1. You ought make whatever the Godfather says should be true, true.
2. The godfather says “today is Tom’s last day on earth"
3. You ought make “today is Tom’s last day on earth" true.
4. You should kill Tom.

This negates the OP and does not suffice to win my proposal (in the response you quoted of me), since they were claiming that your #2 is a description that is itself a prescription. Your argument is perfectly valid exactly because the prescription are being derived from other prescription, and not #2.

I.e., “You should kill Tom.” is being derived from the prescription #3, which is derived from the prescription #1 with the supplement of the empirical fact (which is not a prescription) #2. The OP is in disagreement with you, as they would have to argue #2 can be itself derived as a prescription:

It is the context which allows us to determine the "ought" given a descriptive statement issued with confidence or from an authority in the present in refrence to the future.
…
Here is a case where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"

Banno, you didn't derived an ought from an is.

Thanks for the reference to Searle on this. The distinction he makes between internal and external understandings of promising is valid and useful, but I don’t think it gets him out of trouble here. Let’s grant that, from the internal, institutional viewpoint, “Ought I to keep my promise?” is tautologous, more or less equivalent to “Are triangles three-sided?”. The person I’m imagining – the deceptive promise-giver – is presumably going to say something like, “Fine, but my promise was not a ‛promise’ in your sense. I said some words to deceive, well aware that my listeners would assume I was speaking from within the institution of promising. But I was not.”

So – was he? We’d have to agree with Searle that the “full force” of the expression “I hereby promise” excludes any reference to a description of mental states. But then how shall we describe the difference between the sincere and the deceptive promise-maker? The performative expression is identical, the intention (if I’m allowed that word) is not. Searle says that this makes “the relation between promising and obligation . . . very mysterious,” but I don’t see why. Insincere, deceptive people are common. What sets them apart from genuine folk are their intentions or mental states. Are they “really” promising? Yes, no, and maybe all seem like possible answers.

In a way, though, none of this is central to the ought-is problem, which, if we follow Hume, is strictly a logical one. It is also much deeper than a simple question about entailment. The more closely we look, the more we realize that we’re interrogating the very meaning of “ought.” Does a true “ought” have to be categorical, in Kant’s sense – that is, without any “if” premise? To my mind, Kant’s thoughts about this are still the gold standard, but that’s enough for now.

Given Hume's critique of induction, I find myself wondering if the larger problem in the Guillotine isn't that "is statements" shouldn't also be "ought statements."

Take: "The glass is fragile, if you drop it, it will break."

We can expand this to "based on all my knowledge of the glass, observations of past glasses, etc. and my knowledge of how the world works more generally, glasses ought to be fragile. If you drop this glass, it ought to break."

That is, fact statements can be seen as statements about what "ought" to happen (what would be the "correct" outcome) if our model of the world is correct. We can, and are, frequently wrong about "is" statements, which only makes this more plausible. Then, consider Hume's attack on induction. This seems to require that a great majority of "is statements," really reflect something like: "if induction is valid, and given x observations, y ought to occur." That is, they are statements about the correctness of possible future observations given our model of the world. This would seem to expand to all of Hume's "matters of fact," but not his "relations of ideas."

That aside, it seems like we can make plenty of factual statements related to morality anyhow. "If poverty was alleviated more human flourishing would occur," is a fact statement. "Flourishing is good for the individual," is likewise a fact statement. I would tend to agree that the facts of the matter that can ground and drive on the development of morality are "out in the world," and that these principles tend to get instantiated in human institutions.

Well, there is absolutely no problem in making fact claims about the values human institutions instantiate from what I can see. It might be hard to make the argument that they are, indeed, instantiating those values through historical processes, but that doesn't preclude such an argument being successful. That being the case, morality can be described in an "is" sense completely separate from the "oughts" that institutions impossible on individuals.

Take: "The glass is fragile, if you drop it, it will break."

