answer the question of why Russia invades to try to force Ukraine to give-up it's goal of joining NATO when Ukraine has essentially no hope of joining NATO, again the answer is right there in @Echarmion explanation of the situation.

Ukraine can't join NATO due to the war in the Donbas, but continuing that war indefinitely is not a reasonable solution for Russia. Just like Ukraine is clearly at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with Russia, the Donbas separatists were at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with the rest of Ukraine. There is clear limitations of sending "volunteers" and other covert actions to help the separatists rather than formal military formations. Eventually Donbas would be attritted away (or just leave or die of old age) and Ukraine would prevail without direct intervention of the Russian army.

Therefore, the plan of keeping the Donbas conflict alive in order to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO essentially necessitates an eventual escalation of direct intervention of Russian forces to prevent the collapse of the separatists.

The conflict in the Donbas and the cutting of fresh water to Crimea were also serious political problems. Ordinary Russians expected the Russian government to "solve" those issues one way or another.

Again, the portrayal of the invasion as some some sort of whimsical irrational act on the part of an obsessed imperialist in the Kremlin was again myth building to portray Ukraine as an innocent victim, rather than creating problems for Russia that would inevitably lead to escalating the de facto war with Russia in the Donbas since 2014.

The reason so much effort was spent by the Western media to assert there was no "provocation" was that there was obvious provocations that are easy to understand (such as cutting off fresh water supply and killing ethnic Russians, in one case locking them in a building and lighting it on fire, as well as going around with Swastikas and espousing Nazi ideology), and accepting the reality of these provocations significantly reduces a feeling of moral imperative to help a victim that provokes aggression.

If you recognize the obvious reasons for Russia seeking a military solution to obvious problems, then corollary is that Russia is a rational actor with reasonable concerns and perhaps a peace can be negotiated that is better for everyone, and likewise greatly diminishes a feeling of obligation to send free money and arms to Ukraine.

The myths required are founded on mostly just ignoring obvious facts but also just Western ignorance. Since the Western media mostly ignored the conflict in the Donbas and ordinary Westerners mostly ignore the Western media anyways, the Russian invasion came as a surprise (to them) so it is easy to build on that and portray the invasion as irrational and unprovoked, just sort of out of the blue.

You can of course argue Lindsey Graham's point that it was good for the US to create the myths required to encourage Ukraine to give up their leverage through fanatical fighting as that will "damage" Russia, but it's difficult to argue that it was rational for Ukraine to do so.

Once it started to become clear that Russia was not weak and would not be easily beaten, the new justification was that the war was existential for Ukraine, again based on the myth that Russia wants to conquer all of Ukraine: therefore it is reasonable to fight even "to the last Ukrainian" because the battle is existential. However, that argument is not only simply wrong (Russia doesn't have the force necessary to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine and there's no gain in doing so) it is also a fallacy anyways confusing what is existential for a state and what is existential for a people. The only time it is reasonable to fight to death against impossible odds is if the aggressor anyways plans to murder you if you surrender.

If I am attacked by a larger and more skilled opponent that I am convinced is trying to murder me (not coerce me into giving him my watch) then it's reasonable to fight back even if I am fairly certain I will lose, as there is always some chance, no matter how small, of prevailing due to luck in fighting or then the lucky intervention of external forces.

However, not only is there zero evidence Russia plans to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine, there is even less evidence Russia wishes to do so in order to murder every Ukrainian.

The war maybe existential for Zelesnky, but it is not existential for the average Ukrainian and there is no rational basis to fight a losing war.

If you are losing a war then your leverage decreases over time and does not increase. The closer the war comes to a military termination (where you lose) the less reason the opposing side has to offer any concessions and of course the more people and infrastructure you lose due to continuing to fight; and to make matters even worse, the more you lose a war the faster you lose the war in the future as the destruction of your fighting capacity means further disadvantage and asymmetry of losses.

Recently brought to my attention was a report written by former UN Assistant Secretary-General Michael von der Schulenberg, German professor Hajo Funke and retired formerly highest-ranking German general Harald Kujat.

The report features a detailed reconstruction of the peace negotiations that took place in March/April of 2022.

This is merely confirming what many of us already strongly suspected, but

Here are the seven points which comprise most of Schulenberg's contribution to the report:

1) Just one month after the start of the Russian military intervention in Ukraine, Ukrainian and Russian negotiators had come very close to an agreement for a ceasefire and to an outline for a comprehensive peace solution to the conflict.

2) In contrast to today, President Zelensky and his government had made great efforts to negotiate peace with Russia and bring the war to a quick end.

3) Contrary to Western interpretations, Ukraine and Russia agreed at the time that the planned NATO expansion was the reason for the war. They therefore focused their peace negotiations on Ukraine’s neutrality and its renunciation of NATO membership. In return, Ukraine would have retained its territorial integrity except for Crimea.

4) There is little doubt that these peace negotiations failed due to resistance from NATO and in particular from the USA and the UK. The reasons is that such a peace agreement would have been tantamount to a defeat for NATO, an end to NATO’s eastward expansion and thus an end to the dream of a unipolar world dominated by the USA.

5) The failure of the peace negotiations in March 2022 led to dangerous intensification of the war that has cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, especially young people, deeply traumatized a young generation and inflicted the most severe mental and physical wounds on them. Ukraine has been exposed to enormous destruction, internal displacements, and mass impoverishment. This is accompanied by a large-scale depopulation of the country. Not only Russia, but also NATO and the West bear a heavy share of the blame for this disaster.

6) Ukraine’s negotiating position today is far worse than it was in March 2022. Ukraine will now lose large parts of its territory.

7) The blocking of the peace negotiations at that time has harmed everyone: Russia and Europe – but above all the people of Ukraine, who are paying with their blood the price for the ambitions of the major powers and will probably get nothing in return. — Former UN Assistant-General Michael von der Schulenberg

Kujat and Funke conclude:

Fact is that the main results of the negotiations were based on a proposal by Ukraine, and Zelenskyy courageously supported them in an interview with Russian journalists on March 27, 2022, even after NATO decided against these peace negotiations. Zelensky had already expressed similar support beforehand in a sign that proves that the intended outcome of the Istanbul negotiations certainly corresponded to Ukrainian interests.

This makes the Western intervention, which prevented an early end to the war, even more disastrous for Ukraine. Russia’s responsibility for the attack, which was contrary to international law, is not relativized by the fact that responsibility for the grave consequences that ensued must also be attributed to the states that demanded the continuation of the war. — Peace for Ukraine

Therefore, the plan of keeping the Donbas conflict alive in order to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO essentially necessitates an eventual escalation of direct intervention of Russian forces to prevent the collapse of the separatists. — boethius

In fact we can be sure of this because it happened. In 2014.



An interesting read, but one should perhaps supply some context.

One the central witness for this Theory, Naftali Bennett, has himself addressed the interview and clarified:

https://web.archive.org/web/20230207191917/https://twitter.com/naftalibennett/status/1622571402430750721

So a more accurate translation of what was said is that the negotiations were abandonned by the west, and Bennet at the time thought this was premature and a mistake. The clarification makes clear that a deal was by no means a done deal and that Bennet himself is unsure of whether it would have been a good idea to make such a deal.

The second witness is ex-chancellor Schröder. Now Schröder is of course well known for his personal friendship with Putin and the very lucrative posts he received from the latter. So perhaps we should treat his "impression" with some caution, though of course everyone is free to decide how reliable he is.

Lastly there's the turkish foreign minister. But he doesn't actually say anything about the negotiations itself, and if you watch the interview (it's difficult with the automatic translate but you can pick up some things) you notice that he's emphasising that the negotiation are ongoing and that he will not say that either one side is closer to peace than the other.

So the evidence we do in fact have that Russia offered some extremely generous terms to Ukraine and the west prohibited Ukrain from taking the deal are: Schröders vague allusion and the statements of Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg (who provides no further justification). I guess we could also count the coincidence of Boris Johnsons visit and the end of the negotiations as evidence that Boris Johnson somehow did it, as the article does.

Does that measure up against the likelihood that Russia offered a peace deal that essentially involves a return to the status quo ante?

