It's also interesting to see the distinction Aquinas makes between "faith" and "articles of faith." If I'm reading him rightly, he says that objections to faith itself can be replied to argumentatively -- they are "difficulties that can be answered." Whereas any particular article of faith is precisely that -- a belief held on faith -- and the only way to reply to the doubter here relies on first finding an agreement that faith is even possible, and then pointing out inconsistencies in the doubter's position using other articles of faith. This is quite subtle. — J

Well, I think what is going on is slightly different. For Aquinas faith is always related to a proposition. My understanding is that when he speaks about "objections against faith," 'faith' is something like a superset of the articles of faith. An article of faith would be akin to an axiom in the sphere of revelation, whereas 'faith' would include not only the axioms but also the conclusions inferred from the axioms. This is a simplification, as Aquinas' treatment of faith is rather subtle, but it seems generally true. Some Protestants are known for speaking about faith in an entirely non-propositional sense, but for Aquinas this would be a kind of hope (i.e. hoping and trusting in God or his promises).

So in that quote, with respect to faith, Aquinas is saying that faith-propositions can only be known by revelation and not by natural reason. For someone who holds at least one faith-proposition, that proposition can be leveraged in order to infer and argue about other faith-propositions. For someone who holds no faith-propositions, there is no possibility of demonstrating (strict scientia) the truth of a faith-proposition. All the same, if someone says, "X faith-proposition is false, and here is a proof for why," Aquinas thinks the proof can be addressed and refuted, even though no contrary proof for the faith-proposition is possible. Or in simpler terms, when it comes to unbelievers Aquinas thinks it's all defense and no offense (although this is complicated because certain things we take to be faith-based Aquinas thinks are accessible to reason, such as the existence of God).

Does it generalize to other overarching world-views? I think it might, though Aquinas seems to be saying that "metaphysics" is in a unique position in this regard. — J

Aquinas certainly thinks it generalizes to other sciences, and I think he would also affirm this of other worldviews. Granted, as you say, metaphysics is in a rather unique situation, as it seems to be able to establish itself in certain ways (and this goes back to our conversation about whether one could actually deny something like the law of non-contradiction).

But wouldn't scientism, for instance, also be able to speak about a similar distinction between "whether scientific knowledge is possible" and "the truths of science"? No one who denied the former could be convinced by the latter. But once scientific knowledge is granted, the specific truths -- the articles of faith, by analogy -- can be argued pro and con, using some truths to demonstrate or refute others. — J

I think this is right, but I should add that for Aquinas one of the easiest ways to show that scientific knowledge is possible is simply to show a scientific truth. If we know a scientific truth then obviously scientific knowledge is possible.

I think the relevant difference is that scientism holds to scientific truths, and these really are demonstrable from natural reason, whereas faith-propositions (and fundamentally the axioms, the articles of faith) are not. The error of scientism lies in holding that the truths of the hard sciences are the only truths.

I think the relevant difference is that scientism holds to scientific truths, and these really are demonstrable from natural reason, whereas faith-propositions (and fundamentally the axioms, the articles of faith) are not. The error of scientism lies in holding that the truths of the hard sciences are the only truths. — Leontiskos

On a deeper level, surely the 'corruption of the intellect' due to man's fallen nature is a factor? There's an interesting scholar, Peter Harrison, who's book The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science, 'shows how the approaches to the study of nature that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were directly informed by theological discussions about the Fall of Man and the extent to which the mind and the senses had been damaged by that primeval event. Scientific methods, he suggests, were originally devised as techniques for ameliorating the cognitive damage wrought by human sin.'

'Scientism' would recognise no such thing, as it's plainly a theological rather than scientific conception. But it's also the sense in which 'revealed truth' has epistemic as well as simply moral implications. 'Fallen man' does not 'see truly' so to speak, because of that corruption. (In Eastern religions, the term is 'avidya' rather than 'sin' and has a rather different connotation, in that it's associated with the corruption of the intellect rather than the will, which is especially the case in Reformed theology. But there are overlaps.)

On a deeper level, surely the 'corruption of the intellect' due to man's fallen nature is a factor? There's an interesting scholar, Peter Harrison, who's book The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science, 'shows how the approaches to the study of nature that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were directly informed by theological discussions about the Fall of Man and the extent to which the mind and the senses had been damaged by that primeval event. Scientific methods, he suggests, were originally devised as techniques for ameliorating the cognitive damage wrought by human sin.' — Wayfarer

I am not familiar with that thesis, so I can't really comment one way or another, but it sounds interesting. Looking at the table of contents, the trajectory he traces seems like a plausible support for the argument.

'Scientism' would recognise no such thing, as it's plainly a theological rather than scientific conception. — Wayfarer

Which is to say that Scientism is a great deal more optimistic about the possibility and accessibility of scientific knowledge? I could definitely see that. I think now, post-Covid, some pessimism is setting in again, and this also flows from things like John Ioannidis' “Why Most Published Research Findings are False.”

But it's also the sense in which 'revealed truth' has epistemic as well as simply moral implications. 'Fallen man' does not 'see truly' so to speak, because of that corruption. (In Eastern religions, the term is 'avidya' rather than 'sin' and has a rather different connotation, in that it's associated with the corruption of the intellect rather than the will, which is especially the case in Reformed theology. But there are overlaps.) — Wayfarer

Right, and I would agree that the intellect is fallen. Also, I would say that the interdependence of moral and speculative knowledge is still operative in our fallen world. But you are right that there has been a strong separation.

Which is to say that Scientism is a great deal more optimistic about the possibility and accessibility of scientific knowledge? — Leontiskos

Hey don't get me wrong, I'm very bullish about science and technology. But there's a missing dimension, without which it might easily loose its moral compass. Look at the turmoil that's engulfed OpenAI - don't know if you've been following, but the charismatic young CEO, Sam Altmann, was suddenly sacked by the Board last Friday, then there was a staff revolt, they all threatened to follow him out the door and join Microsoft, and he was re-hired as of yesterday. The issue? Allegations that he was putting profits ahead of ethics in product development. And it's a legit concern! On the other hand, though, I'm a big fan of ChatGPT, I've been using if, mainly for philosophy research, since Day 1, and it's incredible. The depth of conversation and nuances are really remarkable.

But then, also bear in mind that Aquinas saw no conflict between Science and Faith, unlike the Protestants. This is where I'm suspicious of the motives of Luther and Calvin. There has to be a world where both faith and science can co-exist, instead of the former feeling constantly threatened by the latter. But likewise, it is essential that the objective sciences recognise the limitations of objectivity. We're all participants in existence.

Have a read of this NY Times OP, makes some very interesting points about all this.

if someone says, "X faith-proposition is false, and here is a proof for why," Aquinas thinks the proof can be addressed and refuted, even though no contrary proof for the faith-proposition is possible. — Leontiskos

Ahah, I see. Thanks for the clarification. Argumentation is possible within the "world" made possible by articles of faith, but the articles themselves, and that world, can't be demonstrated, only defended from (necessarily false) refutations. Is this closer?

- Yes, that's exactly right. :up:

- Interesting story at OpenAI! Yes, Aquinas is rather optimistic about the power of reason, so I haven't encountered this idea as much in my own religious setting.

- Thank you! I downloaded a copy.