There were other reasons for invasion. Conquest wasn’t one of them. — Mikie

Except for the parts of Ukraine actually conquered and annexed, right?

I think for the Ukrainians, the distinction between "conquest" and a "special military operation to demilitarise and denazify" is rather academic.

I think for the Ukrainians, the distinction between "conquest" and a "special military operation to demilitarise and denazify" is rather academic. — Echarmion

I'd rather call it pro-Russian propaganda. Indeed, these people have no problems to whine over American imperialism EVEN WHEN American didn't "conquest" anything. While they refrain from talking about Russian imperialism when the territorial conquest actually happens before they eyes while they are denying it. The intellectual misery is cosmic.
BTW here is a useful definition of imperialism from Wikipedia:
Imperialism is the practice, theory or attitude of maintaining or extending power over foreign nations, particularly through expansionism, employing not only hard power (military and economic power) but also soft power (diplomatic power and cultural imperialism). Imperialism focuses on establishing or maintaining hegemony and a more or less formal empire. While related to the concepts of colonialism, imperialism is a distinct concept that can apply to other forms of expansion and many forms of government.
And then ask them: is Russia imperialist according to that definition?
Besides the assumption that politics is about political leaders' intentions (which they wish to be more able to detect than involved political leaders) is rather myopic, also from their guru Mearsheimer's point of view . But apparently self-entitled anonymous nobodies on the internet want to teach politicians how to do their job.

The point is that even considering differences, Russia was not going to occupy the whole Afghanistan with 70 thousand troops or America was not going to occupy Panama with 30 thousand troops. So the whole 'conquest' argument is a strawman.

By the way, you still have not answered my question. Is the phrase so difficult to understand? 'Russia has no concerns' - what could that mean?

Putin and others have been saying different things to different people at different times AND provide the relevant evidence. — Jabberwock

One more evidence: 02.01.2005 Interview with Sergej Lavrov (Foreign minister of Russia) by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt:

Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?

Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on.

https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html

I'd rather call it pro-Russian propaganda. Indeed, these people have no problems to whine over American imperialism EVEN WHEN American didn't "conquest" anything. While refrain from talking about Russian imperialism when the territorial conquest actually happens before they eyes while they are denying it. The intellectual misery is cosmic. — neomac

I would rather turn this around and point out that @Mikie and presumably also the other posters would never accept this kind of argument If we were talking about an US invasion.

They'd scoff at the notion that the US didn't intend to "conquer" Iraq but only to fight terrorism. If we tried to argue that the US had no imperialist ambitions in Iraq and merely reacted to "reasonable security concerns", that really the "most direct cause" of the invasion was the alignment of Iraq with the supporters of radical Islam, they'd laugh us out of the room.

The invasion of Iraq is also an interesting analogy as far as the numbers are concerned. The population of Iraq is 43 million. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq had a large army that was considered relatively modern and effective. Yet the initial invasion forces also numbered "only" some 160.000.

If, for some wild reason, the invasion had failed, would we now be talking about how the US couldn't possibly have intended to conquer Iraq, since clearly it didn't have the troops?

Exactly. But it’s fun to watch people use sarcasm in such a ridiculous way. No one serious denies US power in world affairs, but in order to feel a fake sense of superiority it’s necessary to reduce this fact to absurdity: “That guy slipped on a banana peel— must be the US, ay guys? Har-har-har.” — Mikie

Agreed.

Western policy has been a complete disaster, it's now becoming obvious, so denialists must retreat into the safety of thought terminating clichés:

A thought-terminating cliché (also known as a semantic stop-sign, a thought-stopper, bumper sticker logic, or cliché thinking) is a form of loaded language, often passing as folk wisdom, intended to end an argument and quell cognitive dissonance.[1][2][3] Its function is to stop an argument from proceeding further, ending the debate with a cliché rather than a point.[1] Some such clichés are not inherently terminating; they only become so when used to intentionally dismiss dissent or justify fallacious logic.[4]

The term was popularized by Robert Jay Lifton in his 1961 book Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, who referred to the use of the cliché, along with "loading the language", as "the language of non-thought".[5]

The earliest recorded definition of the term was published in Robert Jay Lifton's book Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism in 1961 wherein he was describing the structure of language used by the Chinese Communist Party, defining the term as "the start and finish of any ideological analysis". — Thought-terminating cliché - Wikipedia

Meanwhile, our defense industry is loving it to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. But I’m sure that has no “major” influence here either.

Anyway, thanks for taking the time to rehash it all again in detail. I really can’t do it anymore. (That’s why I could never be a teacher.) — Mikie

Thanks!

If it is of any use, I write mainly for people who maybe following the discussion and are genuinely curious what arguments can stand up to scrutiny and who can see something as propaganda or the clichés mentioned above but can't quite see the full structure of how it works.

In this light my opponents are very helpful and obliging foils.

My principle project here on the forum is to develop strategies of dealing with bad faith debaters. The first tactic of a bad faith debater is of course to try to both confuse and render the debate tiresome; so rehashing is one such counter-tactic. Most importantly is to call out and clearly explain the ulterior motives; conceding "good intentions" to a bad faith interlocutor is to concede defeat and motivated only by either cowardice or one's own ulterior motive to fraternize with, rather than confront, evil.

So the whole 'conquest' argument is a strawman. — Jabberwock

Okay— so Russia didn’t plan on conquering Ukraine. Glad you don’t think so. It’s hardly a strawman, though:

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has continued to harbor significant resentment against Independent Ukraine, the country it still thinks of as a critical part of ‘Mother Russia’. It therefore considers the conquest of Ukraine as being vital for the restoration of its so-called “Historical Russia”.

https://war.ukraine.ua/why-is-russia-invading-ukraine/

'Russia has no concerns' - what could that mean? — Jabberwock

As long as it’s not right next door in Ukraine. NATO had already expanded at the time of this quote. The worry wasn’t about Lithuania or Estonia — although there are reports that this was hardly celebrated.

What could “Russia will organize its military policies accordingly in connection with NATO nearing its borders” mean? “Yes, please, set up shop right next door to a country we view as incredibly important to us?”

It’s hard to understand why people are so confused about why NATO, or general US influence (including economic influence), in Ukraine would be considered a negative thing in Russia— even if “emotional” and irrational. I don’t think anyone serious denies this, leaving aside for a moment whether it was a major factor in the war (as I maintain) or a minor/nonexistent one.

