Banno, we are both moral cognitivists. There's no need to give an argument on that for this OP (:

I agree that my original argument has been buried, but please address the new argument (since you are a moral realist): which premise do you disagree with?

Again, we cannot reason about ethics unless we acknowledge that ethical statements have truth values. — Banno

Right. We agree this far. The fear, let's say, is that they are all of them false.

We are repeating an argument that occurred after the war in Oxford and Cambridge, notably between Ayer and his intellectual children, and the "four women", Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch. In the wake of the war, many philosophers could not accept the view that morals were no more than expressions of disquiet or preference. There was a renewed insistence on treating ethical themes rationally. This was part of the rejection of Positivism.

It's not so much a matter of faith as of grammar. — Banno

M'kay. Then all I can claim is it feels like faith because I'm uncertain, then.

But also I don't think I'd reduce ethics to expressions of disquiet or preference. Philosophy and rationality go hand in hand, and I think ethical philosophy a good thing to pursue, so I'm certainly not opposed to insisting on treating ethical themes rationally. I hold the same for the arts -- we can reason about the arts, but there even in our knowledge of these things we have to acknowledge it's not all truth and inference and deduction. But then I'm not sure what the role of truth is in evaluating art. I know it's important because this is how we think about things, but also there is something to be said for the performance or the heart in such matters too, and to note how artists have different movements which disagree with one another and we don't really think of Cubism, say, as true.

Ethics is the philosophy of the art of living, perhaps, though it covers more than that too in its course because we are concerned about many things as we deliberate on that question of how best to live or the right thing to do.

there are statements that we think of as true or as false, that say how folk ought behave; and we make use of these statements in deductions. — Banno

This is why astrology is a persuasive example to me. The astrologists think of the statements as true or false, and make use of the statements in deductions: it's at least possible for us to talk this way and believe it and it be false.

Now I believe astrology to have reasons for why it's false, and I think it differs from ethics so this is just to make the case against using arguments as a demonstration of truth.

It's just the sniggling suspicion that if there were real ethical principles then we'd probably agree a little more on some of the intractable problems. But that could just be a problem with us at the moment rather than something that will always be, so I don't argue to the point that there must not be moral facts or some such. Rather it's just that it seems like an art at this point.

I added an Updated 2 section to the OP. Let me know what you think. — Bob Ross

Okay, thanks. Honestly, my sense is that you are somewhat new to philosophy and/or logic, so I am trying to do little more than give you nudges in the right direction for the better development of your ideas.

P2-A*2*2: There are no known subject-referencing prescriptive statements which are facts. — Bob Ross

This sounds to me like, "There are no moral facts."* Presumably if there are no moral facts then the moral realist is wrong, but this is still question-begging because it is asserting the very issue at stake. It is not conceivable that any moral realist would respond to your assertion by saying, "Oh, I see now. There are no moral facts. I am wrong after all!" Banno already addressed this issue in his very first post:

That one ought not kick puppies for fun is a moral statement.
It is a true statement that one ought not kick puppies for fun.
Facts are true statements.

Therefore there are moral facts. — Banno

You responded:

technically “one ought not kick puppies for fun” is non-factual — Bob Ross

But why is it non-factual? (enter )

What's happening in this thread and in your threads generally is a shifting of the burden of proof. What begins as, "I am going to argue for moral antirealism," always ends up in, "Prove to me that moral realism is true!" I am not convinced that it has progressed beyond, "Moral facts don't exist." "Sure they do: here is a moral fact." "That's not a moral fact."

* Or, "There are no moral statements that are factual," where a 'moral statement' is a "subject-referencing prescriptive statement."

---

- :sweat:

This seems to me to be the nub of our differences. Opinions are not meaningless. — Banno

I didn't say that they were...

If they are logically indistinguishable from moral truths (they are not...) then moral truths are not meaningless, either. — Banno

Sure, they're not meaningless as opinions. That's good enough for me. The only value moral truths have is as opinions. I find your prioritisation of applicability over meaning and connotation to be misguided, but I'm satisfied with this ending.

there are statements that we think of as true or as false, that say how folk ought behave; and we make use of these statements in deductions. — Banno

I disagree that this is what is usually meant by "moral truth", but I agree with these two sentences, so I'll wrap up my involvement with that.

