So Russia gets to cuts off choice parts of Ukraine, and when this happens the best thing Ukraine can do is shrug and act like nothing happened? — Echarmion

Pretty much.

The alternative is the war that is currently happening where Ukraine loses far more land, lives, economic power, mass exodus, mass trauma, nothing good.

NATO could send troops into Ukraine at any time since 2008 to protect Ukraine from the current fate, but NATO doesn't because NATO doesn't care about Ukraine nor Ukrainians.

The reason small countries that are close (or close enough) to large powers that they are not friends with (such as Ireland vis-a-vis the UK) often adopt neutral status is precisely to avoid the kind of situation Ukraine is in now. If you don't want to be allies with the large power next door, then the best strategic move is to commit to neutrality and not being allies with anyone. The only exceptions is if there is an imminent or ongoing war between large powers and you are forced to pick sides anyways (can't just stay out of it like Sweden or Switzeralnd).

It's a nice epic fantasy to "reconquer the lost territories" but it was effetively impossible to reconquer Crimea after 2014 and impossible to reconquer the 4 additional oblasts in 2023. It was possible to reconquer at least some of the oblasts in 2023 as the Russians had not yet built extensive fortifications and had a small expeditionary force vulnerable to attack, but that would have required all the heavy weapons that was "common sense" could not be sent to Ukraine in 2022 to as an extension of "whatever it takes" but somehow equally "common sense" needs to be sent now in 2023.

And as soon as the war started I started to explain how offensive actions were not possible without heavy weapons, that it is ridiculous to believe Ukraine could retake significant territory with only shoulder launched missiles.

So, if Zelensky or his generals followed philosophy forum, they would have known my lengthy analysis of why ATGM's and manpads were obviously not sufficient to conduct any sort of offensive, or even counter offensive effectively:

And not just fro me! But this was one point of consensus!

Hence, focus on sending Ukraine anti-tank guided missiles and manpads. These are extremely dangerous weapons for sure, but you can't really assault and take a dug-in position with these weapons; certainly harass supply lines and lay ambushes but they don't really help defend against a concentrated offensive. So, if Russia digs in on the sides of a pincer and has a concentrated offensive to move forward, there's not much Ukraine can do about it with ATGM's and manpads.
— boethius
The basic problem is that for Ukrainians being on the defensive works. But wars are not won just by being on the defensive. Ukraine should make counterattacks and here might be their weak point: to counterattack they should concentrate their forces and firepower and destroy the Russian units. If those Russian units are in a long column in the middle of an urban area, that's easy. If they are in defensive positions, that's hard. And with the concentration the Russian artillery has targets. Likely Ukraine will try to avoid a battle of attrition. Yet the material support coming from NATO countries is substantial. But they would need more than just those ATGMs, but also artillery and medium range Surface-to-Air missile systems. Stingers cannot defend attack from high altitude. And if you are Putin, you don't care about if you hit something else also when destroying the Ukrainian army. — ssu

An exchange from March 10th, 2022.

Right, but that's the precise problem. If it's the risk that Russia reacts to, then Ukraine's current status is pretty much irrelevant. Ukraine can do whatever it wants to remain neutral. As soon as Russia detects a risk to their interests they nevertheless act.

And since Russia clearly considers some domestic political changes risks, Ukraine would be forever under the threat of Russian aggression as soon as the political situation turns in a way Russia considers too risky. — Echarmion

The key is to navigate risk.

Why didn't Russia annex Crimea before 2014?

Because there's also risks to annexing Crimea, so as long as the risks of annexing Crimea, or a full scale invasion, are greater than not-doing-those-things, then Russia doesn't do them.

Hence, you want to minimize risk to your larger neighbour, and the best way to do that is be neutral.

And definitely the position Ukraine is in entails permanent risk and a permanent need to manage that risk.

Joining a military alliance hostile to Russia is a high risk gambit that has enabled (because it provided consolidation of Russian elites about the subject and a justification to the domestic audience) and triggers exactly the war the gambit is designed to prevent.

There is not too many situations in history where this sort of gambit works, and I would honestly be mind-blown if such a gambit has worked in a position analogous to Ukraine.

And if such a gambit ever worked in even remotely similar circumstances, it was because it was entirely prepared in secret, the actors in the gambit knowing that if the large neighbouring power got wind of the plan they would be invaded essentially the next day.

Ukraine has sub optimal strategy at pretty much every critical juncture.

Russia amassing troops made sure the pipeline would not be opened. The idea that Ukraine was just s convenient "outlet for that anger" is just utterly ridiculous, especially since you acknowledge the invasion must have been planned well in advance. — Echarmion

One interpretation is that the troops started being amassed due to delays in opening the pipeline. It's not so much the physical completion of the project that is the key point but approving the license to open the pipeline on the German side; the physical completion of the project just makes delays on licensing cost money and focuses tension on the issue.

Another interpretation was that Russia would do essentially the same exercise every year (albeit bigger every year) as a show of force to Ukraine (Russia does lot's of readiness exercises) and that it became a media thing in 2022 because the US wanted to put pressure on the Germans to not open the pipeline, with the forces being amassed as evidence the Russians are a hostile.

The pipelines were not merely a strong economic incentive to both the Russians and the Germans to cooperate and maintain peace, but also a symbol of Russian-German "friendship", or whatever you want to call it.

My reading of these events was that the pipeline was absolutely critical and would have informed further decision making. As I explain, the money the pipeline would generate can "finance" the situation in the Donbas at least a little longer (be rationalized as the "cost of doing business") but it would also change the diplomatic situation as Germany would be making a strong signal it has a different foreign policy to that of the US.

This was a huge investment designed to create closer ties and more peaceful relations with Central Europe, and the biggest EU player of Germany, so I think it's common sense Russia would have wanted to reciprocate the good faith act of opening the pipeline with the good faith act of not-invading. The pipelines to Germany dwarf in terms of economic value and diplomatic leverage anything the Donbas has to offer, there is no reason to trade one for the other.

Rather, once not only the Nord Stream 2 is not opened and then Nord Stream blown up entirely, only then does Russia annex the regions as ... if Nord Stream no longer exists then the Donbas and even more of Ukraine is better than nothing.

I prefer to be an optimist. That we don't hear about some great German project to reclaim all this land to the east, parts of which they had held for centuries, says something about peoples ability to move on given the right context. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Or our lost Karelia. Nobody ever has thought that it could be gotten back and Finns even wouldn't like it back: it has now a Russian population that has lived there nearly 80 years.

Well, not a lot are craving either for those lands. As all the Finns living there were evacuated out from there, there was basically the memories and some unscrupulous Finnish politicians who after the Soviet Union fell held the view that talks with Russia could perhaps be possible just to get some votes of elderly (and foolish) Karelians. Of course it was nearly the first thing that Yeltsin in and interview had said that Russia would never in any situation give back land. (At least there was an opening that people could visit their old places.)

The Ukraine war, like the Winter War and Soviet-Polish War before it, seems like the opposite phenomenon. A self destructive inability to move on. Putin's own words on the subject certainly seem to look backwards more than forwards. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Russia simply has a character problem as Russia has always been an empire. People who support Putin basically fear that it will otherwise collapse even further than it did when the Soviet Union collapsed. And when those dying now in the Ukraine war come from Dagestan and other minority held places while St Petersburgh and Moscow don't feel the mobilization, it differences just grow.

Russia amassing troops made sure the pipeline would not be opened. The idea that Ukraine was just s convenient "outlet for that anger" is just utterly ridiculous, especially since you acknowledge the invasion must have been planned well in advance. — Echarmion

The invasion was certainly planned in advance, that does not mean refusing to open the pipeline didn't anger Putin and the Kremlin and that anger didn't contribute to the final decision to invade.

These sorts of actions are never "locked in". War is an option, diplomacy another option. Diplomacy fails, Germany decides to humiliate Russia by refusing to open a pipeline that took 10 years to build (and plenty of money to German contractors) and Germany didn't make that clear at the common sense time (i.e. before the pipeline is built), so Russia invades to demonstrate, among other things, its not about to be humiliated by Germany.

This is how any business person would read these events.

Imagine if I let you build a bridge across my property, take your money to help build the bridge, but then when the bridge is finished I tell you the paperwork required to actually use the bridge isn't finalized and also go fuck yourself.

You'd be pissed. I guarantee you Putin and all of the elites in Russian business, politics and the military would be equally pissed.

Only to Americans is it "normal" that America can order a country to do some self-defeating thing in order to humiliate another country that it sources energy from to run major sectors of its economy ... while saying it should buy energy from the US instead at way higher cost.

To the rest of the world, having someone build a 10 billion Euro pipeline only to refuse to have it opened is not a normal way to behave.

The fundamental fallacy Zelensky and co. use to reject Russia's peace offer and accept neutrality, that Russian promise not to invade later isn't a "guarantee" is that neither winning a war against Russia is guaranteed and, much worse, NATO support required to even have a chance isn't guaranteed.

Boris Johnson's promises of aid and money and whatever weapons Ukraine needs and so on required to fight the Russians, was not anymore guaranteed than Russia's peace offer.

More critically, Boris Johnson's offer could have been easily probed for being disingenuous, as there was zero offer at that time for the weapons systems required to have even a reasonable chance of "beating the Russians".

Zelensky and his generals clearly didn't go through a simple exercise of war gaming out a scenario of the steps required to "beat" the Russians.

Either that or they were explicitly told that they wouldn't be given the weapons needed to go on an offensive, but the idea is Russian society would collapse under sanctions, which didn't happen and now they are essentially trapped in the war.

