That one ought not kick puppies for fun is a moral statement.
It is a true statement that one ought not kick puppies for fun.
Facts are true statements.

Therefore there are moral facts. — Banno

A fact is typically defined as a statement that can be proven to be true or false based on evidence or reality.

There are no moral facts because moral statements aren't testable claims, there's no possibility of proof.

Your logic doesn't appear to work as-is. Even if facts are true statements, that wouldn't mean any true statement is a fact. A true statement of "one ought not to kick puppies for fun" would only be a fact if all true statements were facts. Isn't that right? So, is your claim that all true statements are facts?

Seems too strong to me.

A moral realist need only claim that "one ought not harm another" is either true or false.

A moral antirealist claims that it has no truth value...? — Banno

Your use of the term "moral realism" seems equivalent to what most philosophers mean by moral cognitivism, and your use of the term "moral antirealism" seems equivalent to what most philosophers mean by moral noncognitvism. Yours isn't the standard terminology.

See here:

Cognitivist theories hold that evaluative moral sentences express propositions (i.e., they are 'truth-apt' or 'truth bearers', capable of being true or false), as opposed to non-cognitivism.

...

Moral realism ... holds that such propositions are about robust or mind-independent facts, that is, not facts about any person or group's subjective opinion, but about objective features of the world.

...

Ethical subjectivism is one form of moral anti-realism. It holds that moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of people, either those of each society, those of each individual, or those of some particular individual.

...

Error theory, another form of moral anti-realism, holds that although ethical claims do express propositions, all such propositions are false.

...

Non-cognitivist theories hold that ethical sentences are neither true nor false because they do not express genuine propositions.

Or if you don't like Wikipedia then see here:

Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to hold that X exists objectively. On this view, moral anti-realism is the denial of the thesis that moral properties—or facts, objects, relations, events, etc. (whatever categories one is willing to countenance)—exist objectively. This could involve either (1) the denial that moral properties exist at all, or (2) the acceptance that they do exist but this existence is (in the relevant sense) non-objective. There are broadly two ways of endorsing (1): moral noncognitivism and moral error theory. Proponents of (2) may be variously thought of as moral non-objectivists, or idealists, or constructivists. So understood, moral anti-realism is the disjunction of three theses:

1. moral noncognitivism
2. moral error theory
3. moral non-objectivism

Sirius is arguing against moral realism as described above, not against moral cognitivism in general.

Changing recognition of facts (e.g. "cultural / historical lineages") do not change facts as facts. Ignorance afflicts both "religious people" and "progressives" alike so the cognitive faculty is neither "defective" (as you suggest) nor "mysterious and undetectable". The difference is that "religious people" (i.e. supernaturalists) tend to eschew techniques of rational self-correction (i.e. learning) – relying on fallacious appeals to tradition, authority, popularity, incredulity, etc – much more than "progessives" (i.e. naturalists) do.

The big problem here is you begin with the assumption that, not only do mind-independent moral facts exist, but that we can arrive at all true moral facts with your flavor of critical reasoning. Take Elizabeth Anscombe, an incredibly intelligent lady who was well versed in philosophy, a literary executor of Wittgenstein, and largely responsible for reviving virtue ethics in the 20th century. She was vehemently opposed to abortion, which many other philosophers regard as good.

From my perspective, l don't need to take sides at all. But l can say, the catholic background of Anscombe influenced her decision, whereas the progressive/feminist tradition informs the decision of many philosophers who support abortion.

This has to do with the philosophy of disagreement.

If your epistemic peers, with similar evidence, reasoning abilities, dedicated time, self-criticism + other criteria, disagree on X, then you should suspend our judgment on X

1. Naturalism is true

2. The linguistic and non-linguistic practices which do not refer to or supervene on any natural fact outside the linguistic and non-linguistic practices must solely depend on the collective mind judgements of the community. — Sirius

Moral realists reject 1 and/or 2.

To prove moral realism wrong you must prove 1 and 2 true. You haven't done so, only asserted them.

Although it would help if you could explain what you mean by naturalism. Do you mean physicalism? If so, what of mathematics?