I'll wrap up my involvement with that. — Judaka

Fine.While I couldn't see how your ideas could be understood in a coherent fashion, it was fun making up a couple of counterexamples.

This is why astrology is a persuasive example to me. The astrologists think of the statements as true or false, and make use of the statements in deductions: it's at least possible for us to talk this way and believe it and it be false. — Moliere

I'd say you need to think about yourself instead of displacing the question out onto others, such as astrologists. The claim is that, "there are statements that we think of as true or as false." This does not hold of astrology.

The crux here is that you hold to moral truths. You believe, "One ought not kick puppies for fun." The idea that <Moliere believes some moral propositions are true, therefore Moliere should accept moral realism>, is a very, very strong argument. :grin: I don't mean to discount your consideration of error theory, but I think the argument is often dismissed because it is thought to be too simple. I say the simpler the better. Our simple certainties are generally much more reliable than our intricate and complex theories ().

You seem to want to say, "Well, not enough people agree with me, so it probably isn't true." If you really think this is a good argument, then the rational course is to throw out all of your moral convictions. Throw out your prohibitions against kicking puppies, executing the innocent, treating people unjustly, etc. I think the reason it is so hard to take this step is because, among other things, it is highly irrational.

I think morality maps to other sciences more closely than is often admitted. Most people know that 2+2=4, even if they do not know <more complex mathematical truths>. Most people know that we should not execute the innocent, even if they do not know what is supposed to happen in the Middle East. Although it is easier to corrupt our moral intelligence than our mathematical intelligence, a lot of the opposition to moral realism is purely academic. Is there really much disagreement on things like, "One should not kill their newborn infant," or, "One should not lie without reason"?

I thought I had posted a reply to this... it mustn't have uploaded. Or I may have reneged just before clicking...

Now I believe astrology to have reasons for why it's false, and I think it differs from ethics so this is just to make the case against using arguments as a demonstration of truth. — Moliere

Astrology would be true if the words used were in line with the things in the world. So we would get true statements something like

"you will meet a tall dark stranger" is true IFF Jupiter is in Scorpio

Now it seems to me pretty clear that this is false.
(It might be tempting to think that the astrologer must say something like

"you will meet a tall dark stranger" is true IFF you will meet a tall dark stranger

but this doesn't do anything astrological; it makes no reference to the stars)

Antithetically, ethical truth does not set out how the world is, but how we are to act in the world. It's centrally about volition and action. SO it's not about how the world is, but what we might do in it.

So of course no fact about the world will demonstrate it's truth.

So we get a T-sentence such as

"one ought not kick puppies for fun" is true IFF one ought not kick puppies for fun

Now there are all sorts of ways to unpack this, or extend it...

"one ought not kick puppies for fun" is true IFF Kicking puppies for fun decreases the total happiness of the world

or

"one ought not kick puppies for fun" is true IFF one can will that puppies never get kicked for fun

or even

"one ought kick puppies for fun" is true IFF kicking puppies for fun increases my personal autonomy

And each of these the direction of fit is reversed by the antecedent.

So the astrology analogue doesn't work.

That's a bit of a ramble, but it's after a heavy lunch.

You believe, "One ought not kick puppies for fun." — Leontiskos

I think I agree, but with one caveat. It's not the believing that "one ought not kick puppies for fun" that renders it true.

And I think the Principle of Charity comes in to play here, as you hint, Leon. We agree more than we disagree. But especially in this area, it's the disagreement that gets the attention.

At least if we allow ethical statements to have truth values we can engage in a rational discussion. Reject ethical truth values and all there is, is violence.

I think I agree, but with one caveat. It's not the believing that "one ought not kick puppies for fun" that renders it true. — Banno

Sure. I would have to revisit our conversation on belief, but what I meant is that Moliere holds the proposition to be true. Thus in the following sentence, "Moliere believes some moral propositions are true..."