But considering the Ukrainian leaders, at least Zelensky and Zeluzney, seem genuinely surprised the great big counter offensive didn't work at all and are only now explaining they need better technology to "win", seems to me they genuinely had no idea how Boris was manipulating them.

Obviously there are no guarantees about almost anything.

Saying "we can't trust Russia" is not a reason to reject a deal with Russia. Russia invading anyways later is a risk, but losing the war on hand is also a risk. Russia can't offer some iron-clad guarantee ... neither can NATO of even sticking it through with the hundreds of billions of dollars a year needed to even stay in the war.

Furthermore, even if you can't trust a party doesn't necessarily matter all that much in international relation (especially in international relation when you don't even know who will be in charge later anyways), there would be solid reasons to believe Russia would be simply incentivized to not-invade more than it would be incentivized to invade a neutral Ukraine and also strong reasons to believe there is no winning a war against Russia anyways (and certainly even less at an acceptable cost).

It's so common sense that neutrality is the best strategic option, that completely absurd reasoning is needed to support the war: fighting for a "right to join NATO", fighting to protect other Eastern European countries (that are in NATO), fighting because a peace deal might lead to losing a war later (without a credible plan to win the current war), fighting because "Putin can't be trusted" (NATO being no more trustworthy: go ask the Afghans).

The German tabloids are reporting that Scholz and Biden have come together recently and are cooking up a plan to force Ukraine to negotiate.

The original article is behind a paywall, but Alexander Mercouris discussed the article on his channel.

Zelensky is probably resisting because the West initially spurred him on to fight, even though the Russians and Ukrainians were ready to negotiate.

Anyway, if this is true, and it most-likely is, the war is essentially over and the only question is how long the Ukrainians can continue to refuse negotiations, and how much they will be forced to concede in the end.

I hope the Ukrainians will be able to find a way to pay Washington and Brussels back for dragging Ukraine into this war and subsequently throwing it under the bus.

The craziest thing about this, is how obvious this was from the start. Propaganda is a helluva' drug.

The key is to navigate risk. — boethius

Your strategy to "navigate" risk involves just handing Russia whatever they want whenever they want it.

But actually even that isn't sufficient, because you have now added yet another wrinkle: other countries also need to act in Russia's interest, otherwise Russia might feel forced to take Ukrainian land in compensation for e.g. a pipeline project.

Everything Russia does is just an obvious common sense thing, while Ukraine is equal parts stupid, crazy, and controlled by the west. On literally any issue you take the most ardently pro russian position, repeating verbatim the official russian positions on the Euromaidan, the Donbas, etc.

You're even inventing entirely new justifications for Russia, like that they might have somehow substituted Nord Stream 2 for Ukraine, never mind that this goes against Russia's public statements and demands. Even Russia's propaganda would not expect anyone to take that one seriously.

To conclude, your proposed solution is to simply hand Ukraine to Russia. Your pretend reason for this is that this would avoid the war. Your statements though make clear that you would simply prefer Russia to win as much as possible.

A pledge of neutrality would not resolve the underlying conflict any more than the pledges of Minsk agreements did. Russia denies Ukraine the right to get out of its sphere of influence and is ready to use military means to prevent it. So it is not about NATO membership, it is not about cooperation, Russians will not be satisfied until at least they have a pro-Russian government there, preferably with more direct forms of control (like the Russia-Belarus 'Union State').

And the most obvious part is what Russia actually has done: annexed territories it has deemed to be an integral part of Russia. As said many times again and again, the whole annexation and then Russification of occupied territories show well this wasn't just about a pro-Russian government in Kiev or NATO enlargement. And "wasn't just about" NATO would be the correct way to see it. Yes, NATO enlargement was one reason, however if NATO enlargement would have been the only reason, then just a show of force in the border would have done it. NATO is an international organization and membership calls for every state to accept a new member. Sweden shows this. It wouldn't have been easy to do that no matter what an US president wants. That's why Americans like Trump can be so disappointed in NATO.

Sweden is an irrelevant nation. Ukraine, not so much.

Had the US succeeded in creating a fait accompli in Ukraine, it would have pushed for NATO membership and any politician foolish enough to get between the neocons and their project would be disposed of, with lethal force if need be. I'm convinced of that.

To get this topic back to less circular territory:

The strategic situation currently seems almost a repeat of last year, Ukraine is on the strategic defensive and Russia seems set for another grinding assault on a fortress city. As last time they seem to be focusing first on encircling/ turning moves on the flanks.

Ukraine's presence on the eastern side of the Dniepr seems more solid, but it's hard to see what can come of that.

Ukrainian air defense is apparently still working fine, despite the various predictions to the contrary. It seems that sources of ammunition were found so far. The F16 project is still on the way, though we'll have to see what happens now with the Dutch political situation. Will a deal still go through with the deal if the Netherlands pull their support?

Germany seems to want to position itself as a major supporter of Ukraine, which seems kinda at odds with the Bild report. The strategy reported in the Bild is of course the kind of thing you can fit all kind of actual events into in retrospect.

I don't expect negotiated settlement quickly in any case.

A pledge of neutrality would not resolve the underlying conflict any more than the pledges of Minsk agreements did. Russia denies Ukraine the right to get out of its sphere of influence and is ready to use military means to prevent it. So it is not about NATO membership, it is not about cooperation, Russians will not be satisfied until at least they have a pro-Russian government there, preferably with more direct forms of control (like the Russia-Belarus 'Union State'). — Jabberwock

It is obviously about NATO membership.

But if you want to rewrite history your way, how does striving for NATO membership help?

Your position, and that of and all the previous war and Zelensky proponents here (as in the Western main stream media) is essentially the cry baby approach to geopolitics and international relations. You essentially whine about the fact that Ukraine can't get what it wants (can't be in NATO, can't get Crimea back, can't have Nazi's without criticism, can't get the weapons it wants, can't compete with Russia militarily, can't have nuclear weapons now, can't just disappear Russia somehow) and then whining about Ukraine's situation somehow directly connects to justifying repudiating peace negotiations, repudiating neutrality and committing to a long war of attrition that is incredibly destructive for Ukraine and Ukraine has little hope of winning.

There is no logical connection between whining about Ukraine's unfulfilled desires or whining about Russia's available scope of action that the West can't cancel like some podcaster that angered the LGBTQ+ community in a way that requires no case to be proven, and justification for fighting a losing war.

You're basically explaining how Ukraine could have avoided this destructive war by committing to neutrality ... but!! that won't remove Russian influence from Ukraine!!!

So what? Ahah, it's better to fight to the last Ukrainian?

Russian influence in Ukraine is far less destructive and far easier to deal with than a giant war if you're any normal Ukrainian citizen.

, , the invading buggers haven't opened negotiations, they've just restated their ultimatum. Negotiation isn't quite the right word here. (Has come up before in the thread by the way.) They're free to state whatever demands they like, adding their requisite "or else". Should South Korea capitulate to North Korea, "or else"? I don't think laying waste to North Korea is an option (shouldn't be).

Things haven't gone quite as smoothly as the Kremlin might have liked, though. Why else the rattling posturing, pseudo rationalizations, misdirection diversion blame-gaming, spiraling domestic suppression, tight control, heavy-duty manipulation in occupied areas, Kim Jong Un coziness (the two have been mutually consistent in their rattling posturing), ongoing generous scattered bombing of Ukraine, ... ? (at peak so far, Russia fired 50,000 artillery shells a day)

It's not 2014 Crimea. Putin's decision has become costly. What might be next on his (public) agenda?

Your position, and that of ↪ssu
↪Echarmion
and all the previous war and Zelensky proponents here (as in the Western main stream media) is essentially the cry baby approach to geopolitics and international relations. You essentially whine about the fact that Ukraine can't get what it wants (can't be in NATO, can't get Crimea back, can't have Nazi's without criticism, can't get the weapons it wants, can't compete with Russia militarily, can't have nuclear weapons now, can't just disappear Russia somehow) and then whining about Ukraine's situation somehow directly connects to justifying repudiating peace negotiations, repudiating neutrality and committing to a long war of attrition that is incredibly destructive for Ukraine and Ukraine has little hope of winning. — boethius

You and others complain all the time about the supposed US hegemony and how everything in Ukraine happens due to foreign influence. But then it is not whining and cry baby approach to geopolitics and international relations?

You're basically explaining how Ukraine could have avoided this destructive war by committing to neutrality ... but!! that won't remove Russian influence from Ukraine!!!

So what? Ahah, it's better to fight to the last Ukrainian?

Russian influence in Ukraine is far less destructive and far easier to deal with than a giant war if you're any normal Ukrainian citizen. — boethius

No, I have been explaning how Ukraine could NOT have avoided this destructive war by committing to neutrality.

It seems that Ukrainians have decided that it is better to fight than to turn into Belarus (in the best case scenario). The support for the fight remains high So you are obviously wrong about 'normal Ukrainians'.

Sweden is an irrelevant nation. — Tzeentch

Response starting like this is quite irrelevant.

Besides, there are already NATO countries that oppose Ukrainian membership in the organization. So that's that. The only way forward is for the US to make bilateral treaties with Ukraine.

Hardly any stomach for that in the US.

Had the US succeeded in creating a fait accompli in Ukraine, it would have pushed for NATO membership and any politician foolish enough to get between the neocons and their project would be disposed of, with lethal force if need be. I'm convinced of that. — Tzeentch

That's simply nonsense. Hence we disagree. If Sweden hasn't got in, surely Ukraine would have been a problem. It had the "limbo answer" just like Turkey had for EU membership. Membership would always be possible in the future, because there was no reason to bar a sovereign state like Ukraine entering the alliance. However, it wasn't something that would happen, even if some US presidents would have liked that.