Thoughts? — Bob Ross

First thought:
“…. Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour….”
(T. H. N., 3. 1. 1. “Morals Not Derived From Reason)

Subsequent paradigm shifts in moral philosophy demonstrate that no matter what necessarily regulates our conduct, it is not sufficient in itself to explain those factual occasions where manifest conduct does not conform to it. That being the case, Hume’s argument with respect to mere sentiment in general, and its regulatory power over our conduct, is falsified, insofar as under those conditions, rather than no ought follows from an is, it is the case an ought is all that can follow from an is.
————

Second thought:
The concept of “fact”, the primary intended meaning of that which the word represents, being empirical, shouldn’t be adjoined to that human condition having no definitive empirical predication whatsoever. Thus, it isn’t so much that there are no moral facts, but that the notion of moral facts doesn’t make any sense. As it happens, explanatory gaps in moral philosophy are conceptually relieved by exchanging fact for disposition, or…..yikes, dare I say?…..imperative.

End thoughts.

A moral realist might claim that the statement "one ought not harm another" is made true by the mind-independent fact that one ought not harm another (much like someone might claim that the statement "electrons are negatively charged particles" is made true by the mind-independent fact that electrons are negatively charged particles).

I have no problem, fundamentally, with this (other than labeling it as a moral realist position) because it didn’t specify the mind-independent fact of ‘one ought not harm another’ as morally signified. My argument doesn’t negate the possibility of normative facts—just moral facts.

If you think I am wrong, then what signification of ‘moral’ language would the moral realist, in this situation, be using other than using it to signify ‘what one ought to be doing’?

If you assume that only statements about material things or sense data are facts, then of course you will conclude that moral statements are not facts. You will have done no more than reiterated your assumption.

So you are forced to deny what is blatantly evident, that these are indeed true statements, facts, simply to keep your ideology.

My argument did not posit that facts are only about material things or sense data.

Correct. Saying that "T is a normative fact" is not itself giving a prescription (as far as I can tell), and P2 is always going to take that form, and will supplement P1 to get the conclusion. If I am missing something, then I would love to hear your thoughts!

I might be repeating @Banno here by Hume's Guillotine says one cannot logically derive (moral) norms from non-normative facts. The moral anti-realist assumes that 'normative facts do not exist', even though they do as evident in (e.g.) public health, medical & ecological sciences as well as institutional facts like money, traffic signs, marriage vows. The vast majority of considered facts are, in fact, theory/value-laden (i.e. normative), so Hume's Guillotine makes sense to me and 'moral anti-realism' does not.

Those examples don’t make sense to me (and perhaps I am simply misunderstanding): for example, traffic signs exist and that is a fact; but that there should be traffic signs is not a fact. Are you saying the latter is also a fact? This seems to be the crux of what you are saying (as far as I understand).

I think you are begging the question again, and, like in the past, you very much need to define what you mean by 'fact'. All of your arguments depend on your premise that there are no moral facts, and yet you never end up saying what you mean by a fact such that your statement could be reliably assessed.

Fair enough. A 'fact', for intents of the argument in the OP, is 'a statement of which its referent corresponds correctly to something in reality'; or I would be also fine with simply defining it as 'a statement which expresses something that exists mind-independently'. Facts refer to something objective (i.e., mind-independent). Either way, I think that suffices for the argument.

I am not sure what is being argued here, but I agree, and my argument in the OP agrees, that there is a possibility for normative facts: they just aren't moral facts.

My argument only gets one to moral anti-realism, and doesn't speak about moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism. Personally, I am a moral subjectivist, so I agree that moral judgments are truth-apt.

:up:

Let me know if you have any further thoughts!

The point of the argument in the OP is essentially what you described: if we are to take 'moral' language to signify 'what one ought to be doing', then it isn't enough to simply prove the existence of normative facts--and I think many moral realists just skip over this like it isn't an issue (and perhaps it isn't and I am mistaken).

Subsequent paradigm shifts in moral philosophy demonstrate that no matter what necessarily regulates our conduct, it is not sufficient in itself to explain those factual occasions where manifest conduct does not conform to it.

I didn’t quite follow this: it is not sufficient to explain manifest conduct that does not conform to it in what manner?

I would say that our own sentiments is exactly what regulates our behavior, even if the ‘ego’ is not aware of it. It is a manner of ‘strong vs. weak wills’--as Nietzsche put it.

We can most certainly fight most of our yearnings for pleasures and what not, but fighting it is itself a manner of willing it—wanting it.

That being the case, Hume’s argument with respect to mere sentiment in general, and its regulatory power over our conduct, is falsified, insofar as under those conditions, rather than no ought follows from an is, it is the case an ought is all that can follow from an is.

This is interesting, but why think that prescriptions only can follow from descriptions? That doesn’t seem correct to me at all.