Throw out your prohibitions against kicking puppies, executing the innocent, treating people unjustly, etc. I think the reason it is so hard to take this step is because, among other things, it is highly irrational. — Leontiskos

In all fairness, I don't think the question of deciding 'what one should do' is necessarily the same as the question of whether 'what one should do' is a stance independent fact. Throwing out moral realism doesn't require throwing out prohibitions.

Honestly, my sense is that you are somewhat new to philosophy and/or logic, so I am trying to do little more than give you nudges in the right direction for the better development of your ideas.

I wouldn’t say I am new to formal logic nor philosophy (or at least metaethics), but, perhaps, I am a newbie compared to however many years of experience you have in those fields. Nevertheless, I am always glad to hear any criticisms one may have of my views, so please do not hesitate to critique away! (:

P2-A*2*2: There are no known subject-referencing prescriptive statements which are facts. — Bob Ross

This sounds to me like, "There are no moral facts."*

I understand why it would seem that way, but in my argument “there are no moral facts” is not analytically equivalent to “there are no known subject-referencing prescriptive statements which are facts”: the former needs P2-A and P2-B, whereas the latter is one component of the equation to get to P2-A. Just because there are no known subject-referencing prescriptive statements which are facts, it does not strictly follow that there aren’t any; so I just emphasized at the end of the argument for P2-A (i.e., P2-A* and P2-A**) that one has no reason to believe there are any.

I agree that P2-A*2*2 is the premise that a moral realist is going to disagree with, but that is where my head is at now: I do not see any such subject-referencing prescriptive statements which are facts.

Presumably if there are no moral facts then the moral realist is wrong, but this is still question-begging because it is asserting the very issue at stake

It isn’t though: just because there are no subject-referencing prescriptive statements which are facts, it does not strictly follow that there are no moral facts. Question-begging is when one assumes the truthity of the conclusion as its own premise.

It is not conceivable that any moral realist would respond to your assertion by saying, "Oh, I see now. There are no moral facts. I am wrong after all!”

I wasn’t expecting them to: I expected them to contest P2-A*2 (as I said in the OP) and, thereafter, P2-A*2*2.

Banno already addressed this issue in his very first post:
That one ought not kick puppies for fun is a moral statement.
It is a true statement that one ought not kick puppies for fun.
Facts are true statements.

Therefore there are moral facts. — Banno

You responded:
technically “one ought not kick puppies for fun” is non-factual

That is not what I responded with:

P1 can be true and be subjective. It would be a true statement because it corresponds to one’s psyche, and the prescription itself is non-factual (being a part of one’s psyche).

More technically, I would deny, if pushed on it, P2; because technically “one ought not kick puppies for fun” is non-factual, so it is not a proposition or it is false (and only true as a non-factual claim). It would have to be “I believe that one ought not kick puppies”: then it is propositional.

My point (in a nutshell) is that P2 can be true and a statement without being a fact; because ‘one ought not kick puppies for fun’ should be ‘I believe that one ought not kick puppies for fun’.

But, Banno’s biggest problem is that we thinks moral cognitivism is equivalent to moral realism; which makes no sense, especially since I happen to be a moral cognitivist that is a moral anti-realist.

But why is it non-factual?

Originally, I was deploying Hume’s Guillotine to remove the possibility of moral facticity; now, I would just say that, although they are possible, I do not know, nor do I think anyone else knows, of any moral facts (P2-A*2*2). There’s not much more I can say past that, other than that I am have explored most of the literature in metaethics and don’t by any of the moral realist positions.

What's happening in this thread and in your threads generally is a shifting of the burden of proof. What begins as, "I am going to argue for moral antirealism," always ends up in, "Prove to me that moral realism is true!"

I am unsure as to whether this has happened in all my threads, but, yes, this has happened here. Leontiskos, I have no problem refurbishing my OP as good reasons surface for doubting it, and that is what has happened. I am only interested in the truth, and that I why I even put you and Banno’s valid concerns with my original argument in the OP: I want other people to be able to read my OP and be able to easily follow the conversation and where it is heading, so hopefully they can learn from my mistakes.

