For example, mathematics is a human construction with inherent facts. — Lexa

Hmm. Many people think we discovered math and didn't invent it. I personally don't have expertise to make an argument either way.

I was wondering why people think that moral nihilism means that moral facts can't exist. — Lexa

Moral nihilism says there are no moral truths - morality lacks inherent meaning. This must also mean there are no moral facts. I'm not sure how one would arrive at a moral fact (an objective truth about right and wrong) if there is nothing to ground morality in.

Nevertheless, there are good reasons for us to adopt assertive positions on morality even if we are moral nihilists. Morality supports us to organize human behavior and can minimize suffering and maximize flourishing. So if we accept that this presupposition (to minimize suffering) is selected pragmatically, we can build objective morality subject to this goal. The rest will be an inevitable series of arguments and disagreements.

"many people think we discovered math and didn't invent it"
- Tom Storm

I agree that it is a debate that we don't know whether we invented math or discovered it, but what is the concrete realm where numbers lie? I guess you could say that because math can be used to predict so many systems in the concrete world, but what about facts that are purely mathematical?

"Moral nihilism says that there are no moral truth"
-Tom Storm

I'm sorry I should have been more precise, I mean why do the arguments for moral nihilism conclude that there are no moral truths? Because the best arguments for moral nihilism don't seem to point to no moral truths.

I'm sorry I should have been more precise, I mean why do the arguments for moral nihilism conclude that there are no moral truths? Because the best arguments for moral nihilism don't seem to point to no moral truths. — Lexa

I just answered that.

Moral nihilism says there are no moral truths - morality lacks inherent meaning. This must also mean there are no moral facts. I'm not sure how one would arrive at a moral fact (an objective truth about right and wrong) if there is nothing to ground morality in. — Tom Storm

What have I missed?

So why does moral nihilism exclude moral facts? — Lexa

I want to focus on your second argument which you address first. (and if you're interested reading more...)

While I would agree that morality was created by humans and has no other concrete basis, I wouldn't say that morality has no facts. I wouldn't say that morality has the same type of facts that the natural world has, meaning that if intelligent life didn't exist, neither would morality. However, abstract human constructions often do have facts. For example, mathematics is a human construction with inherent facts. The infinite number of primes is an abstract fact of mathematics that has no basis outside of the intelligent mind. You could say that the way we describe a mathematical system is the reason that it can contain facts, meaning that since math as a language leaves little room for subjective interpretation of its findings means that it is an objective practice. However, I would say that is a fundamental problem with how we talk about morality rather than a stark difference between mathematics and morality. — Lexa

I grant the analogy between mathematics and morality. But notice how your argument simply means that moral facts are possible on the basis that we already believe in non-concrete facts, namely mathematical ones, so we can't rule them out just because they are not concrete. What it doesn't do is assert why we ought to believe in moral facts, though. The argument from difference gets along well here because it gives us a reason to believe that there are no moral facts. So I'll pivot to your first argument you address second:

Furthermore the argument that different cultures have different conceptions of morality doesn't mean that moral facts don't exist either. Just because a different conception exists doesn't mean that there is no facts about a certain subject. People disagree about every subject under the sun, even those that have a concrete basis under them. To say that just because there is different conceptions of an issue means that the issue is subjective would be to say that any metaphysical claim means nothing and the entire practice of reasoning about metaphysical claims would be utterly useless. — Lexa

I agree with your arguments here. But notice how these are reasons to accommodate difference while granting moral realism, and not reasons to believe that there are moral facts. These are addressing the arguments for moral anti-realism, rather than giving reasons for moral realism.

I swear it's related, even though it sounds like it's out of nowhere: do you believe that astrology is factual? Astrology is a body of sentences that people believe and utilize to understand the world around them, there are different conceptions of astrology and people disagree over what it means. Using your argument above this wouldn't be a reason to believe that astrology isn't factual, just that there are people who disagree on the factual basis -- but surely that's not right because astrology is not factual.