We can expand this to "based on all my knowledge of the glass, observations of past glasses, etc. and my knowledge of how the world works more generally, glasses ought to be fragile. If you drop this glass, it ought to break." — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is, fact statements can be seen as statements about what "ought" to happen (what would be the "correct" outcome) if our model of the world is correct. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That the glass will break might be an extrapolation deriving from observing something that occurs so often that you can predict a likely outcome - but there is nothing "correct" about the outcome; the glass breaking is just a state of affairs that will likely obtain that is, technically, totally disconnected from our knowledge. The "ought", then, is not really supported by our understanding of glasses.

In other words: our model of the world is rooted in states of affairs, one of which is the glass potentially breaking. To say that the glass ought to break is contingent upon our abstract, perhaps even mathematical, knowledge of glasses. So, to call the likely outcome "correct" if confirmed makes no sense even in the context of a model because such a state of affairs is just that: a likely outcome. You could, however, say that our prediction was accurate and validated our model of the world if the glass breaks. But there is no real, tangible correctness there.

To say that the glass ought to break is contingent upon our abstract, perhaps even mathematical, knowledge of glasses. So, to call the likely outcome "correct" if confirmed makes no sense even in the context of a model because such a state of affairs is just that: a likely outcome.

I think you have what I was intending flipped around backwards. It's not the observed outcomes that can be correct/incorrect, it's the models that ground our "is statements." That is, "if my 'is statement' is correct, x ought to happen." If x does not occur, it casts doubt on the "is statement," not the outcome that occured. "Is statements" can certainly be correct or incorrect, e.g. "Barack Obama is the current President," is an incorrect"is statement."

This gets to the whole idea of prediction as a way of vetting suppositions about states of affairs and causal transitions between them.

But since Hume thinks cause is just constant conjunction, "is statements" to the effect of "gasoline is combustible," would always be on thin ice anyhow. For Hume, such a thing wouldn't be a claim about a single state of affairs, but rather a claim about all states of affairs involving gasoline and combustion.

Yep. The point was to show the error of your

...without simply making the latter an encrypted or ambiguated version of the former. — Bob Ross

The post is about your misuse of "ambiguity'.

If you like.

But that has no impact on the derivation - which commences with an "is" and finishes with an "ought".

If your claim is that here is an implicit ought in (1) then you seem also to be reiterating objection 2 from the article. Yes, you ought to keep your promises - that's a fact about what a promise is - and a mere tautology.

I'm tease the poor thinking hereabouts with Searle's argument. I do agree that there is a difference between what is the case and what ought be the case. I think that better captured by Anscombe's shopping list. The difference is that of direction of fit; when we say what is the case, we change our words to fit the way the world is. When we say what ought be the case, we are changing the way things are to match our words. The first sentence in Searle's argument is an "is" statement that sets out a change in the way things are - the movement of $5.

So the mistake here is to confuse direction of fit with type of statement. An "is" statement can set out an obligation.

Kant's imperative, as a preference for consistency, has my sympathy. But folk seem to think it goes further than mere tautology, and of that I am suspicious. I don't think it much help in deciding what to do. But that's a different story.

I find myself wondering if the larger problem in the Guillotine isn't that "is statements" shouldn't also be "ought statements." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. "fragile" tells us how to act towards the parcel - if you work for Qantas, it tells you to use it for basketball practice. "Is" statements can tell you what you ought do.

I am confused, because you proved my point. What the OP was claiming is clearly false when you explicate it unambiguously, which is exactly what you did.

I wasn't showing how to derive an ought from an is, but to disprove your suggestion that colloquial speech is very imprecise.

I wasn't saying that all colloquial speech is very imprecise but, rather, that it seems as though the OP's conclusion is due to the confusion with the ambiguity in the colloquial speech (they were deploying). Saying "today is tom's last day on earth" does not entail whatsoever that "one ought to kill tom". After explicating it clearly, one can see that more work has to be put into the argument to get that prescription (which you demonstrated, I would say), and from there is it clear that no ought is being derived from an is. I think we may be in agreement: I agree that not all colloquial speech is confused nor ambiguous.

You diagnosed the issue as lack of clarity. I showed that to be erroneous.