If Sweden hasn't got in, surely Ukraine would have been a problem. — ssu

Again, Sweden is irrelevant. If it wants to join of its own accordance, fine - another useful idiot to wave the flag - or such is the sentiment in Washington.

Ukraine on the other hand is extremely relevant, which is why the US is and has been investing billions of dollars in it.

The only way forward is for the US to make bilateral treaties with Ukraine.

Hardly any stomach for that in the US. — ssu

Post-invasion in the short-term, yes. In the long-term clearly not since the irreversibility of Ukraine's route to NATO membership is written in its constitution.

Pre-invasion, I'd say Ukraine was on the verge of developing a military that would have been able to withstand the Russian invasion, at which point bilateral agreements would definitely be in the cards.

↪Tzeentch, the invading buggers haven't opened negotiations, they've just restated their ultimatum. Negotiation isn't quite the right word here. — jorndoe

That's your view, I guess.

Their 'ultimatum' was surprisingly generous, considering what the western propaganda machines have claimed the Russians' goals in Ukraine were.

The peace deal was all but finished when Boris Johnson flew in to announce Ukraine would not be signing any deals with the Russians.

Funny, that. Imagine having Boris Johnson of all people tell you to continue fighting a war - a political walking corpse and who was obviously sent as an errand boy to take the fall in case things went sour, since his political career was already a train wreck.

What a bad joke this Ukraine debacle is.

I think you should put some more Russian propaganda lines in your post. Someone might not have gotten the message. Perhaps some carricature of Zelensky as the greedy Jew? Or is that not up your alley?

Anyways it's quite hilarious that the people who decided to actually fight for their country are the "crybabies" while the guy waffling on the internet about how their favourite country is the best and most righteous thinks himself a geopolitical genius.

That's your view, I guess.

Their 'ultimatum' was surprisingly generous, considering what the western propaganda machines have claimed the Russians' goals in Ukraine were.

The peace deal was all but finished when Boris Johnson flew in to announce Ukraine would not be signing any deals with the Russians.

Funny, that. Imagine having Boris Johnson of all people tell you to continue fighting a war - a political walking corpse and who was obviously sent as an errand boy to take the fall in case things went sour, since his political career was already a train wreck.

What a bad joke this Ukraine debacle is. — Tzeentch

It must be very nice living in your head, having all the answers for everything without even needing to bother with evidence or logic. The superior mind simply knows instantly everything that happens.

It must be very nice living in your head, having all the answers for everything without even needing to bother with evidence or logic. The superior mind simply knows instantly everything that happens. — Echarmion

This might come as a surprise to you, but hand-waving arguments doesn't actually make them disappear, so I guess you'll have to try harder than that. :lol:

What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.

I'll deal with an argument when I actually see one.

Again, Sweden is irrelevant. If it wants to join of its own accordance, fine - another useful idiot to wave the flag - or such is the sentiment in Washington. — Tzeentch

Showing your ignorance again, Tzeentch.

Well, if Sweden was firmly non-aligned would mean that the situation in the Baltic Sea would be very different and the Baltic states would be in a very precarious situation. And without Sweden joining NATO (or applying to join) likely Finland would not have joined. In that case Putin could have smiled confidently, he would have a breach in EU/NATO and his most crucial waterway to international trade wouldn't be cut if a conflict arises with NATO.

If Sweden would then be similar as Belarus, then the whole situation in Europe would be extremely changed. Likely all other Nordic countries would be non-aligned and not try to have bad relations with Sweden. And Sweden likely with it's advanced military industry would be something that Russia desperately needs. Losing Sweden might turn to losing basically all the Nordic countries in some fashion.

(Swedish modern fighters are flown around the world. Not many countries have the ability to manufacture such aircraft.)

My view, ? It's from the Kremlin, like their "new reality" and whatever, and contrary to the UN (and the good baker Jones of upper Negombo, Sri Lanka). You can't have missed it.

So,

Should South Korea capitulate to North Korea, "or else"? I don't think laying waste to North Korea is an option (shouldn't be). — Nov 26, 2023

It's not 2014 Crimea. Putin's decision has become costly. What might be next on his (public) agenda? — Nov 26, 2023

Well, if Sweden was firmly non-aligned would mean that the situation in the Baltic Sea would be very different... — ssu

Sweden isn't and has never been a firmly non-aligned country. It's completely aligned to the West.

The Baltic Sea is NATO-dominated, with or without Sweden.

Sweden is irrelevant, apart from being another useful idiot to wave the NATO flag (aka the flag of American Europe policy).

They, like Finland, don't think with level heads. By joining NATO, the chance of being dragged into a war with Russia doesn't decrease, but increase.

That is a rather naive and ignorant view of how things work around in Europe.

I think you should put some more Russian propaganda lines in your post. Someone might not have gotten the message. Perhaps some carricature of Zelensky as the greedy Jew? Or is that not up your alley?

Anyways it's quite hilarious that the people who decided to actually fight for their country are the "crybabies" while the guy waffling on the internet about how their favourite country is the best and most righteous thinks himself a geopolitical genius. — Echarmion

Who here has decided to fight for their country?

You?

As far as I know there are no Ukrainians who have joined this discussion and, if so, none currently fighting for their country.

The crybaby position references non-Ukrainians cheerleading Zelensky from a far without skin in the game and approving of or creating apologetics for NATO's policies that led to the war.

I imagine actual Ukrainians were and are still very well aware that trying to join NATO would be baiting Russia into a war and was a dangerous gambit to play, whether they approved of the policy or not.

The cry baby position expressed in your posts and other "war party" (at least as implied by @ssu) Zelensky proponents that simply ignore the obvious danger of trying to join NATO, based on just complaining about Ukraine being ought to join NATO and likewise ought to be free from Russian influence, and now that the war is happening Ukraine ought to get back all their territory.

Welcome to the real world! What ought to happen is not what necessarily happens and it is a fallacy to tie what ought to be the situation in your ideal world to justifying actions that nominally try to achieve that situation.

It is a cry baby position because it does not take into account that there may simply not be a path that gets you what you want, just a like a baby crying over a broken cookie wanting it to be whole again (because the baby does not understand yet how the world works and what they want is impossible).

In the real world there was almost no way to join NATO without causing the very war joining NATO is meant to avoid (so completely idiotic and a dangerous policy that was motivated not by any credible plan to join NATO but to placate nationalists who are either completely delusional thinking NATO would come and save them or then less delusional but actually wanted to escalate the war with Russia; a wish they recieved). If there was a way (in the real world) to join NATO it wasn't declaring the intention to do it "oh someday, it will be so nice" and then let the tensions build for a quarter of a century until the war that essentially every Russian or cold-war-policy expert predicted would occur as a result.

In the real world you may simply not have the military capabilities (and NATO unwilling to even attempt to provide them) to reconquer all the lost territories ... in which case trying to do that is just wasting lives, which is exactly what I said would happen months ago about the "great Ukrainian counter offensive".

Others here predicted it would be easy for Ukraine to cut the land bridge.

I predicted not only would it not be easy but Ukraine would not make any progress at all.

At some point, you should lend some credit to the person who makes correct predictions: I predicted offensive actions would not be possible without supplying the heavy weapons NATO kept saying was basically "common sense" they wouldn't and couldn't supply; I predicted Ukraine might have the offensive capacity to conquer some buffer zones last year (such as the push the Russians back across the river) but that would not indicate they have the offensive capacity to cut the land bridge to Crimea (two very different tasks); I predicted Russian society wouldn't collapse due to sanctions (as history would teach us); Russian partners wouldn't join sanctions (as "the rest of the world" is far closer ideologically to Russia than LGBTQ+ activists, such as Justin "black face" Trudeau, and they need Russian resources and, in particular China, it is an opportunity to attrit NATO): that Ukrainian offensives would have all the same problems as the Russian Northern offensive and burn out (just, you know, a lot more problems as Ukraine does not have much air power, electronic warfare, and a bunch of other capabilities and lacks quantity in capabilities it does have) but that Russia did have a man power problem and had not yet dug in too deep last year so it was at least somewhat possible (but that Russia would simply tactically retreat, inflicting losses that Ukraine could not sustain, so Ukraine would not get very far and they didn't get very far for exactly this reason), whereas this year it is not remotely possible due to both solving the man power issues and building multiple layers of sophisticated defences and minefields and also learning better combined arms integration (of categories of arms that Russia has and Ukraine basically doesn't have).

Why am I able to make these predictions that come true?

Because I concern myself with the real world. And Ukraine's inability to reconquer the lost territories means that a diplomatic resolution to the conflict is the only option they have.

In February-March-April 2022 they had far more leverage (and would have far more armed forced intact to deter future Russian aggression) to get the best deal possible, and ending the conflict then would have avoided mass depopulation (most Ukrainians that left would have returned) and significant economic destruction not to mention the deaths and mutilation of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers that fought for an unattainable military goal of reconquering all the lost territory.

So yeah, just ignoring the actual facts and the actual situation Ukraine is in and simply justifying the choice to repudiate negotiations because "waaaahhhh Ukraine shouldn't have to!!! Ukraine should just be able to join NATO!!! Russia should just leave!!! Putin can't be trusted!!! waaaaahhh", is both exactly the level of logic of a crying baby simply wanting something that the baby can't have and in many cases doesn't even make any sense (such as fighting a war for "the right to join NATO").