You are absolutely right that I am now hinging on P2-A*2*2, which inevitably signals a call to all moral realists to provide a counter to it, which is just to say that they seem to now have the burden of proof. I would say that there is nothing more I can say: what else can I say but that I do not know and I don’t think other people know of any subject-referencing normative facts?

I am not convinced that it has progressed beyond, "Moral facts don't exist." "Sure they do: here is a moral fact." "That's not a moral fact."

Well, that is just the nature of metaethical debates! I say “nah”, you say “yeah”. You say “check this out”, I say “checked it out: don’t buy it”. I say “check this out”, you say “checked it out: don’t buy it”.

* Or, "There are no moral statements that are factual," where a 'moral statement' is a "subject-referencing prescriptive statement."

That is fair: I can probably condense the syllogisms to essentially:

P1: If we do not know of any moral facts, then we have no reason to believe them.
P2: We do not know of any moral facts.
C: Therefore, we have no reason to believe them.

Then, the moral realist will just contend P2.

So... what say you about P2?

I realized this morning I kind of hijacked your thread @Bob Ross, so apologies for that. What can I say other than this has been something that's been bugging me and I've been thinking about, and none too clearly given how I'm jumping between points. Thanks for providing the opportunity to work out some thoughts, and forgive my excesses.

I think what you say here gets at the doubts that I'm trying to express in philosophical form:

P2-A*2*1: If one does not know something is true, then they have no reason to belief that something is true. — Bob Ross

It's whether or not we should call this knowledge that makes me doubt. In some sense if we don't have a knowledge of ethics then we are functionally nihilists, even if we believe there are true moral statements, because then what makes the decision is sentiment and attachment to this or that principle rather than a process of deliberation or a cadre of experts who know.

So the astrology analogue doesn't work.

That's a bit of a ramble, but it's after a heavy lunch. — Banno

Oh I've been rambling myself in trying to pick through the thoughts. I appreciate you taking the time to continue your side of the conversation. Perhaps I'll come to some better way of putting things through this talking.

Good points. I suppose the question would be is that if this difference is enough to warrant our belief in a knowledge of the ethical, since this is the doubt. Or, at least, is sometimes the doubt. Because you're right here:

But especially in this area, it's the disagreement that gets the attention. — Banno

I recognize there's agreement. But the depth of disagreement still gives rise to a belief that we're no longer talking about true things, at least sometimes, in spite of agreement. The desire is to avoid a conclusion like this:

Reject ethical truth values and all there is, is violence. — Banno

Because I certainly don't believe that all there is is violence. I want to say that even from an anti-realist perspective that wouldn't follow, else I wouldn't explore anti-realism! But that is certainly a belief we share that we ought to avoid in our reasoning that, at bottom, it's all violence.

I think we can use our words to come to resolutions without resorting to violence, and that this is a desirable thing. The appeal to heart is to note how there's no proof to be had, that is, no war to be fought in the name of a true cause. That is there's this use of moral realism which also yields the conclusion "it's all violence". This way of talking ethically where people want violence because they are in the right strikes me as a backwards ethics, but the language is the same. So we get some odd duck who persuades others

"one ought kick puppies for fun" is true IFF kicking puppies for fun increases my personal autonomy

And you begin to wonder where the truth in it all is when the odd duck is persuasive.
 

Is there really much disagreement on things like, "One should not kill their newborn infant," or, "One should not lie without reason"? — Leontiskos

I think there are times when such propositions come to seem empty or at least people begin to redefine who counts as a person and who doesn't. But since it's our actions, rather than the words, which matter to me this is the sort of thinking that seems to want truth and violence and goodness. Perhaps it's this trifecta that bugs me. I can't square away that we ought to kill and call this a good and say it is true that we ought to kill. I can understand living in a world where violence is necessary, but I cannot then say that this world is a good one because my sentiments are largely peace-loving. And I think it's this intuition which gets along with @Bob Ross's use of the Guillotine -- in some sense I am committed to non-violence, and that's the sentiment what underpins my reasoning here. But not everyone is, and some people even think this is a poor way to go about things because it's not realistic in our world. So which is right, in accord with ethical knowledge?

It seems like something of a judgment call to me that has no truth to it. In a way it's where my ability to reason on the situation breaks.

