Can you change the tree with words? Ordering it cut down will certainly change it. — Banno

You can't cut down a tree, or influence it in any way, with words. You can of course influence other language users with words, you can induce them to cut down the tree. So, it is of course true that we are influenced by our own words and the words of others, that is we are influenced by our understandings of the meanings of those words, and not by the words themselves as mere physical phemomena, whether they come in the form of visual symbols or sounds. — Janus

The point, way back, is that we do things with our utterances. — Banno

In the sense that we may act on other people (and some animals) with our utterances, such as to cause, or at least influence, them to do things, I agree. — Janus

Interesting exchanges, both of you.

It reminds me of Austin's arguments in chapter VII, the one that I tried to summarise last week. It is obvious that we cannot cut a tree with just words, but we can't cut it if we don't understand the act of 'cutting' either.

This is why some words - according to Austin - are considered as 'dimension words', the ones which tend to be more suitable for the needs and demands of people. For example: Banno could have said to me: 'Rip out the leaves of the tree'. I would probably not understand him, so I would not be able to do this action.

But, using dimension words such as 'cut' - or 'good' or the controversial 'real' - my basic knowledge would influence me to do what Banno is asking for.

Then, they depend on each other. Linguistic understanding and metaphysical possibility.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Continuing from p.80 in Lecture VIII, Ayer admits that the criteria he values most is that of prediction. I have here and elsewhere asserted that the claim to objectivity or universality or purity or Ayer’s “directness” is based on the desire to have a reliable, predetermined, complete, independent standard, like math, that allows us to have outcomes that are predictable (thus the clamor for something like science, the facts of which are based on repeatability). For example, we want a moral rule or goal so that we don’t have to be good, we can just do what has been determined is good, and thus we are absolved because we can just claim, “I followed the rule!”

The desire to anticipate the implications of our actions is also a motivation for a general explanation. If there is anything Austin is good at, it is showing that abstraction is the death of truth. It seems clever to find one criteria to judge everything by (true or false? Real or not?) because it doesn’t change, which makes for predictable outcomes. But a general account also flattens out distinctions, which are exactly what will inform us of what might happen in a particular instance.

I think that what needs to be said about the tree is 1) you can't cut down a tree (in one sense of "cut down") with 1) words, 2) a fishing net, 3) a screwdriver ... More generally, there are things we cannot do with words, and there are things we can do with words. The problem then arises with the philosophical division between words and things. That's the bit that creates unnecessary problems. But words are also part of the world and words are also things in the world. The distinction between the two may have uses for certain purposes, but if misapplied, just generates false puzzles.

The last claim above does not follow from the bit that precedes it.

Think of when you've watched another sleep. People sleep. We watch. We're part of the world. The world exists while they sleep. If you agree, but still doubt your own experience, then you're working from double standards. Special pleading for your case. — creativesoul

It wasn't about other people sleeping. It was about the question, do I believe the world exists, when I am asleep? The point is not about the existence of the world. It is about the logical ground for believing in something when not perceiving. There is a clear difference.

We cannot change the tree on the road with our words alone. It does not follow from that that we cannot change the world with our words. Strictly speaking we do always change the world with our language, if for no other reason than we've added more examples of language use to it. — creativesoul

X cannot do Y. That doesn't mean X cannot do Y? Is this not a contradiction? This is exactly the confusion I have been telling he has been insisting on. :)

The point is that we do sometimes use language to do exactly what you said, but... and this is the important part... — creativesoul

Literally you could say anything. But that alone doesn't change anything in the real world. You need action to change the world. I take it that you have never cut your grass by yourself in your life for sure. :rofl: How nice it would be if you can change the world by your words alone. :roll:

You could say your words caused the action to happen. But you forgot the words were just expression (a communicating tool) of your thoughts, emotions and intentions. Not the actions. I hope that you are more reasonable than Banno in understanding and accepting this point. If not, it is OK. I gave my opinion for the points, as you asked for it.