They'd scoff at the notion that the US didn't intend to "conquer" Iraq but only to fight terrorism. If we tried to argue that the US had no imperialist ambitions in Iraq and merely reacted to "reasonable security concerns", that really the "most direct cause" of the invasion was the alignment of Iraq with the supporters of radical Islam, they'd laugh us out of the room. — Echarmion

This is a good point. You’re forgetting two things, though: first, I’m not trying to justify Russia’s actions. In fact I’ve condemned them all along. I think it’s both morally wrong and strategically stupid, as they’ve now pushed even more countries into the hands of the US.

Secondly, when analyzing the justification given by the aggressor state, you look at the evidence. The justification for invading Iraq (connections to 9/11, weapons of mass destruction, etc) turned out to be completely bogus. And the goal wasn’t to conquer Iraq anyway. The actual reason, in my view, was economic.

So in Russia’s case, is there any evidence that NATO is a major factor? Yes, there is. Doesn’t make it correct or rational. Furthermore, it doesn’t make it the only cause.

Saying the US invaded Iraq because the US is evil and George Bush is a madman wouldn’t be a strong argument. Likewise, rejecting that thesis wouldn’t justify the actual (well supported) reasons.

BTW how many rubles do I owe you, prof? — neomac

Me, you owe nothing.

If you have been paying attention, I have already explained several times the basics of negotiation. Attempting to redefine the terms after the deal is concluded is called reneging and an insult to anyone whose word means anything to them.

For example, when Merkel et. al. brag about the Minsk accords being agreed to in bad faith without any intention to implement it in order to "buy time" for Ukraine, it is called reneging. Hopefully that will help you remember the definition.

Had I wanted anything from you in exchange for my services, I would have negotiated that before delivering the goods, because I am a man of honour.

Your reasoning looks rather out of historical circumstances.
First, Ukrainians didn’t refuse negotiation BY DEFAULT. There have been several attempts for negotiations for a ceasefire, all of them ultimately failed. Add to that a long history of failed agreements and reviving historical tensions between Ukraine and Russia. So the refusal of negotiation can very likely be a consequence of past failed negotiation attempts and failed agreements. — neomac

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was asked by a reporter if he would join negotiations mediated by Turkey if Russian President Vladimir Putin came to the table, and Zelensky said, "I don't accept it."

Erdogan "knows my view," Zelensky said. "We discussed this before the war. I told him to put Putin at the table for negotiations. 'Can we please do that? We must avert a full-scale war.' But [Erdogan] was not able to do that. Not only him — he is powerful — but he is not able to do it. And now he thinks that he is? Now we can't," Zelensky said Friday.

Zelensky explained why he cannot speak to Putin anymore.

"It is not the same man. There is nobody to talk to there," he said. — CNN

This is called repudiating negotiations.

To try to reinterpret what I say as claiming there was never any negotiations is foolish.

I clearly explain that there was a negotiation, nearly successful by some accounts (but clearly happened, was in the news and everything), and then Zelensky rejected the Russian offer and repudiated further negotiations with statements like the above.

Since even normal people intuit there's something wrong with walking away entirely from the negotiation table (the US is in continuous negotiation with Hamas as we speak), some pressure is put on Zelensky about it so he changes his position to he'll negotiation but only after Russia leaves Ukraine, including Crimea, entirely ... which is not how negotiation works. You negotiate the points of contention before an agreement is made and the exchange value actually occurs; simply demanding the counter-party does whatever you want before negotiating is another way of saying one refuses any negotiation.

In diplomatic parlance it's called the "cry baby move of unhinged, immature and reckless politicians that wish to see their own country burn".

Second, hand-weaving at hypothetical compensations for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses while abstracting from relevant historical and geopolitical circumstances is a rather weak argument. — neomac

First, it's not hand waiving, it's what negotiation is about: you seek as much compensation as possible from the parties involved in exchange for whatever you're giving up (money, time, apologies, legal claims, paintings, diamonds, leaving town etc.).

So, if there was a deal on the table that was "sufficient" in terms of being preferable to continued warfare, then the only thing to do is attempt to negotiate an even better formulation of the deal but with the aim of ultimately accepting anyways.

Furthermore, I am not abstracting away from anything, I have routinely and diligently analyzed the battlefield situation using both my own soldiering experience and training (including training specifically designed for a fight with the Russians and exactly the kind of warfare we've seen play out in Ukraine) as well as analysis available elsewhere, to evaluate Ukraine's chance of a battlefield victory.

My conclusion is basically no chance, due to the specifics on the ground (Ukraine lack of capacities the Russians have and Ukraine lack of quantity, such as artillery, where Ukraine does have comparable capacity: how can anyone expect soldiers to prevail in such circumstances?!).

Therefore, if Ukraine has no chance of a battlefield victory then it should strive to negotiate a peace, using the leverage of being able to do further damage to Russia (when you are a weaker party to a conflict, you're leverage is the ability to inflict damage even with little threat of victory; of course, being able to threaten actually victory is better leverage, but people seek to avoid damage if they can so generally offer concessions to terminate the war sooner rather than later; and even when no concessions are offered, such as unconditional surrender, it is still usually better, for real people under your command, to surrender unconditionally than to fight to the death).

Indeed, the idea that the US and European allies would compensate for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses is geopolitically questionable if that implies burdening the US as the hegemon (which has been explicitly and repeatedly antagonised by Russia) and its allies (which can’t easily make concessions to Russia without irritating the hegemon) for the Ukrainian losses (which, notice, would be also Western losses if Ukraine was meant to be more integrated into the Western sphere of influence!), the costs of compensating such losses, and the additional strategic risks (by emboldening Russia, China and Iran witnessing Western weakness) while, at the same time, condoning everything to an anti-Western Russia. And historically questionable: appeasing Hitler just emboldened his hegemonic ambitions (and also encouraged a nasty alliance with the Soviet Union before their great patriotic war, right prof?). — neomac

My oh my oh my oh my.

You've said a lot there from various different perspectives that are not the same.

When I say Ukraine should seek compensation from the West in any peace deal for loss of territory, it is because they have the leverage to get that. If they can get compensation from Russia and from the West in a peace deal, that is clearly better than simply compensation from Russia.

Of course now, Ukraine has very little leverage.

But at the start of the war, for example, in exchange for accepting a peace along the lines of what Russia proposing, Zelensky could have sought various compensation from the West, in particular Europe that has the most to lose from a larger and longer war: such as a fast track into the EU (which Russia explicitly said they did not oppose, only NATO).