So the question then becomes: how to differentiate talk which is factual from talk which is not factual?

What the anti-realist asserts is that moral talk is more like astrology and less like math.

Moral nihilism (i.e., error theory) in metaethics is the view that:

1. Moral judgments are propositional; and
2. They are all false.

So, moral nihilism entails necessarily that there are no moral facts that are true.

But, forgetting the semantics, let’s dive (briefly) into the substance of your OP.

The main two arguments I have came across in favor of moral nihilism is that 1. moral thinking differs between cultures and people, so it is a subjective practice, and 2. that there is nothing tangible to attach moral facts too, therefore they do not exist.

Moral disagreement is an argument that some people give for the non-existence of moral facts, but that doesn’t entail that one is a moral nihilist per se—they would be, at a minimum, a moral anti-realist, but they could opt for a different flavor of moral anti-realism than moral nihilism (such as non-cognitivism or subjectivism).

I personally don’t find that argument very compelling, as just because we disagreeing about something it does not follow that what we are disagreeing about is a non-fact (although it very well might be).

I wouldn't say that morality has the same type of facts that the natural world has, meaning that if intelligent life didn't exist, neither would morality.

If the “moral facts” cease to exist with our existences (in the sense of our psychology), then they aren’t facts.

However, abstract human constructions often do have facts. For example, mathematics is a human construction with inherent facts. The infinite number of primes is an abstract fact of mathematics that has no basis outside of the intelligent mind. You could say that the way we describe a mathematical system is the reason that it can contain facts, meaning that since math as a language leaves little room for subjective interpretation of its findings means that it is an objective practice. However, I would say that is a fundamental problem with how we talk about morality rather than a stark difference between mathematics and morality.

Interesting! I would say that in order for mathematics to have facts, it must exist mind-independently and not contingent on subjects. Even in the case that one is a mathematical anti-realist (in the sense that they don’t believe that the structure of reality is inherently mathematical) the mathematical propositions are grounded objectively in our faculties of cognition, which are not subjective. I cannot make up true mathematical propositions because they are independent of my will, even if it is the case that they are dependent on how I cognize. In the case of morality, the counter argument here would be that this is not an analogous situation: there is no such cognitive faculty nor faculty whatsoever that moral judgments depend on nor are there moral facts somehow out there in reality (or so the argument goes). So that would be the symmetry breaker.

I think in order for you to say there are moral facts, you would have to claim that they are grounded in either a faculty we have (which is independent of our will) or exist in reality. Otherwise, they are not facts, they are tastes.

The main two arguments I have came across in favor of moral nihilism is that 1. moral thinking differs between cultures and people, so it is a subjective practice, and 2. that there is nothing tangible to attach moral facts too, therefore they do not exist. The main Idea between these two ideas is that morality was created by intelligent life, therefore it is a subjective practice that doesn't have any basis. — Lexa

Our moral values are just the result of our emotional state, which is no reason to believe anything - especially when we have competing values with others such as consequentialism versus deontology.

they could opt for a different flavor of moral anti-realism than moral nihilism (such as non-cognitivism or subjectivism). — Bob Ross

Non-cognitivism is under the umbrella of moral nihilism? The former is the view that moral statements cannot be true or false and are just an emotional expression. The latter is the view that there is no right or wrong answers to moral questions.

"What have I missed?"
- Tom Storm

I think you have missed that to conclude that things can't be a fact without a tangible grounding then plenty of things that we consider facts have to be subjective, also that the field of metaphysics would be useless to talk about because all of its findings would be considered subjective. Also you did not answer the question about mathematics. If math was discovered instead of invented what, grounds numbers and mathematics? Because while math has a lot of ground-able applications, there are plenty of mathematical facts that are entirely abstract.