Think of when you've watched another sleep. People sleep. We watch. We're part of the world. The world exists while they sleep. If you agree, but still doubt your own experience, then you're working from double standards. Special pleading for your case.
— creativesoul
It wasn't about other people sleeping. It was about the question, do I believe the world exists, when I am asleep? The point is not about the existence of the world. It is about the logical ground for believing in something when not perceiving. There is a clear difference. — Corvus

You seem to have missed the point.

When we sleep, we are not perceiving the world.

Now apply the example I offered. It is of a case where someone we're watching is sleeping, and the world still exists even though they are not perceiving the world. The same holds true of the world and you while you sleep.

We cannot change the tree on the road with our words alone. It does not follow from that that we cannot change the world with our words. Strictly speaking we do always change the world with our language, if for no other reason than we've added more examples of language use to it.
— creativesoul
X cannot do Y. That doesn't mean X cannot do Y? Is this not a contradiction?

You're mistaken here. "change the tree on the road with our words alone" is not equivalent to "change the world with our words". In other words, you've assigned the same variable "Y" to two different things and then treated them as the same thing. They're not.

See that word "alone"?

Words do not cut down trees. Words can instruct another to cut down trees... using language to do so.

The problem then arises with the philosophical division between words and things. That's the bit that creates unnecessary problems. — Ludwig V

Yes.

As I previously said in this long thread: Philosophers... always finding problems where there are none. :wink:

But words are also part of the world and words are also things in the world. The distinction between the two may have uses for certain purposes, but if misapplied, just generates false puzzles. — Ludwig V

I agree. Very well explained, Ludwig. I also think that Austin wants to argue about this in some paragraphs. Especially, when he explains the extension of the application and uses on words such as 'real' and 'good'.

You seem to have missed the point.

When we sleep, we are not perceiving the world.

Now apply the example I offered. It is of a case where someone we're watching is sleeping, and the world still exists even though they are not perceiving the world. The same holds true of the world and you while you sleep. — creativesoul

The point is that we are talking about a logical ground to believe in the world when not perceiving the world.  Please ask yourself, what is your logical ground for believing in the world when not perceiving the world.  Please don't say the world exists even when you are not perceiving it, because it is not what we are talking about here. We are talking about the basis for scepticim regarding the external world.

You're mistaken here. "change the tree on the road with our words alone" is not equivalent to "change the world with our words". In other words, you've assigned the same variable "Y" to two different things and then treated them as the same thing. They're not.

See that word "alone"?

Words do not cut down trees. Words can instruct another to cut down trees... using language to do so. — creativesoul

But did words cut the tree itself? What tools did the words use for cutting down the tree?
OK, you say now you gave instruction to cut down the tree. Did the tree surgeon cut down the tree without any payments for it? If you gave the instruction to cut the tree, but haven't paid for the work, would he have cut the tree?

What if the tree surgeon refused to cut the tree, because the tree is not allowed to be cut due to the local conservation laws. What if he misunderstood your instruction, and cut the tree in next door neighbour's garden instead? But more importantly, did you give the instruction to cut the tree out of blue with no thoughts why the tree needs cut?

Again you could insist on saying that your words in the instruction caused the tree to be cut, but with all the above possibilities with the situation, are you actually justified to claim that it was your instruction which cut down the tree? Some people in ordinary daily life might say that, but you must be aware of the fact that here we are talking about rigid philosophical analysis on the change of the world, not daily life conversations.

The bottom line here is whether logically, if a hammer is the broken door. You used a hammer to repair the door. But the hammer is not the door. If you said that they are the same, I don't see any more point honestly.

Anyhow, I have gone over this same stuff with Banno all along, and I don't see any point of doing so again with yourself. My points are clear.

1. We don't have a logical ground to believe in the world while not perceiving it.
2. Words are not actions.
3. Words are not things.
4. Language is a communicating tool.
Have a nice day.

Cool, thanks!