True, it would be a compromise where Russia is "appeased".

But as I've explained numerous times, the appeasement argument is totally fallacious and demonstrates a total lack of understanding of history.

The appeasement analogy applied to Ukraine would only be remotely similar if it was about chastising Poland for not fighting to the last Polander.

The criticism of appeasement is not levied at the smaller and weaker countries Hitler gobbled up, accusing them of surrendering or cutting deals rather than fighting to their last man and even worman, but rather the criticism of appeasement is levied at the far larger and stronger countries (UK, France, US) that had an actual chance of defeating Hitler.

Avoiding "appeasement" has nothing to do with smaller countries stuck in the middle of the great powers. It is always the same: the strong do as they will, the weak suffer what they must. And so weaker countries can only strive to suffer as little as possible in navigating the rivalry and clashes of the great powers.

A situation I do not approve of, but is created out of the system of international relations—in which the key word is "national" and the nationalism from which those nations spring—and insofar as we have a system of nations then we have more and less powerful nations and among them the "great powers" who do great things – terrible, yes, but great.

Great things generally aimed at each other but sometimes also space.

The smaller powers stuck in the middle have no interest in fighting to the death for one side or another; one needs really extreme circumstances for that option to be viable.

Now, that such a peace would be potentially "bad" for the West is from a US and Western perspective, not Ukraine's perspective. You are basically giving up the ghost of your position. You are simply taking it as assumed that Ukraine should do whatever the West wants it to do and is in the interest of the West, with no consideration for Ukraine.

And indeed, even if you are correct (which I don't think you are) in assuming any peace between Ukraine and Russia would be good for Russia and bad for the West, that's not an argument that Ukraine shouldn't make peace with Russia; only an argument that the West should not want Ukraine to make peace with Russia.

Now, whether this is inherently true or not, that any deal that is or was remotely feasible between Ukraine and Russia is "bad for the West", certainly, depending on the details, a peace deal would be better or worse for the West, and this is exactly the leverage Ukraine has, or at least had at one point.

How Ukraine could get concessions from the West is in threatening to go and make sure of doing exactly what you say would be bad for the West: i.e. threaten to make peace with the Russians in a way that embarrasses and weakens the West the most.

For example, Zelensky could have gone to the US, NATO, the EU, and said "look, you've slow played us into this disastrous war, if you don't give me some additional compensation (such as fast track EU membership), in addition to what the Russians are offering, so that I can do right by the Ukrainian people and we get something for giving up claim to Crimea, then I'm going to declare the West has abandoned us, no Western soldiers are coming, no no-fly zone is coming, we are alone, abandoned by our Western friends, arms and thoughts and prayers won't defeat the Russians, and therefore we will make peace with the Russians (and then imply a bunch of terms even more embarrassing for the West, such as allowing Russia to have military bases in Ukraine, station missiles, or just further economic cooperation with the Russians etc.).

At this stage of negotiation, the West would need to decide whether to play ball or not and participate in negotiations in order to be able to negotiate terms they can better spin as some sort of "victory" for the West (such as "security guarantees" for Ukraine, integrating Ukraine into other Western institutions such as the EU, and so on). If the West refuses to offer anything, well the Russian deal is still better than a disastrous war, and there's nothing to lose in trying to go get concessions also from other parties concerned.

Third, whatever the Russian initial demands were circumstances for peace negotiation worsened within a month: the failure of the Russian special operation in Kiev (if the objective was Ukrainian capitulation) and the genocidal massacres (like in Bucha) became public (as much Russian state media support of Russian genocidal intents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Russia_Should_Do_with_Ukraine). Later, the deal-breaker demands included also the new annexed oblasts. So I’m not surprised that Ukrainians would be compelled to refuse negotiation. — neomac

Ukraine's leverage was likely the highest before the war even started, as it's a big expense and a big risk to even start the war. Now, Russia wanted more a deal with the West, a new European security architecture, which the West refused saying it's between Russia and Ukraine (exactly because neo-cons at least believe that Ukraine fighting Russia, even if irrational for Ukraine, is better than any peace; no a surprise there), that was more comprehensive, but again Zelensky (if he wasn't an idiot) could have gone and threatened the West with peace into agreeing to negotiate with Russia a new framework in which Ukraine is neutral.

Then there is the first weeks of the war where an offer was on the table, Zelensky could have closed a deal had he wanted.

War crimes are definitely usual in any war, and their investigation can be part of a peace deal; it is simply another point to negotiation, and not a reason to refuse to negotiate (even if we are assuming it was indeed the Russians and not elements in Ukraine that don't want any peace).

Another strong reason is that Ukrainians would like to keep the Western alliance and they could likely count on the decades-long support of the US: Ukraine is on the border of Europe, the historical core of the US’s sphere of influence. — neomac

Yeah, sure, and I'd like a toilet of solid gold.

Simply wanting something is not a rational basis to fight a long and costly war that you are very, very likely to lose.

The relevant question here is whether war is a reasonable way of getting what you want. Maybe it is reasonable for Ukraine to "like to keep the Western alliance" (that Ukraine is not apart of), but it does not follow from that to fight a long and costly war to join the alliance of which the purpose would be ... deter said long and costly war?!?!

While Russia explicitly antagonizes the US hegemony and solicits anti-Western regimes to join Russia in this effort, so both the US and its enemies are compelled to see the war in Ukraine as a critical step to establish a new World Order at the expense of the US. So it is reasonable to expect this be of particular concern for the US. — neomac

Sure, maybe it's reasonable for the US to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian ...

If you are right about your manipulative interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said, that proves at best he shares your views of what is rational. — neomac

I am right that the US is manipulating Ukraine. For example "whatever it takes" and "as long as it takes" are both obviously manipulative lies. Likewise, the billions and billions and billions (and many more billions until you've said billions at least 50 times, assuming each billion stands for at least 2 billions) in hard currency and arms the US sends to Ukraine without any tracing or auditing etc. is also a de facto area of affect bribe to all parties in Ukraine who stand to benefit from billion and billion and billions of untraceable currency and arms. That is not only clear manipulation without even attempting to avoid a situation where the money and arms are de facto bribes, but it was well known ahead of times those arms would find themselves in "the wrong hands" (to use RAND's phrasing) and would supercharge terrorism and organized crime around the world.

However, how this would "prove" Graham shares the same definition of rational as me, and what the point would be, I honestly don't see what that argument is or would be, so you'll have to explain it.