If your claim is that here is an implicit ought in (1) then you seem also to be reiterating objection 2 from the article. Yes, you ought to keep your promises - that's a fact about what a promise is - and a mere tautology. — Banno

That is the whole point about promising. It is a voluntary binding of the is and the ought. It isn't trivial. It is the voluntary human enaction which bridges the is-ought gap. Not language. The entire concept of normativity is not just to identify, but to actualize. You can derive completely different oughts from virtually identical is statements just by the addition of one statement.

Tom sees a child about to be hit by a bus.
Tom has only one day left to live.
Tom ought to push the child out of the way, sacrificing himself.

Tom sees a child about to be hit by a bus.
Tom has only one day left to live.
The child just contracted a deadly new form of avian flu that will decimate the population.
Tom ought to let the child die.

The linguistic argument assumes that conditions can be exhaustively elaborated, which is misleading. Even when they can the statements apparently logically entail, it isn't linguistic, it is just a fact of historical consensus about fundamental behaviours. Yes, "promise" implies a binding of behaviour to language. That doesn't mean that language entails behaviour. It doesn't.

There are, broadly speaking, two types of derivation.

The first is to derive from a single premise:

a)
Premise: This is a red car
Conclusion: Therefore, this is a car

The second is to derive from more than one premise:

b)
Premise: If John is a man then John is mortal
Premise: John is a man
Conclusion: Therefore, John is mortal

So now let's consider obligations:

c)
Premise: One ought not murder
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder John

d)
Premise: If John is innocent then one ought not kill him
Premise: John is innocent
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not kill John

Perhaps you want an argument of these forms:

e)
Premise: Murder is Y
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder

f)
Premise: If murder is Y then murder is Z
Premise: Murder is Y
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder

I don't think either e) or f) can ever be valid. But so what? Why isn't c) or d) sufficient?

There seems to be this implicit claim that if "one ought not murder" cannot be derived from "murder is Y" premises alone then it cannot be true. What justifies this claim?

To say that the glass ought to break is contingent upon our abstract, perhaps even mathematical, knowledge of glasses. So, to call the likely outcome "correct" if confirmed makes no sense even in the context of a model because such a state of affairs is just that: a likely outcome.


I think you have what I was intending flipped around backwards. It's not the observed outcomes that can be correct/incorrect, it's the models that ground our "is statements." That is, "if my 'is statement' is correct, x ought to happen." If x does not occur, it casts doubt on the "is statement," not the outcome that occured. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, so there is an outcome within the parameters of the model that validates an ought if it occurs. But this ought is totally contingent on the veracity of the "is statements" that make up the model. Thus, they must be grounded in reality if they wish to reflect reality - and in the case of morality must likely also be universalizable. Saying merely that "flourishing is good for the individual", for instance, could contain myriad interpretations as to what constitutes flourishing depending upon which "facts" you start with, and how broad your scope is.

So now let's consider obligations:

c)
Premise: One ought not murder
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder John

d)
Premise: If John is innocent then one ought not kill him
Premise: John is innocent
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not kill John — Michael

I don't think either e) or f) can ever be valid. But so what? Why isn't c) or d) sufficient?

There seems to be this implicit claim that if "one ought not murder" cannot be derived from "murder is Y" premises alone then it cannot be true. What justifies this claim? — Michael

I think the issue is not that it cannot be true, but rather that such an "ought" is up for debate if it isn't supported by a relevant fact. I mean, if we cannot say that killing that might constitute murder is wrong in a way related to a reality outside of us, then how can we say that one is definitely behaving morally by not killing John? Why is the "ought" in "one ought not murder" morally compelling? I could just as easily claim that we ought to kick dogs and it would be equally as supported as your assertion one ought not kill John, but people wouldn't consider that morally acceptable. You might couch the "ought" in a concept of innocence in (d), but that concept of innocence is, naturally, theoretical and somewhat subjective.

You could, of course, shore up your statements with plenty of compelling reasoning and by appealing to some basic shared principles concerning innocence, but it will never be related as strongly as if it corresponded to a fact about reality (or something like that).

So, I think you are right. I also think your position is inherently weaker but far more reasonable when it is expounded upon than hoping for some more mystical, direct is-ought connection - as much as that pains me to write.

edit: I mean that the moral status of the ought is up for debate, not its trueness

... it will never be related as strongly as if it corresponded to a fact about reality (or something like that). — ToothyMaw

The realist will claim that that one ought not murder is a fact about reality, much like that an electron is a negatively charged particle is a fact about reality.

