I was amused to see Austin describe philosophy’s desire for certainty in a few lines (it takes Wittgenstein half his book). — Antony Nickles
There's no doubt that the meaning of "cricket" is being extended but I don't think it is being transformed in quite the way that a metaphorical use would extend it. "Cricket" is defined as a noun and we understand how it is constituted. But "cricket" in Austin's example is being used as an adjective, in a different category. This change, or stretching, is different from a metaphorical use. — Ludwig V
Plato does not conclude that all we see is shadows, he presents that as a symbolic representation to elucidate how the average person is wrong in one's assumptions about the nature of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
And as I explained, it is the common way of using language which misleads us in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover
my commitment is absolutely minimal; so that in principal nothing could show that I had made a mistake, — Antony Nickles
The point being that philosophy hasn’t wanted to know the truth, or knowledge, but just to never get egg on its face — Antony Nickles
his approach just didn't seem to me to get off the ground; — Banno
This is why he states that the person might gaze at those words trying to find out a common factor. — javi2541997
It is similar to a metaphorical use. — javi2541997
If you know that there's another side to the apple, you know that you are looking at a three-dimensional object, so you are not seeing in two dimensions. — Ludwig V
I thought that helping each other to understand Austin's text was the point of the thread. — Ludwig V
The problem with Austin is that he is taking his Ordinary Language philosophy too far, even further than the Ordinary Man would take it.
For example, in the expression "I see an apple", Austin's approach is to ignore any possible metaphorical meaning for its so-called "ordinary" usage, thereby turning a blind eye to the range of possible meanings as laid out in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. — RussellA
The pursuit of the incorrigible is one of the most venerable bugbears in the history of philosophy.
In a nutshell, the doctrine about knowledge, 'empirical' knowledge, is that it has foundations. It is a structure the upper tiers of which are reached by inferences, and the foundations are the data on which these inferences are based. (So of course-as it appears-there just have to be sense-data.) Now the trouble with inferences is that they may be mistaken; whenever we take a step, we may put a foot wrong. Thus-so the doctrine runs-the way to identify the upper tiers of the structure of knowledge is to ask whether one might be mistaken, whether there is something that one can doubt; if the answer is Yes, then one is not at the basement. And conversely, it will be characteristic of the data that in their case no doubt is possible, no mistake can be made. So to find the data, the foundations, look for the incorrigible. — Austin, p. 105
From the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word "see" can have several meanings, including "to perceive by the eye" and "to imagine a possibility". — RussellA
For example, in the expression "I see an apple", Austin's approach is to ignore any possible metaphorical meaning for its so-called "ordinary" usage, thereby turning a blind eye to the range of possible meanings as laid out in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. — RussellA
However, for Ayer, it is an important metaphysical question when looking at an apple whether I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form — RussellA
Though, as an aside, as a Christian author could write an article evaluating Atheism and unsurprisingly find it wanting, — RussellA
Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting. — RussellA
From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, I may well agree that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant. — RussellA
Whether ordinary language misleads us is precisely the question. Though there's no doubt that language can mislead - as it is clearly misleading Plato when he concludes that all we see is shadows. — Ludwig V
Surely Plato does differentiate between the Forms and the ordinary world? — Ludwig V
(Phaedo 99d-100a)So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.
(Republic 511b)Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole.
The shift from worrying about true or false to commitment and retraction is definitely helpful. — Ludwig V
One would have to show this works in the context of incorrigible first person statements of experience. The assumption that the language is being used in standard, or at least shared, ways would be one point. The possibility of self-correction is another. (Austin mentions both of these.) — Ludwig V
Isn't there a doctrine - it is present in my memory, but I've lost any sense of where it can be found - that logical truths are true in all circumstances and consequently empty and trivial. — Ludwig V
This lecture is about why this is a misguided approach. — Banno
that I am informing you so that you might help me, — Antony Nickles
that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me. — Antony Nickles
This is not a general foundation, but, again, pointing out that a question only comes up in a specific situation. — Antony Nickles
But how do we distinguish philosophical theories which can be debunked by appeal to ordinary language from other theories, physical, psychological - without begging the question? — Ludwig V
"I am in pain" is not simply passing on information, but is an expression that elicits a response — Ludwig V
[Austin does not claim] that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me.