And I suppose this is why I find statements like ""One ought not kick puppies for fun" is true" as unpersuasive. Sure, but It's the hard questions that give me pause, not the points of agreement. And our love of puppies does nothing to speak to our, what appears to me, thirst for violence.

You seem to want to say, "Well, not enough people agree with me, so it probably isn't true." — Leontiskos

Heh. I think this is to be avoided. My doubt can be put in reverse form, for my purposes, because I'm doubtful of a knowledge, at least at times: I am unable to agree with others and so I wonder on what basis I have to think that this is a knowledge I possess at all? What could change my mind on the matter to conform with others? Perhaps this is also why I see it as faith -- it seems like I'm the odd man out, and yet I cannot change my belief in spite of this.

Now sometimes I have changed my mind. The question of violence is one I tend to go back and forth on, but the at-bottom sentiment is what drives me to think "No, it's pretty much wrong". One thing that moral realism explains is that people do, at times, change from one perspective to another because they think it's true. In fact I'd say this is why, early on, I had realist inclinations because I've changed over time in the same way I've changed my beliefs about facts in the world. It seemed to me that because I had changed my mind on this or that moral position that there must be some truth to the matter. But I notice many prefer to stay where they are -- so it does really seem to come to seem less like a knowledge than I had previously thought. I'm still open to looking at various articulations, but most of the time I see people setting up camps rather than exploring the various ways of thinking through the ethical.

Or, at least, the desire is to find a way to express ethics in a way that it's not just "Well, not enough people agree with me, so it probably isn't true" -- because that seems to be where we're at on some issues.

But I must admit that these desires and doubts are not arguments. The argument for me, more than the Guillotine (because I think sentiment is perfectly compatible with rationality, and there could be interesting ways of working sentiment into logical form) is from difference, in the form "If morals were real then we would agree to such and such a standard. We do not agree to that standard, therefore morals are not real" -- but I can see it needs delimiting from the way this expresses, and some of my doubt is based in an inability to articulate a standard. It's too broad and gives the impression that I'm arguing that morals are necessarily not real, where the actual doubt is: here are some issues where reasoning seems to stop working, and so I have some doubts about whether truth is part of our discussion here or whether this is a body of knowledge or whether it's an art, and how to go about thinking here.

Thanks for wading through this with me. It does seem obvious that some kind of one-to-one correspondence, a la Tarski, would help bridge the gap between states of affairs and facts. Certainly it would make my question about quantifying over statements pretty much moot. I'll keep thinking.

No problem! Thank you for bringing thought-provoking material to the discussion board!

I would say that my mistake was in not realizing that a subject-referencing normative fact would obligate the subject, without need of another prescription for justification, because if 'one ought to...' is a fact then it is true and if it is true that 'one ought to' then one ought to (as a mere tautology).

So, afterall, the disagreement between me and (possibly) Banno is that (1) I don't think there exists any such subject-referencing normative facts and (2) it is not enough for a normative statement to be factual in order for moral facts to exist (since if the normative fact isn't subject-referencing, then granting it as true doesn't entail that one ought to do anything). I think @Banno would disagree with both 1 and 2.

To your point, I just don't see how it is valid separate quantifying over statements completely from states of affairs: to me, a proposition is a statement that corresonds to a state-of-affairs. So even quantifying over a statement is a proposition (which references a statement) that is true IFF it corresponds to that state-of-affairs (i.e., that there really is that statement).

I realized this morning I kind of hijacked your thread

Not a problem at all! Admittedly, I haven’t read most of your posts, but assuming it is about this topic (metaethics) then I don’t mind at all. I usually only read the one’s that link me in it some way or another (e.g., quote or @).

In some sense if we don't have a knowledge of ethics then we are functionally nihilists, even if we believe there are true moral statements, because then what makes the decision is sentiment and attachment to this or that principle rather than a process of deliberation or a cadre of experts who know.

As a moral subjectivist, my push-back would be that moral nihilism entails that there are no true moral statements. Moral subjectivism (arguably) saves moral anti-realism from complete intelligibility and allows anti-realists to still validly have moral discourse: I don’t see how that is the case with moral non-cognitvists and nihilists. If you think all moral judgments are false, then there is nothing to be said about morality.