Whatever you're trying to say, rationality does not mean "good" only lacking in self-contradiction, and "self" is a key word as a rational position does not imply a universal position.

People who want to cause as much harm as possible and do as much evil as possible in their limited time, can be perfectly rational in such a pursuit. That they may lack self contradiction in pursuing their purpose to murder, rape and torture, does not make those actions good on account of being rational nor lend any weight to the position that such purposes should be universal and adopted by all rational agents.

It may very well be that it is rational for Senator Graham, relative his neo-con ideology and evil purposes, or even just plain-ol' US imperialism in general, to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. That being true would not somehow make it true that is rational for Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian.

But I find questionable your concept of “rationality” roughly for the same reason I find questionable your interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said. — neomac

How is my interpretation questionable?

If you find something questionable, moreoverso in a philosophical debate, you should explain what's questionable about it and, in the case of interpretation, provide your position on the matter.

How do you interpret Senator Graham's statement?

Before rebutting the rest of your post, I think it is wise to take a hiatus here and see if you even have an alternative interpretation.

For, if you don't (which your failure to support your "questioning" my interpretation by providing an alternative one, very strongly implies that you don't), then your thrashing about in the void is far more easily dealt with as obvious denialism (that even you clearly see in simply denying my interpretation without providing your own) of what Senator Graham obviously has stated (the "quiet part out loud"), and that equally obvious it is a direct and clear statement of US government policy (reinforced further by the lack of anyone from the White House even bothering to contradict Senator Graham, even just for appearance sake ... as it's so obvious an admission of what is so obviously actually happening that it's easier for everyone if the mainstream media simply never cites Graham in full on the US position in the war, much less discuss it).

... such as a fast track into the EU (which Russia explicitly said they did not oppose, only NATO). — boethius

It should be noted that Russia has voiced concerns about Ukraine joining the EU as well, because the EU features a military dimension such as a mutual defense clause (making it function, on paper, in a similar way to Art. 5 of the NATO treaty).

It would of course not involve the US, which the Russians perceive as the primary instigator. That's probably why they've been more open to EU membership for Ukraine.

Okay— so Russia didn’t plan on conquering Ukraine. Glad you don’t think so. — Mikie

I think the scenario of Belarusinization was much more likely - subjugation without formal annexation. It is simply more convenient this way. But for Ukrainians that would make little difference - they would still lose their independence.

As long as it’s not right next door in Ukraine. NATO had already expanded at the time of this quote. The worry wasn’t about Lithuania or Estonia — although there are reports that this was hardly celebrated. — Mikie

But that directly contradicts most of the quotes you have provided! You have given quotes from 1995 and 1997 where exactly that expansion was described as a grave threat and a red line! And just a few years later it turns out that Russia does not really care about that... Your source states:

First, any Russian government would be concerned to assure that the initial expansion was not the first step on the way to subsequent “evolutionary enlargements” that would include the Baltic States and Ukraine. [...] As President Kuchma of Ukraine has said, NATO expansion would place Ukraine “in the front lines” between an expanded NATO and Russia, and the same would be true of the Baltic States and Belarus. — Should NATO grow

Your source clearly states that there would be no difference between the Baltics and Ukraine.

What about your other source?

The Act does not address two aspects of expansion which cause the greatest concern to the Russians, namely the scope and pace of expansion. NATO's current plan is open ended. It clearly contemplates inclusion of the Baltic states. But Russia has made clear that inclusion in NATO of any members of the former Soviet Union is unacceptable. — Opposition to NATO Expansion

So your own sources clearly state that it was 'unacceptable'. When you write 'The worry wasn’t about Lithuania or Estonia' you directly contradict the very sources you have provided.

Not to mention that the quote I have provided was given in 2004, i.e. two years after Ukraine has started its accession to NATO. In other words, Ukraine is on its way to NATO and Kremlin's site writes 'Russia’s relations with NATO are developing positively'.

The Gulf War campaign had about a million coalition troops. The Iraqi Army was no longer considered nearly as well supplied or competent in 2003. Sanctions and the collapse of the USSR as an arms provider had crippled their military, as had a decade of a US enforced no fly zone. During the Gulf War, the US essentially defacto partitioned a whole third of Iraq, which was under Kurdish control and rule after.

When the US invaded in 2003, it has 60,000 Kurdish Peshmerga supporting their operations, and essentially started with a third of the country under their control. It still invaded with an overall coalition of about 600,000.

Another comparison might be Vietnam. South Vietnam had about half the population of Ukraine but the SVA and US forced for COIN operations there peaked at 1.4 million.

However, in general, the size of military deployments has been decreasing. Modern warfare has shown a definite trend towards quality beating quantity. Military hardware is significantly more expensive when adjusting for inflation than during WWII and soldiers now require more training.

Russia's invasion was largely predicated on the prediction that Ukraine's would collapse. The low troop numbers represent Russia's (over)confidence in this collapse, over confidence in the effectiveness of bribes they had paid to Ukrainian leaders, corruption (they thought they had more men than they did, there have been multiple trials over under strength formations and "ghost soldiers"), and general poor planning skills, more than anything relative to their war aims IMO. That and their relative inability to mobilize and support a much larger force. After all, they couldn't support the men they went in with. Having more unsupported columns wouldn't have helped them.

Even a layman can understand that a country that has been receiving western military aid for a decade, with a large, well-trained and well-equipped military, wasn't simply going to 'collapse'.

Like the Afghan National Army? Or the Iraqi Armed Forces in the face of ISIS? Or the South Vietnamese Army? Those three all received significantly more aid than the US had provided to Ukraine before the invasion. The US had not particularly provided all that much by means of lethal aid before the war, whereas it had fully outfitted the Iraqi military with aircraft, artillery, tanks, IFVs, stuff the US still won't give to Ukraine or has only given to them in token numbers. And the Iraqi military had way more recent combat experience than the Ukrainians, with veterans of the war with Iran, Kuwait, the Gulf, and the civil war. But collapse they definitely did.

ISIS blitzed Mosul, Kirkuk, and besieged Baghdad with a quite small force because resistance collapsed, despite plenty of Western aid and training. Less well equiped Peshmerga and Shia militias actually preformed a good deal better (partly due to essentially facing the threat of genocide).

Quality of equipment and quantity of $ aid means very little if morale collapses, or if you have effectively bribed commanders to "throw open the gates," for you. Russian intelligence operations, bribes/pressure did help them gain Kherson City easily, due to collusion. They expected that to happen in many more places?