While in general support of your arguments, I think your #1 is suspect.

It’s nonetheless quite obvious, if you’re doing continental metaphysics and everyone else is doing meta-linguistics, the chances for agreeing on much of anything is vanishingly small.

Ok good point. This is my argument.
The logical ground for me to believe the tree exists across the road is that, I have perceived its existence. There is no other ground for me to believe in the tree to exist apart from the perception.
But when I don't perceive it, I don't have that ground to believe it still exists. It might well be existing, but with no perception of it, there is no ground for believing it anymore.

Normally people still believe the tree to exist when not seeing it, because that's what they do.
But as I don't have a ground to believe in its existence, I can choose not to believe in its existence.
Now which belief is more rational? I would say my belief is more rational than the ordinary peoples' belief, because their belief has no ground, but I chose not to believe in its existence when I don't have a logical and epistemic ground to believe in it.

So the whole point of argument was about the logical ground for belief in the world, rather than the existence of the world itself.

The logical ground for me to believe the tree exists across the road is that, I have perceived its existence. There is no other ground for me to believe in the tree to exist apart from the perception. — Corvus

You might believe the tree exists because a trusted friend told you so, and on the other hand, your perception might be delivering false information to you if, for instance, you have taken a hallucinogenic drug. So, though it's true that if you perceive a tree, it's rational to believe there's a tree, it's probably not the only grounding for such a belief, right?

You might believe the tree exists because a trusted friend told you so, and on the other hand, your perception might be delivering false information to you if, for instance, you have taken a hallucinogenic drug. So, though it's true that if you perceive a tree, it's rational to believe there's a tree, it's probably not the only grounding for such a belief, right? — frank

hmmm being a sceptic, I am afraid I don't base on any of above case as the logical infallible ground for the existence of the tree apart from my own perception. Maybe some other folks might. Not me. :)

I am afraid I don't base on any of above as the logical infallible ground for the existence of the tree apart from my own perception. — Corvus

I don't think your perception is infallible. LSD is not a "true" hallucinogenic, which means you know at the time that what you're seeing isn't real. For instance, I had an incident where I observed that the moon was following me around. I knew that wasn't real, though.

I don't think your perception is infallible. LSD is not a "true" hallucinogenic, which means you know at the time that what you're seeing isn't real. For instance, I had an incident where I observed that the moon was following me around. I knew that wasn't real, though. — frank

Sure, I don't claim my perception is infallible. As a sceptic, in fact I even doubt my own perception. But it is the most reliable source of knowledge for me.

And the 2nd reason that I don't believe in the objects in the world is that there is a possibility that my perception was mistaken, it could have been an illusion, the tree I thought existed was cut down by someone while not being perceived by me, and not there anymore, or it could have been hit by lightening, and burnt down to ashes (and I am certain that it wasn't someone's words or shoutings that caused the burnt down - no, no. That would be an irrational belief or claim, if not insane ) ... etc. I am open minded about all the possibilities that existence can succumb to at anytime. I think it is a rational belief to have.

As a sceptic, in fact I even doubt my own perception. But it is the most reliable source of knowledge for me. — Corvus

Right. I don't think Austin is arguing with that, although it may seem that some posters in this thread are. He was taking issue with a theory of perception transmitted by Ayers, which says your knowledge of external entities is built up from smaller units of perception called "sense data."

The idea is that what you directly perceive are these units, and the larger things like trees are constructed from the smaller ones. I think Ayers would have been interested to learn that this doesn't mesh with what we now know about perception, which is that the brain appears to be "wired" to anticipate objects, which is kind of what Kant believed @Mww, although I don't think he would have thought of it as the brain doing it.

Austin's objections have to do with the way we talk about perception, that we say we've perceived a tree, we don't say we've perceived sense data, so he's saying that Ayers' supporters are misusing English. I think they could have answered that by saying they would make up their own jargon, which is very common and acceptable. Otherwise, Austin puts forward arguments that are ancient philosophical issues.

