So, the type of mechanism Newton disproved isn't exactly what we think about today. It was a view very much based on billiard balls crashing into each other, etc., which turned out to have issues. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The universe is not billiard balls - I fully agree. My idea of "mechanistic" is much broader than that.

We are beginning to speak about different things now. As you ask, yes, I think determinism is one thing, mechanical is another. My impression was that, by now most physicists (that I read, which admittedly are popular scientists) reject the view that the universe is a big machine (like a giant clock, for instance, or the example Timothy mentioned), but they call still be deterministic, and many are.

I was pointing out that this view, that the universe was not a machine, was reluctantly recognized by Newton, much previously than QM. Now, you can define a machine in a different way than the traditional conception if you want.

You are correct, there are some theories that may suggest a deterministic outcome, like Many Worlds or some remaining "hidden variables" theory. Maybe they're correct. Or maybe not, I can't say.

I don't see what big outcome in philosophy hinges on a deterministic universe. Like, if you have in mind free-will, I don't think the universe being one way or the other matters for this topic. But that's a subject for a different thread.

I don't see what big outcome in philosophy hinges on a deterministic universe. — Manuel

I agree, I think we, as in human beings, are mechanistic even if quantum physics is random. Maybe I just have a different idea of what "mechanistic" means.

There is, however, a neat poll of modern philosophers, and physicalism/materialism is pretty dang popular there. Perhaps they didn't get the memo? — flannel jesus

It's because Western culture, generally, has deprecated and dismantled classical metaphysics. That happened mainly as a consequence of the division of mind and matter, self and world, primary and secondary, that I mentioned in my initial post. Science and engineering subsequently seized on the supposed reality of 'res extensia' and dismissed the mind, 'res cogitans', as a ghost in the machine. But whole model was built on abstractions in the first place! And to call 'materialism' or 'physicalism' into question is to flirt with - what, exactly? - spooky immaterial substances and other slippery notions of mind that no respectable academic would defend. They're materialist by default.

That, of course, is a bit of a caricature, but it's not too far from the fact of the matter. But outside academic and mainstream philosophy, there are worlds of alternative worldviews and philosophies, against which your mainstream 'analytic philosophy' is an academic parlour game.

Quantum physics is probabilistic, yes, but the function that determines those probabilities is deterministic (the Schrödinger equation). — flannel jesus

Nevertheless it is indisputable that 'the nature of the wave function' is among the great unresolved issues in philosophy of physics. There is a strong idealist streak in the new physics, Schrodinger himself wrote extensively on philosophy later in life, and professed admiration of Arthur Schopenhauer and Advaita Vedanta.

So its materialism that hasn't got the memo. It's why academic philosophy, especially in the English-speaking world, that is hardly relevant to current culture.

I think so too.

But we agree on the bigger points, so, all seems well for now. :)

Physis also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiēsis ~ Heidegger. — Joshs

precisely what occurs with the act of observing an experimental result. It 'makes manifest'.

What is the fundamental difference between information processed by a mechanical computer and a brain? — Restitutor

Computer information processing is simply a mechanical procedure --- one thing after another --- as envisioned by Shannon. And some people still expect those assembly-line mechanisms to soon become Conscious, emulating human Sentience, as the data through-put increases. Yet "computing" is easy compared to "knowing".

For example, the brain stores data, not as localized physical registers, but distributed & interrelated as non-local pattern. Similarly, the human Self-image (Me) is not a physical pattern of dots, but a meta-physical design of meaningful relationships. So, the "Fundamental" difference, is an Integrated System versus a linear procedure.

Therefore, it's plausible that, as AI becomes more internally integrated and self-referenced (feedback), it might become Conscious, in some artificial or alien sense. But, I suspect that a novel manner of manipulating Information may be necessary. :smile:

PS___ This is just a riff on your insightful question, not an authoritative answer to the riddle of the "hard question".