In fact we can be sure of this because it happened. In 2014. — Echarmion

Yes, obviously the separatists cannot prevail by themselves and already required support in 2014 and support would inevitably require escalation to either a peaceful settlement of the Donbas conflict or then a full blown war.

So the evidence we do in fact have that Russia offered some extremely generous terms to Ukraine and the west prohibited Ukrain from taking the deal are: Schröders vague allusion and the statements of Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg (who provides no further justification). I guess we could also count the coincidence of Boris Johnsons visit and the end of the negotiations as evidence that Boris Johnson somehow did it, as the article does. — Echarmion

Interesting that you describe the alleged deal as extremely generous.

Are you agreeing that assuming such terms were on offer (neutrality, recognizing Crimea, Russian speaker protections in the Donbas) that, at least in hindsight, that was a far better deal at that time than continued fighting turned out to be?

The main point of issue in the present debate is whether (since all present seem to agree a peace agreement is the only viable end to the conflict) Ukraine's leverage increased or decreased since the first phase of the war. Whatever Russia was offering, if Ukraine's leverage was higher in the past then they had the best chance of getting the best deal at that time in the past along with avoiding further loss of Ukrainian lives.

What a deal would have actually looked like is subordinate to whether it was a better deal than whatever Ukraine can ultimately negotiate from here.

As for what the terms actually were, Russia made the offer and key points publicly so Ukraine could have accepted publicly. One topsy-turvy narrative is that Russia was making the offer in bad faith and therefore Ukraine was right to reject the offer and insist on a military defeat of Ukraine; however, the correct negotiation move when a good offer is made in bad faith is to simply accept it and if the counter-party renegs then one's position is improved by clearly demonstrating the bad faith of the opposing party.

One issue I think is important to address is the framing are statements such as "the west prohibited Ukraine from taking the deal". US / NATO I do not think had any hard leverage that essentially means they were deciding for Zelensky / other Ukrainian leaders, but they needed to persuade Zelensky et. al. and absolutely essential to this was the mythology that was rapidly constructed to portray the Russian invasion as somehow a complete failure, Ukrainians fiercer fighters that are more motivated, Zelensky himself a brazen war hero and so on.

In short, Ukrainian decision makers, and in particular Zelensky, needed to be seduced to the neo-con world view that what actually matters is what Western people can be made to think and somehow reality will flow from such beliefs, whether they be true or false initially or at any point in the future. The promise of military aid, "whatever it takes", and tens of billions of dollars certainly helped.

And we have evidence that they have shelled ONE FACTORY. Given that your initial argument was LITERAL QUOTE: 'shelling targets of military value for 2 months', giving evidence for shelling one factory is coming up a bit short, I would say. Even if you do it twice. — Jabberwock

This was the most widely reported and only one example is required to disprove your assertion that Russia did not shell anything of military / industrial value.

Here's another example of shelling something of military value:

A military facility in Brovary, outside Kyiv, was destroyed in recent shelling. (Genya Savilov/AFP/Getty Images) — Another example of shelling stuff - CBC

But let me get this straight, shelling is cheaper than missiles, Russia has artillery with a range of up to 30km, Russia is in position around Kiev where we now agree much of the industrial capacity will be outside the city ... but you are arguing Russian forces elect not to use this opportunity to shell targets of military value, such as industrial zones and literal military facilities?

Your argument is Russia didn't shell much of anything? Or only shelled residential areas of no military value?

In any case, my point that the Northern operation allows Russia to shell targets of military value and that's one advantage of undertaking such an operation is obviously true even in a bizarre scenario where Russian forces simply elect not to shell anything of military value.

It WOULD be a siege, if, as the colonel said it, if Russians did manage to 'isolate and completely detain Kiev and start applying pressure'. The obvious issue is that they never did that. They shelled one factory and a few residential suburbs and they were never close to blockading the city, as most of the roads were outside of their range. — Jabberwock

A siege, how the word is usually employed, starts when an army gets to a city or fortification and starts the process of assaulting it or then starts the process of blockading it.

There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful, the defenders manage to prevent complete encirclement, or then were always partial with supply roots in and out of the city (for example a coastal city being under siege from the land) but nevertheless the siege succeeds.

Even the term blockade does not require the blockading force to "isolate and completely detain" the defending force, but simply disrupting supply roots is still a blockade. Indeed, most sieges and most blockades in history are not perfect for obvious resource reasons that perfecting something takes exponentially more resources and resources are needed for other things; restricting most supplies to a city is perhaps sufficient and obviously still blockading said city; likewise attacking a city, aka. besieging the city, does not require a perfect blockade of the city nor any blockade of the entire city at all.

It's honestly bizarre your fixation on not only me using the word siege but as you admit yourself the mainstream media.

Saying a city is under siege is conjures up a different idea than saying a battle took place near a city, a much better idea to describe Russia's approach to and process of encircling Kiev. Obviously the siege of Kiev is not successful in terms of taking the city by force or then pressuring a peace deal, but no where in the definition of a siege is need be successful. There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful and the attacker failed to completely encircle the city, failed to starve the city into submission or then failed to storm and take the city by force.

You seem to be living in a world where we should only use the word siege if the attacker perfectly implements a blockade. That is not how the word is used.

No, they were not. That is obviously false and repeating that will not make it any more true. If you have trouble finding the map in the very article you quote, I will provide it here for you: — Jabberwock

That map you post shows Russians blockading, to use your definition, essentially half of Kiev and due to the range of artillery able to significantly disrupt traffic on the remaining roads and rail into Kiev, which is a perfectly sensible siege of a city. People are literally living in subways at this time and you're telling me that if you were there you'd be willing to go down into the subway system and explain to them that Kiev is not under siege?

Sure, but I do not question that. The point of the discussion were the planned purposes of the northern campaign and assessment of their successes. — Jabberwock

As I've stated several times, insofar as the purpose was to compel a peace deal, the Northern campaign failed to do that.

Insofar as the purpose was to absorb focus and resources in the North so as to contribute to success in the South, the Northern campaign was a success.

The Russians do conquer the strategically critical land bridge to Crimea so overall the initial invasion is a military success and the Northern campaign played a critical military role.

Did Russia commit the troops necessary to conquer Kherson in siege and urban combat? And yet they have taken it. Did Russians commit enough troops for a siege of Melitopol? And yet they have taken it. Not to mention that forces required for a siege also typically need to be larger than the defending forces, for the simple fact that they need to be spread around a large area, while the defenders can attempt to break the blockade at any given point, not to mention to defend the blockade ring from the outside attemps at rescue. So if the siege was the supposed plan, Russians would need even more troops. — Jabberwock

Where cities simply capitulated obviously Russia did not have to besiege the city and take it by force. If there was fierce resistance in Kherson then either Russia would have needed to commit the troops required to take the city or then not take it.

I'm not sure what your point here is, that the Russian plan was based on assuming Kiev would just capitulate without a fight?

The only issue with the theory that the northern campaign was just a diversion and a fixing operation is that it is complete nonsense contradicting all the basic facts of the campaign. You do not send your best VDV troops to get massacred in Hostomel in a 'fixing operation'. — Jabberwock

Actually you often do send your best troops on the fixing operation since it is a more difficult mission that requires greater skill and discipline and military wisdom and also greater bravery knowing one is in fact facing superior numbers. It is a much more sophisticated operation than just busting through with overwhelming force. If you send your worst troops they risk just getting completely destroyed or captured immediately and then the enemy can anyways reinforce where you are actually attacking.

Indeed, that is exactly one purpose of elite forces in conventional warfare, is to go and deceive the enemy of where the main attack will take place.

So if indeed elite troops were committed to the North that is not unusual.

Attacking Hostomel with elite troops and making it appear that the plan is to take the airport and then fly in reinforcements to take Kiev is exactly the kind of plan special forces would come up with if they are tasked with a fixing operation.

Interesting that you describe the alleged deal as extremely generous.

Are you agreeing that assuming such terms were on offer (neutrality, recognizing Crimea, Russian speaker protections in the Donbas) that, at least in hindsight, that was a far better deal at that time than continued fighting turned out to be? — boethius

The sticking point is of course what you consider "neutrality" to mean. If it just means "don't join NATO but you get some multilateral security arrangement" then yeah that sounds like a pretty good deal that I would definetly take over fighting.