Why is the "ought" in "one ought not murder" morally compelling? — ToothyMaw

That's a different question. It might be true that one ought not murder even if knowing this doesn't compel me to obey. Perhaps I just don't care about what I ought or ought not do. Perhaps I enjoy doing things I shouldn't.

Meta ethics isn't concerned with what we actually choose to do.

Thus, they must be grounded in reality if they wish to reflect reality - and in the case of morality must likely also be universalizable. Saying merely that "flourishing is good for the individual", for instance, could contain myriad interpretations as to what constitutes flourishing depending upon which "facts" you start with, and how broad your scope is.

Might we consider that history is the arbiter here? How many morally loaded ideas have fallen "on the wrong side of history," and become widely anathema? General opinion against child marriage seems to have gained enough ground, at least in the West, to constitute and global moral fact. At least certain forms of racial and sex discrimination seem to be headed in the same direction. The idea of "noble birth," has been consigned to the "dust bin of history."

This is what we might expect if the principles that undergird moral facts are "out in the world," but must be objectified in our morality and institutions through historical processes in the same way that scientific facts are assimilated as a historical process and built into paradigms.

... it will never be related as strongly as if it corresponded to a fact about reality (or something like that).
— ToothyMaw

The realist will claim that that one ought not murder is a fact about reality, much like that an electron is a negatively charged particle is a fact about reality. — Michael

I know. Are you saying you are a realist and thus that your claim that one ought not murder is a moral fact? It sounds more like you are just adopting a pragmatic way of going about it that appeals to concepts like innocence and obligation and not actual fact hood.

Why is the "ought" in "one ought not murder" morally compelling?
— ToothyMaw

That's a different question. It might be true that one ought not murder even if knowing this doesn't compel me to obey. Perhaps I just don't care about what I ought or ought not do. Perhaps I enjoy doing things I shouldn't.

Meta ethics isn't concerned with what we actually choose to do. — Michael

Yes, meta ethics doesn't concern what we actually decide to do, but one's meta ethical view either does or does not make valid whatever normative efforts one puts forward. If you cannot demonstrate why your particular morality is fundamentally more justified than another's, what reason do I have to follow it? You need to define the space in which you are working in when applying morality, and that means at least a lightweight meta ethical exposition.

I know. Are you saying you are a realist and thus that your claim that one ought not murder is a moral fact? It sounds more like you are just adopting a pragmatic way of going about it that appeals to concepts like innocence and obligation and not actual fact hood. — ToothyMaw

I'm simply questioning the assertion that if one cannot derive an ought from an is then any claim of obligation is false.

Perhaps "you ought not harm another" is simply a brute fact about reality, much like "electrons are negatively charged particles" is.

If you cannot demonstrate why your particular morality is fundamentally more justified than another's, what reason do I have to follow it? — ToothyMaw

If by "what reason do I have to follow it" you mean something like "why should I believe you" then maybe you shouldn't believe me if I can't prove it.

But whether or not I can prove it and whether or not you should believe me is a separate issue to whether or not it is true.

If realism is correct then something can be both true and unprovable.

If you cannot demonstrate why your particular morality is fundamentally more justified than another's, what reason do I have to follow it?
— ToothyMaw

If by "what reason do I have to follow it" you mean something like "why should I believe you" then maybe you shouldn't believe me if I can't prove it.

But whether or not I can prove it and whether or not you should believe me is a separate issue to whether or not it is true.

If realism is correct then something can be both true and unprovable. — Michael

Perhaps "you ought not harm another" is simply a brute fact about reality, much like "electrons are negatively charged particles" is. — Michael

Demonstrating why something like that might be true could constitute merely pointing to a relevant fact about why it is wrong to harm people. That isn't the same as proving it per se, but it certainly constitutes providing evidence. That is mostly all I would ask for to really ground an ought statement in reality.