To get this topic back to less circular territory: — Echarmion

It's only circular because at some point you understand that Ukraine is not going to reconquer all the territory (not that that would end the war anyways, as I explained at length at the start of the conflict) and that therefore the only resolution to the conflict is a diplomatic one.

We then discuss the diplomatic and political problem Ukraine has (that it turned down a far better offer at the start of the conflict) which puts sharply into question Zelensky's competence, and, in any case, has the political problem of Ukraine fighting to a far worse negotiating position.

You even have no problem agreeing that Ukraine had more leverage at the start of the conflict than it does now, just quibbling over exactly which day was the maximum leverage attained, but in the context of agreeing that it was higher in the past and is lower now.

This puts into question Zelensky's competence even more, and also the good faith of NATO in encouraging and convincing Ukraine to take this path rather than negotiations.

To make matters even worse, as you note yourself, making negotiation positions public can be a significantly frustrate further negotiations. Although you're wrong about making a negotiation position public never being a good idea (it can be a good idea if your position is reasonable), it definitely can be a bad idea such as Zelensky making promises that can't be kept (reconquering even Crimea) and ridiculous ultimatums to restart negotiations such as he'll negotiate only after Russia leaves all the territory concerned, that he won't talk to Putin and he'll negotiate after Putin is replaced and so on.

Which, again, puts into absolute clarify the incompetence of Zelensky.

Not willing to accept the implications of what you yourself agree to, you retreat into your habitual way of resolving cognitive dissonance in just inventing whatever would be convenient if it was true and stating that as a fact.

So, after debating at length Ukraine's terrible negotiating position and terrible political position for (certainly the existing leaders) to sell a deal to the Ukrainian public ... you simply invent that Ukraine is actually doing well in the war (which would indeed make all Zelensky's choices far better if he can "win on the battlefield") rather than look at the reality:

Ukraine cannot retake the lost territory and that is clear now even to Zelensky and the whole west.

Ukraine cannot win a war of attrition against Russia.

Continuing to fight therefore brings Ukraine further away from any sort of "victory", destroys remaining leverage, and brings Ukrainian military closer to collapse.

The strategic situation currently seems almost a repeat of last year, Ukraine is on the strategic defensive and Russia seems set for another grinding assault on a fortress city. As last time they seem to be focusing first on encircling/ turning moves on the flanks. — Echarmion

It is not a repeat of last year.

Last year Russia needed to survive sanctions, needed to keep domestic population behind the war, and needed time to mobilize and train hundreds of thousands of additional soldiers, ramp up military production, and so their strategy was to attrit Ukrainian ground forces in the symbol of Bakhmut using mercenaries (which are far less problematic casualties for the home audience) and attritted the Ukrainian air defence system with sustained missile attacks. While attention was on Bakhmut and Zelensky was going around repeating "Bakhmut holds" the Russians also built hundreds of kilometres of sophisticated defences so that Ukraine's strategy of "Bakhmut holds" while NATO trained and equipped brigades for an offensive this year would not succeed and that offensive capacity (that would be useful to have now in a defensive strategy) is mostly destroyed.

This year is very different from last year.

Ukraine's presence on the eastern side of the Dniepr seems more solid, but it's hard to see what can come of that. — Echarmion

It is not solid and it is completely delusional to believe that Ukraine could more easily make meaningful gains with the additional logistical problem of crossing the Dnieper than it could where it attacked without needing to cross a river.

This was purely for political purposes and is impossible to sustain in place, much less push towards Crimea. Russia built the same multilayerd defensive lines on this front as elsewhere and it is not some sort of "soft underbelly" of the Russian position.

Makes zero military sense, but if you can only tiny gains then having a tiny bridgehead across the river sounds more impressive than taking a village along the main line of contact, that is more obviously insignificant a change.

Ukrainian air defense is apparently still working fine, despite the various predictions to the contrary. It seems that sources of ammunition were found so far. The F16 project is still on the way, though we'll have to see what happens now with the Dutch political situation. Will a deal still go through with the deal if the Netherlands pull their support? — Echarmion

Air defence is not working fine, as Russia can now approach the line of contact close enough to drop glide bombs regularly.

The F16 project could have been a good idea at the very start of the war (if NATO actually wanted Ukraine to have a chance to do something major, such as cut the land bridge) ... but is too little too late now.

Germany seems to want to position itself as a major supporter of Ukraine, which seems kinda at odds with the Bild report. The strategy reported in the Bild is of course the kind of thing you can fit all kind of actual events into in retrospect. — Echarmion

Or the writing is on the wall now, Ukraine clearly can't "win" and "defeat Russia", and that's clear to everyone, so "forcing Ukraine to negotiate" will repaint NATO as the peacemakers, which the Western public will easily swallow. The new narrative will be that Ukraine makes its own choices, and if Ukraine wants to fight then NATO supported that (giving Zuluzney everything he said he needed for his strategy to work), placing massive sanctions on Russia and since fighting didn't work out then peace is just the unfortunate reality.

I don't expect negotiated settlement quickly in any case. — Echarmion

Well we agree here.

The opportunity for this is long past.

Unfortunately, the dynamic in place is that Russia has lost too much to give back any territory (they had not lost many troops in taking the territory initially, so could have more easily given it back in March-April 2022), and Ukraine has lost too much to psychologically accept it made the wrong choice in fighting for that failed objective.

Furthermore, the pipelines are blown up and there's no way for the West to normalize economic relations with Russia anyways (Putin is Hitler and a "wanted man" etc.), which was the other major piece of leverage in play in 2022, so there is not really any incentive for Russia to concede anything at all.

The only root to a negotiated settlement is the collapse of the current Ukrainian government and essentially just accepting whatever the Russians want.

• PART 01

For example, when Merkel et. al. brag about the Minsk accords being agreed to in bad faith without any intention to implement it in order to "buy time" for Ukraine, it is called reneging. Hopefully that will help you remember the definition. — boethius

Another non-shared assumption. You keep reasoning in non-comparative and historically decontextualised ways. “Bad faith” may be a compelling reason for grievance if there is “good faith” and cooperative attitude on one side, but not in the other. If there is bad faith and unwillingness to cooperate on both sides, “bad faith” is no longer a compelling grievance for either side.
One can try to make such grievances more compelling by reasoning in terms of “who started it?”, proportionality and stakes. Minsk agreements weren’t about Russian sovereignty, but about Ukrainian sovereignty. And if a weaker state is aggressed or threatened in its sovereignty by an unprovoked (=unaggressed) hostile stronger state with a history of “bad faith” in agreements [1] and despite the reciprocal acknowledgement of sovereignty, the weaker state has a compelling reason to play deceptively, especially if the alternative is either escalation or surrender.
Hopefully that will help you remember how your “bad faith” accusation looks rather pointless to me.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was asked by a reporter if he would join negotiations mediated by Turkey if Russian President Vladimir Putin came to the table, and Zelensky said, "I don't accept it."

Erdogan "knows my view," Zelensky said. "We discussed this before the war. I told him to put Putin at the table for negotiations. 'Can we please do that? We must avert a full-scale war.' But [Erdogan] was not able to do that. Not only him — he is powerful — but he is not able to do it. And now he thinks that he is? Now we can't," Zelensky said Friday.

Zelensky explained why he cannot speak to Putin anymore.

"It is not the same man. There is nobody to talk to there," he said. — CNN


This is called repudiating negotiations.

To try to reinterpret what I say as claiming there was never any negotiations is foolish.

I clearly explain that there was a negotiation, nearly successful by some accounts (but clearly happened, was in the news and everything), and then Zelensky rejected the Russian offer and repudiated further negotiations with statements like the above.

Since even normal people intuit there's something wrong with walking away entirely from the negotiation table (the US is in continuous negotiation with Hamas as we speak), some pressure is put on Zelensky about it so he changes his position to he'll negotiation but only after Russia leaves Ukraine, including Crimea, entirely ... which is not how negotiation works. You negotiate the points of contention before an agreement is made and the exchange value actually occurs; simply demanding the counter-party does whatever you want before negotiating is another way of saying one refuses any negotiation. — boethius

I didn’t state nor suggested nor believe you are “claiming there was never any negotiations”. I claim that you are not interpreting Zelensky’s attitude toward negotiation as a function of past and present circumstances that mould the Ukrainians’ national interest as they understand it. But you have no problem to do it when it’s matter to explain (or justify?) Russian aggression and then blame it completely/mostly/primarily on the US.
Bennett in his often cited interview talks about Zelensky reaching him to mediate with Putin a ceasefire. After the Bucha massacre (while Russian state TV was broadcasting genocidal propaganda against Ukraine), Zelensky was expected to turn down that negotiation as Bennett acknowledged (not surprisingly so from a Israeli representative who knows the political impact of terrorist massacres). Another attempt happened a while later, with the Istanbul Communique (again, out of the Ukrainian initiative), the problem is that, a part of the difficulties to treat the territorial dispute, both Russia and Ukraine seek American security guarantees (which you consider “ornamental” and with “zero meaning”, right prof?) under incompatible conditions. As far as I’ve understood the problem is that Russia wants to be part of the guarantors and this might enable Russia to comfortably sabotage whatever pro-Ukrainian agenda at convenience (as it already happens within the UN), while at this point in history the US intends to turn Russia into a rogue state after its aggression of Ukraine, which includes economic and diplomatic sanctions as long as needed. So whatever negotiation scenario alternative to plain surrender, seems to require foreign security guarantees that do not depend on Zelensky. That’s how diplomatic stalemate becomes likely. And let’s pretend that , in diplomatic parlance, attempts of killing Zelensky are not really the most obvious sign of diplomatic “good faith” or “good will“ from Putin, right?
Announcing ceasefire demands (as the Russia often did) doesn’t prevent any party to keep exploring margins for negotiation through secured diplomatic channels and intermediaries, of course. The point is that after Bucha, repeated failed negotiation attempts, and Zelensky’s refusal to negotiate with Putin by decree still Zelensky’s support among Ukrainians was wide and high up until recently as far as I can tell (https://www.jpost.com/omg/article-751972). So I do not see strong evidence that Zelensky’s attitude toward negotiation goes against Ukrainians’ perceived national interest. Maybe things have changed now.

