A command is not the same thing as a moral ought. An ought is something that we do "because it is right" not because we are commanded to do it by another person.

True but the ought/is debate is about objective morality and whether or not certain moral claims are objectively true regardless of human opinion.

:up:

I think the confusion, Sirius, may be that various metaethical debates, and the depiction of Hume's Guillotine, incorrectly depict them as "ought" vs. "is"s--but the english language has many examples of ought statements which aren't, in-themselves, moral statements.

Also, inferring "You should kill Tom" from "Today is Tom's last day on earth" is just an inference from colloquial speech: technically, one cannot logically nor coherently derive, all else being equal, the former from the latter. It is only with context in colloquial speech, where we use words very imprecisely, that one could infer this: so I wouldn't even say this proves, philosophically, that one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

I’m all for questioning ‘authority’.

“You ought to (X)!”
“You must (Y).”

Why? Hmm… :chin:

“It’s raining hard. You must wear a raincoat, my beloved child!”
But whyyyyyy? :fear:

However, adding an If clause to the sentence radically changes the energy of the statement from a command or assertion… to something more propositional, debatable, even broadly scientific.
(IE. If your want to see photosynthesis happening live, you must look into a microscope at plant cells).

So then we have: If you don’t want to get soaking wet, you ought to have some protection from the rain”.

To which the philosophical and daring child might answer:
“But what is the nature of wetness? And who (or what) is asking this question?” :nerd:

only with context in colloquial speech, where we use words very imprecisely, that one could infer this: so I wouldn't even say this proves, philosophically, that one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. — Bob Ross

You summed it up perfectly.

A command is not the same thing as a moral ought. An ought is something that we do "because it is in right" not because we are commanded to do it by another person.

Whether the "ought" we derive is correct or not is a seperate question. I am only addressing the claim that we cannot derive an "ought" from an "is"

Hume's distinction goes beyond morality. Normative commands don't need to be related to morality.

Nevertheless, addressing your concerns. Your objection only holds for those who are moral realists, who believe mind-independent moral standard is given and we can judge what is right or wrong in reference to it.

But a moral irrealist would simply tell you, moral statement are mind-dependent (non-objectivists) or moral statements are not truth apt (non-cognitivists) or moral statements are all false (errror theorists ).

I think the confusion, Sirius, may be that various metaethical debates, and the depiction of Hume's Guillotine, incorrectly depict them as "ought" vs. "is"s--but the english language has many examples of ought statements which aren't, in-themselves, moral statements.

Also, inferring "You should kill Tom" from "Today is Tom's last day on earth" is just an inference from colloquial speech: technically, one cannot logically nor coherently derive, all else being equal, the former from the latter. It is only with context in colloquial speech, where we use words very imprecisely, that one could infer this: so I wouldn't even say this proves, philosophically, that one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

The usage of "ought" for general normative statements is correct, since Hume wasn't only concerned with moral statements.

I don't see a problem with using colloquial language. In the philosophy of language, we don't look for a perfect language anymore. All we do is explore how language works in real life, following the example of Wittgenstein, who reminded everyone to let philosophy leave everything as it is

As for imprecise language, didn't Wittgenstein say it is friction that allows to walk ? A smooth floor would not allow us to walk. The fact is language is imprecise, but it works.

There is no technical issue here. It's not like l have uttered nonsense.

Perhaps if you specified exactly what "Ought" you are deriving I might be able to offer a more specific argument. If you are suggesting that "You should kill Tom" is an ought, I would respond that this is nothing more than an example of an illocutionary act (command by the boss) and that the perlocutionary effect consists of the hitman's response to the command. If this is your definition of the meaning of an "ought" then, logically, any time anyone tells us to do something and we accept, the conditions for normativity have been satisfied, which is absurd.

Perhaps if you specified exactly what "Ought" you are deriving I might be able to offer a more specific argument. If you are suggesting that "You should kill Tom" is an ought, I would respond that this is nothing more than an example of an illocutionary act (command by the boss) and that the perlocutionary effect consists of the hitman's response to the command. If this is your definition of the meaning of an "ought" then, logically, any time anyone tells us to do something and we accept, the conditions for normativity have been satisfied, which is absurd.

It doesn't have be like that. We can have conditions that the person issuing declarative statements must satisfy some objective moral criteria.

Criterion : The poor need some of our money

A poor child comes to you and spreads his hand saying, "I am starving" , you can derive the implication from his statement, "You should give me ( a poor child ) some money" . He is not just stating a fact, "I am starving" , he is begging for help and expecting you to be a kind person.