And if there is evidence, ought I not believe you? I mean, if realism were true, maybe some facts would exist that couldn't be proven, but these facts could be used to form reasonable explanations for other moral considerations. Shouldn't we also pay attention to those explanations that are most logical, reasonable, etc.? Sure, one might make mistakes in analyzing such explanations, but the moral person would search for those most true given a set of "brute facts".

Demonstrating why something like that might be true could constitute merely pointing to a relevant fact about why it is wrong to harm people. — ToothyMaw

Asking why it’s wrong to harm people is like asking why electrons are negatively charged. There is no answer; some things are simply fundamental, brute facts. Explanations have to come to an end somewhere.

Sure, one might make mistakes in analyzing such explanations, but the moral person would search for those most true given a set of "brute facts". — ToothyMaw

One such brute fact might be “it is wrong to harm people.”

Demonstrating why something like that might be true could constitute merely pointing to a relevant fact about why it is wrong to harm people.
— ToothyMaw

Asking why it’s wrong to harm people is like asking why electrons are negatively charged. There is no answer; some things are simply fundamental, brute facts. Explanations have to come to an end somewhere. — Michael

Sure, one might make mistakes in analyzing such explanations, but the moral person would search for those most true given a set of "brute facts".
— ToothyMaw

One such brute fact might be “it is wrong to harm people.” — Michael

I agree. I also believe that to be a brute fact. But for the purposes of discussing the is-ought divide, I feel obligated to mention that we don't have the kind of philosophical or scientific certitude in the area of morality that we have elsewhere.

I think that you as well as I are certain people should not be harmed, and that also explanations do have to end somewhere. I just like to discuss meta ethics as it is really interesting to me.

I think that you as well as I are certain people should not be harmed, and that also explanations do have to end somewhere. I just like to discuss meta ethics as it is really interesting to me. — ToothyMaw

This will likely to be very incomplete reasoning, but I’ll give outlining my current idea of metaethics a best shot:

First, consider that all ethics results first and foremost from what one oneself wants to obtain in the future given a) that one as agent is compelled in an ontologically fixed manner to optimally minimize one’s own present and future suffering (a premise which I grant can get very complex when looked at in detail) and b) that one is not alone in the cosmos as an agent described by (a) but that, instead, all coexistent agents in the cosmos are likewise described by (a).

Any conceivable end, or telos, that satisfies (a) given (b) will then be that which is good for oneself. One can of course envision more than one such possible future state of being. Yet some such envisioned future states of being will be unrealizable and, thereby, false. Pursuit of such a false state of future being will not minimize one’s own suffering but intensify it, thereby being a wrong notion of what is good. To pursue such false ultimate telos would then be to do what is wrong, or else bad, for oneself.

Here tersely outlined, (a) given (b) is first off taken to be an objective fact. Addressing just this part, one then gets into the riddle of how no matter what one does one can only be in pursuit of the good. Next addressing that telos which, ideally, perfectly satisfies (a) given (b), one can again likely obtain more than one conception of what it might be. Given that these alternatives will be mutually exclusive, were any one alternative to in fact be fulfillable as a telos/goal in principle, it would then be the objectively true good, with all other alternatives then necessarily being objectively false, hence wrong, hence bad goals to pursue. Here, then, some things one could do to satisfy (a) given (b) will be objectively good (for they approach the objectively true telos just specified) and others will be objectively bad (for they approach objectively bad teloi at expense of the objectively good telos). Furthermore, because of (b), that which is the objectively good end to pursue for yourself will then likewise be the objectively good ends to pursue for all others.

Indulge for the moment that the dictum of “liberty, equality, and fraternity for all” serves as a steppingstone toward one conception of what this objectively good, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 1”

Also indulge for the moment that, as an alternative to this trajectory, the dictum of “It’s good to be the absolute ruler over everyone and everything other” serves as a steppingstone toward another conception of what the objectively true, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 2”.

The two will be mutually exclusive and thereby contradictory: one cannot gravitate toward both at the same time and in the same way. One will be objectively good and the other thereby objectively bad. If one were to figure out which of the two just mentioned teloi is the true objective good, one then would furthermore figure out an existentially fixed (though non-physicalist) “is” via which “oughts” can be established.

Next, take the ought that “people should not be unduly harmed”.

