Ask yourself when you last acted as if there were no other people, no things, no animals, i.e. nothing other than yourself. When did you last refrain from eating because you doubted the existence of food? When did you last believe, and treat, people you see across the street from you as if they were only, e.g., 6 inches tall because that's how they appeared to be when you saw them, and thought that they became 6 feet tall when they crossed the street to speak to you — Ciceronianus

I recognize shades of your critique of Descartes’ radical doubt here. Apart from your disagreement with Descartes, how pervasive a problem do you see this kind of thinking as being within the contemporary philosophical community as a whole , or the history of philosophy? It’s fine and dandy for all of us here to agree how silly and pointless it would be to reason in the manner you depicted above, especially given you made no effort to justify it or widen the context of its use. But without reference to concrete examples in philosophy ( preferably from someone other than Descartes), the O.P. seems to be tilting at windmills.

Descartes and Hume both distinguished beliefs produced by reason from beliefs produced by the imagination (i.e. by instinct, custom and habit), an imagination which we share with the beasts. In their view, a method of belief formation presents itself as a method of reasoning only if it appears to justify certainty about its conclusions. Any method of belief formation which fails to promise certainty must first be vindicated by a proper method of reasoning before we can rely on it. And if this can’t be done, we must admit that to form beliefs by that method is to yield to the workings of our imagination. Since induction could not be so vindicated, Hume made the required admission:

"the experimental reasoning, which we posses in common with the beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to ourselves (my italics) (Hume 1975: 108)

And he thought the same applied to any method of belief formation. For Hume, ‘belief produced by reason’ is an empty category; for him, our beliefs are governed by the very principles of instinct and imagination which rule the mental lives of the beats. — D. Owens.

https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/1211/1/owensdj3.htm

Hume elsewhere confesses that he does indeed expect the future to be like the past, and the ground not to collapse beneath him. My understanding that he is not in fact attacking the common-sense understanding of the world at all, Rather he is attacking the over-reach of "reasoning". It is reason that is limited by not being able to get an 'ought' from an 'is' or a 'will be' from a 'has been'.

But humans are not constrained by reason, only philosophy students are, and then only in their academic productions.

...how pervasive a problem do you see this kind of thinking as being within the contemporary philosophical community as a whole , or the history of philosophy? — Joshs

I don't think it a problem in the wider community, nor with professional philosophers, who tend to be more critical of their own thinking. But it's not uncommon amongst the denizens of these fora. It is often dressed as radical scepticism or relativism. My suspicion is that it is found in those with a little philosophy, but not enough.

I always imagined that people have two sets of books in life. There’s what they claim and what they really do. What was Simon Blackburn’s quote - everyone is a realist when they walk out the door.

I think this is all a dream, but it's a remarkably persistent and painful dream that I'm currently unable to wake up from. So I'll continue to eat dream-food and avoid dream-cars and drink dream-alcohol. I don't see anything inconsistent or hypocritical about that.

When did you last ponder whether the car you're driving was in fact a car having the characteristics of a car as you understand them to be, or instead something else you can never know (if, indeed, it was anything at all)? — Ciceronianus

I have a thing where I lose confidence that the road in front of me will be there when I get to it. I think it's along the lines of OCD. I get through it by humming. For some reason, the worst drive is through West Virginia when the big open valleys appear between the peaks. In other words, philosophy probably isn't for you. :razz:

Mmm. Yes and no. Being-for-others itself can be genuine. Perhaps someone acts bravely, even to the point of self-sacrifice, catalyzed by the gaze of the group. There is an inescapable honesty in solitary thought, but there can also be the revelation of a publicly discovered truth. I think that commitment is the differentiator; and I agree that a lot of gratuitous philosophizing smacks of affectation.

"Affectation" according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, is:

"a. Speech or conduct not natural to oneself: an unnatural form of behavior meant especially to impress others; b. the act of taking on or displaying an attitude not natural to oneself or not genuinely felt." — Ciceronianus

Or are you perhaps talking about people post(ur)ing at philosophy forums when it's already past their bedtime?