Maybe they expected Zelensky to flee. I was a little surprised he didn't. Maybe he turned out to be the wildcard the Russians weren't expecting.

This is a good point. You’re forgetting two things, though: first, I’m not trying to justify Russia’s actions. In fact I’ve condemned them all along. I think it’s both morally wrong and strategically stupid, as they’ve now pushed even more countries into the hands of the US. — Mikie

That's fair. But I do think it changes the moral judgement a fair bit whether we think of the US invasion of Iraq as a misguided and ultimately tragically counterproductive attempt at fighting terrorism or as a cynical move to exploit a tragedy in order to reshape the middle east according to the US' geopolitical interests.

For similar reasons, it does rankle me if Putin is called a "reactive leader" in this context for, even if it's not meant to exculpate him, it seems to nevertheless distract from the fact that had he not given the order, thousands victims of this war would be alive today (though this is ultimately tangential to our discussion).

Secondly, when analyzing the justification given by the aggressor state, you look at the evidence. The justification for invading Iraq (connections to 9/11, weapons of mass destruction, etc) turned out to be completely bogus. And the goal wasn’t to conquer Iraq anyway. The actual reason, in my view, was economic.

So in Russia’s case, is there any evidence that NATO is a major factor? Yes, there is. Doesn’t make it correct or rational. Furthermore, it doesn’t make it the only cause. — Mikie

Sure, it's a different case with different facts. The analogy only goes so far.

Mostly what I'm interested in at this point isn't debating an individual point - we have tried that at length. But I do (obviously) also think I'm looking at the evidence.

You're drawing a direct line from NATO expansion to the war of Ukraine. I'm saying at some point in the 2000s the line entered a bundle of causes we might label "Russian resentment towards the west", which ended up one of the causes of the war. These views aren't really fundamentally opposed. I'm not saying "no actually, there really were WMDs in Iraq".

I think it's more useful to understand Putin's decision as an expression of his geopolitical goals. The include keeping Ukraine neutral, but they also go much beyond that.

Saying the US invaded Iraq because the US is evil and George Bush is a madman wouldn’t be a strong argument. Likewise, rejecting that thesis wouldn’t justify the actual (well supported) reasons. — Mikie

From where I sit, only a madman would have thrown Russia's entire available armed forces at Ukraine if they did not intend for this to result in a seismic geopolitical shift in their favour. Neutrality for Ukraine for some indefinite period doesn't strike me as such a shift.

The Gulf War campaign had about a million coalition troops. The Iraqi Army was no longer considered nearly as well supplied or competent in 2003. Sanctions and the collapse of the USSR as an arms provider had crippled their military, as had a decade of a US enforced no fly zone. During the Gulf War, the US essentially defacto partitioned a whole third of Iraq, which was under Kurdish control and rule after. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I confess I have not really looked into this in detail. I checked the troop dispositions for Iraq out of curiosity and noticed that they didn't actually seem in an entirely different ballpark (only looking at the initial invasion force). The comparison is flawed in many ways, and yet I don't think it's entirely out of the question that Russian commanders also looked at the US invasion in Iraq as a model for their planned campaign.

Another comparison might be Vietnam. South Vietnam had about half the population of Ukraine but the SVA and US forced for COIN operations there peaked at 1.4 million.

However, in general, the size of military deployments has been decreasing. Modern warfare has shown a definite trend towards quality beating quantity. Military hardware is significantly more expensive when adjusting for inflation than during WWII and soldiers now require more training.

Russia's invasion was largely predicated on the prediction that Ukraine's would collapse. The low troop numbers represent Russia's (over)confidence in this collapse, over confidence in the effectiveness of bribes they had paid to Ukrainian leaders, corruption (they thought they had more men than they did, there have been multiple trials over under strength formations and "ghost soldiers"), and general poor planning skills, more than anything relative to their war aims IMO. That and their relative inability to mobilize and support a much larger force. After all, they couldn't support the men they went in with. Having more unsupported columns wouldn't have helped them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No disagreement here. One can say the russian invasion forces were much too small, yet on paper they still represented one of the most formidable forces in the world. The number of nations who could have assembled something similar is small.

There are and have been many Finnish volunteers in Ukraine, yes. They have gotten actually a quite positive welcome back here in Finland. Naturally they don't make a huge fuss themselves about it. A lot of people have basically been transporting supplies to Ukrainians themselves, especially to the civilians close to the front.

You're trying to compare completely different types of countries and completely different types of conflicts. Apples to oranges, as usual.

It only seems like apples and oranges in retrospect. In 2014, Russia saw a good deal of defections from the UAF and meaningful local collapses. There was plenty of reason for them to think that it would be the same just 8 years later. One of the reasons for them to expect this is that Western train and equip missions had a fairly mixed track record at actually building decent militaries.



Almost certainly. The whole blitz on Hostomel and rush to Kyiv makes sense in the context of a "decapitation strike" that crushes the resolve of the enemy. But, being poorly planned and executed, it instead turned into a massive stalled out convoy north of Kyiv, the decimation of the VDV sent ahead in air assaults, and eventually the entire collapse of that axis.

The most telling thing about what Russia expected to happen is the fact that what were essentially police units, armed with riot control gear and small arms alone, moving in thin skinned trucks, were sent towards the front of the advance on Kyiv and Kharkiv. This is what you move in if you think you'll mostly be dealing with unrest and protests. Instead, their advance was a disaster because they ran right into still very much active military formations with tanks and artillery.

Given how deeply the US was committed to project Ukraine - given the size, state and equipment of the Ukrainian military, I find it unthinkable to be honest.

This is just not how military planning works. Military planners tend to plan, as a minimum, for 'most likely enemy course of action' and 'most dangerous'.

In what world was the most likely thing to happen for Ukraine to collapse? Even in Putin's wildest dreams it would be a stretch, and I find it very hard to believe for any modern military to fall for that level of wishful thinking.

:up:

Where have you been the last two years lol? Of course they were wildly over confident. They accidentally published the articles they had prewritten about the collapse of Ukraine's government and were continuing to publish ridiculous maps like this until the week they decided to declare the advance on Kyiv a "feint."



Oh look, eastern Ukraine has been encircled and cut off, it's over! The only saving grace is that they didn't decide to actually launch their clearly suicidal amphibious assault on Odessa. But they still published reports about how they were "contesting it"

Of course they were wildly over confident. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see any evidence of that. It seems to me you're cherry-picking snippets of information (from Russian propaganda channels, no less) and interpreting them to fit your preferred narrative.