Were telos 1 to be objectively true—hence, an existentially fixed telos that is actualizable in principle and that awaits to be fulfilled—then it would substantiate the just addressed dictum rationally, thereby making the proposition that “people should not be unduly harmed” an objectively good ideal/goal/telos to pursue, for it as such satisfies closer proximity to telos 1. However, were telos 2 to be objectively true, then “people should not be unduly harmed” would be unproductive to bringing oneself into closer proximity to telos 2—thereby signifying that this ought is an inappropriate and thereby bad ideal/goal/telos to pursue.

At core issue would be, not so much what most people deem to be good or bad (hence, current normality) but, instead, which ultimate telos specified is actualizable in principle and which is not. The former will be the right telos to pursue—what some in history have termed “the Good”—and the latter will be the wrong telos to pursue.

All this as an exceedingly terse outline of how I so far approach the issue of metaethics. And, of course, none of this makes any sense in a world wherein no teleological processes (and, hence, wherein no teloi) occur.

And, as a reminder, metaethics isn’t about prescription but about description. If telos 1 were true, it would justify the given ought. If telos 2 were true, it would not justify the given ought. The issue, again, is which conceived of ultimate telos is true and thereby conforms to what in fact is.

a) that one as agent is compelled in an ontologically fixed manner to optimally minimize one’s own present and future suffering — javra

Disregarding that this might not apply to, say, Jihadists, this sounds pretty reasonable. But many people also feel compelled to reduce others' suffering, too. Or they might have any number of moral convictions.

Yet some such envisioned future states of being will be unrealizable and, thereby, false. — javra

I'm sorry, what? How can a state of being, even unrealizable and future, be false? Maybe it doesn't satisfy (a) given (b), but it is a state of affairs, not a proposition or something. You could say that a certain state of the universe, or being, could not possibly come to fruition, so therefore it would not be moral to pursue it, however, which you don't quite say here:

Pursuit of such a false state of future being will not minimize one’s own suffering but intensify it, thereby being a wrong notion of what is good. To pursue such false ultimate telos would then be to do what is wrong, or else bad, for oneself. — javra

But who is to say for sure that pursuing a false state of being is truly sub-optimal? Maybe one genuinely believes that climate change is a hoax and one will not be affected, and thereby believes that they are justified in being extravagant in their usage of fossil fuels. This harms other people, but not so much the individual in the short term.

Now that I look at what you are writing some more, you don't differentiate between "future states of being" of the individual with everybody's states of being, and I don't buy that what is good for everyone is always good for the individual.

Here tersely outlined, (a) given (b) is first off taken to be an objective fact. — javra

Presupposing (b), and thus (a), is true to support the argument that purports that there are true or false, or moral or unrealizable, future states of being that we should avoid or pursue, and thus that any realizable end that satisfies (a) given (b) is moral - even if to differing degrees - is circular. So yes, if (b) is true, (a) is too. But why is (b) true? And, once again, even if (b) is true, why is what is good for the individual good for everyone or vice versa?

Addressing just this part, one then gets into the riddle of how no matter what one does one can only be in pursuit of the good. — javra

What does this mean? People definitely don't always pursue the good. Are you talking about why under many ethics people are always obligated to pursue the good?

Next addressing that telos which, ideally, perfectly satisfies (a) given (b), one can again likely obtain more than one conception of what it might be. Given that these alternatives will be mutually exclusive, were any one alternative to in fact be fulfillable as a telos/goal in principle, it would then be the objectively true good, with all other alternatives then necessarily being objectively false, hence wrong, hence bad goals to pursue. — javra

Why would a satisfactory telos be an objectively true good? Your telos is based on a shaky presupposition - that what is good for the group is good for the individual, or that (b) is true in the way you claim. And who are the bad goals bad for? The group, or the individual? You didn't really differentiate between the two.

Furthermore, because of (b), that which is the objectively good end to pursue for yourself will then likewise be the objectively good ends to pursue for all others. — javra

I disagree. What about holding slaves? Even if (b) is true, slaveholders kept slaves for their own benefit, and that doesn't disagree with your argument as far as I can tell. They just did what benefitted themselves, and I'm sure the slaves tried to do what benefitted themselves too, or at least as much as they could, given the circumstances.