Computer information processing is simply a mechanical procedure --- one thing after another --- as envisioned by Shannon. And some people still expect those assembly-line mechanisms to soon become Conscious, emulating human Sentience, as the data through-put increases. — Gnomon

Your thinking is rather last decade. The systems that run modern AIs use many interconnected processors operating in parallel, and a complex ballet of distributed processing is a more accurate metaphor than an assembly line. Furthermore, neuromorphic hardware that will massively increase the degree of parallelism while also dramatically dropping the power consumption is around the corner.

:up: :up:

Nevertheless it is indisputable that 'the nature of the wave function' is among the great unresolved issues in philosophy of physics. — Wayfarer

Really? FWIW, my understanding is that "the nature of the wavefunction" is a mathematical artifact of the set ups of QM experiments. Philosophers of physics, in contrast to philosophically sophisticated physicists, wantonly and unparsimoniously (mis/over)interpret this mathematical artifact which is, as is often pointed out, of little to no significance to theoretical physicists. Like every other theory in science, QFT is only a simulation of the world and not 'the world itself'; thus, "the nature of the wavefunction" is nothing more than an extension of "the nature" of QFT (i.e. simulation). Re: model-dependent realism.

Yes, modern physics, is a useful abstraction, but it is a useful abstraction that represents fundamental reality well enough to make incredibly accurate, specific and counterintuitive predictions so don’t just dismiss it. It is more than just abstract.

The fact that some people 400 year back formalized the old idea of a material and immaterial world and dressed it up as science doesn’t make what they say correct. There were plenty of people in Descartes time that weren’t buying what he was selling. Princess Elisabeth for one.

You have probably been told things like substance dualism breaks the 2nd law of thermodynamics, but you probably don’t care even though it is a rather important law. Also, people have probably pointed out that the fact that head trauma, tumors, etcetera will affect everything and anything about your introspective experience, including your sense of self, suggests that your mind (rez -cognizance) isn’t independent of our brain (rez-cognizance).

The reason I am not substance dualism is because it is very unlikely to be true because it is very bad science. Extremely few people who understand the 2nd law of thermodynamics (physicist) or understand modern neuroscience are substance duelists and I care what these people think more than I care about what a “scientist” that died 400 years ago and had no insight into how the brain works thinks. If you were seriously interested in the truth in this matter, you would believe somebody like Michal Gazzaniga over Descartes. I recommend Gazzaniga’s Gifford lectures. They will blow your mind.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dadT-14FkSY&list=PL8AD2B712B1A0578F

I think the idea of Dualism is broadly correct, but it does needs to be modified to make it fits with established scientific fact with substance dualism simply doesn’t do.

But it's not. There are machine-like elements, to be sure, but at the basis, humans (and all other creatures) are organic and not mechanical. They don't operate solely according to the abstractions of physics, in addition there is a much more sophisticated level of activity that occurs even on the level of cell division and growth. The machine metaphor is just that - a metaphor - and you could argue that it's a metaphor that's gone rogue, that is, escaped from its enclosure and wrought havoc in culture at large — Wayfarer

Sorry to highlight but this section of your answer is kind of lazy. You quoted the stuff about the musculoskeletal system, ignored the bit where I highlight less superficial parts of the body that said were mechanical (ATP synthase) and then tell me that once you get past musculoskeletal system is all organic and not mechanical. Of course, the body is organic. It is just that it is also mechanical when you look down at it with high enough resolution. The videos below explain.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUrEewYLIQg&t=303s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9RUHJhskW00

It’s obvious I am not saying the body is a machine in the naïve, narrow and stereotypical way a child may see a machine. I am saying the body is machine in the sense that every aspect of what is does is mechanistic and things that are purely mechanistic can be called machines without abusing the term machine. If your definition of a machine is something made of mettle and is designed by a human we are not machines but that isn’t the definition of a machine

Oxford dirtionary “an apparatus using or applying mechanical power and having several parts, each with a definite function and together performing a particular task.”