The concept of “fact”, the primary intended meaning of that which the word represents, being empirical, shouldn’t be adjoined to that human condition having no definitive empirical predication whatsoever.

I agree: so where does that leave moral realism, then? As opposed to normative realism?

No ambiguity. If it is a fact, it is true. If it is not true, it is not a fact. — Banno

Okay, but this would be an implication of the assertion of P2, not its primary sense. Getting away from the OP for a moment, consider two syllogisms. The first is of <this form>, the second is explicitly Humean in form:

S1: Walking the dog is a normative fact.
S2: All normative facts are volitional.
S3: Therefore, walking the dog is volitional.

H1: One ought to walk their dog.
H2: Fred is Hanover's dog.
H3: Therefore, Hanover ought to walk Fred.

I think there is an important way in which S1 differs from H1 vis-à-vis normativity, and this is seen by looking to the conclusions. S is not a practical syllogism, for it prescribes no course of action. H is a practical syllogism. This remains true even once we admit that S1 implies the truth that dogs ought to be walked. It is not necessarily the same thing to say, "It is true that dogs ought to be walked," and, "Walking the dog is a normative fact," even if the latter implies the former.

I have no problem, fundamentally, with this (other than labeling it as a moral realist position) because it didn’t specify the mind-independent fact of ‘one ought not harm another’ as morally signified. My argument doesn’t negate the possibility of normative facts—just moral facts. — Bob Ross

What would it mean for a fact to be moral? Do these two propositions mean different things?

1. one morally ought not harm another
2. one non-morally ought not harm another

If so then let's just rephrase my previous comment:

A moral realist might claim that the statement "one morally ought not harm another" is made true by the mind-independent fact that one morally ought not harm another (much like someone might claim that the statement "electrons are negatively charged particles" is made true by the mind-independent fact that electrons are negatively charged particles).

. . . and I'm probably missing some.

To be sure, a ritual for American vegans on Thanksgiving! Free the turkeys . . .

While I slept my tofu-heavy sleep, this discussion has done really well for itself. I am no longer sure of my position here. “Legitimate ambiguity,” as Leontiskos puts it, now seems about right to me on the entailment question. So just one more comment: Could the ambiguity lie in the fact that we haven’t specified the universe of discourse – the objects over which we want our predicates to range?

Let me explain (coughs nervously and consults his old logic notes). Statements are perhaps best understood, for logical purposes, as not existing in the world of space and time – the old logical distinction was “subsistent” vs. “existent”. So we could, following this idea, quantify either over the universe of space/time objects, or over a different set, in this case the set of statements, or facts. My original reading of Bob Ross’s syllogism was that it quantified over both things and statements, whereas Banno’s objection is that we have to take it as referring only to things or states of affairs -- the subjects of facts, rather than the facts themselves, which are of course statements. There is a vast literature on quantifier variance which I’m only casually familiar with, but here is the difference, as I understand it, for our purposes:

If we exclude statements as bound variables in themselves, then “X is a normative fact” and “It is true that X is a normative fact” are equivalent. This is Banno’s position, if I’m understanding him correctly. But if we allow statements into our universe of discourse, we get a different interpretation. “X is a normative fact” and “The statement ‛X is a normative fact’ claims to state a truth” now say two different things, because they quantify over different ranges, in the first case a state of affairs, and in the second case a statement. I don’t think we’d need to know, or claim, anything about the truth of the statement in order to talk about it, provided we allowed ourselves to talk about statements at all as a separate class.

I think the example often given of this (I’m taking it from Copi & Gould’s Readings on Logic) is: “Sentences having ‛ghosts’ as a subject-term are not really about ghosts . . . but about some people’s statements about ghosts, or perhaps certain ideas about ghosts.” Substitute “normative fact” for “ghost” and this makes the case pretty well, though C&G say (or said, in 1972) that this interpretation can lead to several “odd consequences.” And, thinking it through, I'm unsure whether it requires the presumption that the subject-term doesn't exist, which moral realists would deny.

That said, I am an indifferent logician at best, and I’m open to correction here by my betters.

As for moral facts, I also think there are such things, but emphatically disagree that demonstrating their existence is as easy as Banno says:

That one ought not kick puppies for fun is a moral statement.
It is a true statement that one ought not kick puppies for fun.
Facts are true statements.

Therefore there are moral facts. 