What it doesn't do is assert why we ought to believe in moral facts, though. — Moliere

To be honest at the moment I do not have a concrete argument as to why we should believe in moral facts, which is why I am only arguing that the arguments for moral nihilism doesn't necessarily rule them out. So, the only argument I can posit for is that we should continue to try and uncover them. That argument being that since the arguments for moral nihilism don't necessarily mean that moral facts can't be real.

I swear it's related, even though it sounds like it's out of nowhere: do you believe that astrology is factual? — Moliere

I don't believe in astrology lol, But I would differentiate claims like astrology and something factual by saying that things like astrology don't have any repeatable theories. A factual moral theory would have repeatable outcomes. For example, you would be able to know what is moral and immoral, and how to navigate moral situations. Astrology cannot make repeatable theories. For example, everyone who is a libra will not be extroverted, or possibly most of them will not be extroverted. Therefore, things like astrology cannot be facts.

would say that in order for mathematics to have facts, it must exist mind-independently and not contingent on subjects. — Bob Ross

I would say that moral facts do exist in our psychology. Every culture and person has some idea of what morality should be. Which to me doesn't say that morals are inherently subjective, but that all people want to know what it is to be moral. I would say that no one has found these facts, but they do want to find them. Which shows that our psychology wants to figure out what is moral.

To be honest at the moment I do not have a concrete argument as to why we should believe in moral facts, which is why I am only arguing that the arguments for moral nihilism doesn't necessarily rule them out. So, the only argument I can posit for is that we should continue to try and uncover them. That argument being that since the arguments for moral nihilism don't necessarily mean that moral facts can't be real. — Lexa

Cool.

While I don't rule out moral facts by necessity, I remain uncertain of them in fact. I acknowledge that I may be wrong -- my belief is itself true or false, or so I contend -- but I don't believe there is a moral fact in this sense that I'm uncertain what such a fact would be or mean.

I don't believe in astrology lol, But I would differentiate claims like astrology and something factual by saying that things like astrology don't have any repeatable theories. A factual moral theory would have repeatable outcomes. For example, you would be able to know what is moral and immoral, and how to navigate moral situations. Astrology cannot make repeatable theories. For example, everyone who is a libra will not be extroverted, or possibly most of them will not be extroverted. Therefore, things like astrology cannot be facts. — Lexa

Also cool. We at least agree that astrology is not factual.

And we agree that mathematics is factual.

That means there is a question to be asked -- how do we make this judgment, and when? Sometimes we can speak factually, and sometimes we can speak in the same way that looks like it's factual but, as we agree, astrology doesn't quite hit the mark.

I find the argument from difference persuasive enough to need some kind of response. If morality is real why is the disagreement so disparate in relation to, say, mathematics? What are the conditions under which we should accept a moral proposition as a real one, and a moral proposition as a not-real one, given the disparity of disagreement?

What are the moral situations that a that we'd be able to navigate?

These seem like non-trivial, in the sense that they are also ethical, questions. But I don't know of any way to solve them by way of a math.

And if they're all false that would at least explain why people disagree.

I think you have missed that to conclude that things can't be a fact without a tangible grounding then plenty of things that we consider facts have to be subjective, also that the field of metaphysics would be useless to talk about because all of its findings would be considered subjective. — Lexa

Ok. Plenty of things people take as facts are speculative. Metaphysics is speculative, and in contemporary discourse is generally ignored, even if it does underpin physicalist science as much as it underpins idealism.

A moral fact is an objective truth about morality. To qualify it needs to belong to a coherent whole - an objective realm of moral realism. This does not compare to the status of math which can be demonstrated by logical axioms and calculation. How do you demonstrate that morality has logical axioms like math?

Also you did not answer the question about mathematics. If math was discovered instead of invented what, grounds numbers and mathematics? Because while math has a lot of ground-able applications, there are plenty of mathematical facts that are entirely abstract. — Lexa

I don't have expertise to know if math is discovered or invented. But I can only repeat that a mathematical truth is something which can be demonstrated to work - it is based on the logical axioms which appear universally true (identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle). Morality has no equivalence to this. Can you show one in action?