Of course if "neutrality" is understood to mean that Ukraine ends up internationally isolated, with no ability to, for example, join the EU or make security arrangements with anyone but Russia, then that's a far worse deal, and would likely just be postponing the conflict. I would only accept that if I had some plan to make sure I don't just end up invaded 5 years later in a much worse situation.

This was the most widely reported and only one example is required to disprove your assertion that Russia did not shell anything of military / industrial value. — boethius

But I did not assert anything of that kind. I have claimed that Russian shelling had a negilgible effect. Given that you were able to produce evidence for only two targets, I fully support my claim.

But let me get this straight, shelling is cheaper than missiles, Russia has artillery with a range of up to 30km, Russia is in position around Kiev where we now agree much of the industrial capacity will be outside the city ... but you are arguing Russian forces elect not to use this opportunity to shell targets of military value, such as industrial zones and literal military facilities?

Your argument is Russia didn't shell much of anything? Or only shelled residential areas of no military value?

In any case, my point that the Northern operation allows Russia to shell targets of military value and that's one advantage of undertaking such an operation is obviously true even in a bizarre scenario where Russian forces simply elect not to shell anything of military value. — boethius

Russians never got into position to shell the city itself with artillery, so all they could shell were the far outskirts of the city and even those were sporadic. That is why there was no massive shelling reported and that is why the number of victims is low and most of those are attributed not to shelling, but to missiles. So if massive shelling of Kiyv was one of the goals of the Northern operation, it failed.

A siege, how the word is usually employed, starts when an army gets to a city or fortification and starts the process of assaulting it or then starts the process of blockading it.

There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful, the defenders manage to prevent complete encirclement, or then were always partial with supply roots in and out of the city (for example a coastal city being under siege from the land) but nevertheless the siege succeeds. — boethius

And the flight to the moon starts with launching a rocket and when it disintegrates in the air it is a failed flight to the moon. Still, it would be rather misleading to say that the person has flown to the moon.

But sure, if we take into consideration failed sieges and failed attempts of sieges, then we can call it a failed siege.

Even the term blockade does not require the blockading force to "isolate and completely detain" the defending force, but simply disrupting supply roots is still a blockade. Indeed, most sieges and most blockades in history are not perfect for obvious resource reasons that perfecting something takes exponentially more resources and resources are needed for other things; restricting most supplies to a city is perhaps sufficient and obviously still blockading said city; likewise attacking a city, aka. besieging the city, does not require a perfect blockade of the city nor any blockade of the entire city at all. — boethius

Sure, and Russians did not do that with Kiyv - Ukrainians forces were able to move in and out freely.

Saying a city is under siege is conjures up a different idea than saying a battle took place near a city, a much better idea to describe Russia's approach to and process of encircling Kiev. Obviously the siege of Kiev is not successful in terms of taking the city by force or then pressuring a peace deal, but no where in the definition of a siege is need be successful. There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful and the attacker failed to completely encircle the city, failed to starve the city into submission or then failed to storm and take the city by force.

You seem to be living in a world where we should only use the word siege if the attacker perfectly implements a blockade. That is not how the word is used. — boethius

As I wrote, I am completely fine with using the term 'a failed siege'.

That map you post shows Russians blockading, to use your definition, essentially half of Kiev and due to the range of artillery able to significantly disrupt traffic on the remaining roads and rail into Kiev, which is a perfectly sensible siege of a city. People are literally living in subways at this time and you're telling me that if you were there you'd be willing to go down into the subway system and explain to them that Kiev is not under siege? — boethius

No, the road traffic was not disrupted, as Russians did not get into range, as I wrote repeatedly (the rail travel was suspended in a larger area due to the risk of air attacks). And people were hiding in subways because of air/missile strikes, which was unrelated to the ground operations.

The Russians do conquer the strategically critical land bridge to Crimea so overall the initial invasion is a military success and the Northern campaign played a critical military role. — boethius

No, the Northern campaign played mostly a negative role. Had those same troops stood at the border of Belarus, the fixing effect would be the same, because Ukrainians would still have to commit forces to the North and Russians would not sustain such losses.

Where cities simply capitulated obviously Russia did not have to besiege the city and take it by force. If there was fierce resistance in Kherson then either Russia would have needed to commit the troops required to take the city or then not take it.

I'm not sure what your point here is, that the Russian plan was based on assuming Kiev would just capitulate without a fight? — boethius

No, the Russian plan most likely assumed that there would be resistance, but it would not be able to react and hold against the blitz movement from the North. That is why there was an attempt to take Hostomel and Vasylkiv.

Actually you often do send your best troops on the fixing operation since it is a more difficult mission that requires greater skill and discipline and military wisdom and also greater bravery knowing one is in fact facing superior numbers. It is a much more sophisticated operation than just busting through with overwhelming force. If you send your worst troops they risk just getting completely destroyed or captured immediately and then the enemy can anyways reinforce where you are actually attacking.

Indeed, that is exactly one purpose of elite forces in conventional warfare, is to go and deceive the enemy of where the main attack will take place.

So if indeed elite troops were committed to the North that is not unusual.

Attacking Hostomel with elite troops and making it appear that the plan is to take the airport and then fly in reinforcements to take Kiev is exactly the kind of plan special forces would come up with if they are tasked with a fixing operation. — boethius

So you claim that the Russian diversion was so cunning that they have knowingly sent their elite troops to be massacred, just to pretend they want to take an airport?

The sticking point is of course what you consider "neutrality" to mean. If it just means "don't join NATO but you get some multilateral security arrangement" then yeah that sounds like a pretty good deal that I would definetly take over fighting. — Echarmion

We seem then to be on agreement of the principle point that if there was a suitable peace available based on an "acceptable neutrality", before or at the beginning of the war, then that was far better for Ukraine as a state and Ukrainians as living breathing people compared to the situation now.

If we furthermore agree that using the Ukrainians to their detriment simply to harm Russia some is immoral, which I assume if you agree peace is preferable you'd agree with this additional point, then the West rejecting peace on such a basis rather than the interest of Ukrainians was certainly an immoral decision, whether it succeeds in some grand geopolitical strategic sense or not (which I have my serious doubts, countries generally getting stronger militarily, rather than weaker, from this kind of war).

Of course if "neutrality" is understood to mean that Ukraine ends up internationally isolated, with no ability to, for example, join the EU or make security arrangements with anyone but Russia, then that's a far worse deal, and would likely just be postponing the conflict. I would only accept that if I had some plan to make sure I don't just end up invaded 5 years later in a much worse situation. — Echarmion

Yes, certainly if a deal would likely end up in a worse situation later, then it's better to reject it.

Nevertheless, the logic of "better to fight now than later" still requires the expectation of winning. For example, the criticism of appeasement is levied against the great powers of the time - France, UK and the United States - who have reasonable chance of stopping Nazi Germany and completely defeating if need be. We do not direct the criticism towards Poland for not fighting to the last Polish.

What deal would have been attainable at the time we can never know for sure now, but what I think is clear is that Ukraine, particularly Zelensky, believed further fighting would improve their position; my argument of why Zelensky believed further fighting to be a better course is the various myths quickly built up around the war: Russia was incompetent and easy to beat, Putin an irrational actor as well as some sort of nostalgic reenactment of WWII Western allied solidarity ... just without anyone coming to actually help.

Russians never got into position to shell the city itself with artillery, so all they could shell were the far outskirts of the city and even those were sporadic. That is why there was no massive shelling reported and that is why the number of victims is low and most of those are attributed not to shelling, but to missiles. So if massive shelling of Kiyv was one of the goals of the Northern operation, it failed. — Jabberwock

But I did not assert anything of that kind. I have claimed that Russian shelling had a negilgible effect. Given that you were able to produce evidence for only two targets, I fully support my claim. — Jabberwock

Your first claim was literally:

All i can find are residential areas on the outskirst of the city. — Jabberwock

So for the benefit of anyone following that does not already think you are a complete fool, that is called moving the goal posts.