The fact is there was a peace deal on the table in March / April, in which Ukraine reneged on their plans to join NATO, and Russia returned all the territory it occupied at that time. This deal was blocked by the US and Britain.

It seems to me that forcing Kiev to the negotiating table was the main purpose of the invasion, and everything from Russian troop numbers to deployments and disposition coincides with that idea. The deal was blocked because the US knew it would be seen as a Russian victory.


If you want to view this conflict through a lens of Russian incompetence, be my guest, though. I doubt I'll be able to change your mind. Given the staggering levels of Russian incompetence I'm sure a Ukrainian victory is just around the corner.

The fact is there was a peace deal on the table in March / April, in which Ukraine reneged on their plans to join NATO, and Russia returned all the territory it occupied at that time. This deal was blocked by the US and Britain. — Tzeentch

That's not a fact, it's a wild flight of fantasy.

The deal was blocked because the US knew it would be seen as a Russian victory. — Tzeentch

Of course, Russia camped his force on Ukraine's border for months, then invades, looses men and materiel, gets absolutely nothing in return but the US blocks it because it'd "be seen as a russian victory".

Moral condemnation requires analyzing all these things to be sure the condemnation is justified.

Why do I say so? Because I would wish for myself a thorough analysis before I am condemned.

What does not take much analysis is to conclude that ending the war through talking, in some workable solution for everyone, is better than continued warfare.

If Zelensky wins, ok, another intrepid and committed war leader willing to sacrifice any number of his own citizens for glorious victory.

If Zelensky eventually accepts terms that were on offer before and at the start of the war, then it's difficult to justify the lives lost. — boethius

That's not a fact, it's a wild flight of fantasy. — Echarmion

I am in the midst of writing a response to your previous comments, which also contains this same denialism:

The russian offer which we ultimately know very little about. — Echarmion

Which is just so preposterously bad faith that I went all the way back to when we (by which I mean myself and other people, not yourself, actually concerned about the war and Ukrainian lives, regardless of our respective positions, when the war first broke out and a settlement is easiest to reached).

Russia's conditions for a peace settlement were made public, so we do in fact know a lot about Russia's peace offerings, and calling this knowledge "fantasy" is just ludicrous attempt to rewrite history to make the Ukrainian war effort and the West clearly doing everything possible to both start and maintain the war, as less evil and less stupid.

LONDON, March 7 (Reuters) - Russia has told Ukraine it is ready to halt military operations "in a moment" if Kyiv meets a list of conditions, the Kremlin spokesman said on Monday.

Dmitry Peskov said Moscow was demanding that Ukraine cease military action, change its constitution to enshrine neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognise the separatist republics of Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states.
— Reuters

There's zero reason to assume this offer isn't genuine.

Unless Ukraine has some way to "win", then Russia will simply implement these conditions by force. — boethius

This is literally March 7th, 2022 (both the publication by Reuters and my comment citing Reuters in the context of the debate at the time).

Of course, Russia camped his force on Ukraine's border for months, then invades, looses men and materiel, gets absolutely nothing in return but the US blocks it because it'd "be seen as a russian victory". — Echarmion

Again, just inventing whatever that makes Western policy sound better.

This is exactly what "the West" (officials, mainstream media, zillions of commenters on social media) was insisting on, that any peace (in which Putin keeps Crimea and Ukraine accepts neutrality, which was the only deal the Russians would consider accepting) would be a win for Russia: they wanted Ukraine neutral, they want recognition of Crimea by Ukraine, so if they get that then they "win".

You're debate technique is just to think backwards to what would be convenient to be true in order to defend Western prestige (make Western policy look less stupid and evil) and just state it like it was fact.

My diagnosis of your philosophical disease is that you've, until now, happily swallowed what Western media was selling you about this war so could comfortably ignore taking a closer look, confident that certainly if the Western media and social media is so pro-Ukraine their cause and our support for their cause must be just and reasonable and going towards a good result—perhaps some are hurt, even sacrificed but it is all worthwhile, and certainly "casualties are low"—, and now that the war has clearly "gone wrong" as evidenced by radically different facts and opinions appearing in even the Western media (Ukraine can't win, casualties are high, Russia's economy is doing well actually), the cognitive dissonance has pierced your ears and arrived at your brain, and you come here to try to quell your uneasiness and retroactively prove (or then at least throw some shade on the posters who have stated since the beginning of the war the very things the Western media are now admitting, couldn't have been "really right" but just lucky guesses, nothing could have been prevented by wiser decision making, the West meant well and so on) Ukraine and Western decisions made some sort of sense and had good intentions at least, that "maybe" a preferable peace was achievable at different moments but we have little "knowledge" about it.

But feel free to provide a different narrative, personal mythology if you prefer, of why you suddenly take interest in the war now that Ukraine is clearly on the verge "not winning" with the very real risk of total collapse (especially if the dollars stop flowing).

However, the main issue is not "what exactly" Russia was offering, but that Ukraine walks away from negotiating, makes absurd ultimatums public and so on, rather than strive to get the best deal they can when they have maximum leverage.

Now, if you are in a weak position, negotiating when you have maximum leverage doesn't guarantee you get what you want (maybe there was a way to get into the EU, maybe not; maybe Donbas could be fully recovered, "autonomy" watered down, or maybe not), but not getting everything you want (like keeping "the right to join NATO" without actually joining NATO) is not a reason to refuse a deal, even less a reason to refuse continuing to negotiate.

If Russia's offer was "not quite good enough" ... then why don't we have a Reuters citation of Ukraine's counter-offer, such as neutrality and keeping the Donbas with more limited cultural protections for Russian speakers (since that's important for "some reason")?

The reason is that Zelensky is a moron and willing to destroy his country and get hundreds of thousands of his comrades killed to be on vogue ... and have a finger in billions of dollars of currency and arms flowing into the country that he has since said it's insulting to Ukraine for anyone to ask any accounting of.

Now, there is lots of philosophical nuance to analyze but as I said at the time (March 21st, 2022):

What does not take much analysis is to conclude that ending the war through talking, in some workable solution for everyone, is better than continued warfare.

If Zelensky wins, ok, another intrepid and committed war leader willing to sacrifice any number of his own citizens for glorious victory.