The second premise merely imports the conclusion, thus begging the question. If there were no moral facts, then premise 2 couldn’t be true. But if it is “a true statement” that we shouldn’t kick the puppies, then this true statement is a moral fact. Circular, no? How have we established that premise 2 is a true statement? Is it meant to be obvious? But if it were, then we’d already know there are moral facts, and thus no proof would be required.

Let's keep it simple.

Electrons are negatively charged particles. How do I verify (or falsify) this?
One ought not murder. How do I verify (or falsify) this?

Assume that we can verify that electrons are negatively charged particles but cannot verify that one ought not murder. What then? Perhaps:

One ought not assert a claim that one cannot verify.

But then how do I verify (or falsify) this?

I used moral language just fine all my life before I ever encountered metaethics, and now suddenly I must pick a position between the existence of some type of bizarre normative platonic realm, or hold that all moral statements are technically.. false?

This seems like philosopher babble to me. Take a statement (divorced from its actual use in discourse - itself problematic), "torturing babies for fun is wrong!" Everyone that isn't a psychopath just agrees, and leaves it at that, but the philosopher must know *what* makes it true - is there a stance independent normative realm the statement flies out and corresponds with?? And if not must the statement then be actually false???? AHHHH!!!

People don't have metaethical commitments when they use moral language. Philosophers take individual utterances eg "x is wrong" and build entire worlds out of them to the point you can reach a conclusion like "torturing babies for fun is wrong" is actually a false statement. Its just idiotic.

You know how a normal conversation goes? Someone says you shouldn't do x because x is wrong. The person responds why is it wrong? What you DONT do is go into some metethical tirade about stance independent normative facts and get into a debate on their existence or not. No you just explain in the typical manner, "x is wrong because it causes y type of harm or negative outcome" and the person may either come round to your conclusion or not. That's how moral language works. I don't know what the philosophers are doing.

The big problem here is you begin with the assumption that, not only do mind-independent moral facts exist, but that we can arrive at all true moral facts with your flavor of critical reasoning. — Sirius

Where do I make this"assumption"? Stop making shit up.

l can say, the catholic background of Anscombe influenced her decision, whereas the progressive/feminist tradition informs the decision of many philosophers who support abortion.

Like Anscombe, I was raised and educated in Roman Catholicism until I attended university and I "support abortion" as many current and former Catholics do. So what. Wtf are you talking about? This has nothing to do with my previous reply to you.

People don't have metaethical commitments when they use moral language. — Inyenzi

:up:

I don't know what the philosophers are doing. — Inyenzi

Trying to make sense of and justify the many things we simply take for granted.

What would it mean for a fact to be moral?

For my argument, I was using ‘moral’ language as signifying ‘that which one ought to be doing’.

Do these two propositions mean different things?

1. one morally ought not harm another
2. one non-morally ought not harm another

Yes, with respect what I regard as ‘moral’ signification, the word ‘morally’ is signifying in #1 that this is something you actually ought to be doing (and, in this case, more specifically, that you should not be harming others).

#2 is just, at best, a normative fact; i.e., some prescription which exists mind-independently. From that normative fact, it simply does not logically follow that you ought to do it. Another example is, ‘one ought to eat food’: arguably, this is a normative fact, since this obligation is embedded into both of our biology—but does that mean it is moral to do so? No.

A moral realist might claim that the statement "one morally ought not harm another" is made true by the mind-independent fact that one morally ought not harm another

That is how the story goes...but, this use of ‘moral’ is not signifying ‘what one ought to do’; because it does not follow from any normative fact that one ought to do it. So I would rephrase your statement here as:

A moral realist might could validly claim that the statement "one morally ought not harm another" is made true by the mind-independent fact that one morally ought not harm another, but, this does not (logically) entail that one ought to not harm another: one would also need to add a claim, or something similar, that ‘one ought to abide by what is a normative fact’--then it is of ‘moral’ significance.

Great post J!

Although I am not sure that I fully followed, let me try to adequately respond and you let me know if I am on the right track.

If we exclude statements as bound variables in themselves, then “X is a normative fact” and “It is true that X is a normative fact” are equivalent.
…
But if we allow statements into our universe of discourse, we get a different interpretation. “X is a normative fact” and “The statement ‛X is a normative fact’ claims to state a truth” now say two different things, because they quantify over different ranges,

It seems as though you are positing these two examples as of two competing and mutually exclusive views of quantifying ‘things’ with propositions; but I am failing to see them as a true dilemma (with relation to each other): I accept both of your examples.