You literally "can't find", despite an honest search, anything other than residential areas on the outskirts of the city being shelled.

I explain the "outskirts" is exactly where industrial zones are situated, provide the most reported shelling on an entire industrial zone, then literal "military facilities" being shelled.

Anyways, here's more evidence:

Unlike on Monday, Russia did not shell central Kyiv in the first weeks of its invasion. Instead, it primarily targeted the city’s outskirts and a military plant where advanced weaponry is manufactured. — Aljazeera

Casualties would be low if Russian focus is on shelling industrial facilities, such as factories for advanced weapons manufacture mentioned above, rather than residential areas.

It's called propaganda. Western propaganda only reported when shells landed on residential areas, but since there wasn't all that many civilian casualties you then conclude that therefore Russia must not have shelled all that much after all.

Truly marvellous specimen of someone who is willing to believe anything that fuels their preferred narrative.

No, the road traffic was not disrupted, as Russians did not get into range, as I wrote repeatedly (the rail travel was suspended in a larger area due to the risk of air attacks). And people were hiding in subways because of air/missile strikes, which was unrelated to the ground operations. — Jabberwock

Road traffic was not disrupted on the roads Russia literally occupied?

Anyways, it was widely reported when Russia got into artillery range of the remaining Southern road, and as you note yourself rail was suspended due to the risk of air attacks.

In other words, Russia is significantly hampering supply roots into Kiev, also known as blockading the city, also known as a siege.

No, the Northern campaign played mostly a negative role. Had those same troops stood at the border of Belarus, the fixing effect would be the same, because Ukrainians would still have to commit forces to the North and Russians would not sustain such losses. — Jabberwock

This is so stupid it is almost not worth responding to at all.

Actual fighting is going to absorb more troops, more resources, more amunition, more C&C reaction and planning capacity, than just sitting on the other side of a border and there being no fighting.

No, the Russian plan most likely assumed that there would be resistance, but it would not be able to react and hold against the blitz movement from the North. That is why there was an attempt to take Hostomel and Vasylkiv. — Jabberwock

Again, as actual experts have already informed you, Russia did not have the troops to effectively occupy a large city such as Kiev, much less the other major urban centres, and even if Russia took major urban centres without costly and long Urban combat (which unlikely) that would not end the war due to there being zero reason to believe Ukrainian partisans won't continue fighting from elsewhere in Ukraine.

The Northern operation obviously had the military effect of aiding Russia's conquest of the South, because that is what literally happens. Certainly the Kremlin would have preferred the pressure was enough to pressure Kiev into a peace agreement, but if that doesn't happen the Russians take also shell targets of industrial and military value while they are there.

Even if you don't believe Wikipedia's estimate that 15 000 to 30 000 Russian troops took part in the siege of Kiev (7 - 15 % of the overall force), the entire 200 000 Russian force is not enough to occupy major Ukrainian urban centres, likely not even sufficient to occupy only Kiev, especially if the population is extremely hostile to the Russians (which plenty of Ukrainians are).

The alternative view is, instead of attempting to do something that is basically unfeasible, the Northern operation puts pressure on Kiev, keeps Ukrainian resources and operational focus there instead of in the South, shells a bunch of valuable targets, and when the South is secure and it becomes clear peace is unlikely, the Russians retreat (as expected in a fixing operation once the principle objective is accomplished elsewhere).

So you claim that the Russian diversion was so cunning that they have knowingly sent their elite troops to be massacred, just to pretend they want to take an airport? — Jabberwock

First, there is zero evidence that the battle at the airport was some sort of "massacre".

Conversely, CNN described the airport's fall as "the first major victory notched by the Russians" in the invasion.[48] The Washington Post also stated that "still, the Russians had their bridgehead" after capturing the airport on 24 February. — Battle of Antonov Airport - Wikipedia

All the analysis that concludes the battle was a failure for the Russians presumes their goal of capturing Kiev, which doesn't happen so the argument goes that failing to completely secure Hostomel is the critical event that prevents taking Kiev.

Now, if the Northern operation was a fixing operation, makes sense anyways to attack the airport to destroy the AA and other assets that are there, which Wikipedia informs us were destroyed in precision strikes, prevent Ukraine from making use of the airport, but also make it seem right off the bat that Russia is committing to taking Kiev, which the whole narrative around Hostomel definitely served to establish.

As for sending special forces on special missions ... that's pretty much what they are for in conventional warfare. What you want to avoid is throwing in special forces into a large infantry formation doing conventional manoeuvres where there's little or no difference between special and regular infantry.

Whether they suffered greater than expected losses or not, an air assault on an airbase to both destroy assets there as well as make the enemy believe "the real goal" is Kiev is exactly a mission where special forces can do their special thing and have an disproportionate effect on the theatre.

So, the use of special forces in a special mission is entirely expected.

Furthermore, your objection that this would be too cunning for the Russians to try to solicit over commitment from Ukraine to defending Kiev, while the entire South is conquered, is just bizarre. These are extremely banal and standard military ideas that are literally thousands of years old. If you want to take position A then if you can you will try to get your enemy to be at not-A.

If we are discussing the allies in WWII deceiving the Nazi's as to where they plan to land in Normandy it goes without saying that this this is both a good military idea as well as there are officers that can plan and execute a deceptive campaign.

However, if we consider the idea that the Russians deceived the Ukrainians as to their primary military goal and getting Ukraine to overcommit to defending Kiev, suddenly its ludicrous that Russian officers have even read a single book on military tactics and strategies.

So for the benefit of anyone following that does not already think you are a complete fool, that is called moving the goal posts.

You literally "can't find", despite an honest search, anything other than residential areas on the outskirts of the city being shelled.

I explain the "outskirts" is exactly where industrial zones are situated, provide the most reported shelling on an entire industrial zone, then literal "military facilities" being shelled. — boethius

Again, my point, which I have repeated over and over, is that the shelling was insignificant. I admit I did not find the two cases you have quoted, but it does not change the overall picture at all - even if the total number of shellings amounted to a dozen. No amount of bickering changes the fact that the amount of shelling was minimal, contrary to your initial claims.

Anyways, here's more evidence: — boethius

Your 'evidence' specifically writes about 'shelling' AFTER the ground troops have withdrawn and states:

'Russia most likely used strategic bombers, cruise missiles and Iranian-made Shaheed “kamikaze” drones, military analyst Alexander Kovalenko said in televised remarks.

That is what Al Jazeera considers 'shelling' throughout the article. I have already patiently explained to you that it is not the 'shelling' what we talk about, it is a bit tiresome to correct the same errors of you again and again, each time you decide to google 'shelling kiyv'. If you do that, at least read the article you have googled.

Casualties would be low if Russian focus is on shelling industrial facilities, such as factories for advanced weapons manufacture mentioned above, rather than residential areas.

It's called propaganda. Western propaganda only reported when shells landed on residential areas, but since there wasn't all that many civilian casualties you then conclude that therefore Russia must not have shelled all that much after all.

Truly marvellous specimen of someone who is willing to believe anything that fuels their preferred narrative. — boethius

You have evidence for shelling of two military objects, one rather vague. But sure, you cannot come up with any more, because bad Western propaganda is hiding it from us. When unable to provide evidence for your claims, resort to conspiracy, always works.

Anyways, it was widely reported when Russia got into artillery range of the remaining Southern road, and as you note yourself rail was suspended due to the risk of air attacks.

In other words, Russia is significantly hampering supply roots into Kiev, also known as blockading the city, also known as a siege. — boethius

I see exactly one report by Klitschko that the city was encircled, but it was quickly denied. However, if it was widely reported, I am sure you can provide such reports.

This is so stupid it is almost not worth responding to at all.

Actual fighting is going to absorb more troops, more resources, more amunition, more C&C reaction and planning capacity, than just sitting on the other side of a border and there being no fighting. — boethius

Not if it stalls less than two weeks into the campaign. Ukrainians did not even engage most of the troops they had at hand. They did not even have time to move their reserve units before Russians left.