The logical ground for me to believe the tree exists across the road is that, I have perceived its existence. — Corvus

I agree you have the logical ground for the existence of a thing, as you say, while not perceiving it, iff you’ve already had the experience of that thing, under sufficiently congruent conditions. Your #1 asserts you have no logical ground for believing while not perceiving, which is precisely the time in which that ground is all you have.

There is no other ground for me to believe in the tree to exist apart from the perception. — Corvus

Actually, there is no other ground for knowing the tree exists, with apodeitic certainty, apart from the perception of it. You can still think whatever you please.

So the whole point of argument was about the logical ground for belief in the world, rather than the existence of the world itself. — Corvus

Agreed, which makes explicit the vast dissimilarities between mere belief conditioned by logic and empirical knowledge conditioned by perception.

Thanks for your elucidation. Clear and precise analysis. :cool: :up:

I don't think he would have thought of it as the brain doing it. — frank

Oh, he was quite aware the brain does everything, but we as human don’t consciously operate in accordance with the scientific mode of brain mechanics. And, of course, we don’t give a damn how we operate un- or sub-consciously, insofar we are not sufficiently equipped to know of it, so not much point in constructing a speculative methodological system grounded in something we know precious little about.
————-



Yeah, well, I’m still on your side, though we’re both technically outside the boundaries of the discussion.

Right. I don't think Austin is arguing with that, although it may seem that some posters in this thread are. He was taking issue with a theory of perception transmitted by Ayers, which says your knowledge of external entities is built up from smaller units of perception called "sense data." — frank

I am not sure if perception or indeed any mental events could be reduced to the brain from Epistemology and Metaphysical perspectives.  It cannot be denied that the brain is where all the mental events happen, but from that boundary we are entering the physiological and neurological land, which are the foreign territories.

There are lots of issues that can be talked about at the conceptual level on mental activities since ancient times, and that is what we have been doing, and I don't see much changes in the near future for that trend to change as far as speculative Philosophy is concerned, and I am happy with that.

For sense data theory of perception, I feel that it is more reasonable than any other theories of perception.  When I see an object in the world, many times I am not sure what it is at first, when they are some distance away.  All I get is the extension and colour of the object. 

The extension is in the space and time, but the colour is a property from my consciousness, so there is some synthesis going on in perception. At this stage of the perception the object is nothing more than data i.e. I know the shape, colour and the location of the object (i.e. on the grass of the garden). I can further go and look close into the object and try to find out what it is looking for more data on the object. 

But even if it was found out to be a tree leaf, if I keep asking questions on it, there are more facts I don't know about the leaf i.e. which tree did it fall from? Was it indeed from the trees in the garden? or Was it blown into the location?  How long was it there? So, I never get absolute full information about the leaf, and in that sense, it still remains as data.  Data is also, by definition, information that can be stored and retrieved for further manipulation, which is coherent with perceived data, because we remember, imagine and reason with the perceived data after the perception.

This is the case even when I pick up a cup with my hand and look into it. Of course it is a cup, but at asking where it is made. what it is made of, who made it, or which factory made it, what is the diameter?, the weight? ... etc. Of course some information will be available if I go and measure the diameter with the ruler, and weigh it on the scale, but many information still remains unanswered. It is a data. For some naive direct realist, it is a cup, and that's the end of story for them. For me, there is a lot more I don't know about the cup. It is a data needing more investigation if need be, and possible to find out more information on the data in due course. Because a cup is a cup, not just because it looks like a cup, but because it has the extensive properties (some are in the form of essential properties and some are informational properties) attached to it for being a cup.

Anyway, I feel in that sense, Austin's endeavour trying to criticise or deny Ayer's Sense Data theory had been in vain.  Asking how we talk about perception is interesting, but it wouldn't make our perception have more certainty in perceiving.

It would have been more meaningful if Austin came up with his own definition and theory of perception before criticising Ayer, but it doesn't appear to be the case.

