Sure, I find Hume's argument interesting, which I am going to read further. Whether he was denying the world or not, is not really important for me at all.it's safer to think that what you won't know can still kill you.
But hey, you won't find any purely deductive disproof of solipsism either. — jorndoe
Hume displays a slightly faulty way of understanding sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Any relevant quotes from Hume? — Corvus
First, That, properly speaking, ’tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses ; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, as that which we examine at present. — Hume, Treatise of Human Understanding, p191
It still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us … must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof. — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B519
is it logically correct in saying "The world exists."?
— Corvus
Might be interesting how that even came to be a question. — Mww
You seem to be a master of missing the point. The argument is simply that the existence of the world independently of its being perceived is an inference to the best explanation for our experience. It isn't a proof and doesn't purport to be.
As I read Hume all he was doing was pointing out that inductive and abductive reasoning are not deductively/ logically certain; a move against rationalism. — Janus
My take is that the subjective nature of time and space are the cornerstone of the framework. But I don't think he claims that these are 'merely' or 'only' subjective, in the sense of being peculiar to the individual. Rather that they are grounded in the human mind, so, if you like, a kind of 'universal subject' rather than an individual ego. This is where Kant's 'transcendental apperception' is significant ('experience both of the self and its objects rests on acts of synthesis that, because they are the conditions of any experience, are not themselves experienced'). It's an antidote to the kind of hyperbolic objectivity that science is inclined to foster (many argue that it culminates in a kind of hyperbolic subjectivism, although I don't agree with that.)
//ps// and also Hume's scepticism should be mentioned which was principally scepticism of the knowledge of causal relationships. This was the subject of Kant's answer to Hume which is a unit of study in its own right.// — Wayfarer
What do you want me to do, quote all the places where Hume is wrong? — Metaphysician Undercover
Sure, I feel this is one of the interesting points in CPR. Will have read and thoughts, and get back for further discussions and clarifications.Ehhhh, maybe. I’ll have to back check that. But there’s a more exact exposition of why not. See A592/B620 for the groundwork, if you’re so inclined. — Mww
He goes on proving Philosopher's belief in the existence of the external world, and concludes that the belief cannot be based on reason, but imagination. There are extensive arguments and proofs why this is the case. — Corvus
Yājñavalkya says: "You tell me that I have to point out the Self as if it is a cow or a horse. Not possible! It is not an object like a horse or a cow. I cannot say, 'here is the ātman; here is the Self'. It is not possible because you cannot see the seer of seeing. The seer can see that which is other than the Seer, or the act of seeing. An object outside the seer can be beheld by the seer. How can the seer see himself? How is it possible? You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the Thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the Understander of understanding. That is the ātman."
Nobody can know the ātman inasmuch as the ātman is the Knower of all things. So, no question regarding the ātman can be put, such as "What is the ātman?' 'Show it to me', etc. You cannot show the ātman because the Shower is the ātman; the Experiencer is the ātman; the Seer is the ātman; the Functioner in every respect through the senses or the mind or the intellect is the ātman. As the basic Residue of Reality in every individual is the ātman, how can we go behind It and say, 'This is the ātman?' Therefore, the question is impertinent and inadmissible. The reason is clear. It is the Self. It is not an object.
"Everything other than the ātman is stupid; it is useless; it is good for nothing; it has no value; it is lifeless. Everything assumes a meaning because of the operation of this ātman in everything. Minus that, nothing has any sense.
Then Uṣasta Cākrāyana, the questioner kept quiet. He understood the point and did not speak further. — Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad
Arguments do not prove anything; they are merely consistent (if valid) with their presupposed premises.
This means that belief in the existence or non-existence of the external world is based on reason, but the premises that reasoning, whether for or against, is based on cannot be certain and are themselves based on abductive speculation (imagination). None of which disagrees with Hume, so it looks to me like it is you who misunderstand Hume. — Janus
Your post sounds like as if you have not read anything on Hume and any messages in this thread with attention. What does Hume say about the way our beliefs arise for the continuous existence of the external world? — Corvus
Our belief in the external world and causation are habitual based on the experienced reliable presence of objects and invariance of objects and the observed constant conjunction of events.
What do you think he says? — Janus
I will conclude that, if the objective reality of any of my ideas is such that I clearly recognize that it is neither formally nor eminently in me and that, consequently, I cannot myself be the cause of it, it necessarily follows that I do not exist alone in the world, but that there is still something that exists and that is the cause of this idea; whereas, if such an idea is not found in me, I will have no argument that can convince me and assure me of the existence of anything other than myself; for I have searched them all carefully and have not, until now, found any.
Now between these ideas, apart from the one which represents me to myself, from which there can be no difficulty here, there there is another which represents to me a God, others corporeal and inanimate things, others angels, others animals, and finally others which represent men similar to me. But as for the ideas which represent other men to me, or animals, or angels, I easily understand that they can be formed by mixing and composing other ideas that I have of bodily things and of God, although besides me there were no other men in the world, neither any animals nor any angels. And as far as the ideas of corporeal things are concerned, I do not recognize nothing so great or so excellent, which does not seems like it could come from myself
and“Can it, however, also happen that these same things which I suppose not to be because they are unknown to me, are not actually different from me, who I know?”
Though these possible unknown parts of his nature would not affect the imagination, he claims. There is no reason prima facie that some unknown part of the mind would not affect it, but defining the mind as at least things that I am conscious of, it can't be the case. As SEP puts it:“[…] more distinctly known than that part of myself which I do not know and which does not affect the imagination;”
That alone proves the outside world, be it things or an evil or good god. When it comes to a physical world, Descartes' approach is not without trouble, as is explained in the following SEP article.For from the additional premise that nothing can be in my mind of which I am unaware, it follows that if sensations were being produced by some activity in my mind, I’d be aware of that activity on the occasion of its operation. Since I’m not thus aware, it follows that the sensation I’m having is produced by a cause external to my mind. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Can I ask if it would make any sense to believe otherwise? Then if it matters at all if we believe in such an ‘existence’ extraneous to our general sensory interaction as part-of the world (rather than as some disembodied entity). — I like sushi
You might be interested in Descartes proof of the outside world, from the MM:
I will conclude that, if the objective reality of any of my ideas is such that I clearly recognize that it is neither formally nor eminently in me and that, consequently, I cannot myself be the cause of it, it necessarily follows that I do not exist alone in the world, but that there is still something that exists and that is the cause of this idea; whereas, if such an idea is not found in me, I will have no argument that can convince me and assure me of the existence of anything other than myself; for I have searched them all carefully and have not, until now, found any. — Lionino
So we are now talking about the ‘existence’ of fictional and hypothetical worlds?
No thanks. I am out.
Only so many liberties we can take with words before gibberish takes over. — I like sushi
Ehhhh, maybe. I’ll have to back check that. But there’s a more exact exposition of why not. See A592/B620 for the groundwork, if you’re so inclined. — Mww
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