Or

“any device that transmits a force or directs its application.”

Saying people don’t “Operate solely according to the abstractions of physics, in addition there is a much more sophisticated level of activity that occurs even on the level of cell division and growth.” I am the director of a Lab at a rather prestigious scientific institution. A staggering amount of information we have on how the body works at the smaller scale says it is all 100% mechanistic obeying physics 100% of the time. There isn’t even a hint of anything happening that isn’t 1000% explained by the laws of physics. Biology is just as mechanistic as movement of the motion of the planets.

It is difficult to convey how much we know and at what detail we know it to laypeople without just using superlatives. Laypeople really have no idea (sorry laypeople). We for example know the structures of over 100 thousand proteins. We very frequently know what they do and how they do it. Look at the video about ATP synthase. We have the crystal structure for the vast majority of it know how it works mechanistically.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/pro.4038#:~:text=On%20January%2020%2C%202021%2C%20there,in%20the%20last%205%20years). –

“On January 20, 2021, there were 153,400 and 13,253 protein structures, respectively, determined by x-ray crystallography, by solution and recently solid-state NMR, and 6,814 by electron microscopy (a rapidly increasing number in the last 5 years)”.

I don’t know how to prove how much we know as scientists now as you need to be immersed in it. I can’t just quote you the entity of the scientific literature. All I can do is show you something like ATP synthase and say we have the same kind of information on masses amount of other systems and they are all just as mechanistic.

The fact that there are emergent properties that relies on the functioning of lots of molecular machine, such as cell division say nothing about if the human body is a machine. Machines can do thing that require multiple parts working together. We know a massive amount what is happening during cell division, down to the individual molecules. We know how memory works, down to individual molecules for example. This is not a good objection against the mechanistic nature of the human body as lots of machines have lots of parts that work together.

You think that the idea humans are machines is a metaphor, but I tell you as a scientist, the vast amount of information we have about the human body says we are as mechanistic as a computer and the atoms within us obey the laws of physics just as the atoms in any machine does.

Please understand, you do not have enough of a scientific background to understand how mechanistic science has shown the human body and all “life” to be. You also need to reassess where you are getting your information from.

You can ignore the philosophical reality of this by denying it or by saying its just a metaphor. You may even need to believe that it is true, but it isn’t true.

Yes, modern physics, is a useful abstraction, but it is a useful abstraction that represents fundamental reality well enough to make incredibly accurate, specific and counterintuitive predictions so don’t just dismiss it. — Restitutor

I'm not dismissing it, but I'm saying it's not the full picture, which is what you're proposing. The point of harking back to the Cartesian division is not because Descartes was great (although that might be), but to point out where the idea of the universe as 'machine like' originated.

I am saying the body is machine in the sense that every aspect of what is does is mechanistic and things that are purely mechanistic can be called machines without abusing the term machine. If your definition of a machine is something made of mettle and is designed by a human we are not machines but that isn’t the definition of a machine — Restitutor

'Metal'. Machines are manufactured artifacts, whilst humans and other animals are organisms. Organisms and machines have many fundamental differences, organic processes and mechanical processes have many fundamental differences. Organisms have the ability to grow, heal, mutate, learn and evolve, which machines do not have.

Please understand, you do not have enough of a scientific background to understand how mechanistic science has shown the human body and all “life” to be — Restitutor

You have provided no indication that you do, nor any citations for same, so no need to be condescending. You're advocating a mechanistic model which is well out of date.

Yes, modern physics, is a useful abstraction, but it is a useful abstraction that represents fundamental reality well enough to make incredibly accurate, specific and counterintuitive predictions so don’t just dismiss it. It is more than just abstract. — Restitutor

In respect of physical things, right. That doesn’t make it a model for philosophical analysis of the nature of being.