“X is a normative fact” is equivalent to “it is true that X is a normative fact” because “it is true” is superfluous; and “the statement ‘X is a normative fact’ claims to state a truth’” is different then ‘X is a normative fact’ because, as you noted, the former is referencing a statement about the latter—once we strip away the linguistic aspects (e.g., ‘is true’, in this case, isn’t superfluous linguistically in ‘the statement “” is true’ just because of how English is setup), we find that they are different propositions simply because they are references two different ‘things’.

Furthermore, I don’t see how propositions referencing ‘statements’ is any different than referencing ‘states of affairs’ (other than obviously a state of affair is not a statement): they are still valid propositions.

Finally, I don’t see how my syllogism (in the OP) is contingent on accepting these ‘statement’-style propositions: “T is a normative fact” is not itself referencing a statement—it is, rather, referencing a fact. To make it analogous (in my mind), you would have to refurbish “T is a normative fact” to “the statement ‘T is a normative fact’ is true” to make the proposition reference a statement.

Let me know if I am on the right track (with respect to what you were trying to convey).

Yes, with respect what I regard as ‘moral’ signification, the word ‘morally’ is signifying in #1 that this is something you actually ought to be doing (and, in this case, more specifically, that you should not be harming others). — Bob Ross

I don't understand the distinction between something I ought to do and something I actually ought to do.

But fine, using your language:

A moral realist might claim that the statement "one actually ought not harm another" is made true by the mind-independent fact that one actually ought not harm another (much like someone might claim that the statement "electrons are negatively charged particles" is made true by the mind-independent fact that electrons are negatively charged particles).

I don't understand the distinction between something I ought to do and something I actually ought to do.[

So, the confusion, I think, is in the ambiguity of ‘I ought to do something’: that could be an expression of a normative fact or non-fact. The point is that when anyone states “There exists a normative fact that expresses ‘I ought to do something’” it does not follow that ‘I ought to do something’.

So I can regress your elaboration (again) validly into:

The proposition “there is a normative fact such that ‘one actually ought not harm another’” does not entail, if true, that “one actually ought not harm another”; and this is Hume’s Guillotine in a nutshell. If you say “one actually ought no harm another” and this is a normative fact, this is just a more ambiguous way of saying “there is a normative fact such that ‘one actually ought not harm another’”.

I think I may see what you are saying now. I would say that every normative fact, T, can be and honestly probably should be rewritten as "There is a normative fact T" (or something similar to that) because it disambiguates the conversation.

If I create major premise, P1, that is "I ought not kill people", it is not clear if the truthity of that statement is subjective or objective: it could go either way. But, if we are being technical, it should be "I believe that I ought not kill people" if it is subjective and "There is a normative fact T" if it is objective. Then it isn't so confusing why I might say that there being a normative fact "I ought not kill people" does not entail that "I ought not kill people". Does that help?

If it is a true statement its truth does not share a sense with other uses of "truth". "One ought not kick puppies for fun" is false, in sense of the natural world. It fits the form of a proposition, but it doesn't rely upon any feature of the natural world for its truth. Rather we are using the word "true" in the place of the moral words "good" or "bad", which have no natural instantiations. — Moliere

This is the sort of post that requires either five thousand words or something brusque and undiplomatic. I don't have time for five thousand words.

There are quite substantive problems with this approach.

The most obvious is that there simply is not a common use of "true" that exclusively applies to the natural world, nothing in the OED or Macquarie that comes even close.

And the reason for that is that it's a philosopher's conceit, a herniated remnant of logical positivism.

Nor does the idea have any credibility. "One ought not kick puppies for fun" is true; the remainder of your post shows that you agree that it is true. You sensibly wish ethics to work in a way quite different to science, but throw out the babe.

Indeed, adopting the proposal that ethical statements are not truth-apt is a way not of highlighting ethics but of reducing it so it may be thrown out of consideration. If ethical propositions are not truth apt, they cannot take a place in logic, and hence are outside of rational consideration.

So, please, reconsider.

So, is your claim that all true statements are facts? — Judaka

Yep.

...ism, ism, ism.

All we are saying is give peace a chance.

But no one listens to Lennon any more.

I don't really care what label folk put on the titular view. My concern is simply that folk accept that there are moral truths. I don't see that the syllogisms in the OP amount to very much of anything, actually.

Sirius is arguing against moral realism as described above, not against moral cognitivism in general. — Michael

I don't think I addressed @Sirius...?

- Yes, I very much agree. I think these ethical debates result in a great deal of tail-chasing that in the end substitutes highly reliable beliefs for highly implausible theories.