Again, as actual experts have already informed you, Russia did not have the troops to effectively occupy a large city such as Kiev, much less the other major urban centres, and even if Russia took major urban centres without costly and long Urban combat (which unlikely) that would not end the war due to there being zero reason to believe Ukrainian partisans won't continue fighting from elsewhere in Ukraine. — boethius

But that is a strawman, as nobody argues for that. The blitz assault was meant to break through the initial defense and cause enough panic and morale drop (particularly if the government fled) that the city would surrender. That is how Wikipedia describes it:

Russia apparently intended to rapidly seize Kyiv, with Spetsnaz infiltrating the city, supported by airborne operations and a rapid mechanised advance from the north. Russian Airborne Forces attempted to seize two key airfields near Kyiv, launching an airborne assault on Antonov Airport, followed by a similar landing at Vasylkiv, near Vasylkiv Air Base south of Kyiv, on 26 February. — Northern Ukraine campaign

Now, Wikipedia of course is not always reliable, but then it is not often completely wrong. So yes, it might be possible that you have access to special expert knowledge that counters the common knowledge reflected in the Wikipedia articles. However, you have proven time and again that you do not have any special knowledge, on the contrary, at the beginning of the discussion you have shown that you lack basic knowledge both of the duration and progress of the campaign. So, initially, you had a view quite different from the generally accepted one and the level of knowledge demonstrably lower than those who expressed it. When faced with facts, you continue to redress the argument: the two-month siege of Kiyv ending a week after the fall of Mariupol - such a short phrase with three factual errors! - somehow became a vague 'diversion'.

The Northern operation obviously had the military effect of aiding Russia's conquest of the South, because that is what literally happens. Certainly the Kremlin would have preferred the pressure was enough to pressure Kiev into a peace agreement, but if that doesn't happen the Russians take also shell targets of industrial and military value while they are there. — boethius

Two. We have evidence of two targets of industrial and military value (one of rather unknown value, given that all we have is a single picture) that were shelled. If the Russian plan was to shell two military targets in order to pressure Ukrainians into peace talks, it is not very surprising they have not succeeded.

First, there is zero evidence that the battle at the airport was some sort of "massacre" — boethius

https://www.newsweek.com/russian-military-losses-31st-guards-air-assault-brigade-ukraine-1712686

All the analysis that concludes the battle was a failure for the Russians presumes their goal of capturing Kiev, which doesn't happen so the argument goes that failing to completely secure Hostomel is the critical event that prevents taking Kiev.

Now, if the Northern operation was a fixing operation, makes sense anyways to attack the airport to destroy the AA and other assets that are there, which Wikipedia informs us were destroyed in precision strikes, prevent Ukraine from making use of the airport, but also make it seem right off the bat that Russia is committing to taking Kiev, which the whole narrative around Hostomel definitely served to establish. — boethius

Yes, they presume that, because, unlike you, they are familiar with the details of the operation. You base your argument on your very general speculations, completely overlooking how the battle has actually proceeded. It makes zero sense to send your best elite troops behind the enemy lines and just leave them there, if all they were supposed to do was to destroy it (which could as well be done with missiles). Sure, special forces attack airfields, but they do have a plan to retreat rather quickly after that. Russians have dropped 300 special forces and left them there (their helicopters came back to Belarus). They were supposed to hold the airfield until the armor column arrived, but they were unable to do that - Ukrainians had time to counterattack, inflicting heavy losses. And VDV forces were not to stop Ukrainians to use the airfield - Russians could do that with missiles or the ground forces which arrived later, without engaging VDV at all. On the contrary, it is rather obvious that Russians wanted the airstrips to be intact. The special forces had a single, very specific task - to secure the airfield so it could be used by Russians and that is exactly what they tried to do, that is why they stayed instead of retreating. Again, you seem completely unaware of the details of the actual events.

Here is a more detailed article on that battle:
https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/the-battle-of-hostomel-airport-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv/

Furthermore, your objection that this would be too cunning for the Russians to try to solicit over commitment from Ukraine to defending Kiev, while the entire South is conquered, is just bizarre. These are extremely banal and standard military ideas that are literally thousands of years old. If you want to take position A then if you can you will try to get your enemy to be at not-A. — boethius

But that is not my objection, that is another strawman. My objection is that the nature of the attack clearly indicates that Russians wanted much more than a fixing or diversionary attack, because they have committed much more than required for those. The assault on Hostomel was, as the experts in the article quoted above wrote, a 'high-risk, high-reward strategy'. Russians took a gamble and lost a significant number of their best troops. They risked that, because they went for the main prize: quick overwhelming of the Kiyv government. That is also why the advance column moved so fast: it was also risky (as there was a danger of overstretching the supply lines - which happened - and attacks on the extended line, as you wrote yourself), but necessary to support the airborne operation. As a fixing operation such high-risk maneuvers are questionable, as a diversion they are absurd. If Russians moved slowly, overwhelming the resistance on the way to Kiyv and securing the supply lines, they would achieve even greater fixing effect, they could bring much more troops in the vicinity of Kiyv of the 70000 available in the North and siege and bombard the city much more effectively. Also they would not need to retreat in the middle of negotiations, significantly weakening their negotiating position.

We seem then to be on agreement of the principle point that if there was a suitable peace available based on an "acceptable neutrality", before or at the beginning of the war, then that was far better for Ukraine as a state and Ukrainians as living breathing people compared to the situation now. — boethius

This is almost a truism, isn't it? If the deal is good enough to avoid fighting then the deal is good enough to avoid fighting.

Incidentally if that was the case then there was no reason for the invasion in the first case.

What deal would have been attainable at the time we can never know for sure now, but what I think is clear is that Ukraine, particularly Zelensky, believed further fighting would improve their position; my argument of why Zelensky believed further fighting to be a better course is the various myths quickly built up around the war: Russia was incompetent and easy to beat, Putin an irrational actor as well as some sort of nostalgic reenactment of WWII Western allied solidarity ... just without anyone coming to actually help. — boethius

And further fighting did improve Ukraine's position. Whether that will be be the case going forward is another question.

What I notice about your view, and this also goes for @Tzeentch to a different extent, is that in your "myth", or perhaps we should use a more neutral term like "narrative", noone has any agency. Decisions are ultimately just reactions to the shadowy machinations of an abstraction like "US imperialism" or "the neocons". Hence why Zelensky must be manipulated by a myth. Perhaps he is even entirely a puppet. The russian actions, too are ultimately just a reaction to the actions of the masterminds.

One does not need to invoke a master plan to explain Ukraine's decision to fight. They're hardly the first people in history to react with defiance when attacked by a seemingly overwhelming enemy.

What I notice about your view, and this also goes for Tzeentch to a different extent, is that in your "myth", or perhaps we should use a more neutral term like "narrative", noone has any agency. Decisions are ultimately just reactions to the shadowy machinations of an abstraction like "US imperialism" or "the neocons". Hence why Zelensky must be manipulated by a myth. Perhaps he is even entirely a puppet. The russian actions, too are ultimately just a reaction to the actions of the masterminds. — Echarmion

That is particularly apparent in their complete misunderstanding how and why Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries have joined NATO.

That is particularly apparent in their complete misunderstanding how and why Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries have joined NATO. — Jabberwock

What misunderstanding?

Can you even cite where we've even discussed Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries joining NATO?

You're literally making up conversation that has not occurred, but please cite where we even discuss other countries joining NATO and explain again what we don't understand about the reasons for doing so.

The reasons Ukraine would want to join NATO before or even now are obvious: not only direct military protection but nuclear deterrence.

The problem is that, if you haven't noticed, Ukraine isn't in NATO. NATO could have flown to Kiev and made Ukraine apart of the club one night by surprise anytime in the last 8 years, or even right now. The explanation of why that doesn't happen by explaining that plenty of countries (including the US) doesn't want Ukraine in NATO simply expounds the obvious reason why Ukraine isn't in NATO as we speak.

If there are "rules" that would prevent NATO allowing Ukraine to join, those rules could be changed if NATO was so motivated to help their friend Ukraine. If there are common sense reasons why no one would change the rules for Ukraine, that is simply another way of saying NATO (and its parts) does not want Ukraine in NATO.