Second, hand-weaving at hypothetical compensations for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses while abstracting from relevant historical and geopolitical circumstances is a rather weak argument. — neomac


First, it's not hand waiving, it's what negotiation is about: you seek as much compensation as possible from the parties involved in exchange for whatever you're giving up (money, time, apologies, legal claims, paintings, diamonds, leaving town etc.).

So, if there was a deal on the table that was "sufficient" in terms of being preferable to continued warfare, then the only thing to do is attempt to negotiate an even better formulation of the deal but with the aim of ultimately accepting anyways. — boethius

Yes also barter is by definition about exchanging goods without using money. But what if people need money? That’s the point I’m making about the failed negotiation attempts. And I’m questioning the claim that “there was a deal on the table” for the following reason: Russia and Ukraine can agree on whatever ceasefire proposal, but if this proposal requires security guarantees from foreign guarantors, and foreign guarantors are not willing to provide them, then there won’t be a deal.

Furthermore, I am not abstracting away from anything, I have routinely and diligently analyzed the battlefield situation using both my own soldiering experience and training (including training specifically designed for a fight with the Russians and exactly the kind of warfare we've seen play out in Ukraine) as well as analysis available elsewhere, to evaluate Ukraine's chance of a battlefield victory.

My conclusion is basically no chance, due to the specifics on the ground (Ukraine lack of capacities the Russians have and Ukraine lack of quantity, such as artillery, where Ukraine does have comparable capacity: how can anyone expect soldiers to prevail in such circumstances?!).

Therefore, if Ukraine has no chance of a battlefield victory then it should strive to negotiate a peace, using the leverage of being able to do further damage to Russia (when you are a weaker party to a conflict, you're leverage is the ability to inflict damage even with little threat of victory; of course, being able to threaten actually victory is better leverage, but people seek to avoid damage if they can so generally offer concessions to terminate the war sooner rather than later; and even when no concessions are offered, such as unconditional surrender, it is still usually better, for real people under your command, to surrender unconditionally than to fight to the death). — boethius

Not all depends on the battlefield situation, the historical circumstances include past experiences and current geopolitical conditions, how all these factors reinforce cultural trends and shape national interest perception over generations. And no politicians can really abstract from them. Their political history depends on the selective pressure of those factors. So, rationality requirements in the domain of politics can’t reasonably ignore the weight of such factors. And to the extent war is politics by other means, one has to take into account the political aims of all prominent involved parties when assessing battlefield outcomes. For example, the strategy of containment adopted by the US against Soviet Union, and still adopted against Russia in some form, doesn’t require the complete defeat of the enemy, because it may not be necessary, desirable, or even possible.
Concerning your other assumptions, I’d counter that politics is primarily about LEADING people, not about pleasing people. Otherwise people could self-govern themselves as they please, right? Another assumption of mine is that politicians can AT BEST pursue national strategic interests (which will concern also future political administrations and generations). And nobody can reasonably expect political leaders to be capable of infallible, risk free or uncontroversial choices, especially in critical times like during war.
Besides many Ukrainians have all-too personal stakes in this war, also thanks to Russian broad and arbitrary massacres (which add up to the past ones). For every Ukrainian soldier or civilian that has been killed or injured in this war of aggression by Russia, there is potentially an entire social network (starting with relatives and friends) which will personally resent the Russians for that and may crave for revenge until they die. And this emotional trauma will likely nurture also future generations.
So I’ll repeat once more my previous argument: Palestinians, Afghans, Kurds fight for their independence and national identity, for generations, no matter if they are the weaker party to a conflict, no matter if they are instrumental to geopolitical moves of other bigger players. BTW how many Russians, soldiers and civilians, were killed during the great patriotic war, prof?
I find COMPLETELY IRRATIONAL to assess human behaviour based on social standards not grounded on realistic assumptions about human behaviour. Humans value social identity and freedom to the point of fighting for them to death, take revenge for it, mistrust enemies for it, and sacrifice their own individual and collective well-being/safety for it, over decades, over generations. Afghans, Kurds, Palestinians, Israeli, Ukrainians, and Russians keep reminding us that however tragic in itself and disturbing to armchair self-entitled nobodies on the internet, this is a very common hardcore driving factor of human behaviour. To what extent that holds for Ukrainians is up to the Ukrainians to tell. And when Ukrainians will grow tired enough of Zelensky, they may find their ways to get rid of him.

When I say Ukraine should seek compensation from the West in any peace deal for loss of territory, it is because they have the leverage to get that. If they can get compensation from Russia and from the West in a peace deal, that is clearly better than simply compensation from Russia. Of course now, Ukraine has very little leverage.
But at the start of the war, for example, in exchange for accepting a peace along the lines of what Russia proposing, Zelensky could have sought various compensation from the West, in particular Europe that has the most to lose from a larger and longer war: such as a fast track into the EU (which Russia explicitly said they did not oppose, only NATO). — boethius

Ukraine has its security concerns about Russia and if Europeans can’t offer security guarantees to deter Russia’s aggression and political interference, joining the EU (assuming Russia won’t be able to sabotage it) would NOT compensate the Ukrainian security concerns and at the same time will create additional security hazards for the Europeans. Besides as long as the Europeans need the US for their own security (as much as Ukraine) and prioritise security concerns over economic concerns, the Europeans might still be reluctant to question the American leadership at this point in history. Actually this war may buy Europeans time to re-arm and/or press them to re-shape their security strategy.

True, it would be a compromise where Russia is "appeased".

But as I've explained numerous times, the appeasement argument is totally fallacious and demonstrates a total lack of understanding of history.

The appeasement analogy applied to Ukraine would only be remotely similar if it was about chastising Poland for not fighting to the last Polander.

The criticism of appeasement is not levied at the smaller and weaker countries Hitler gobbled up, accusing them of surrendering or cutting deals rather than fighting to their last man and even worman, but rather the criticism of appeasement is levied at the far larger and stronger countries (UK, France, US) that had an actual chance of defeating Hitler.

Avoiding "appeasement" has nothing to do with smaller countries stuck in the middle of the great powers. It is always the same: the strong do as they will, the weak suffer what they must. And so weaker countries can only strive to suffer as little as possible in navigating the rivalry and clashes of the great powers.

A situation I do not approve of, but is created out of the system of international relations—in which the key word is "national" and the nationalism from which those nations spring—and insofar as we have a system of nations then we have more and less powerful nations and among them the "great powers" who do great things – terrible, yes, but great. — boethius

Your counter-argument fails on two grounds: first, my “appeasing argument” was targeting the strategic choices of the West (the US and its allies) wrt Russia aggression of Ukraine, not Ukraine. Indeed, I don’t even see strong evidence that Western propaganda is about “chastising” Ukraine for not fighting to the last Ukrainian. The appeasement argument is about “chastising” the West for not supporting the Ukrainian patriotic fight enough (I myself would lean that way). Something like: “I believe that we have no other choice than giving Ukraine all they need to be successful in their mission to restore their sovereignty and control on their borders: whatever less will be our failure” (https://www.corriere.it/esteri/23_novembre_27/petr-pavel-our-uncertainties-hurt-kiev-s-counteroffensive-396fdc30-8c6e-11ee-8ccd-c15b03fea28c.shtml). The problem for the Ukrainians is however that as long as Ukraine badly needs Western assistance to secure its sovereignty against Russian aggression and oppression, then Ukraine can’t discount Western conditions for such assistance (not surprisingly, Zelensky often appealed to the Western audience not with “help us Ukrainians out of humanitarian concerns“ but “help us because we are fighting for your freedom”). Second, I have no idea why you believe the “appeasement argument” can’t hold also for Ukrainians by the same logic that historical precedents exemplify. Satisfying predatory demands is not only a cost but also a big risk for the victims for two obvious reasons: if it works, predatory demands can be escalated (e.g. if a hacker gains control over your private computer and mobile, and manages to block them to ask you a ransom, you may decide to pay the ransom, but the hacker may later decide to ask you some more). Besides, the benefits coming from their predatory activity can be reinvested to perpetuate/widen predatory activities. So even victims can be compelled to not appease their predators and look for alternative coping strategies, depending on the circumstances. From a historical point of view, I’d also contend that the desire for peace within a community depends on how circumstances wear out or boost collective morale to support rebellion and fight against foreign oppression: humans may value peace at the price of enslavement (as it happened to many Africans) or marginalization (as it happened to many native Indians or Australian aboriginals) by foreign nations, but other communities may live in such conditions that polarized indigenous minorities may emerge and lead more or less complacent/passive majorities to support fight at the price of individual and collective well-being/safety for generations (like Palestinians, Afghans, Kurds), no matter if they are the weaker party to a conflict, no matter if they are instrumental to geopolitical moves of other bigger players. And also the Ukrainian fight against the Russians is generational: Ukrainians allied in the past with the Nazis to fight back Soviet Russia, now they are allying with the West to fight Putin’s Russia. So the “appeasement argument” can apply also to weaker states and be motivated by their own perceived strategic interest.
In any case, even if “weaker countries can only strive to suffer as little as possible in navigating the rivalry and clashes of the great powers” and I don’t know to what extent the Ukrainian morale will hold under external pressure (from Russia and from the West) in the current circumstances, my understanding is still that it’s on the Ukrainians to establish what it means to “strive to suffer as little as possible” and that weaker states are compelled to ally with great powers which they feel enough less oppressive at the price they find tolerable. Not to mention that you just suggested one compelling argument for old-school imperialism: the best chance for weaker states to suffer the least from wars against stronger countries that violate their territorial sovereignty would be to give up on their territorial sovereignty.