The more I think about your argument the more I think you defined (a) too narrowly. There are good goals other than minimizing one's own suffering - but they are more nebulous than your (a), and you seem to have defined (a) in such a way that you could extrapolate such a goal to everyone, as (a) is pretty much true for everyone. But is it really the only relevant consideration?

By the way, what does all of this mean for the pre-existing, intensely religious people that care more about eternity than about minimizing pain on the Earth? According to you, and, given their beliefs are incorrect, they are being serious immoral pursuing such a state of being. It would be a moral obligation to convert them away from religion or to elsewise pacify them.

Indulge for the moment that the dictum of “liberty, equality, and fraternity for all” serves as a steppingstone toward one conception of what this objectively good, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 1”

Also indulge for the moment that, as an alternative to this trajectory, the dictum of “It’s good to be the absolute ruler over everyone and everything other” serves as a steppingstone toward another conception of what the objectively true, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 2”.

The two will be mutually exclusive and thereby contradictory: one cannot gravitate toward both at the same time and in the same way. One will be objectively good and the other thereby objectively bad. If one were to figure out which of the two just mentioned teloi is the true objective good, one then would furthermore figure out an existentially fixed (though non-physicalist) “is” via which “oughts” can be established. — javra

Okay, I don't think your assertion that the "is" you have provided is justified. You just assumed (b) was true and then that what is good for everyone is good for the individual. It ends there as an assumption, and I don't think it is even existentially fixed, really.

Consider a population of people existing merely to serve a dictator. Is what is good for the dictator (staying in power) good for the people? This dictator could implement some grand, moral telos like “liberty, equality, and fraternity for all” that would benefit everyone, but why? He largely just wants to hold power, and preventing the people from, say, organizing, will serve his needs and be to the detriment of everyone else. Even if the people rise up and overthrow the dictator to implement some sort of new government, many people will likely be harmed in the process. This might be the right telos - liberty, equality, and fraternity for all - the people pursue by overthrowing the dictator, but it is most certainly not to each person's benefit when manifested; the suffering of each person is often not minimized even when implementing a good telos in practice.

Next, take the ought that “people should not be unduly harmed”.

Were telos 1 to be objectively true—hence, an existentially fixed telos that is actualizable in principle and that awaits to be fulfilled—then it would substantiate the just addressed dictum rationally, thereby making the proposition that “people should not be unduly harmed” an objectively good ideal/goal/telos to pursue, for it as such satisfies closer proximity to telos 1. However, were telos 2 to be objectively true, then “people should not be unduly harmed” would be unproductive to bringing oneself into closer proximity to telos 2—thereby signifying that this ought is an inappropriate and thereby bad ideal/goal/telos to pursue. — javra

All I'm reading is: if it sounds like it jives, it jives.

At core issue would be, not so much what most people deem to be good or bad (hence, current normality) but, instead, which ultimate telos specified is actualizable in principle and which is not. The former will be the right telos to pursue—what some in history have termed “the Good”—and the latter will be the wrong telos to pursue. — javra

So we should choose between the options available to us according to which ones can be actualized with guidance from a set of principles that are objectively good because they minimize each person's current and future suffering.

I think a case could be made that you could reduce the net suffering of a population this way, but I think my examples show that a good telos might still not be the best thing for each individual. It would probably be impossible to take into account enough variables to implement anything even remotely ideal outside of the current good stuff we have going in many areas.

Honestly, the morality you are outlining sounds more like the philosophy of a race of aggressive aliens trying to take over the universe and less like something any normal philosopher or person would take on, partly because it is a little too self-assured, and partly because there is only one good way to go about doing good: what the analysts tell us to do.

I mean, the pieces might fit, but will we like what we see?

Lots of questions and issues. Thank you for them. In my defense, I did mention that the post would likely be wanting of sufficient justification and only a rough outline, or something to the like, this in my post’s opening sentence. Also, it’s not intended to be about morals, which are prescriptive, but about meta-ethics, which is purely descriptive.