The whole point of being in NATO is to avoid exactly the war that is happening now.

So, if NATO isn't going to do you the favour of rushing over and making you apart of the club and defending you, fighting the war that you want NATO to protect you from to defend the principle of "having the right" to join NATO, is dumb.

And that was the argument for a while, that Ukraine has the "right to join NATO" and so Russia does not have the right to ask neutrality as part of a peace agreement and so Zelensky is right to reject negotiation.

This is almost a truism, isn't it? If the deal is good enough to avoid fighting then the deal is good enough to avoid fighting. — Echarmion

It's a truism that you state.

I agree with your truism and then you complain about me agreeing with your truism.

What is not a truism is that we agree that the Russian terms on offer, at least as they appeared to be and were interpreted by diplomats and the West's own media, were reasonable, you even go so far as to say generous (a term I would hesitate to use; generous would be just leaving all the occupied territory).

Now, what is notable, is who doesn't accept this truism is Zelensky. He rejects further negotiation until his demands are met, rather than negotiate and see if there's a deal good enough to take and thus he should take it.

But it's an additional truism that you negotiate before an agreement not after your counter-party accepts your terms.

So maybe it is an obvious truism that you should negotiate and take a good enough deal if it's on offer, but it's clearly not so obvious as to be accepted by Zelensky nor his cheerleaders in the Western media.

Ukraine rejects the terms before the war and also, we are told, the whole Minsk process of diplomacy before was just a ruse and those previous settlements to the conflict were agreed to in bad faith.

And further fighting did improve Ukraine's position. Whether that will be be the case going forward is another question. — Echarmion

What further fighting improved Ukraine's position?

You think now Ukraine is in a better negotiation position than it was at the start of the war? And only going forward from now their negotiation position might decrease?

What I notice about your view, and this also goes for Tzeentch to a different extent, is that in your "myth", or perhaps we should use a more neutral term like "narrative", noone has any agency. Decisions are ultimately just reactions to the shadowy machinations of an abstraction like "US imperialism" or "the neocons". Hence why Zelensky must be manipulated by a myth. Perhaps he is even entirely a puppet. The russian actions, too are ultimately just a reaction to the actions of the masterminds. — Echarmion

You obviously didn't read what I wrote.

I explicitly stated I disagree with the narrative that the US forced Zelensky to abandon negotiating but needed to persuade him. I even go so far as use the word seduce.

The reason I use myth instead of narrative for things like Putin wanting to conquer all of Ukraine, or Russian military incompetence and Zelensky as the modern Churchill, is because there's not enough elements in these ideas to even constitute a narrative.

The other reason I use the word myth is that there's an epic dimension to these ideas; heroic defence of freedom and so on.

I wouldn't have much of a problem with the use of the word narrative but I feel myth building is more appropriate in this case.

Now, the US not being able to literally force Zelensky to do or not do things doesn't mean they didn't do their best to convince him. Where they did clearly intervene is in the coup of 2014, so that was more US agency than Ukrainian but Ukrainians had 8 years to make peace with Russia if they wanted to.

What is also of note is that all the imperialists in the Kremlin also want this war as well. Imperialists look at a map and ask why this part here isn't ours, and wars as the opportunity to make it theirs.

The US and Russian imperialists are more freinemies then actual adversaries when it comes to this particular war.

Can you even cite where we've even discussed Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries joining NATO? — boethius

Apologies, it seems I have mixed up our discussions with someone else's.

It's a truism that you state.

I agree with your truism and then you complain about me agreeing with your truism. — boethius

It wasn't intended as a complaint.

What is not a truism is that we agree that the Russian terms on offer, at least as they appeared to be and were interpreted by diplomats and the West's own media, were reasonable, you even go so far as to say generous (a term I would hesitate to use; generous would be just leaving all the occupied territory).

Now, what is notable, is who doesn't accept this truism is Zelensky. He rejects further negotiation until his demands are met, rather than negotiate and see if there's a deal good enough to take and thus he should take it.

But it's an additional truism that you negotiate before an agreement not after your counter-party accepts your terms.

So maybe it is an obvious truism that you should negotiate and take a good enough deal if it's on offer, but it's clearly not so obvious as to be accepted by Zelensky nor his cheerleaders in the Western media.

Ukraine rejects the terms before the war and also, we are told, the whole Minsk process of diplomacy before was just a ruse and those previous settlements to the conflict were agreed to in bad faith. — boethius

I haven't said anything about what I think the terms actually were, and I have already decided that it's pointless to discuss specifics with you as our views just diverge too much.

Clearly we do not inhabit a shared reality (mentally, that is).

What further fighting improved Ukraine's position? — boethius

Mostly all the fighting in 2022 after the first couple of weeks.

You think now Ukraine is in a better negotiation position than it was at the start of the war? And only going forward from now their negotiation position might decrease? — boethius

Yeah, at least in terms of relative battlefield advantage. You can of course argue that the russian losses will make it harder for Russia to justify any kind of settlement, but psychological effects like this are hard to measure.

It's possible that Ukraine has passed it's peak and the war of attrition will slowly accumulate russian battlefield advantage, as well as erode Ukrainian will to fight. Certainly the very public show of disunity recently is not a good sign.

But there doesn't seem to be a reason to assume either side will collapse any time soon and a lot can happen in a long war.

You obviously didn't read what I wrote.

I explicitly stated I disagree with the narrative that the US forced Zelensky to abandon negotiating but needed to persuade him. I even go so far as use the word seduce. — boethius

Fair enough. I was just reminded of the phenomenon that, in the proxy wars of the 20th century, junior partners often acquire outsized influence, because the prestige of either the US or the USSR was bound up with their fate. So both powers ended up much deeper in wars than they really wanted.

So I think (without agreeing with the sentiment that this is a proxy war) that even if Zelensky is reliant on the west for aid, we should not discount his own influence.

For that matter, an interesting thought is that Russian involvement with the DNR and LNR, which as far as I know was opportunistic and not initially part of some larger strategy, ended up setting up the conditions of the 2022 invasion.

In that sense you maybe are right to point out that Russian support for the separatists was always likely to eventually escalate. Perhaps by sending regular russian troops into Donbas Russia unknowingly (at the time) embarked on the course that would lead to the 2022 invasion.

Apologies, it seems I have mixed up our discussions with someone else's. — Jabberwock

That's good to know.

It wasn't intended as a complaint. — Echarmion

Well then it seems we are of one mind on the matter and Zelensky disagrees with what is obvious truth to us.

I haven't said anything about what I think the terms actually were, and I have already decided that it's pointless to discuss specifics with you as our views just diverge too much. — Echarmion

I agree it's mostly an academic exercise and speculation what the best deal possible was at the time, though I would not say useless; what would have been the best diplomatic strategy (what concessions were achievable not only from Russia but the US, NATO, EU) could inform similar situations in the future.

As for the subject at hand, seems we agree that Zelensky should have been willing to accept neutrality, recognizing Crimea and some degree of independence for the separatists, certainly getting as many concessions as possible from all the involved parties for agreeing to those points.

Whether the Russian offer was "bad faith" or would result in some future war seems also now of academic interest.

Though, as I mention, if an offer is in bad faith it is still good to accept it. Likewise, even if you think a war would only be postponed for later one still needs to be confident of winning a sooner war.
[/quote]

Clearly we do not inhabit a shared reality (mentally, that is). — Echarmion

We seem to agree on the major points.

Whether the Northern operation was worth the cost (which we actually know Russia casualties), and whether there was a better strategy available, it made military sense to undertake and did help achieve the military gains in the South.

Of course, geo-politically, economically, in terms domestic politics, the whole war certainly has many consequences. On these issues my position is that it is not a given that Russia is being harmed by the war, or then being more harmed than NATO as a whole (even if there is relative benefit to the US relative Europe), and of course the big winner is China (and whether Russia is a relative loser vis-a-vis China, strengthening the China block is not necessarily productive for the West). The latter point even US mainstream analysts seem to be adopting as well.

Mostly all the fighting in 2022 after the first couple of weeks. — Echarmion

Then we are in agreement, by start of the war I mean the general period from before the fighting even starts to then the first weeks of fighting.