— Antony Nickles
I don't quite understand this. What else would they be based on? — Ludwig V
Surely Plato does differentiate between the Forms and the ordinary world? The traditional view, as I understand it, is that he believes that the Forms are in some sense superior to the ordinary world. How would you describe that difference? — Ludwig V
I'm afraid the question is whether it is us or Plato who is being misled. — Ludwig V
many kinds of sentences may be uttered in making statements which are in fact incorrigible-in the sense that, when they are made, the circumstances are such that they are quite certainly, definitely, and un-retractably true. — Austin, p.115
Meta is notable for apparently not having even mentioned Austin on a thread about Austin. — Banno
The Forms are philosophical poiesis, images of the truth and knowledge that those who desire wisdom strive for. — Fooloso4
I think this is a much better way of putting what's going on. Perhaps it is helpful to reflect that lawyers arguing a point in case law are in a similar position. The practice of the courts, rather than legislation needs to be examined in order to arrive at justice. It strikes me that Austin's examples can be treated as simply (counter-) examples. The ordinariness of the language is beside the pointAnd it isn’t about “language”, it is about the everyday criteria and cases shown in contrast to the singular criteria of certainty (incorrigibility) and an abstract generalized case. — Antony Nickles
Exactly. The ordinariness of the language is beside the point.It is a method of doing philosophy by examining specific cases and “what we say when…” in order to draw conclusions about the way things work (and don’t). — Antony Nickles
.. and it may well be helpful in such situations to articulate and formalize our habits in order to be better able to focus arguments and settle those difficult cases.And so not that it can’t be a pig unless it checks all the (entailed) boxes, because we don’t know which, if any, criteria to apply until there is a situation, which may be novel, and thus require stretching or changing or ignoring our ordinary criteria. — Antony Nickles
I'm probably unusual in that I'm rather suspect that there is really no such a thing as a or the scientific method. Blame Feyerabend. (I know he's persona non grate for two good reasons, but if he's right, he's right. I can accept that without approving or excusing some of the things he's probably done). I prefer the idea that science is simply organized common sense.But, of course, science is not searching for philosophical certainty; it has its own: if I apply its method, I come up with the same answer (so does everyone). — Antony Nickles
.. and you elaborated further and I agree with all of that.Which is what I was trying to say, only said better. — Antony Nickles
Quite so. That's a consequence of the private language argument. But then, there's the issue whether psychosomatic pains and illnesses are "real" or not. I'm in the camp that says they are not deceptions or illusions, even though the usual causal pathways are not involved.This is to say, first-person statements might not be incorrigible at all, and, even if they are, the fact I am making them is not of the only importance. — Antony Nickles
Yes. Austin thinks that sense-datum theory can be disposed of or dissolved. Cavell, writing some time later, is taking seriously 1) the survival of scepticism (and sense-data) post Wittgenstein, and 2) Wittgensteins remark about "our real needs" being at the heart of the issues. But his phenomenological turn, though plausible, is not, I think, particularly illuminating. On the other hand, I'm not sure where else to go. However, our discussion of the pursuit of certainty is helpful.Cavell (through Wittgenstein) takes the sceptic's generic claims more seriously (where Austin is more… condescending?), though not on their terms either (towards certainty). — Antony Nickles
I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form — Ludwig V
I wouldn't say he ignores metaphorical meanings for "apple". He explicitly draws attention to one kind of relevant metaphor in the passage you quote. He also draws attention to the difference between that metaphorical use and the literal use. — Ludwig V
As it happens, in the example you cite, "I" am perceiving by the eye (in future, I will write "see" instead of this cumbersome form) two dimensional forms which I know give me information about the three-dimensional world. I can't see any important metaphysical questions from this. — Ludwig V
It is perfectly possible for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the existence of God that deserves to be taken seriously. — Ludwig V
Ordinary Language Philosophy is a method of evaluation and he is using it to evaluate Ayer's argument and he comes to the conclusion that the argument is invalid. — Ludwig V
You seem to be saying that the sense-data theory is irrelevant. — Ludwig V
I believe that sense-data are metaphysically true, and I also believe that sense-data is irrelevant to linguistics. — RussellA
True, but it would be more difficult for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the non-existence of God. — RussellA
The difficulty is that arguments about metaphysics have to be expressed in language. If the (attempts to express) metaphysical argument result in self-contradiction or absurdity, they cannot be correct. — Ludwig V
I don't believe in God, yet I can tell you what the arguments for and against are. What's the problem? — Ludwig V
Plato seems to me to be an early progenitor of the mistakes we are talking about, because he believes that ordinary perceptions are all false and develops something that is close to sense-datum theory in the "cave" metaphor. — Ludwig V
(Republic 514a)... an image of our nature in its education and want of education, likening it to a condition of the following kind.
(514c)... statues of men and other animals wrought from stone, wood, and every kind of material ...
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