All I can do is show you something like ATP synthase and say we have the same kind of information on masses amount of other systems and they are all just as mechanistic. — Restitutor

So to paraphrase your argument, ‘the universe operates according to mechanical principles because science says it does. If you disagree then it’s because you don’t understand science.’

Did I miss anything important?

No, it make it a model for scientific analysis of the nature of being, which is better.

It is better than a model for philosophical analysis of the nature of being because it is much more likely to represent reality, rather than just representing the way we would like reality to be, with your scientifically indefensible belief in substance dualism being case in point.

Did you look at the ATP synthase YouTube video?.

No, if you don't think the world is mechanistic science isn't the problem, the facts are the problem

The fact that a Urbain Jean Leverrier predicted the location of Neptune based Newtonian physics equations is the problem.

The fact that from a genetic test you can say that a one nucleotide change will or won't cause cystic fibrosis is the problem.

The fact that the whole modern world, including the computer you are using was built based upon experienced reality that the world behaves mechanistically is the problem.

where the idea of the universe as 'machine like' originated. — Wayfarer

Democritus was before Descartes.

No, it make it a model for scientific analysis of the nature of being, which is better. — Restitutor

Not being as such, but of the objects of experience. Questions about what objectively exists are different to questions about the nature of existence, which are much broader in scope.

Democritus was before Descartes. — Restitutor

Not relevant to the issue though. The mechanistic model of nature comes from early modern science not Greek philosophy as such.

'Metal'. Machines are manufactured artifacts, whilst humans and other animals are organisms. Organisms and machines have many fundamental differences, organic processes and mechanical processes have many fundamental differences. Organisms have the ability to grow, heal, mutate, learn and evolve, which machines do not have. — Wayfarer

I gave you real definitions from a real dictionary saying what a machine is. All you have done is crafted an artificially narrow definition of a word that contradicts dictionaries but proves your point. Find a dictionary that says a machine is defined in the way you define it and then we will talk.

What are these fundamental differences? What you have done is cherry pick a whole load of emergent properties. Saying humans have properties that non-human machines don't just doesn't prove your point. Lots of classes of machines have specific emergent properties other machines don't. Growing is simply an emergent property the same way flying is an emergent property. A few hundred years ago you could have included flying on your list of what machines can't do and organisms can. Even now there are emergent properties on your list that robots can do. Machines certainly learn for example, it is called machine learning. Although i don't know of machines can physically evolve, there are lots of examples of programs that control robots being designed to evolve. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RbyQcCT6890.

“By convention hot is hot, by convention cold is cold, by convention color is color. But in reality, there are atoms and the void”. Democritus (c. 460 BC – c. 370 BC).

Not relevant to the issue though. The mechanistic model of nature comes from early modern science not Greek philosophy as such — Wayfarer

Democritus even says introspective experience is generated by atoms. (he did believe atoms moved mechanistically).

Descartes acknowledged all animals to be "beast machines" except us. Its soooo incompatible with science.

None of which defrays the point that machines are manufactured artifacts.

The fact that from a genetic test you can say that a one nucleotide change will or won't cause cystic fibrosis is the problem. — Restitutor

But plainly that is a fact of neither mechanics nor physics but of biology. In all of what you’re saying ‘machines’ are a metaphor. Furthermore you’d never learn about genetics by studying physics, the fact you can call on ‘emergence’ as a kind of universal ad hoc gap filler notwithstanding.

Oxford dirtionary “an apparatus using or applying mechanical power and having several parts, each with a definite function and together performing a particular task.” — Restitutor

That is the dictionary definition quoted. Organism is defined as

1. : something having many related parts that function together as a whole. 2. : an individual living thing that carries on the activities of life by means of organs which have separate functions but are dependent on each other : a living person, plant, or animal.

Organisms are mechanical in some respects but with attributes not possessed by machines.

my understanding is that "the nature of the wavefunction" is a mathematical artifact of the set ups of QM experiments. — 180 Proof

Not so. The implications of the nature of the wavefunction are significant.