My point being that period of time Ukraine had more leverage than now. At what point it had maximum leverage is again a somewhat academic speculative exercise. The Kremlin may have been willing to make more concessions to avoid the war entirely, in which case maximum leverage was before the war. Once fighting begins then "exact leverage levels" I would argue are pretty volatile as a lot depends on perceptions and worries of decision makers.

There's huge risks in military operations of this size so as days go by the major risks may seem to be radically bigger or smaller.

What military leaders, the Kremlin and Putin are most worried about and would motivate them the most to settle the conflict so as to be sure to avoid, are potentially things that Ukraine doesn't even have the capacity to do or then doesn't ever attempt to do even if they could.

To give an extreme example, a major invasion and/or missile attacks on undisputed Russian territory is certainly something Ukraine could do, and even if doing so would likely solicit Russia responding with massive military call up (not only "unlocking that ability" in the Russian legal code but the Kremlin may feel obliged for international prestige to react as hard as possible), Russia still needs to deal with the sanctions and so such events, even if terrible for Ukraine, risk also havoc in Russia that the Kremlin legitimately believes maybe overwhelming. Maybe the Russian people band together to crush the insolent Ukrainians or maybe things start falling apart militarily or economically.

So, at the start of the war, Ukraine has this theatre level chaotic wildcard sort of leverage over Russia as well as simply the costs and risks of the fighting itself.

If it interests you, or then anyone following, to evaluate risks and stakes on this level you need to keep in mind all the possibilities. By committing to the defence Kiev and re-posturing forces for that, Russia anxiety may significantly decrease as the possibility of Ukraine actually invading Russia decreases.

The Russian plan is to prosecute the first phases of the war with 200 000 troops supplemented by mercenaries, so, at minimum, Ukraine invading Russia would cause a problem to the Kremlins preferred strategy.

I use this example not simply because it's extreme to illustrate the point of risk perception, but also Ukrainians and neo-cons have (after nearly 2 years) realized this themselves that forbidding Ukraine from invading Russia was a significant strategic weakness.

But for the subject at hand, Russia could not know for certain in any case at the start of the war that the US would forbid Ukraine from invading Russia nor that Ukraine would head such limitations; it is the risk, not what actually happens in the future (that is not known at the time), that is leverage at the negotiating table. Of course, Zelensky having zero experience was likely clueless about anything and just a snow flake on spring breeze blowing higher and tither in his understanding of the situation.

Making irrational ultimatums in public to close the door on negotiation entirely, is a sign of a weak mind that is unable to deal with complexity so seeks to simplify the situation by making the choice of the day (or hour or minute) permanent and so not need to think about the options anymore; certainly serves no diplomatic or military purpose.

Yeah, at least in terms of relative battlefield advantage. You can of course argue that the russian losses will make it harder for Russia to justify any kind of settlement, but psychological effects like this are hard to measure.

It's possible that Ukraine has passed it's peak and the war of attrition will slowly accumulate russian battlefield advantage, as well as erode Ukrainian will to fight. Certainly the very public show of disunity recently is not a good sign. — Echarmion

Well I think it's more than possible Ukraine has passed its peak, but for the sake of completeness "we don't know for certain" relative casualties.

We will see how the war unfolds.

But there doesn't seem to be a reason to assume either side will collapse any time soon and a lot can happen in a long war. — Echarmion

A war of attrition at this scale of intensity leads to sudden collapse of the one side if it continues.

This is not an insurgency where the insurgents mostly hang out among the civilian population, in well hidden and remote bases, as well as other countries entirely and can sustain a low level conflict indefinitely.

At this intensity of fighting, continuous supply of munitions is required, continuous replacement of casualties adequate enough to hold the entire front.

It's only difficult for either side to advance insofar as they must penetrate heavy fortifications and mine fields into artillery bombardment and under risk / pressure of counter attack and degradation by suicide drones, and if you manage to advance despite all that it's simply all redeployed and rebuilt 5 or 10 km further away and you need to do it all over again.

A total collapse of one part of the line would allow deep penetration where none of these things exist anymore likely leading to a cascade of collapse along the entire front.

Now, Ukraine is massive so they can always retreat far enough that they are simply out of range of Russian logistics to chase them, but it would be a massive win for Russia. If Russian history is anything to go by, collapse of the front results in political changes in the capital.

Even so, as has been discussed at length with @ssu, Ukraine could still hold plenty of defendable positions (such as the giant river in the middle of the country) as well as sustain an insurgency for years if Russia did occupy the whole country (which is unlikely for this reason), but collapse of the front would mean Russia could take more territory, possibly significantly more.

Collapse of one side of the other is essentially guaranteed at this level of intensity.

"Freeze theory" depends on the Russians giving up on advancing and so lowering the intensity to a sustainable level. Why I think this is unlikely is due to there being too many standoff munitions and drones being too effective and Russia being now totally committed to doing whatever it takes to win the war (Russia started the war with significant self-limitations clearly to make a way back to peace with the West easier' progressive deescalation was perhaps feasible before Nord Stream was blown up).

In principle, Ukraine could hold out and the Russians exhaust their offensive capability (what Western media keeps saying), but as it stands my own view is that Russia has simply too many advantages, in particular artillery and in the air with heavy standoff munitions.

Fair enough. I was just reminded of the phenomenon that, in the proxy wars of the 20th century, junior partners often acquire outsized influence, because the prestige of either the US or the USSR was bound up with their fate. So both powers ended up much deeper in wars than they really wanted. — Echarmion

We're in agreement here. If you read carefully the RAND report cited above, they emphasize repeatedly that escalation of the conflict is not good for the US and advise resolving the Donbas conflict, using arms support only in the context of essentially a negotiating tactic to achieve the best resolution.

There's certainly forces in Ukraine that wanted a war and played the part exactly as you say.

However, a bigger factor I think is that the war festers during the Trump presidency and Russia gate was an overriding US political game that prevented the Trump administration from doing what RAND suggests for domestic political reasons.

However, a bigger factor I think is that the war festers during the Trump presidency and Russia gate was an overriding US political game that prevented the Trump administration from doing what RAND suggests for domestic political reasons. — boethius

Personally I think this war was going to happen no matter what. Many presidents, including Trump and Obama, tried to change the course of US foreign policy, but were unable to fight 'the Blob'.

The people who are in charge now aren't just favorable to the Blob, they ARE the Blob. Neocon hawks who have all been involved in project Ukraine. If you check their political track record, you'll find they're all elbow deep in Ukraine literally for decades.


Perhaps a more interesting question would be what the goal is of project Ukraine.

In my view, it is thinkable that they knew the Russians were going to invade, and also knew the Russians would eventually prevail, since the decision not to put NATO boots on the ground was obviously made in advance of the conflict.

Maybe the goal of project Ukraine really was to incorporate Ukraine into NATO/EU, but perhaps this was just the red herring to provoke Russia, and the actual goal of project Ukraine lies elsewhere - perhaps the goal was a forever war between Russia and Europe.

For example, European energy dependency has been a thorn in the United States' side for at least a decade, and it ties in nicely with the US blowing up Nord Stream.

In my view, it is thinkable that they knew the Russians were going to invade, and also knew the Russians would eventually prevail, since the decision not to put NATO boots on the ground was obviously made in advance of the conflict. — Tzeentch

Uhh... exaclty when? 2014? Earlier?

Sorry, but the West was totally surprised with it's pants down when Russia annexed Crimea. Remember, then the Intelligence services were still fighting the War on Terror.

Finland closed four of the major border crossings to Russia as a response to a hybrid attack.

When you had, out of the blue, after decades without it happening Iraqis and other Third World country citizens coming with bikes without the proper documentation and seeking asylum, the officials here knew what was happening. A brief interrogation of the first asylum seekers clearly showed how Russian authorities were behind this.



The good thing now was that the politicians here weren't clueless of what is happening. That's the problem of when Russia has already shown earlier that it could do this, then even Finns can anticipate it. Luckily we are in NATO, poor of Sweden...