Yeah, well, I’m still on your side, though we’re both technically outside the boundaries of the discussion. — Mww

:ok: :cool:

Did folk notice ' new thread?

Yes, appreciatively.

IX
This, and the last lecture, are twice the length of the other lectures. Austin is broadening his account here, becoming more explicit as to his method. In this lecture he is also sorting out some of the motivation he ascribes to Ayer. Austin has argued that Ayer makes use of the Argument from Illusion, but that a closer reading shows Ayer does not actually believe the argument. That is, Ayer does not reach the conclusion, that what we directly perceive are sense data, as a consequence of consideration of the Argument from Illusion. Rather, Ayer has other reasons for his view, and uses the Argument for Illusion only rhetorically, as a post hoc justification.

This lecture, then, examines Ayer's actual motivation.

But before pursuing Austin's argument, it would be worth looking in a bit more detail at the broader context in which Ayer was writing. What follows is my own potted history.

Since Hume, the great problem for empiricism has been moving beyond observation. How is it that we can move from what is here, before us, now, to a general principle or a prediction as to what will occur next? How do we get from the observation of a white swan to the principle that all swans are white?

There are at least three aspects to this problem - it's really a series of problems. First is the problem overtly addressed in the present essay: how is it that we can move from the evidence of our senses, on which empiricism is supposedly grounded, to making true statements about the world? Second is the problem of induction, how we can move from a series of such observations to a general principle, a "law". The third problem is to do with when we might correctly say that one even causes another.

Ayer was addressing these problems. The two main rival accounts were that of Karl Popper and of fellow logical positivist Rudolf Carnap.

Roughly, Carnap tried to quantify confirmation - the more observations, the better. This was not very convincing. Popper took on the impossibility of indubitable confirmation, and proposed instead that science was based on proving our conjectures wrong.

For a long while Popper's falsification was the winner, at least in terms of popularity, although Bayesian analysis owes much to Carnap, and the arguments are far from finished. I'd surmise that Ayer thought of himself as addressing these rivals, and that Austin's quite different account came out of left field for him.

IX continued...
A bit more about Ayer, perhaps, since it's arguable that Austin is addressing a caricature, rather than the real McCoy.

The SEP article on Sense Data starts its account by listing things generally agreed:

• In perceiving, we are directly and immediately aware of a sense datum.
• This awareness occurs by a relation of direct mental acquaintance with a datum.
• Sense data have the properties that they appear to have.
• These properties are determinate; in vision, we experience determinate shapes, sizes, and colours.
• Our awareness of such properties of sense data does not involve the affirmation or conception of any object beyond the datum.

Consider the last of these. There are some who supose that our sense data provide information about the things in the world; while others will claim that we there are issues if we move beyond the sense data to make claims about the state of the world that is supposed to bring them about. Ayer has a compromise. So some will say, of a coin viewed obliquely, that the sense data is oval in shape, while the coin remains circular; others would say that the coin viewed obliquely changes shape from circular to oval. Ayer, to his credit, argues that the difference between these two accounts is linguistic, that this is not a difference in ontology but in semantics.

For Ayer, statements about objects just are statements about sense data.

(For my part, that this discussion should take place at all shows something of the poverty of the sense data theory).

LSD is not a "true" hallucinogenic, which means you know at the time that what you're seeing isn't real. — frank

You might try increasing the dosage. You cannot dismiss all that you see while you're on acid as not real, because you must see some real things or else you\d be completely lost in a completely unfamiliar surrounding. So some of what you see must be real.

The problem of course is how do you distinguish between what is real and what is not real. And if you cannot make the distinction you cannot know that what you are seeing isn't real, at any given time, nor that what you are seeing is real at any given time.

It is obvious that we cannot cut a tree with just words, but we can't cut it if we don't understand the act of 'cutting' either. — javi2541997

This is true, but it is also true that we don't need language in order to understand the act of cutting. Think beavers, for example, or leaf-cutter ants.