Ontological Status: Is it a real, physical entity or merely a mathematical tool for predicting experimental outcomes? Realists argue that the wave function represents a physical state of a quantum system. In contrast, instrumentalists view it as a tool for calculating probabilities of different measurement outcomes, without ascribing it any physical reality.

Wave Function Collapse: The issue of wave function collapse during a measurement process is another philosophical puzzle. When a quantum system is not being observed, it is described by a wave function that encompasses a superposition of all possible states. However, when a measurement is made, the system appears to 'collapse' into one of these states. The nature of this collapse – whether it is a real physical process or a mere update of our knowledge – is debated with no empirical way of adjuticating the competing interpretations.

Locality and Nonlocality: Quantum entanglement, where particles remain connected so that the state of one (no matter how far apart they are) instantly affects the state of the other, challenges the notion of locality in physics. This leads to philosophical questions about the nature of reality and whether actions at one point in space can instantaneously affect distant objects (nonlocality).

Determinism and Indeterminism: Quantum mechanics, through the probabilistic nature of the wave function, raises questions about determinism in the universe. While classical physics is largely deterministic, the probabilistic outcomes in quantum mechanics have led to debates about whether the universe at a fundamental level is deterministic or indeterministic.

The Measurement Problem: This is related to the issue of wave function collapse and concerns the question of how and why quantum states appear to change abruptly and discontinuously in the act of measurement. This problem has led to various interpretations of quantum mechanics, each with its own philosophical implications.

Many-Worlds Interpretation: This interpretation posits that all possible alternative histories and futures are real and that they exist in a vast and complex multiverse. This raises philosophical questions about the nature of reality and our place in it, as well as the meaning of probabilities in a universe where every possibility is realized.

Epistemological Questions: Quantum mechanics also poses epistemological challenges. It forces us to reconsider our notions of knowledge, observation, and reality. The role of the observer in quantum mechanics, and the limits of what we can know about the quantum world, are central to these discussions.

Of course, most working physics can ignore the questions, as the equations and predictions work with enormous precision. They simply shut up and calculate.

The implications of the nature of the wavefunction are significant. — Wayfarer

Those "implications" are nothing more than second-order interpretations of first-order models. You're merely referring to "the nature" of the simulation, Wayfarer, and not what it simulates.

You're merely referring to "the nature" of the simulation, Wayfarer, and not what it simulates. — 180 Proof

The whole point is that 'what it simulates' is an unknown.

The whole point is that 'what it simulates' is an unknown. — Wayfarer

Not at all, sir: what is simulated – the natural world, 'subject-invariant' reality – is approximately known with respect to the scope precision and fidelity of the simulation (à la mapping territory which necessarily exceeds mapping). Dispense with the outdated Kantianism, sir, epistemology as well as science has developed two and have centuries past his (anti-Copernican) transcendental anthropocentricity and occult ding-an-sich.

the natural world, 'subject-invariant' reality – — 180 Proof

'If you're not shocked by quantum physics, then you plainly haven't understood it' ~ Neils Bohr, taking questions after lecture to the Vienna Circle, Copenhagen, 1950's.

Well, if you believe the findings of quantum physics are not subject-invariant (i.e. objective), then you, my good man, certainly have not even understood that quantum physics is natural science, let alone any of QFT/QM's findings and problems. I really wish you clueless 'antirealists idealists woo woo-ists' would quit this pseudo-quantum crutch. :sweat:

if you believe the findings of quantum physics are not subject-invariant (i.e. objective) — 180 Proof

The fact that quantum physics appears to undemine the concept of objectivity was part of the major news out of the Solvay Conference in 1927. Why was Albert Einstein compelled to ask the question 'doesn't the moon continue to exist if we're not observing it?' The later Bohr-Einstein debates were mainly about this. Hey, don't take it from me, here it is from John Wheeler:



From John Wheeler, Law without Law

'No elementary phenomena is a phenomena until it is an observed phenomena'.