Sorry, but the West was totally surprised with it's pants down when Russia annexed Crimea. — ssu

I doubt the US was completely surprised by it, since they had just supported a coup in Ukraine. Perhaps they hadn't anticipated that the Russians would dare invade Crimea with such a small force.

I'm sure the decision not to put boots on the ground was made somewhere between 2014-2021.

Luckily we are in NATO, poor of Sweden... — ssu

Personally, I really dislike my country throwing their lot in with countries like the US and Britain, which are essentially island nations that don't share any of the security concerns of the mainland European nations. It actually makes sense for them to play political games to keep the Eurasian continent divided, as per Mackinder's Heartland theory.

A European security structure would make more sense, though not via the EU.

I doubt the US was completely surprised by it, since they had just supported a coup in Ukraine. Perhaps they hadn't anticipated that the Russians would dare invade Crimea with such a small force. — Tzeentch

More than your personal doubt, please give some reason why wouldn't this be the case? Yes, the hadn't make extensive preparations that your normal satellite intelligence would notice, that is true. But really, the focus wasn't at all in Ukraine. That is a simple fact.

(POLITICO, 3.4.2014) the U.S. intelligence community failed to read the signs when it came to Ukraine.

“We have to better deploy our resources… because we have large resources and it should not be possible for Russia to walk in and take over the Crimea and it’s a done deal by the time we know about it,” Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) told POLITICO as she left a closed-door briefing for committee members on Ukraine and other issues. Feinstein indicated that the intelligence community has already moved to re-focus on the region.

"From everything I’ve seen, this was not anticipated,” Rep. Peter King (R-N.Y.), a member of the House Intelligence Committee, said in an interview Monday. “I think there will have to be a whole evaluation of what our links into Russia are and [into] determining their policy.”

King said it was evident that U.S. policymakers such as Obama viewed Putin’s move as unlikely — until it happened.

“As far as the administration, I think they had to be taken off guard,” he said. “They were making these very tough pronouncements that there will be consequences and he won’t do it. I don’t think they would have done that if they were thinking that Putin would do this.”

More than your personal doubt, please give some reason why wouldn't this be the case? — ssu

Because the Russians had been drawing a red line since at least 2008, so supporting a coup was essentially calling Russia's bluff. That the US was unaware of this is simply unthinkable.

Also, I don't believe a single word that comes from US about its intelligence agencies.

Personally I think this war was going to happen no matter what. Many presidents, including Trump and Obama, tried to change the course of US foreign policy, but were unable to fight 'the Blob'. — Tzeentch

Well I agree the war was extremely likely and it's definitely a testament to the power of the neo-cons that they can simply continue the policy without presidents having much say in it.

Nevertheless, I have no problem recognizing Ukrainian "agency" in parallel to the US policy.

It may certainly be true that Zelensky is Nuland's "our man" and the leverage and compromat Nuland has on Zelensky essentially guaranteed rejecting any peace or negotiation before the war.

However, not only are there other actors in Ukrainian society, once the war started and the stakes were clear I think Zelensky did have real agency. In extreme circumstances many previous obligation, pressures and considerations that seemed important before are swept away in force majeur. Had he wanted, Zelensky could have chosen to be something other than be a patsy and instead play an astute diplomatic game playing the sides off each other and making use of his leverage to cut a deal, playing the Americans and the Europeans, while keeping a step ahead of hardliners (aka. literal Nazi's) in Ukraine.

Of course, you may retort that Zelensky is an idiot and could not possibly come up with some sophisticated play that would have shoved a peace down the throats of Nuland and fellow patsies in the EU. And for myself, personally, I would not care much to defend more than the agency of an idiot.

However, it is a common refrain from apologists for US foreign policy that the disasters are co-created with "agency" of local players. It may not seem too relevant to you that the US is "invited in" to get a bunch of people killed, poisoned, maimed and tortured, but it is very important in the foundation of psychopathic analysis that victims "want it", or then at least had hypothetical chance to prevent it. So, for the sake of these fragile souls I have no problem admitting the agency of American agents does in fact exist—yeah, sure, why not I say—, but I would still leave it to them to argue what kind of agency we're talking about. The agency of a moron like Zelensky maybe little more than hypothetical and seen as Nuland elects the Ukrainian leader since 2014 then it would follow that Ukrainians have little say in the matter.

In my view, it is thinkable that they knew the Russians were going to invade, and also knew the Russians would eventually prevail, since the decision not to put NATO boots on the ground was obviously made in advance of the conflict. — Tzeentch

Agreed.

To add to your observation, there's no actual rush to make Ukrainians as effective as possible. Drip feed theory, the centre piece of my analysis here, of only supplying the next weapons system when the previous weapon system fails to deliver any sort of victory for Ukraine, I would argue definitive proof there's no real intention to even try to defeat the Russians.

US officials have managed to impress upon the fungible minds of even the most ardent war zealot that there's some rational reason for holding back weapons all while "doing whatever it takes" to win ... but this is clearly untrue given that they can send the very weapons one day they presented as simply common sense they could not possibly send the day before. What changes as time passes is not some reevaluation of these "of course not" arguments for not sending more sophisticated weapons, but rather the destruction of Ukrainian's war fighting capability.

As the RAND paper insists upon multiple times, support to Ukraine must be "Calibrated" to avoid any real inconvenience to Russia that risks escalation, which isn't good for anyone.

Maybe the goal of project Ukraine really was to incorporate Ukraine into NATO/EU, but perhaps this was just the red herring to provoke Russia, and the actual goal of project Ukraine lies elsewhere - perhaps the goal was a forever war between Russia and Europe. — Tzeentch

Well, I'm sure if Russia just "let it happen" then Ukraine and Georgia would be in NATO already, but since Russia didn't the neo-cons saw the opportunity for a new war that would be good as far as war making is concerned. The gas and destroying the Euro as a competitor the USD as well as making European states essential permanent vassals without the possibility of "playing off both sides" anymore were additional benefits. However, I'm pretty sure the neo-cons just like killing as many people as bureaucratically possible (they can't just launch nukes at random and live out their fetish of rebuilding civilization in a bunker, for example, because other bureaucrats would stop them ... for now).

So, I certainly agree with your point:

For example, European energy dependency has been a thorn in the United States' side for at least a decade, and it ties in nicely with the US blowing up Nord Stream. — Tzeentch

But that's just dirty money business, Tim Cook has money for god's sake; no, money isn't the main motivation, you really know you're powerful when you get a lot of people killed due to your creative engagement with the world. Money is only a tool, not an end in itself you know.

Also, I don't believe a single word that comes from US about its intelligence agencies. — Tzeentch

Many didn't when the US intelligence services were saying that Russia will invade Ukraine in 2022. I remember that well. :smile:

Many didn't when the US intelligence services were saying that Russia will invade Ukraine in 2022. I remember that well. :smile: — ssu

Including a well-known illuminator of a thoroughfare (X)

By what you are saying now, Russia should not be threatened by NATO at all, because there is no evidence suggesting NATO was planning on conquering Russia or annexing part of it! — Jabberwock

Is this a joke?

So Russia has invaded Ukraine in 2014 for the main cause which was not NATO expansion. The conflict was ongoing since then, with different intensity. Your argument is now that Russia would likely not escalate it further if Ukraine did not arm itself in response to Russia's aggression. — Jabberwock

The US had a plan for Eastern Europe. That plan is not exclusively NATO. Your inability to understand that isn’t my problem.

The US decided to support them, for its own selfish interests, of course, I have never denied that. But the actual question is: without the US influence, would there be no conflict at all or simply there would be a conflict in which Ukraine would have less chance to succeed? — Jabberwock

That’s not the question. It’s not about hypotheticals. It’s about the facts, of what actually happened. And US influence is all over it, from the billion + spent on social influence to NATO expansion to supporting the overthrow of the government to economic influences to supplying military training and arms.

The question is whether we — the US —should have taken the Russian perspective seriously. I think we should have. We didn’t. And that’s why we have the war.

What the Ukrainian people have wanted has varied greatly. We see from polls about NATO or EU membership that things change, and especially in different regions. So to treat Ukraine as a monolith is incorrect. But it’s also irrelevant to the point about US influence, which is all over this war and all over Ukraine for decades.