Some people go to pubs and drink and talk. Some people go to philosophy forums and talk ... and drink.

And besides, one has to try on different philosophies for size, so to speak, given them a trial run. That's not hypocrisy.

Apart from your disagreement with Descartes, how pervasive a problem do you see this kind of thinking as being within the contemporary philosophical community as a whole , or the history of philosophy? — Joshs

Descartes isn't called the "Father of Modern Philosophy" for nothing. Descartes had, and in some respects still has, his followers. It seems to me that Kant, with his things-in-themselves, and any of those who accept dualism, the view that there is an external world, apart from us, the mind-body distinction; those that believe we can't be directly aware of the world, all participate in what seems to me to be an affectation.

The closest real example to the sort of thing you're talking about that comes to mind is Parmenides' denial of the reality of change. However, it seems like his whole point was to show the flaws in the "common sense," view, rather than to put forth an equally common sense/naive view of changelessness.

As you say, such things are normally put forth as thought experiments. What they generally try to show is that the common sense explanation of things cannot be the case, not that the "silly" view is the case. This isn't always true, but it often is. I think that when people embrace extremely counter intuitive ideas of the world, it is because the problems with the "naive view" start to seem worse. That, and some people enjoy being iconoclasts and going against the grain.

I don't think this is (always) affectation meaningless naval gazing though. People have been writing about philosophy for about as long as they have had written language. It's natural to us. Thinking through these sorts of things is natural. A lot of our world is quite counter intuitive, which gives us grounds for testing bedrock assumptions.

Think about a question as simple as "what does it mean for two things to touch?" This actually has a very complex and counter intuitive answer in physics. We don't need to know this answer to know what is meant by "touch" in everyday speech, but knowing more about the more complex answer has helped us do things like build cars, cell phones, GPS satalites, etc. In that way, questioning our starting point is worthwhile.

Likewise, animism is sort of the human default. Both human children and early societies tend towards animism. "Why does the river flood?" Because it wants to. "Why does it rain?" Because the sky is mad.

We have no problem figuring out what someone means by "an angry sky," or what people are saying when they say "free hydrogen atoms want to pair up with oxygen atoms." But at the same time, questioning our initial animist, common sense proclivities, turns out to be time well spent.

My guess is that, if we ever get a really satisfying answer for the relationship between particulars and universals, or a satisfying explanation of how parts relate to wholes, these will actually come with some pretty significant advances in technology and scientific understanding. They seem so basic as to be irrelevant, but the same is true vis-á-vis what it means for two objects to "touch."

Hume elsewhere confesses that he does indeed expect the future to be like the past, and the ground not to collapse beneath him. — unenlightened

Which I think some (like me, maybe) would maintain constitutes a confession he himself
disregards the claims he makes in philosophy all the time. One would think that should make a difference to him, and to others, in assessing the validity and value of his claims.

My understanding that he is not in fact attacking the common-sense understanding of the world at all, Rather he is attacking the over-reach of "reasoning". — unenlightened

In that case, he's attacking a view neither he nor anyone else genuinely accepts, if our conduct is any guide.

My suspicion is that it is found in those with a little philosophy, but not enough. — Banno

I hope your suspicion is correct.

What was Simon Blackburn’s quote - everyone is a realist when they walk out the door. — Tom Storm

Yes. But I'm wondering what it means when they're not a realist otherwise.

I think this is all a dream, but it's a remarkably persistent and painful dream that I'm currently unable to wake up from. — RogueAI

Why call it a dream, then?

have a thing where I lose confidence that the road in front of me will be there when I get to it. I think it's along the lines of OCD. I get through it by humming. For some reason, the worst drive is through West Virginia when the big open valleys appear between the peaks. In other words, philosophy probably isn't for you. :razz: — frank

Interesting that I loved driving through the mountains in West Virginia. Beautiful.

But I think some of philosophy may be genuine.

Well, one is left wondering if some professional philosophers were unduly pretentious. If not He of the Great Moustache, then certainly some of his acolytes; Feyerabend, maybe - Hero of the Left as he was; a few more recent French "thinkers", perhaps...