My point was to show, our language does allow declarative statements to function as normative statements simultaneously

A poor child comes to you and spreads his hand saying, "I am starving" , you can derive the implication from his statement, "You should give me ( a poor child ) some money" . He is not just stating a fact, "I am starving" , he is begging for help and expecting you to be a kind person. — Sirius

I completely agree that this we can and should contextually interpret such things as requests. One hundred percent. I have made the point myself. But there is a difference between the illocutionary utterance (the declaration) and the interpretation whereby that utterance gains normative force. The request itself does not have that normative force. This is precisely where the "gap" occurs.

A poor child comes to you and spreads his hand saying, "I am starving" , you can derive the implication from his statement, "You should give me ( a poor child ) some money" . He is not just stating a fact, "I am starving" , he is begging for help and expecting you to be a kind person. — Sirius

But do I have a moral duty to help the poor child? Suppose I'm a sergeant and my platoon is in an urban firefight and this poor injured kid comes out of the shadows begging for help. It's not clear to me that I should drop everything and help the kid.

But there is a difference between the illocutionary utterance (the declaration) and the interpretation whereby that utterance gains normative force. The request itself does not have that normative force. This is precisely where the "gap" occurs.

I believe this rests on a mistaken notion of how language works. Why do we interpret sentences the way we do ? What forces us to derive conclusions ? The non-linguistic practices and contexts. That's it.

Language itself is normative. It doesn't need a force, nor does it depend on rules, for rules would require further interpretation ad infinitum. There are no gaps to be fulfilled. The wrong and right inferences from a statement depend on the community of language speakers.

Language itself is normative — Sirius

Language can be used to make normative statements.. Stating that language is normative is overreaching. Normativity describes a standard of behaviour. To the extent that behaviour and language do not necessarily coincide, language absolutely is not normative.

I'm fine with considering this an "ought" statement in the same way that a moral one is. I also agree that the colloquial, illocutionary nature of the statement is confusing, though I think we could sharpen it up if we needed to.

But the problem is the same old one: There's an implied hypothetical between "I command you to" and "you ought to," namely "You ought to do this IF you want to keep your kneecaps intact" or some such. It's perfectly possible, though unlikely, that the hitman could reply, "I'm OK with broken kneecaps," in which case we haven't managed to derive a pure "ought" from an "is." This example certainly clarifies that the ought-is problem is logical, not psychological. Since just about no one wants to be injured in this way, the command has a lot of psychological force -- but no logical entailment without the "if" premise,

Exactly.

I'm fine with considering this an "ought" statement in the same way that a moral one is. I also agree that the colloquial, illocutionary nature of the statement is confusing, though I think we could sharpen it up if we needed to.

But the problem is the same old one: There's an implied hypothetical between "I command you to" and "you ought to," namely "You ought to do this IF you want to keep your kneecaps intact" or some such. It's perfectly possible, though unlikely, that the hitman could reply, "I'm OK with broken kneecaps," in which case we haven't managed to derive a pure "ought" from an "is." This example certainly clarifies that the ought-is problem is logical, not psychological. Since just about no one wants to be injured in this way, the command has a lot of psychological force -- but no logical entailment without the "if" premise,

Language can be used to make normative statements.. Stating that language is normative is overreaching. Normativity describes a standard of behaviour. To the extent that behaviour and language do not necessarily coincide, language absolutely is not normative.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-following/#NormCond

"According to a prominent line of thought, the notion of correctness involved in the seemingly platitudinous claim that meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application is intrinsically normative. On this reading, meaning facts are normative facts—they not only sort the applications of expressions into correct or incorrect, but also prescribe how expressions ought to be applied. They issue semantic categorical obligations that bind speakers in determinate ways; the justified applications are precisely those that fulfil these semantic obligations"

Keeping the above paragraph l quoted in mind

Take this example

"This is a pencil" implies "This ought to function like a pencil"

If it doesn't, then the first statement is wrong.

With the same line of reasoning, if you claim "murder is wrong" , but you cannot derive "murder should be wrong" , then your first statement is false

Why ? Wrong comes equipped with "ought not to do"

According to a prominent line of thought, the notion of correctness involved in the seemingly platitudinous claim that meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application is intrinsically normative. — Sirius

Hmm. Saying that a meaningful expression inherently contains its own context of correct application is "normative" is not the same kind of normativity which applies to behaviour, at least not trivially so. A meaningful expression could "rightfully" be interpreted to mean "this man must be executed," but the agent is still free to disregard this claim. The disregarding would be an example of real normativity overriding this "semantic normativity". Which doesn't seem normative to me at all in any kind of significant or "meaningful" way.....

There is another thread on when philosophy becomes affectation. This makes me think of that.

Searle might have a clearer example.

(i) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you,
Smith, five dollars."
(2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
(3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation
to pay Smith five dollars.
(4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
(5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars — How to derive an ought from an is

The "Is" is the utterance of the words, a fact. The "Ought" is the obligation.