No, moral non-cognitivism is a flavor of moral anti-realism, not moral nihilism.

But wouldn't that entail that you don't think there are moral facts, since you think that no one has found any?

No, moral non-cognitivism is a flavor of moral anti-realism, not moral nihilism. — Bob Ross

I would have said this:

the view that moral statements cannot be true or false and are just an emotional expression — Down The Rabbit Hole

Is a flavour of this:

the view that there is no right or wrong answers to moral questions — Down The Rabbit Hole

Maybe the literature considers them separate.

Moral nihilism (error theory) is not the view that there are no right or wrong answers to moral questions. If you are interested, then I would suggest reading this standford entry; as it is a good summary.

Here's the super-relevant parts:

Error theory is:

The error theorist is a cognitivist: maintaining that moral judgment consists of beliefs and assertions. However, the error theorist thinks that these beliefs and assertions are never true

Non-cognitivsm is:

One might deny that in making a moral judgment we are engaging in the assignment of properties at all. Such a rejection is, roughly speaking, the noncognitivist proposal

The problem is there being so many different definitions.

I searched "moral nihilism definition" on Microsoft's AI and it replied "Moral nihilism is a philosophical concept that posits that there is no objective morality, and that moral statements are neither true nor false". I searched "Non-cognitivism definition" and it replied "Non-cognitivism is a meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions and thus cannot be true or false".

Both the moral nihilist and non-cognitivist believe that ethical sentences cannot be true or false. The non-cognitivist goes one step further by giving a reason for this (that they do not express propositions).

Isn't this right? And wouldn't this justify calling non-cognitivism a flavour of moral nihilism?

1. moral thinking differs between cultures and people, so it is a subjective practice, and 2. that there is nothing tangible to attach moral facts too, therefore they do not exist. The main Idea between these two ideas is that morality was created by intelligent life, therefore it is a subjective practice that doesn't have any basis. — Lexa

Moral thinking differs, but there are commonalities rooted in emotions. And we do indeed attach morality to the fact that we have emotions. We do not say it is immoral to kill because there aren't any situations in which killing is considered a good action, we do it primarily from a primal limbic system response to the fact that being killed is an extremely negative action done onto us. It has a lot of pain attached to it and the denial of someone's existence requires a damn good argument for the continued existence of the killer for justifying that killing.

Cultures move in and out of different values but we tend to base our moral values on some basic truths about the experience of being a human, and those truths are indeed facts. Otherwise, you cannot argue for why people shouldn't kill you. Why shouldn't someone kill you? I bet you can come up with reasons for why you don't want to be killed, none of those reasons are valid in of themselves, because there's no essential meaning to your existence, but they're attached to negative emotions you feel about the negation of your continued existence. So we can infer that there's something there that guides our moral thinking.

The problem with moral philosophy is that the aim always seems to be on finding an objective moral that is detached from the existence of being a human. But since morality is a concept that is deeply tied to our experience as human beings, we cannot detach ourselves and the nature of our existence from the moral theories we produce. We have to include us in these theories, or else we're not talking about human morality, but some abstract nothing.

Think of the "why?" scene in Terminator 2. "You can't go around killing people!" to which the terminator replies "Why?" over and over. That's because John Connor cannot find a definition for why it is bad. But he could have explained it through telling the Terminator that the morality of killing is tied to the experience of being a human, so he wouldn't understand the "why", but he could instead draw conclusions from understanding the facts about pain. Meaning, if he hurts another person, that person feels pain (fact), killing someone is the final conclusion of "pain" and is considered morally negative. Therefore, killing is morally bad as a concept human morality. A computer like the Terminator could draw conclusions based on this, it would probably draw utilitarianistic conclusions when trying to calculate further outcomes of killings, but it would at least find a defining idea around why killing is bad.