Reject ethical truth values and all there is, is violence. – Banno

This is a common and misplaced objection to moral anti-realism. Firstly, even if there are moral facts, everything bottoms out at violence—period—since values are what drive societies, not morals. One has to value moral facts to even impose them in the first place, and that bottoms out equally at violence.

Likewise, moral anti-realist positions like moral subjectivism can allow for rational and productive moral discourse—so it certainly is not the case that it necessarily explodes into violence.

And I think it's this intuition which gets along with @Bob Ross's use of the Guillotine -- in some sense I am committed to non-violence, and that's the sentiment what underpins my reasoning here

That’s true. Banno can justify what they ought to do if ‘they ought to...’ is a moral fact, but there are still value judgments underpinning Banno’s actions here—there’s no way around that. However, this was not my intention with Hume’s Guillotine, and I think my original argument is false.

But I must admit that these desires and doubts are not arguments.

I am now at a similar point: I just don’t believe there are any subject-referencing normative facts. I’ve looked into moral naturalist and non-naturalist accounts of objective morality and I don’t buy it. So I don’t really have an argument anymore, or if I do then it is just “I don’t buy it, convince me”.

Leontiskos brought up a good point: update 1 & 2 can now be condensed essentially into the following argument:

P1: If we do not know of any moral facts, then we have no reason to believe them.
P2: We do not know of any moral facts.
C: Therefore, we have no reason to believe them. — Bob Ross

Are you saying that we do not know that there are moral facts or are you saying that we do not know whether or not something like "you ought not harm another" is a moral fact? Because these are different things (e.g., I know that you have/had a mother but I do not know which woman is/was your mother).

I will entertain either of those. Preferably, I would like to hear (1) how we know there are moral facts, (2) where and what they subist/exist in or of, and (3) how we discover them. I think those are the key points I would question.

Sure. Understood.

Banno’s biggest problem is that we thinks moral cognitivism is equivalent to moral realism; which makes no sense, especially since I happen to be a moral cognitivist that is a moral anti-realist. — Bob Ross

Moral cognitivism: Ethical statements may have a truth value. They may be true, they may be false. Moral cognitivism does not rule out assigning some third or even no, truth value to some Ethical statements. Hence a moral cognitivist may adopt, say, Kripke's theory of truth and assign no truth value to some ethical statements. Such a one would be a non-cognitive antirealist. But keep in mind that this term only has standing in contrast to moral non-cognitivism; we would not use "non-cognitivism" if it were not for "cognitivism"

Moral realism is sometimes understood as claiming that moral statements have the same sort of standing as other statements about how things are; a cognate of moral objectivism. It is also sometimes understood as asserting that moral statements are all either true or they are false, a notion which is very nearly the same. Again, moral realism is set up as against moral antirealism; we would not use "realism" if it were not for "antirealism"

If there is a point to be made about "-ism"s, it is that no such nomenclature can ever be finalised, nor even agreed on. The mere act of setting out a nomenclature invites folk to contradict it or invent novelties that do not fit in. Arguing in terms of "-ism"s is fraught with ambiguity. Best avoided.

But honour is due to you for reconsidering your position.

I guess the only issue I face while interpreting your view (thus far) is that I am a moral cognitivist and a moral anti-realist. So, I guess, under your terms I am a moral realist but not in the sense that I believe there are moral facts, right?

Or do you think that accepting moral cognitivism entails accepting moral facticity?

Well, if I have any opinion it's that assigning names to positions doesn't work, and doesn't help.

it's all in the detail.

I will entertain either of those. Preferably, I would like to hear (1) how we know there are moral facts, (2) where and what they subist/exist in or of, and (3) how we discover them. I think those are the key points I would question. — Bob Ross

The time honored perspective is that we know there are moral facts because of God, and they exist in God's nature, and we discover them in the Bible. I don't think there is any other commonly accepted framework for moral facts. I think that rejecting the above is to reject moral facts.