If Zelensky eventually accepts terms that were on offer before and at the start of the war, then it's difficult to justify the lives lost. — boethius

It of course goes without saying that if Zelensky eventually accepts terms that are far worse than what was on offer at the start of the war, that is called ruining his country to be on the cover of vogue magazine while Western leaders blow smoke up his ass to do what's in their interest and not Ukraine's interest.

Russia's conditions for a peace settlement were made public — boethius

You seem to have ommitted the part where you show Russia's pledge to retreat and return all territory, (which would include the parts of Donetsk & Luhansk not occupied prior to the 2022 invasion).

This is exactly what "the West" (officials, mainstream media, zillions of commenters on social media) was insisting on, that any peace (in which Putin keeps Crimea and Ukraine accepts neutrality, which was the only deal the Russians would consider accepting) would be a win for Russia: they wanted Ukraine neutral, they want recognition of Crimea by Ukraine, so if they get that then they "win". — boethius

Sure, a win, but a relatively minor one which offers no long term strategic advantage to Russia.

My diagnosis of your philosophical disease is that you've, until now, happily swallowed what Western media was selling you about this war — boethius

I have a pro-Ukraine bias, but I do try to avoid looking away when bad news for Ukraine surface.

their cause must be just — boethius

Their cause is just.

If Russia's offer was "not quite good enough" ... then why don't we have a Reuters citation of Ukraine's counter-offer, such as neutrality and keeping the Donbas with more limited cultural protections for Russian speakers (since that's important for "some reason")? — boethius

Actual offers in serious diplomatic negotiations are not made public, much less when actual lifes are at stake. Sure Ukraine could publish the offers made, but then why would we believe Ukraine was telling the full truth, and any such move could jeopardize further negotiations.

However, the main issue is not "what exactly" Russia was offering, but that Ukraine walks away from negotiating, makes absurd ultimatums public and so on, rather than strive to get the best deal they can when they have maximum leverage. — boethius

I guess we'll have to trust their judgement on when they have "maximum leverage" for now. The war isn't over.

It should be noted that Russia has voiced concerns about Ukraine joining the EU as well, because the EU features a military dimension such as a mutual defense clause (making it function, on paper, in a similar way to Art. 5 of the NATO treaty). — Tzeentch

This is just meant as an example of what Ukraine could try to get from the West using the leverage of ending the war (which some parties wanted, such as German industrialists) as well as the leverage of threatening to make peace with Russia that maximizes Western embarrassment rather than have some form of spin available for the West to pretend it is a "defeat" for Putin in some sense.

I.e. offer to make peace with Russia in a way that now claims would be "obviously" a Russian defeat:

Of course, Russia camped his force on Ukraine's border for months, then invades, looses men and materiel, gets absolutely nothing in return but the US blocks it because it'd "be seen as a russian victory". — Echarmion

And threaten to make peace with Russia in a way that maximizes Western embarrassment, going so far as to threaten "publicly admitting" Russian talking points such as Maidan was a coup and so on.

This is simply an example of the leverage Ukraine had at the time over the West and things the West has that could be good for Ukraine to get, but I am not arguing it would be trivial to get those things.

The counter-offer of the West could easily be: we'll murder you within an hour if you keep talking this way.

By explaining the leverage Ukraine has, it does not meant to be taken in a vacuum and that other parties have no leverage.

The West's leverage over Ukraine since the beginning of the war is that finance can be pulled at any time and Ukrainian government would entirely collapse, which is a far bigger threat than not sending arms.

However, this leverage was at a minimum at the very start of the war, and so when Ukraine would have had the most room to try to deploy its own leverage in negotiations.

If Ukraine tried to pull what I describe was possible at the start of the war now, his Western counterparts would just laugh in his face.

Another big point of leverage Ukraine had at the start of the war was a functioning economy that did not depend on continuous Western finance (maybe not a "great" economy, but it was functioning), so this is leverage in terms making an economic deal with the EU (which does not need to be full EU membership, there's a large spectrum of possibilities such as status similar to Norway or Switzerland) and likewise threatening (if there is nothing offered by the EU) economic rapprochement with Russia.

Now that the Ukrainian economy is completely wrecked, that leverage is also gone.

You seem to have ommitted the part where you show Russia's pledge to retreat and return all territory, (which would include the parts of Donetsk & Luhansk not occupied prior to the 2022 invasion). — Echarmion

This was Russia's offer as reported at the time.

You're trying to create some sort of plausible deniability scenario that we "don't actually know" that Russia was offering something so obviously reasonable and so obviously preferable to continued fighting.

But that's just straight up rewriting history. Everyone at the time understood the Russian offer to be pulling their troops back to Russia and Crimea if the offer was accepted. There was huge amount of analysis at the time; the Reuters citation is just the most authoritative "Newspaper of record" of what the substance of the Russian offer was. We can of course debate exactly what Reuters is meaning by "independent" or then exactly what Russia's meaning is in their actual offer, as well as what Russia may have been willing to accept, but what is clear is the three main points are neutrality, recognizing Crimea and some sort of status change in Donbas (but not integration into Russia, which has happened since if you haven't noticed).

Now, obviously "all territory" does not include Crimea, but it was understood Russia was offering to pull their troops from the rest of Ukraine including the Donbas (it's not really a "retreat" if it's part of a peace agreement). Certainly Russia was not offering to abandon their allies in the Donbas, so to that extent they were not offering Donbas seperatists to be conquered by Ukraine, but rather a peace that protected the separatists as well.

However, the minutia of how a peace plan would be implemented and the exact status of the Donbas is clearly irrelevant compared to the actual point of contention here which is that Ukraine had far more leverage to try to negotiate the best deal they could ever get back then compared to now. A point you don't seem to agree with.

If you want to argue (as other posters have already done) that the Russian offer was maybe in bad faith and they would have continued the invasion even if the offer was accepted, that is not reason to reject the offer: it strengthens your diplomatic position to accept an offer that is then reneged on and would seriously weaken Russia's diplomatic position to be seen reneging on a clear offer that was clearly accepted by Ukraine (a big reason the "rest of the world" hasn't joined the West and implemented sanctions is that Russia is able to say they kept on offering reasonable peace deals that Ukraine and the West rejected: so pressure the West, not Russia, if you want peace and lower food prices).

I have a pro-Ukraine bias, but I do try to avoid looking away when bad news for Ukraine surface. — Echarmion

Well then, what "good news" do you even see in even mainstream Western media?