The smaller powers stuck in the middle have no interest in fighting to the death for one side or another; one needs really extreme circumstances for that option to be viable.

Now, that such a peace would be potentially "bad" for the West is from a US and Western perspective, not Ukraine's perspective. You are basically giving up the ghost of your position. You are simply taking it as assumed that Ukraine should do whatever the West wants it to do and is in the interest of the West, with no consideration for Ukraine.

And indeed, even if you are correct (which I don't think you are) in assuming any peace between Ukraine and Russia would be good for Russia and bad for the West, that's not an argument that Ukraine shouldn't make peace with Russia; only an argument that the West should not want Ukraine to make peace with Russia — boethius

.


I never argued that “Ukraine should do whatever the West wants it to do and is in the interest of the West, with no consideration for Ukraine”. Indeed, you can not quote me claiming this nor saying anything that logically implies this. On the contrary, my understanding is that the political imperative for sovereign states is the pursuit of their national interest, independently from ideology, typology of regime and capabilities (but conditionally on sovereignty claims and acknowledgments). The US should pursue its national interest, Russia should pursue its national interest, Ukraine should pursue its national interest, Israel should pursue its national interest, Iran should pursue its national interest, China should pursue its national interest, Nazi Germany should pursue its national interest, Soviet Union should pursue its national interest, etc. It’s an empirical matter if the national interest of one sovereign state converges or is in conflict with the national interest of another sovereign state. So if “make peace with Russia” is convenient to the Ukrainian national interest, Zelensky has a political imperative to pursue it no matter if the West is against it, obviously. It remains however problematic to establish what goes or should go into Zelensky’s political calculus under given power relations and past experiences, though.
Besides I’m not “assuming ANY peace between Ukraine and Russia would be good for Russia and bad for the West” unless “ANY peace between Ukraine and Russia” equates to surrender to Russian demands (like acknowledgement of annexed territories and no security compensation, which is tantamount to a loss of sovereignty to the Russians). My assumption is that surrender goes against the Ukrainian national interest as it has been understood until now by the Ukrainians themselves. If they changed their mind, that’s their decision to make. Another assumption of mine however is that the West under the American leadership will support Ukraine to avoid surrender for several reasons: reputational costs within the general public (the West abandoned Ukraine, yet another American foreign policy failure, the West lost to Russia, etc.), loss of hegemonic deterrence toward competing world leaders (emboldening competitors like China and anti-American populism, also in the West), so a significantly destabilising blow to the Western world order. And if this is not bad for the West I don’t know what is. But there are other strategic reasons why the US may be compelled to support Ukraine to avoid both surrender and peace (unless that means: Russian complete surrender or, a least, ceasefire agreements compliant with Western world order) and to support freezing the conflict, especially at the prospect of a possible military conflict with China in the next decades. Indeed, weakening Russia through economic and diplomatic sanctions, fixating Russia’s strategic concerns on its Western front instead of engaging in other arenas (like in support of China), cutting economic ties between Europeans and Russia/China (obliging Europeans to look for compensation in the rest of the Rest), and buying time to build up European and Ukrainian military capabilities/readiness may be functional conditions to support American hegemony. It’s also possible that even Trump, if in power, won’t change this trend, not immediately at least. Indeed, the frozen conflict may be exploited as a leverage both against China (e.g. Trump may promise to push for a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine in exchange for Russia breaking its alliance with China or in exchange for Europe feeding more US economy at the expense of China) and/or against Trump’s political enemies (e.g. Trump may threaten to push for a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine if his political enemies in the congress obstruct his policies in other more urgent areas).


[1]
To those who have missed the previous 30 years, here is a short list of the results of negotiations with Russia that it never respected: 1. The Budapest Memorandum of 1994. Russia agreed to “respect independence, sovereignty, and the existing borders of Ukraine” as well as “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”. Breached by Russia invading Crimea in 2014. 2. The Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty of 1997. Russia agreed to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and “reaffirmed the inviolability of the borders” between the two countries. Russia breached it in 2014. 3. The OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999. Russia committed to withdrawing its troops from Moldova’s Transdniestrian region and Georgia until the end of 2002. That never happened. 4. The 2008 Georgia ceasefire agreement following Russian aggression against the country. Russia agreed that “Russian military forces must withdraw to the lines prior to the start of hostilities”. That never happened. 5. The Ilovaysk “Green Corridor” in August 2014 and other “humanitarian” death corridors. Russia pledged to let Ukrainian forces leave the encircled town of Ilovaysk in the east of Ukraine, but instead opened fire and killed 366 Ukrainian troops. In the following years, Russia attacked numerous humanitarian corridors in Syria. 6. The “Minsk” agreements of 2014 and 2015. Russia agreed to cease the fire in the east of Ukraine. There had been 200 rounds of talks and 20 attempts to enforce a ceasefire, all of which the Russian side promptly violated. On February 24th, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 7. The 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative. Russia pledged to “provide maximum assurances regarding a safe and secure environment for all vessels engaged in this initiative." It then hindered the initiative's operation for months before withdrawing unilaterally a year later. NB: I am only focused on deals made with Russia to address specific issues and conflicts. I am not mentioning almost 400 international treaties that Russia has breached since 2014. There are no conclusions to be drawn here, except that no one can seriously use the words "Russia" and "negotiations" in the same phrase. Putin is a habitual liar who promised international leaders that he would not attack Ukraine days before his invasion in February 2022. Russia's tactic has remained consistent in its many wars over the last three decades: kill, grab, lie, and deny. Why would anyone genuinely believe that Russia in 2023 is any different from Russia in 1994, 1997, 1999, 2008, 2014, 2015, and 2022?
https://twitter.com/DmytroKuleba/status/1724427557016043668

• PART02

Now, whether this is inherently true or not, that any deal that is or was remotely feasible between Ukraine and Russia is "bad for the West", certainly, depending on the details, a peace deal would be better or worse for the West, and this is exactly the leverage Ukraine has, or at least had at one point.

How Ukraine could get concessions from the West is in threatening to go and make sure of doing exactly what you say would be bad for the West: i.e. threaten to make peace with the Russians in a way that embarrasses and weakens the West the most.

For example, Zelensky could have gone to the US, NATO, the EU, and said "look, you've slow played us into this disastrous war, if you don't give me some additional compensation (such as fast track EU membership), in addition to what the Russians are offering, so that I can do right by the Ukrainian people and we get something for giving up claim to Crimea, then I'm going to declare the West has abandoned us, no Western soldiers are coming, no no-fly zone is coming, we are alone, abandoned by our Western friends, arms and thoughts and prayers won't defeat the Russians, and therefore we will make peace with the Russians (and then imply a bunch of terms even more embarrassing for the West, such as allowing Russia to have military bases in Ukraine, station missiles, or just further economic cooperation with the Russians etc.).

At this stage of negotiation, the West would need to decide whether to play ball or not and participate in negotiations in order to be able to negotiate terms they can better spin as some sort of "victory" for the West (such as "security guarantees" for Ukraine, integrating Ukraine into other Western institutions such as the EU, and so on). If the West refuses to offer anything, well the Russian deal is still better than a disastrous war, and there's nothing to lose in trying to go get concessions also from other parties concerned. — boethius

I doubt that Zelensky would politically survive this plot twist in the face of the Ukrainians, his entourage, and his Western allies. Or be fully shielded from sabotage attempts. Besides you seem to give for granted that Zelensky can deflect his political responsibility by supporting the idea that Ukraine has been slow played into a disastrous war. But, unless Zelensky was really a puppet of the US and would now heroically denounce himself as such, maybe Zelensky bears a good deal of responsibility. Indeed, that is what is legitimate to expect from rulers of sovereign countries. Maybe he was abundantly warned behind doors by Western politicians (when politicians can put aside their rhetoric posturing and be more pragmatic) and his entourage (as the evidences of the internal struggle within Zelensky’s administration may suggest) of what risks he would have faced since the beginning of the war and of the potential constraints of the Western support. After all, the Westerners too suggested him to surrender (in the sense of giving up fighting) and flee at the beginning of the war, and after the Russians withdrew from Kherson Zelensky was again suggested by the Westerners to re-consider negotiation from a position of strength. As I suggested earlier maybe the US was just fine with freezing the conflict right there at that moment and Zelensky could have been satisfied just with his resistance against regime change and against demilitarisation, even assuming there was no peace deal and the territorial dispute was still open. This might have been enough to turn Russia into a rogue state and give Ukraine some breath while keeping the Western pressure on Russia. However Zelensky may have been compelled also by being in a unique political and historical position to take a greater risk for a greater reward with a last big push before the next American and Russian elections.