The usual response from those who like Hume's guillotine is that there must be a slight of hand somewhere in the argument. I don't think there is any such prestidigitation. it's just that we do in fact commonly place ourselves under obligations.

The promise example avoids the quibbles and side issues of authority and ethics.

There's a vast literature stemming from Searle's paper. Further, Searle was a student of Austin, to whom is making reference, if obliquely.

Doesn't the fact that Jones makes a verbal promise to pay suggest that the normative force precedes the statement, rather than being derived from it?

Given the baggage, you'd have to set that out in more detail. Are you saying that one ought keep one's promises? But that is what a promise is, so of course. That doesn't make (1) not an "is".

Correct. If I promise to do something it presupposes I have decided already that is the right thing to do. The only way to make it an is would be to disconnect it from the agent. But you can't do that proactively. You can say, Jones owed Smith five dollars. You can say Jones paid smith five dollars. Those are factual statements. Saying "Jones uttered the words" however is just a sneaky way of trying to make an already normative statement "factual".

The usage of "ought" for general normative statements is correct, since Hume wasn't only concerned with moral statements.

That’s true, but Hume was only interested in the fact that one cannot derive a prescription from an indicative statement—not that one cannot derive a normative fact. My only point before was that, in metaethics, it is about moral statements—but perhaps I mischaracterized your OP as having to do with that.

I don't see a problem with using colloquial language. In the philosophy of language, we don't look for a perfect language anymore. All we do is explore how language works in real life, following the example of Wittgenstein, who reminded everyone to let philosophy leave everything as it is

The problem is that it is leading to ambiguity that is convincing you that you have successfully derived a prescription from a description, when you haven’t. What is happening is you are converting an imprecise sentence into its underlying meaning: a prescription (like “you should kill”) cannot simultaneously be a non-prescriptive claim (like “today is Tom’s last day on earth”).

If you doubt this, then try and make a syllogism that concludes “you should kill Tom” is derivable with “today is Tom’s last day on earth” without simply making the latter an encrypted or ambiguated version of the former.

Another way of thinking about it is imagine that you heard someone tell you “today is all you can eat taco day!”. Now imagine, unknown to you, that within that area of the world (you were in) that it really was code for “you should kill”. Now, it should be clear that a purely descriptive statement has no prescriptions in it: they are categorically different. For a person who knew the lingo and knew that it was code would simply convert it in their head: they wouldn’t be legitimately deriving an ought from an is. You are just noting that we can codify sentences.

Here is a common attempt:

Determinism is true. So folk cannot be responsible for their criminal actions. Thus, we ought not punish folk for their criminal actions.

Determinism is true. So folk cannot be responsible for their criminal actions. Thus, we ought not punish folk for their criminal actions. — Richard B

We punish people for their actions. Ergo determinism is false.

Nice. Couldn't we also say - Mary has not studied or read quantum physics. Thus you ought not ask her to teach a university physics class in it.

I love the Searle example, and how much good philosophical conversation it has provoked. But . . . . it is sleight of hand. The missing "if" premise is: "If you believe you ought to keep your promises (or fulfill your obligations)." Sadly, it's perfectly possible to engage in the speech-act of making a promise without having or feeling the slightest sense of obligation to follow through. The sense in which making a promise "puts you under an obligation" may not apply to you at all, in your opinion. Others will disagree, of course, and call you names, but oh well. There's still no logical entailment.

I'm still not too sure of your point.

If I promise to do something it presupposes I have decided already that is the right thing to do. — Pantagruel

Even if this is so, the issue is that the fact of the utterance implies the obligation.

See Searle's reply tot he second objection, p.50 in the article linked above.

If you doubt this, then try and make a syllogism that concludes “you should kill Tom” is derivable with “today is Tom’s last day on earth” without simply making the latter an encrypted or ambiguated version of the former. — Bob Ross

1. You ought make whatever the Godfather says should be true, true.
2. The godfather says “today is Tom’s last day on earth"
3. You ought make “today is Tom’s last day on earth" true.
4. You should kill Tom.

Thing is, there is nothing ambiguous about "“today is Tom’s last day on earth". It's not open to an alternative explanation - unless it's Major Tom, talking to ground control - but that would be an utterly different context, not a case of ambiguity. It isn't a case of "converting an imprecise sentence into its underlying meaning".

I think we can be confident there is no chance of anyone in the room with The Godfather misunderstanding.

Even if this is so, the issue is that the fact of the utterance implies the obligation. — Banno

The fact of the obligation implies the obligation, not the utterance. The utterance is secondary. The real statement of facts is:

Jones borrowed five dollars from Smith.
Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

The verbalizations memorialize the normative force, they don't create it.