I'm sorry, what? How can a state of being, even unrealizable and future, be false? — ToothyMaw

I’ll for now only try address this issue of truth and falsity as these pertain to teloi, aka, aims/goals/ends one pursues in hopes of fulfilling said aim/goal/end as a future reality.

Any proposition regarding future states of affairs can either evidence itself “conformant to the reality of what will be” and thereby true/right/correct or, otherwise, “to lack conformity to the reality of what will be” and thereby be false/wrong/incorrect. For instance, the proposition that “the sun will rise again tomorrow” can either be true or false, as will be evidenced in the span of the subsequent 24 hours.

If this is generally agreed upon, then: teloi are not propositions (at least not normally) but will nevertheless hold the same general property: either they can be accomplished, as one consciously or unconsciously believes they can when they are actively held, or they cant. Take a hypothetical madman who aims to jump so high as to land on the moon and who proceeds to so jump on account of this goal being actively held. We’d label him a madman because we know that this goal he momentarily holds is unrealizable in principle, and believe that a sane person should know better than to hold such an aim. The stated aim here does not conform to the reality of what can be. It is a false hope, so to speak. And, in so being, it is then a fully fictitious, and hence false, presentation of what will be given the invested effort and means.

Regardless of aim—from that of scratching one’s nose to that of interstellar travel, etc.—the aim could either be realizable in principle or, else, it might not be. Any unrealizable aim will then be pure fantasy concocted by our imagination, devoid of any reality in terms of being an end that is actualizable given the invested effort and means. In this sense alone, the unrealizable aim/goal/telos will then be false, deceptive, for although one aims X one will never obtain X even in principle. However, if the aim toward X conforms to the reality or fact of X’s obtainment upon given effort and means, then it will be true that X can be obtained given the required effort and means: making the telos/aim/goal true in this sense alone.

What I was saying, however, goes beyond this. But on seeing the many complexities and misunderstandings you find in what I previously wrote, I’ll leave all that for some other time. All the same, let me know what you think of what I've just written if you disagree. But again, there are more valid senses to truth and falsity than those that strictly apply to propositions.

The example given is about semantics rather than overcoming Hume's Guillotine. The hit man may glean what the mob boss wants him to do (the ought) from a descriptive statement (the is), but that is more about the nuances of communication in the sense of understanding innuendo. But independent of that there is nothing within the statement "Today is John's last day on earth" that can be causally tied to "You ought to kill John." Even if true, the descriptive statement that John will die today doesn't compel any sort of moral imperative on anyone hearing this statement. It takes some extra-linguistic context (i.e. being able to discern mob culture innuendo) to get to that conclusion.

That doesn't mean that language entails behaviour. It doesn't. — Pantagruel

The point here is to show how an ought statement follows from an is statement. That's what Searle does.

It would be no defence, on being accused of reneging on a promise, to say "Oh, yes, I made a promise, but I did not undertake an obligation!"

Languge does entail behaviour, because language is behaviour.

it’s not intended to be about morals, which are prescriptive, but about meta-ethics, which is purely descriptive. — javra

Yes, dumb mistake. Just replace meta-ethics with morality and my post hopefully makes sense.

Any proposition regarding future states of affairs can either evidence itself “conformant to the reality of what will be” and thereby true/right/correct or, otherwise, “to lack conformity to the reality of what will be” and thereby be false/wrong/incorrect. For instance, the proposition that “the sun will rise again tomorrow” can either be true or false, as will be evidenced in the span of the subsequent 24 hours. — javra

Okay, so we have propositions about what will be that can be true or false. But that isn't the same thing as saying that future states of being or of the universe are false, and a relevant telos is a goal with what I would presume to be a state of being as its end - something that I now grant can be false when referenced against what is actually possible - even if fictitious, and not to make a proposition true. But I get what you are saying now.

Okay, so we have propositions about what will be that can be true or false. But that isn't the same thing as saying that future states of being or of the universe are false, and a relevant telos is a goal with what I would presume to be a state of being as its end - something that I now grant can be false when referenced against what is actually possible - even if fictitious, and not to make a proposition true. But I get what you are saying now. — ToothyMaw

Awesome. It's good to know. Thanks.