Ethical naturalism vs. non-naturalism

Bob Ross

I have been thinking about moral realist positions under the camps of ethical naturalism and non-naturalism, and I wanted to voice some preliminary concerns I have of them (generally) and see your guys' thoughts.

For ethical naturalism, it seems like there really is an (Moorean) open-question for any naturalistic analysis of N about moral properties M such that one could always validly ask: is N really M? Say I find out that there is some sort of obligation embedded into my genes: ok, is it really the moral thing to do though?

For ethical non-naturalism, it seems like the positive is that one doesn't have the open-question problem, but they trade it for complete ambiguity on what the moral properties subsist in or of. A normal person would intuit that torturing a baby with scissors is immoral and the non-naturalist would say that that moral judgment is latching onto real non-natural moral properties; but, then, why even think there are any such moral properties if it cannot be empirically obtained by analysis of the natural world which we live in and experience? It seems a bit like projecting one's own tastes as matter of fact masked in the form of an intuition. Likewise, if there really are non-natural moral facts (that are something akin to platonic forms), then what faculty do we have to intuiting them? It seems, to me, like we don't.

What are you guys' thoughts?

wonderer1

Say I find out that there is some sort of obligation embedded into my genes: ok, is it really the moral thing to do though? — Bob Ross

I was quite surprised when my first child was born, how overwhelmingly protective I felt towards her. I had fully expected to love her, but this went beyond that, to recognition that I wouldn't hesitate to die to protect her.

I suspect most people are naturally inclined to view acting out of that sort of protectiveness to be moral. I myself don't think there are moral fact though.

Pantagruel

@Bob Ross Do you believe that ethical reasoning ought to be effective in influencing actual moral behaviour? Or does it simply exist for the purpose of providing post hoc justifications? If actual moral practices are not directly affected by ethical analysis, of what merit is the analysis?

180 Proof

↪Pantagruel

:up:

↪Bob Ross

GE Moore's "open question" is besides the point for actual moral agency. The bases of my position on ethical naturalism is summarized in the old post "An inquiry into moral facts"

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540198

... from which I conclude, as expressed in another thread "Can Morality ever be objective?"

Thus, my metaethics is Ethical Naturalism (i.e. "good" is agency (i.e. capabilities – virtues, habits – for nonzero sum caring for the functional defects of self, others & commons) optimized by praxes of preventing and reducing harms & injustices, respectively); my normative ethics is Negative Hedonic Utilitarianism (i.e. "right" judgments and conduct which prevent or reduce harm); and my applied ethics is Negative Preference Consequentialism (i.e. "right" policies-practices which prevent or reduce injustice). — 180 Proof

As for "ethical non-naturalism" ...

It seems a bit like projecting one's own tastes as matter of fact masked in the form of an intuition. Likewise, if there really are non-natural moral facts (that are something akin to platonic forms), then what faculty do we have to intuiting them? It seems, to me, like we don't. — Bob Ross

:up: I agree.

Bob Ross

↪wonderer1

That is very interesting: I agree that our biology can most certainly motivate us to do things (even to an extreme level). But I think we both agree that that doesn't entail that it is the morally right thing to do (in virtue of being a moral fact).

Bob Ross

↪Pantagruel

I am not sure that I entirely followed the question, but I would say that they should influence moral behavior. If there is a moral fact X, then that should influence, to some degree, our moral behavior.

Bob Ross

↪180 Proof

I don’t think I am fully understanding your ethical naturalist theory yet, so let me try to explain it back to you (and tell me if I am on the right track).

You are saying, firstly, that the open-question argument does not hold as valid (“besides the point for actual moral agency): why?

Secondly, you are saying essentially:

1. Suffering entails a want for help.
2. Asking for help entails a promise to do likewise for the helper (if they ever were to need it).
3. That promise is a moral fact because it is an obligation which implicitly unravels from #1.

Is this an accurate summary of your view?

Ethical naturalism vs. non-naturalism

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