That is probably as close to something factually based as we could possibly come. And this can be changed to whatever culture a species have. So if we encounter an alien species with wildly different aspects of the experience of being, then morality can only be defined based on their perspective, meaning, we humans can grasp the morality of other beings by not applying our morality to them, but their morality to them. This doesn't work for different human cultures as the experience of being a human is the same between all of us. It is therefore species based.

But we can infer that there are facts about the human experience that are universal for our species and morality is tightly linked to them. One evidence of this is the very fact that we try to draw conclusions of morality when speaking about killing someone. If morality was truly nihilistic, if there was nothing there, then why would we ever even gravitate towards concepts like "killing" when talking about morality? Why not "the morality of bananas"? A nihilistic perspective on morality would equal bananas having the same level of moral relevance as "killing", but we view such a conclusion as absurd since morality has to do with our actions and consequences as humans. As such, actions and consequences have an impact on our experiences as humans, and therefore ideas on morality has a value to them as they are linked to our experience and especially emotions of being humans.

Moral thinking differs, but there are commonalities rooted in emotions. And we do indeed attach morality to the fact that we have emotions. We do not say it is immoral to kill because there aren't any situations in which killing is considered a good action, we do it primarily from a primal limbic system response to the fact that being killed is an extremely negative action done onto us. It has a lot of pain attached to it and the denial of someone's existence requires a damn good argument for the continued existence of the killer for justifying that killing. — Christoffer

Can you envision a moral system build entirely of non-emotional values? If we were to turn everyone into Mr Spock, would we still have the same variety of moral stances we now see in human culture? If our moral
systems would be different, how would they change?

I don’t consider any AI to be a trustworthy source of a definition when it comes to specialized fields of study, as, so far as I understand, it is simply using public knowledge on the internet to figure it out (and that usually implies that it uses the colloquial definitions, as opposed to the formative ones). This is no different with Google’s definitions that they give or any basic online dictionary: they are more interested, most of the time, with colloquial definitions and not specialized ones. For example, Wikipedia says “Moral nihilism (also called ethical nihilism) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong and that morality doesn't exist.” Colloquially, this is, indeed, how people tend to use the term; and it is not completely wrong--it is just ambiguous.

However, in metaethics, moral nihilism is the view that (1) moral judgments are cognitive (i.e., propositional) and that (2) there are no true moral judgments. That there are no moral facts just follows from #2.

Moral non-cognitivists deny #1, and it follows from that that there are no moral facts.

Both the moral nihilist and non-cognitivist believe that ethical sentences cannot be true or false

No. Moral nihilists are moral cognitivists.

And wouldn't this justify calling non-cognitivism a flavour of moral nihilism?

Unless I am misunderstanding you, I would say that your definitions here would entail the converse: if moral nihilists are moral cognitivists, then they are subsumed under moral cognitivism.

Can you envision a moral system build entirely of non-emotional values? If we were to turn everyone into Mr Spock, would we still have the same variety of moral stances we now see in human culture? If our moral
systems would be different, how would they change? — Joshs

We wouldn't need to as humans philosophizing about our morality is philosophizing about ourselves. There's no point in imagining a species other than ourselves when trying to figure out morality for ourselves since a change in our species would change the foundation for our moral system.

We can do so for the sake of it or as a contrast, but it will feel as alien to us as anything else that's alien to our biology.

A moral system for a species like Vulcans would probably rely more on logical axioms rather than ranges of values. The problem is that we cannot judge that system when we're stuck in the emotionally driven biology that we exist in. So we can guess what moral system they would have, but it wouldn't make sense to us. However, if they explained it to us we would probably be able to rationally understand it, like thinking about it as a system of logical axioms, but their decisions on moral choices in their society could be so alien to us that we would think of them as immoral by our standards.

We can therefor draw a line between finding a moral system that applies to all people of humans, even between cultures, but never apply a system that applies between species as the biology and nature of a species would define the foundation of their moral system.