Hrmm, I'd say we've already covered this point a bit, and the account laid by is sufficient for me to see a difference between claiming those as moral facts, and claiming Biblical moral facts as moral facts. I like the Book of Moral Propositions because I don't want to get sidetracked into discussions about why the Bible is true, given all the possible avenues that can go. Instead it's The Good Book because we defined it as so, in this thought experiment. In it the Book of Moral Propositions has one that you happen to disagree with. Do you change your mind?

But this is different from

...ethical truth does not set out how the world is, but how we are to act in the world. It's centrally about volition and action. SO it's not about how the world is, but what we might do in it.

So of course no fact about the world will demonstrate it's truth.

So we get a T-sentence such as
"one ought not kick puppies for fun" is true IFF one ought not kick puppies for fun
Now there are all sorts of ways to unpack this, or extend it...
"one ought not kick puppies for fun" is true IFF Kicking puppies for fun decreases the total happiness of the world
or
"one ought not kick puppies for fun" is true IFF one can will that puppies never get kicked for fun
or even
"one ought kick puppies for fun" is true IFF kicking puppies for fun increases my personal autonomy

And each of these the direction of fit is reversed by the antecedent. — Banno

Which puts volition and action at the center, rather than the propositions in a book.

I didn't make this connection, though I ought to have before -- but a reread of Fear and Trembling might be due.

Which puts volition and action at the center, rather than the propositions in a book. — Moliere

I think you and Banno are agreeing that there are no moral facts. I love Fear and Trembling, btw.

, , I'm not keen on Abraham, sacrificing others at the behest of a voice in his head. I'd rather Tolstoy's three questions.

gue that some statements of this kind are true and are made true by some mind-independent feature of the worl — Michael

Which ones, what mind-independent feature, and how could that come to our sensibility if not through phenomenal interpretation (i.e not a fact about anything but perception in an individual)?

This isn't really aimed at you - i just saw this comment and have never heard anything come close to justifying it.

You beat me to these questions... LOL.

Which ones — AmadeusD

Perhaps “one ought not harm another.”

what mind-independent feature — AmadeusD

Perhaps that one ought not harm another.

and how could that come to our sensibility if not through phenomenal interpretation — AmadeusD

Perhaps not all truths come to our sensibility through phenomenal interpretation.

For example, perhaps either it is a mind independent fact that the universe was created by a transcendent intelligent designer or it is a mind independent fact that the universe wasn’t created by a transcendent intelligent designer. Perhaps either it is true that it is sometimes reasonable to believe in something despite there being no phenomenal evidence or it is true that it is never reasonable to believe in something despite there being no phenomenal evidence.

Or must we be agnostic on all such things? But then what phenomenal evidence suggests that we must be agnostic on all such things?

Oh. Well, now I see it.
 
Read this morning. It's definitely more soothing than the Dane's :D

It seems right, though.

Oh. Well, now I see it. — Moliere

Weren't you agreeing that morality doesn't tell us anything about the way the world is? That's what Banno had said in the quote you posted. A fact is an aspect of the way the world is.

I'm not keen on Abraham, sacrificing others at the behest of a voice in his head. I'd rather Tolstoy's three questions — Banno

Tolstoy was a giant Schopenhauer fan. He's awesome.

Well, there's a subtly here that I'm now not certain about -- between truths and facts, to give a name to the distinction, where truths might include more than features of the world or how it is and so can include statements like "One ought such and such", which then can be true, and understanding the difference between them and facts is through its direction-of-fit. But that doesn't disqualify them from being real, per se, because surely our actions and volitions are real? It only disqualifies them from being facts to the extent that we understand facts to only include statements with word-to-world direction of fit.

Whereas before I think I've been treating these as lumped together in thinking through intractable problems in ethics, and wondering, in that ambiguity, if this is more a matter of faith than reason, or at least a kind of faith within the bounds of reason.

We might say that the hermit on the mountain tells the emporer a truth about the world at the end of the story of the Doestevsky'sDostoevsky'sTolstoy's three questions even though it does not rely upon facts. There's a sense in which the story gives credence to the notion through on over-arching providence, but I think that's understandable in the context of a story trying to deal with what seem like reasonable questions that don't have specific, factual answers.