Ukraine's leverage was likely the highest before the war even started, as it's a big expense and a big risk to even start the war. Now, Russia wanted more a deal with the West, a new European security architecture, which the West refused saying it's between Russia and Ukraine (exactly because neo-cons at least believe that Ukraine fighting Russia, even if irrational for Ukraine, is better than any peace; no a surprise there), that was more comprehensive, but again Zelensky (if he wasn't an idiot) could have gone and threatened the West with peace into agreeing to negotiate with Russia a new framework in which Ukraine is neutral.
Then there is the first weeks of the war where an offer was on the table, Zelensky could have closed a deal had he wanted.
War crimes are definitely usual in any war, and their investigation can be part of a peace deal; it is simply another point to negotiation, and not a reason to refuse to negotiate (even if we are assuming it was indeed the Russians and not elements in Ukraine that don't want any peace). — boethius

And, why did Russia want a deal with the West and not with Zelensky, if for Zelensky “it's a big expense and a big risk to even start the war” (apparently, you really can’t help but sound like pro-Russian propaganda)?
If Russia didn’t have enough leverage to get what it wanted from the West, why are you so convinced that Zelensky had it?
If neoconservatives were bent to make Ukraine fight to the last person, even if irrational, and Zelensky is an idiot put there by the neoconservatives to play their script, why are you conjecturing that things could have gone otherwise?
Why would the leverage for Zelensky against the Europeans be bigger at the beginning of the war when Europeans didn’t experience economic fatigue than after the Europeans experienced economic fatigue for almost 2 years?
Why would Zelensky have more leverage with Europeans than with Russians at the beginning of the war? He could have exchanged Crimea and Donbas for economic compensations to Russia (or just for survival given Russian attempts to kill him) and turn into a Russian puppet right away, while sparing Putin all the fuss.
Why would any involved party trust other involved parties in this ornamental agreement with zero meaning given the historical penchant for “bad faith” on all sides?
If neoconservatives are such an evil specimen that loves to violently subjugate and exploit the rest of the world, how come that the neocoservatives’ support for post-Cold War globalization in the last decades boosted Russia (and China)’s economic-military-political growth and power projection outside their borders far more than the American “provocations” weakened their offensive power?
If neoconservatives are such an evil specimen that loves to violently subjugate and exploit the rest of the world, why do you think that the US would let the Europeans normalise their relations with Russia over a peace deal with Ukraine?
BTW can you teach me what about Zelensky’s ten points for peace negotiations in November ’22 was rational to give up (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-zelenskiys-10-point-peace-plan-2022-12-28/)? They also mention Russian war crimes among the negotiable points, as you suggested.
Again, your entire reasoning is grounded on a load of non-shared and historically decontextualised assumptions, which I even hardly find consistent as such. Apparently, history and geopolitics and national strategic interest is good to explain (justify?) Putin’s aggression of Ukraine and blame the US meddling in Russia’s backyard, but it is not good to explain (justify?) Zelensky’s, Biden’s, Europeans’ approach toward Putin.
What is so self-defeating in your all-knowing man-of-honour pedagogic stunt is that you can not use one single bit of your own impeccable definitions or military, economic, and moral omniscience to fix YOURSELF any of the rational failures, idiocy, evilness you are complaining about. You can at best whine over the internet along with your sidekicks wishing that this would do the fixing by others some day, as any random anonymous self-proclaimed man-of-honour from the internet would do, of course.

Another strong reason is that Ukrainians would like to keep the Western alliance and they could likely count on the decades-long support of the US: Ukraine is on the border of Europe, the historical core of the US’s sphere of influence. — neomac


Yeah, sure, and I'd like a toilet of solid gold.

Simply wanting something is not a rational basis to fight a long and costly war that you are very, very likely to lose.

The relevant question here is whether war is a reasonable way of getting what you want. Maybe it is reasonable for Ukraine to "like to keep the Western alliance" (that Ukraine is not apart of), but it does not follow from that to fight a long and costly war to join the alliance of which the purpose would be ... deter said long and costly war?!?! — boethius

I’ve been reasoning in geopolitical terms, so I meant a strategic alliance with the West, obviously.
I never argued in support of “fight a long and costly war to join the alliance of which the purpose would be ... deter said long and costly war”. Indeed, you can not quote me saying it nor saying anything that logically implies this.
The political objectives, as I understand them, could have been more maximalist (e.g. resist regime change and demilitarisation, regaining territorial integrity, join EU/NATO, overthrow Putin) or more minimalist (e.g. resist regime change and demilitarisation, and then weaken Russia through other means as a rogue state). If Zelensky might likely have felt compelled to be maximalist, the US might likely have felt more compelled to be minimalist. For the US even having Zelensky escape from Ukraine, might have been enough to try to turn Russia into a rogue state: SO FAR, the US has definitely got more than it prospected at the beginning of the war. Zelensky got less than what he hoped. But not a total defeat either so he can’t now just surrender without compromising what has been able to achieve so far. From a strategic point of view, things shouldn’t look as bad as you wish to depict them even from the Ukrainian point of view. BTW even if there was no major land breakthrough in the last push, yet the successful attacks against the Black Sea Fleet may be of particular significance also for a future ceasefire negotiation. What contributed to magnify this sense of failure is arguably the Ukrainian propaganda itself which (MAYBE unnecessarily) created a hazardous hype over something that was very difficult, if not most certainly unlikely to succeed, given the inadequate/slow military support from the West.

While Russia explicitly antagonizes the US hegemony and solicits anti-Western regimes to join Russia in this effort, so both the US and its enemies are compelled to see the war in Ukraine as a critical step to establish a new World Order at the expense of the US. So it is reasonable to expect this be of particular concern for the US. — neomac


Sure, maybe it's reasonable for the US to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian ... — boethius

I doubt it would be reasonable even for the Great Satan: if all Ukrainians got killed, there would be no resistance left against the Russians, if there are any left. So the Great Satan may want Ukrainians to spare human and material forces to continue fighting, as needed.

If you are right about your manipulative interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said, that proves at best he shares your views of what is rational. — neomac

I am right that the US is manipulating Ukraine. For example "whatever it takes" and "as long as it takes" are both obviously manipulative lies. — boethius

Again, a non-shared assumption. “Whatever it takes" and "as long as it takes" is propaganda but what you wish to infer from that depends very much on how you understand propaganda. As far as I’m concerned propaganda is a political tool as much as diplomacy, war and economic sanctions. Political propaganda’s purpose is not primarily to inform but to politically mobilise people. So the information may be presented not to maximise understanding but to maximise a politically desired reaction. However propaganda has: 1. its costs, like any other political tool, including reputational costs; 2. its targets, political propaganda for the general audience is not for politicians (they have all sorts of informal and formal secured channels to communicate more PRAGMATICALLY, they are expected to be the experts of political propaganda not be fooled by it) but they send a signal to the politicians on what narrative they intend to push to gain support, typically from their fan base (but non exclusively) 3. its constraints and side-effects, fore example I find most certainly reasonable to assess propaganda within the context of other actual/potential rival propaganda (that BTW can come from internal and external political rivals). It’s in the interest of any politician to have or pretend to have rivals overstretching with their propaganda beyond sustainability to then spin the counter-propaganda against failed promises by calling them “propaganda” and “manipulative lies”.
From this perspective, propaganda is simply part of the game. For any propaganda from one political administration there is a counter-propaganda from national competitors and foreign administrations. Any propaganda is expected to stress the flaws of one policy or highlight the benefits of alternative policies, to even claim merits for others’ deeds and blame others for one’s own faults, to present one’s own representatives and choices as rational and noble while opponents as evil or stupid. So having people denouncing propaganda and others’’ “manipulative lies” as you do is not rationally compelling in an environment where everybody is and is expected to spin their own propaganda. Indeed, it proves just how committed you are in spinning pro-Russian propaganda in this forum. The only point I can agree with is that the US will likely pay reputational costs by giving up on supporting Ukraine now and/or in the future (I guess significantly bigger than the ones paid for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan). That’s why I find it unlikely that the US will give up on supporting Ukraine, just they will support Ukraine on their own terms. We will see how things will change if Trump wins.

Likewise, the billions and billions and billions (and many more billions until you've said billions at least 50 times, assuming each billion stands for at least 2 billions) in hard currency and arms the US sends to Ukraine without any tracing or auditing etc. is also a de facto area of affect bribe to all parties in Ukraine who stand to benefit from billion and billion and billions of untraceable currency and arms. That is not only clear manipulation without even attempting to avoid a situation where the money and arms are de facto bribes, but it was well known ahead of times those arms would find themselves in "the wrong hands" (to use RAND's phrasing) and would supercharge terrorism and organized crime around the world. — boethius

To me that’s not enough to assess if this lack of transparency goes against the American or the Ukrainian national interest. Since we are talking about lack of transparency one can conjecture cases were lack of transparency may still serve national interest: e.g. if part of the Ukrainian elite was running on Russian bribing, maybe bribing them back is convenient, if the money and weaponry supply is not traced maybe it’s to protect the network of local informants and dormant Ukrainian insurgents, offering both plausible deniability against Russian complaints or even curbing Ukrainian demands, and protect politicians of the current administration from future counter-investigation by internal political enemies who may compromise national interest. The lack of transparency can also backfire, of course: Russia could steal and indirectly pass to Hamas American weaponry supplied to Ukraine, to let the Western “useful idiots” exploit this to conveniently spin pro-Russian counter-propaganda. Not to mention that all wars have their nasty collateral (not only killing civilians).

However, how this would "prove" Graham shares the same definition of rational as me, and what the point would be, I honestly don't see what that argument is or would be, so you'll have to explain it.

Whatever you're trying to say, rationality does not mean "good" only lacking in self-contradiction, and "self" is a key word as a rational position does not imply a universal position.

People who want to cause as much harm as possible and do as much evil as possible in their limited time, can be perfectly rational in such a pursuit. That they may lack self contradiction in pursuing their purpose to murder, rape and torture, does not make those actions good on account of being rational nor lend any weight to the position that such purposes should be universal and adopted by all rational agents.