But one's prejudices will show: I'm authentic, you are ostentatious, he's a wanker.

I don't mean to claim all philosophy is affectation. Consider this a preliminary inquiry into when it becomes affectation.

Well, one is left wondering if some professional philosophers were unduly pretentious. If not He of the Great Moustache, then certainly some of his acolytes; Feyerabend, maybe - Hero of the Left as he was; a few more recent French "thinkers", perhaps...

But one's prejudices will show: I'm authentic, you are ostentatious, he's a wanker. — Banno

According to Wallace Stevens, "Imagination loses vitality as it ceases to adhere to the real." I think the same goes for philosophy.

Why call it a dream, then? — Ciceronianus

Because I think it is one. I don't think non-conscious non-mental stuff can produce minds and consciousness.

And besides, one has to try on different philosophies for size, so to speak, given them a trial run. That's not hypocrisy. — baker

I don't think what I refer to is hypocrisy. But I think there's more involved than a "trial run" by the curious. I do think it's peculiar, and aberrant in a way, requiring an explanation. I'm wondering if it's a kind of contrivance on the part of those who engage in it.

Because I think it is one. I don't think non-conscious non-mental stuff can produce minds and consciousness. — RogueAI

What happens when you wake up?

What happens when you wake up? — Ciceronianus

You become one with the godmind? I don't know for sure.

As you say, such things are normally put forth as though experiments. What they generally try to show is that the common sense explanation of things cannot be the case, not that the silly view is the case. This isn't always true, but it often is. I think that when people embrace extremely counter intuitive ideas of the world, it is because the problems with the naive view start to become insurmountable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think those like Austin show that in most cases, if not in all of them, the "naive view" starts to "become insurmountable" only due to confusion and error. But I'm curious how we come to think that a stick in a glass of water and other such things establishes that we cannot trust our senses. Do we really believe the stick bends on contact with water? No. Why, then, do we claim we think it does? It's a kind of special pleading.

Which I think some (like me, maybe) would maintain constitutes a confession he himself
disregards the claims he makes in philosophy all the time. One would think that should make a difference to him, and to others, in assessing the validity and value of his claims.

There is an important bit of nuance here; Hume absolutely did think that we couldn't justify induction without reference to induction. He does appear to take this claim seriously.

If Hume is right, then we can't justify induction via any straightforward, foundationalist, rationalist argument.

This isn't inconsistent with Hume saying that "of course we still end up using inductive reasoning, because we sort of have to."

Likewise, his reduction of cause to constant conjunction has a similar bit of nuance. Does he really think cause doesn't exist? IDK. Does he take the epistemic issues his argument highlights seriously? Absolutely.

“We should not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts”. -C S Peirce

Plato uses the "stick in water" example because it's an obvious example of sight not matching reality.



A and B being identical shades of gray would be a less obvious example. I've had students refuse to believe they are the same before I copy and paste them into the same paint file before, so it definitely isn't intuitive.

I think those like Austin show that in most cases, if not in all of them, the "naive view" starts to "become insurmountable" only due to confusion and error

IDK, wouldn't the Earth being round, the Earth rotating around the Sun, etc. all be examples here? Same with Galileo's finding re the period of pendulums and the rate at which things fall in a vacuum. Aristotle"s physics remained so popular for so long precisely because it was intuitive and seemed to match sense data.

I think those like Austin show that in most cases, if not in all of them, the "naive view" starts to "become insurmountable" only due to confusion and error. — Ciceronianus

Someone should start a thread about that...

Someone should start a thread about that... — Banno

That's a great idea.

This isn't inconsistent with Hume saying that "of course we still end up using inductive reasoning, because we sort of have to." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Or 'a more scientifically updated Hume' saying, "of course we still end up using the deep learning in our neural networks because we sort of have to."

This isn't inconsistent with Hume saying that "of course we still end up using inductive reasoning, because we sort of have to." — Count Timothy von Icarus

If we "have to" there's something about it, or us, which requires or provides for its use. How/why is it appropriate to insist it's use must be justified if that's the case? What induces someone to claim that what we have to do by virtue of the fact we live is unwarranted?