Sure, a win, but a relatively minor one which offers no long term strategic advantage to Russia. — Echarmion

Well, at the time, the West was framing this as giving Putin what he wants rather than punishing him for breaking the "rules based order" over annexing Crimea and the West refused to negotiate directly with Russia to try to come to a larger deal over European security architecture as a whole and so on.

For a while talking heads and social media were continuously repeating that "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" and that "Russia can't demand Ukrainian neutrality as Ukraine is a sovereign nation" as justification for repudiating any peace agreement, which are absolutely moronic points and do not justify war fighting (precisely because Ukraine can't join NATO, it should not fight a war for the "right to join NATO" and precisely because Ukraine is a sovereign country it can accept neutrality to avoid war if it wants).

Their cause is just. — Echarmion

We can come back to this point, as no one so far as actually provided an argument of why the Ukrainian cause is just. For example, in nearly 2 years of debate no one has answered the question of how many Nazi's in Ukraine would be too many Nazi's (people have admitted that there are Nazi's, just not enough to justify invasion, but then refuse to explain how many Nazi's would be too many and therefore not-invading Ukraine would be an actually accurate analogy of appeasement; a force that can stop Nazi's going and stopping Nazi's), and furthermore, not a single "pro-Ukrainian" has been able to explain why the Donbas separatist cause is not just on exactly the same grounds as the Ukrainian cause of "self determination", and even if we ignore that issue then why shelling civilians was justified, reneging on the Mink accords was justified.

However, let's assume none of that matters and it's all very simple and Russia is fundamentally in the wrong in their invasion of a sovereign nation and Ukraine is fundamentally in the right and exercising self defence.

Even assuming that, once Ukraine rejects reasonable peace terms (which you seem to accept are reasonable) then their cause is no longer just, but fanatical fighting for a hypothetically just cause. It's hypothetically a just cause to take back Crimea in the simplistic framework we are using her, but to be actually just you need to be actually able to take back Crimea, otherwise you are fighting a pointless war and getting people killed for no feasible military objective, which is not just cause.

Actual offers in serious diplomatic negotiations are not made public, much less when actual lifes are at stake. Sure Ukraine could publish the offers made, but then why would we believe Ukraine was telling the full truth, and any such move could jeopardize further negotiations. — Echarmion

What are you talking about? Offers in serious negotiations can and often are made public. Making an offer public can put further pressure on the counter-party if the offer is clearly reasonable to take, and that's why Russia made their offer public. Regardless of the West spinning it this war or that, the rest of the world concluded Russia was being reasonable and did not deserve sanctions and Ukraine was stupid and the West cynical and duplicitous.

Now, definitely Zelensky should have heeded your advice and at least kept his positions secret, such as refusing to talk to Putin and making ultimatums in public that would be a serious loss of face and obstacle to try to reverse if Ukrainian prospects became bleak even for Zelensky's "belief" based approach to the war, but again he did not.

You are trying to create some sort of plausible deniability smoke shield where none existed at the time and last time I checked smoke cannot be blown into the past.

I guess we'll have to trust their judgement on when they have "maximum leverage" for now. The war isn't over. — Echarmion

Sure, this has been the position of every other "pro-Ukrainian" to debate these points: war isn't over, maybe Ukraine will turn things around, wonder weapons and all that.

We shall see.

That's not a fact, it's a wild flight of fantasy. — Echarmion

:lol:

This is why discussion with you oompa loompas is pointless.

This is why discussion with you oompa loompas is pointless. — Tzeentch

You could simply provide evidence of your claim.

This was Russia's offer as reported at the time. — boethius

Russia's offer was a ceasefire in place.

But that's just straight up rewriting history. Everyone at the time understood the Russian offer to be pulling their troops back to Russia and Crimea if the offer was accepted. — boethius

No, they didn't.

There was huge amount of analysis at the time; — boethius

Then no doubt you can provide relevant evidence.

the three main points are neutrality, recognizing Crimea and some sort of status change in Donbas (but not integration into Russia, which has happened since if you haven't noticed). — boethius

And these are their demands for a ceasefire.

but it was understood Russia was offering to pull their troops from the rest of Ukraine including the Donbas (it's not really a "retreat" if it's part of a peace agreement). — boethius

No, that was not understood. You seem to be confusing a ceasefire with a peace treaty.

which is that Ukraine had far more leverage to try to negotiate the best deal they could ever get back then compared to now. A point you don't seem to agree with. — boethius

Correct.

it strengthens your diplomatic position to accept an offer that is then reneged on — boethius

Unless you had already made concessions and got nothing in return. As would have been the case in this scenario.

Well then, what "good news" do you even see in even mainstream Western media? — boethius

Russian offensive capabilities don't seem to have markedly improved, so they seem unable for now to do more than grind forward at a snail's pace.

Well, at the time, the West was framing this as giving Putin what he wants rather than punishing him for breaking the "rules based order" over annexing Crimea and the West refused to negotiate directly with Russia to try to come to a larger deal over European security architecture as a whole and so on. — boethius

Which is a reasonable position to take generally, western hypocrisy notwithstanding.

For a while talking heads and social media were continuously repeating that "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" and that "Russia can't demand Ukrainian neutrality as Ukraine is a sovereign nation" as justification for repudiating any peace agreement, which are absolutely moronic points — boethius

The argument was that Russia cannot demand that western nations bar Ukraine's NATO entry.

We can come back to this point, as no one so far as actually provided an argument of why the Ukrainian cause is just. — boethius

But that's relatively easy. They're fighting an aggressor who violated their undisputed borders repeatedly (and who also has a treaty obligation to protect the sovereignty of Ukraine), and they have not committed any kind of crime against humanity which might in extreme cases justify a war of aggression.

one has answered the question of how many Nazi's in Ukraine would be too many Nazi's — boethius

Well I'm glad to hear people here had enough sense not to.

explain why the Donbas separatist cause is not just on exactly the same grounds as the Ukrainian cause of "self determination — boethius

Separatism is a thorny issue at the best of times, and the Donbas separatists lack any convincing popular legitimacy.

even if we ignore that issue then why shelling civilians was justified — boethius

Even if it wasn't, it was not remotely significant enough to be cause for an invasion.

reneging on the Mink accords was justified. — boethius

At the least Russia also failed to implement it's obligations under Minsk.

What are you talking about? Offers in serious negotiations can and often are made public. Making an offer public can put further pressure on the counter-party if the offer is clearly reasonable to take, — boethius

Or it can blow up the negotiations because now one side is compelled to accuse the other of lying to avoid fatally compromising their position. It's a dangerous game to play.