It may very well be that it is rational for Senator Graham, relative his neo-con ideology and evil purposes, or even just plain-ol' US imperialism in general, to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. That being true would not somehow make it true that is rational for Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. — boethius

If we are talking about national strategic interest, my understanding is that its identitarian nature makes it inherently NOT universal. Yet that doesn’t exclude possible similarities or margins for convergence with the national interest of other countries. Then we can try to assess national interest as what is desirable wrt what can be done in a similar way as computer scientists assess algorithms, namely efficacy and efficiency. The problem is that algorithms are comparable on objectives that are defined to be computable from the same sets of conditions in a finite number of steps, but from a historical perspective objectives may evolve endlessly, generation after generation, and there are no same sets of conditions. One can try to reason by historical analogy: e.g. how long did it take, how much did it cost, how successfully was it for the jews to strive and fight for their own sovereign state generation after generation? Or, how long did it take, how much did it cost, how successfully was it for the Palestinians to strive and fight for their own sovereign state generation after generation? Ukrainians may be in an analogous situation. Is it worth it? Hard to tell and it’s ultimately not on us to tell because costs and risks are primarily on their skin, future prospects remain uncertain in the long term and national interest is inherently national matter.
One might however argue that, IN THE SHORTEST TERM, a containment approach instead of a maximalist approach may be less rewarding but also less costly and more likely to succeed.

But I find questionable your concept of “rationality” roughly for the same reason I find questionable your interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said. — neomac


How is my interpretation questionable?

If you find something questionable, moreoverso in a philosophical debate, you should explain what's questionable about it and, in the case of interpretation, provide your position on the matter.

How do you interpret Senator Graham's statement?

Before rebutting the rest of your post, I think it is wise to take a hiatus here and see if you even have an alternative interpretation.

For, if you don't (which your failure to support your "questioning" my interpretation by providing an alternative one, very strongly implies that you don't), then your thrashing about in the void is far more easily dealt with as obvious denialism (that even you clearly see in simply denying my interpretation without providing your own) of what Senator Graham obviously has stated (the "quiet part out loud"), and that equally obvious it is a direct and clear statement of US government policy (reinforced further by the lack of anyone from the White House even bothering to contradict Senator Graham, even just for appearance sake ... as it's so obvious an admission of what is so obviously actually happening that it's easier for everyone if the mainstream media simply never cites Graham in full on the US position in the war, much less discuss it). — boethius

To begin with, let’s clarify once again what I’m questioning. Here your quote [1]. You are inferring from Sen. Graham’s quoted statements the belief that “the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one”. That is twice a manipulative interpretation of Sen. Graham’s quoted statements. Why? Since your inference is not a valid logic deduction from Sen. Graham’s quoted statements (“rational” doesn’t even figure in Sen. Graham’s quoted statements), you need some additional implicit assumptions concerning Sen. Graham’s understanding and application of the “rationality” claim to the Ukrainian case the way you do to make the inference logically valid: something like “fight to the last person” is irrational OR “fight to the last person” is irrational if a military victory is most certainly unattainable OR “fight to the last person” is irrational if a military victory is most certainly unattainable and military victory equates to regaining complete territorial integrity. But all such assumptions look pretty spurious to me. Indeed, Sen. Graham’s words make sense even without a specific “theory of victory” or chances of success you wish to question (which terms are not mentioned in the quoted statements). Sen. Graham (who also has a military background) is plausibly reasoning over necessary requirements to enable Ukrainians to military fight Russians: morale (“fighting to the last person” as upper limit of morale) and means (out of the military aid the West is capable to provide). And the former may be critically conditional on the latter.
Besides, the spirit of Graham’s rhetoric is that the Ukrainian willingness to fight to the last person (which is taken as a given not as something that needs foreign moral encouragement or chastising) is expression of admirable patriotism and freedom against the Russian oppression (denounced as a terrorist state) perfectly in line with American Republican values. Indeed, Ukrainians resisting the invasion reminded him of "our better selves in America. There was a time in America that we were this way, fighting to the last person, we were going to be free or die." https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-condemns-us-senator-grahams-comments-death-russians-2023-05-28/
Graham’s propaganda is obviously meant to boost military support for Ukraine by using Republican style rhetoric, with the likely understatement to his wider audience that Americans won’t do nor need to get directly involved in the Ukrainian war to beat Russians’ ass. Sure, it’s still a hawkish approach. But from a national interest perspective there is nothing intrinsically bad in being hawkish.
Your manipulation has two rhetoric intents: discrediting the Ukrainians (as irrational and fanatics) and the Americans (as exploitative). This is how Sen. Graham’s political slogans turn into an evident confession of exploitation by the Americans at the expense of the irrational Ukrainians in your pro-Russian counter-propaganda.

[1]

“I like the structural path we’re on here,” Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham declared in July 2022. “As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person.” — Aaron Mate


Which makes clear the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one, but a good path for the US (what "we" refers to in this context).

And this is nothing new, using fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101. — boethius

The only root to a negotiated settlement is the collapse of the current Ukrainian government and essentially just accepting whatever the Russians want. — boethius

Perhaps too clearly stating your "pro-Russia party" credentials there, tovarich!

Yeah, why didn't my country and my grandparents generation accept the wisdom of not fighting back in WW2 and essentially just accept whatever the Russians want?

Oh yes, they were cry-babies. :grin:

The crybaby position references non-Ukrainians cheerleading Zelensky from a far without skin in the game and approving of or creating apologetics for NATO's policies that led to the war. — boethius

A fairly transparent fig-leaf, since you ascribe the same argumentation to Zelensky and the rest of the Ukrainian leadership.

At some point, you should lend some credit to the person who makes correct predictions: — boethius

You seem to be vastly overvaluing the novelty of your predictions. "You need heavy weapons to prevail in a high intensity conflict" and "breaking through a prepared, tiered defense will be difficult" is not exactly ground breaking stuff. Such analysis was widely available for anyone who cares to look.

I would give you credit for looking if it wasn't painfully obvious you're simply repeating whatever the current Kremlin propaganda is, and your correct predictions are an incidental result of russian success.

I predicted not only would it not be easy but Ukraine would not make any progress at all. — boethius

In which case you would be wrong, but again incidental to you simply repeating the Kremlin line.

It's only circular because at some point you understand that Ukraine is not going to reconquer all the territory (not that that would end the war anyways, as I explained at length at the start of the conflict) and that therefore the only resolution to the conflict is a diplomatic one. — boethius

Yes, Ukraine won't be able to conquer Moscow and force a peace. In case you think this is somehow some big revelation.

We then discuss the diplomatic and political problem Ukraine has (that it turned down a far better offer at the start of the conflict — boethius

I reject this claim as fundamentally unlikely and not supported by available evidence.

has the political problem of Ukraine fighting to a far worse negotiating position. — boethius

This is irreconcilable with facts on the ground, namely that Ukraine controls far more territory and has a much smaller disadvantage in Artillery and Armor as well as the West collectively having far greater economic reserves.

You even have no problem agreeing that Ukraine had more leverage at the start of the conflict than it does now, just quibbling over exactly which day — boethius

This is a distortion, you're substituting "at the start" for "at some point during the last year".

Although you're wrong about making a negotiation position public never being a good idea — boethius

That's not a claim I have made.

Not willing to accept the implications of what you yourself agree to, you retreat into your habitual way of resolving cognitive dissonance in just inventing whatever would be convenient if it was true and stating that as a fact. — boethius

I'm not willing to accept your version of what I say. That's not cognitive dissonance, that's just a result of you lying about and distorting what is said.

you simply invent that Ukraine is actually doing well in the war — boethius

In relative terms. They have managed a number of surprising feats.

Ukraine cannot retake the lost territory and that is clear now even to Zelensky and the whole west.

Ukraine cannot win a war of attrition against Russia. — boethius

It is my estimation that, in strategic terms, the war is already a net loss to Russia, so if we look at the status quo we're looking at an operational defeat for Ukraine insofar as the objective of reconquering all territory is concerned, but a strategic victory insofar as Ukraine has retained an independent government in Kiev and continues to posses the ability to contest the battlefield against the best troops Russia has to offer.

Continuing to fight therefore brings Ukraine further away from any sort of "victory", destroys remaining leverage, and brings Ukrainian military closer to collapse. — boethius

Russia cannot currently replace it's losses in heavy weaponry which, as you so astutely pointed out, is necessary to pierce heavy defenses unless you're willing to take massive casualties.

Therefore Russia is also loosing leverage with every tank or artillery piece destroyed. Taking Avdivka will no more end the war than taking Tokmak would have.

Last year Russia needed to survive sanctions, needed to keep domestic population behind the war, and needed time to mobilize and train hundreds of thousands of additional soldiers, ramp up military production — boethius

It still needs to do all these things.

and that offensive capacity (that would be useful to have now in a defensive strategy) is mostly destroyed — boethius

That's just baseless russian propaganda again.

Air defence is not working fine, as Russia can now approach the line of contact close enough to drop glide bombs regularly. — boethius

You still apparently do not realise how glide bombs work.

The only root to a negotiated settlement is the collapse of the current Ukrainian government and essentially just accepting whatever the Russians want. — boethius

That was always the way to peace from the russian perspective. The idea that Russia would have easily given up the gains it made, or that it clearly assumed it could make, out of the goodness of their hearts is simply not credible.

The amount of resources and political capital Russia had already funneled into this project before the invasion even began would make such a solution a death sentence for Putin, both politically and likely in the most direct sense, too.