Through this, we could even analyze potential moral systems of animals, even if they're not conscious enough to view themselves in such mirrors. What is the moral system among lions? We can find commonalities between decisions made by many lions, but never judge their system based on our own morality. Then again, we could just decide that a moral system can only exist as a self-governing system for conscious beings, that it requires conscious self-awareness. In that sense, morality is a system only applicable to societies in which actions and consequences can be set into common principles.

So, it could be that the definition of a universal nature of morality is whatever biologically driven principles that becomes a foundation for a functioning society. If aliens form a long term functioning society, they have a moral system underneath it, however alien that system is to us. And that system is whatever principles that inform a common biological ground for the society to exist on top of and definitions for how long such a society can exist.

I'm sorry I should have been more precise, I mean why do the arguments for moral nihilism conclude that there are no moral truths? Because the best arguments for moral nihilism don't seem to point to no moral truths. — Lexa

Yes, I think op was poorly phrased.

but I don't believe there is a moral fact in this sense that I'm uncertain what such a fact would be or mean. — Moliere

Perhaps "fact" is the wrong word then. Maybe a better word would be "truth", Where there is a best or correct moral ideal, that may not have a burden of proof as high as "fact". Because while "fact" and "truth" may have different levels of burden of proof, they come to the same conclusion, being that there is a correct moral theory.

f morality is real why is the disagreement so disparate in relation to, say, mathematics? — Moliere

I would say that the reason why there is so much disparity is because we don't have a language like mathematics to describe these situations. Mathematics is a language where its components always mean the same thing. 2 will always mean 2 no matter what mathematician you talk too, but you talk to two philosophers in your own department they may define things vastly different. So if we could create a language with concrete definitions we could perhaps come up with these truths. Obviously that begs the question of "what should be the concrete definitions be?" and "how do we find them?", but I feel that those questions also have truths to be found.

But wouldn't that entail that you don't think there are moral facts, since you think that no one has found any? — Bob Ross

Not at all. We discover things everyday that we didn't know the day before, i'm sure there is a ton of facts that we don't know of at the moment that we can discover.

Can you envision a moral system build entirely of non-emotional values? If we were to turn everyone into Mr Spock, would we still have the same variety of moral stances we now see in human culture? — Joshs

Of course. It's what we have. Who doesn't present themselves as "logical" and "rational"? What ideology is not praised as such?

Spock only presents himself as "rational", "logical", these are the words he uses to describe himself.
Envision that the character of Spock would be played by the handsome actor playing Kirk. What would change? That rendition of Spock would seem perfectly human, only ironic. Which is the point. Spock is as "emotional" as everyone else, he just openly denies being so (the way some people do). This is what people can relate to, and why Spock's character is so liked by people.

(Probably some 80% of cowboy characters in classical western films are similar to Spock in that they show very little emotion in their face and voice. It used to be considered "manly".)

And, of course, the Star Trek franchize is responsible for the greatest abuse of the word "logic", ever.

:100:

That is fair.

Perhaps "fact" is the wrong word then. Maybe a better word would be "truth", Where there is a best or correct moral ideal, that may not have a burden of proof as high as "fact". Because while "fact" and "truth" may have different levels of burden of proof, they come to the same conclusion, being that there is a correct moral theory. — Lexa

Maybe there is. Changing whether we call it a fact or a truth, though, doesn't change my doubt.

I would say that the reason why there is so much disparity is because we don't have a language like mathematics to describe these situations. Mathematics is a language where its components always mean the same thing. 2 will always mean 2 no matter what mathematician you talk too, but you talk to two philosophers in your own department they may define things vastly different. So if we could create a language with concrete definitions we could perhaps come up with these truths. Obviously that begs the question of "what should be the concrete definitions be?" and "how do we find them?", but I feel that those questions also have truths to be found. — Lexa

So you would say that no one disagrees, but rather they misunderstand one another. Is that about right?