This is true, but it is also true that we don't need language in order to understand the act of cutting. Think beavers, for example, or leaf-cutter ants. — Janus

Yes, that's true. We can understand the act of 'cutting' by mimicking it with gestures too, for instance. If I am not wrong, I think Austin argues about this in other books. How to do things with words, I guess.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Lecture IX: The smack-down that Austin gives Ayer here seems almost uncanny (@Banno even feels Ayer might be misrepresented). And so how is Austin able to claim this kind of logical necessity? Take Ayer’s example when “I see a stick which looks crooked”. (P.87) Ayer wants to make this a special kind of “seeing”, but Austin says that what this ”shows” us is “that what looks crooked may not really be crooked.” almost as if it were a rule (P.88). He says this is something “we all know”, but then who are “we”? and what do we “know”? Isn’t it everyone who knows how “looks” works, in its sense of “seems”? Is there anyone who would deny the implication? Though perhaps there is a moment where it hasn’t yet dawned on you, but then you realize it (maybe with a slap to the head, as it seems obvious now), maybe if it were emphasized “I see a stick which looks crooked”, and then it is a given to accept the unspoken implication, as if it were simply a continuation of the sentence, “[but I don’t know that it is crooked or just seems that way]” and there might be other implications that we could acknowledge apply here, as “[until I get more evidence, look at it closer, differently].” So then ask yourself, say @Corvus, how these “just words” have now become, undeniable?

We are talking about the basis for scepticism regarding the external world. — Corvus

I agree that scepticism is a fundamental starting-point for this debate. But there's a question of the burden of proof. Your challenge to me is to provide a reason for believing that the cup that holds your coffee exists when you don't perceive it. Do you accept that if you were to turn and look at it, you would see it? Is that not a reason for believing that it still exists?

You either don't accept the counterfactual or don't accept that the counterfactual implies that the cup exists when you don't perceive it.

Remember the part about how words don't affect the world? If you think that the cup exists when you perceive it and doesn't exist when you don't, you believe that your perceiving affects the world. Most people, I think, believe that it does not - at least in paradigm cases like your cup of coffee.

I think the counter-factual is a reason for believing that your cup of coffee exists whether you perceive it or not. So I think that the burden of proof is on you. So I ask you what reason you have for not believing that the cup exists whether you perceive it or not?

You might also like to look up Berkeley's argument for believing that he does not perceive himself when he perceives the cup and yet believes in his own existence, and then for believing that his perceptions must have a cause, that he is not the cause and hence that God exists even though he does not perceive God. (You don't have to be a theist here. You could just believe in external objects as the cause of your perceptions instead of God.)

For Ayer, statements about objects just are statements about sense data. — Banno

Exactly. But it depends on the linguistic version of the issue. The question is, whether the two versions are equivalent. However, sense-datum language implies a general scepticism about external objects. Ordinary language does not. So can we not conclude that the two versions are not equivalent and hence not inter-translatable?

This is the case even when I pick up a cup with my hand and look into it. — Corvus

You have put you finger on what gets left out of the debate. I think that even Austin accepts the dissection of perception out of our lives and to a large extent overlooks the huge contribution that our actions in the world modify how we perceive it. Our perceptions are not like images on a screen. There is a feed-back between perception and action. Ayer nearly gets there when he says that prediction is crucial, but misses the point that predictions are not only based on sense-data but on the results of actions.

The desire to anticipate the implications of our actions is also a motivation for a general explanation. If there is anything Austin is good at, it is showing that abstraction is the death of truth. It seems clever to find one criteria to judge everything by (true or false? Real or not?) because it doesn’t change, which makes for predictable outcomes. But a general account also flattens out distinctions, which are exactly what will inform us of what might happen in a particular instance. — Antony Nickles

Yes. But I think that abstraction and generalization (which, despite Berkeley, I do not think are the same thing) are also sources of truth. So let's not over-generalize about it. Pragmatism is probably the best policy here.