When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?

When it's done for ideological purposes.

Apart from your disagreement with Descartes, how pervasive a problem do you see this kind of thinking as being within the contemporary philosophical community as a whole , or the history of philosophy?
— Joshs

Descartes isn't called the "Father of Modern Philosophy" for nothing. — Ciceronianus

The historical reception of Descartes would be comical, if it wouldn't be so sad and had such enormous consequences.

Even though Descartes made it clear that he wrote his philosophy specifically for the purpose of providing ready-made arguments that Roman Catholics can use for the purpose of converting non-Catholics (which is also the reason why the RCC allowed the publishing of his texts at all), he was somehow received into the history of philosophy as some kind of poor guy who was just trying to find his way while the mean mean RCC was breathing down his neck (and is thus eminently suitable to be considered the "Father of Modern Philosophy").

Instead of writing him off as yet another religious preacher, he was embraced as some kind of beacon of wisdom even by atheists. Well, apparently he and the RCC succeeded in their intents ...

How do we find out that we are mislead? By other empirical observations. You have to trust some observations to conclude that you've been led astray in the first place.

↪Ciceronianus
Right, we could adopt the pragmatist view, which is that we can accept positions based on the benefit they grant to us. In this way, beliefs don't have to be justified by their truth status, but rather by the benefits that accrue from holding them. Hume didn't have access to this line of reasoning though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would say that pragmatism isnt about turning our attention away from whether actual events validate our predictions, in order to satisfy subjective needs. On the contrary, pragmatism recognizes that the actual events which validate or invalidate our predictions are themselves the products of our value-oriented social and material practices. Thus we are continually having to pragmatically recalibrate our criteria of truth and falsity.

How do we find out that we are mislead? By other empirical observations. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Our conversation is now spread across two threads, this and my thread on Austin. Might have to choose one.

It is not obvious what counts as an empirical observation, and what counts as theoretical. All observations are interpretations. And we are very selective as to what we choose to see.

As for pragmatism, sure, you might as well believe what is useful, but it's a good idea not to think that because it is useful it is true. You seem not to disagree with this. doesn't:

...we are continually having to pragmatically recalibrate our criteria of truth and falsity. — Joshs

If that's the case, though, why purport to think, or believe, otherwise, i.e. contrary to the way in which you actually live your life? Those who say we should act in one way, and then act in another way, are called hypocrites. I don't say certain philosophers are hypocrites, or even that they're disingenuous when they contend that what we see and interact with every day without question isn't real, or can't be known, but when what we do is so contrary to what we contend, or what we contend is so unrelated to what we do as to make no difference in our lives, I think we have reason to think that we're engaged in affectation. — Ciceronianus

Yes, great point. This is why I prefer philosophers like Aristotle to philosophers like Kant. As others have noted, it is perhaps more common on philosophy forums than among "professional" philosophers. With that said, I think it is also present among professionals, except there it occurs in more subtle ways. For example, Aristotle is quick to remind us that not all matters are susceptible of the same level of certitude, and I think the violation of this maxim is one clear way that philosophers tend to fall into 'affectation'. For instance: the idea that all legitimate knowledge must possess an apodictic kind of certitude, or must be known via the same means as the physical sciences, etc.

When you wear a scarf and a beret and drink espresso out of a demitasse.

Wouldn't it be due to the nature of our reason? When reason reflects on itself, it cannot fail to notice the problems in the existence and the knowledge of existence. — Corvus

One may notice problems, but why extrapolate from them the notion that such problems are ubiquitous, regardless of considerations of context?

I'm wondering whether there is any such philosophical discussion. Can you give an example of the topic of such a discussion? — Luke

Most discussions related to ethics or questions of value would qualify, I think.

I take it that "how we live" includes the differing values, worldviews and/or philosophical positions of each of us, rather than assuming some universal common sense view. Further, that we each have the opportunity to consider and reflect on positions that may differ from our own or that we had never previously considered, as well as to question the views we hold at any particular time. — Luke

Yes.

Does the present discussion meet its own criteria? Is it only those philosophical discussions that are anti-philosophical which are relatively free of affectation? — Luke

It would seem to me that proposing that certain views are affectations isn't itself an affectation, as it would be to validate what we do all the time.

he problem with the purely pragmatic view IMO, is that, while it certainly works for justifying the use of induction, it also seems like it could be used to justify sticking your head in the sand on all sorts of issues because "it feels better." But how can we know if sticking our head in the proverbial sand will actually maximize our benefit? For that we need to know the "truth of the matter," and so we come back to where we started. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We know by sticking our head in the sand and seeing what happens. Before we do that, though, we'd consider what it is we wish to achieve by doing so. In fact, there are quite a few things we do without looking to determine what's "true."

William "Wild Bill"James may have said things suggesting what is true is what "works" but I think you'd find that Peirce and Dewey, and others, don't. Dewey thought the word "true" carried too much baggage. He thought that it's inappropriate to think only of propositions as true or false, but consider judgments as the subject matter. He felt that we are justified in making judgments when we act on the best evidence available. What that evidence indicates is what we are warranted in asserting.

Sometimes that evidence will be what "works." Sometimes it won't be. It happens that induction has been used successfully in the resolution of questions and problems for a very long time. Justification lies in the results of it use time and time again--the best evidence available on which to make a judgment of it.

Instead of writing him off as yet another religious preacher, he was embraced as some kind of beacon of wisdom even by atheists. Well, apparently he and the RCC succeeded in their intents ... — baker

Well, to give him his due he seems to have been a great mathematician. Perhaps the perceived need for absolute certainty worked to his benefit. Everyone seemed to desire that. I think of Berkeley, and his use of God to serve as a reassuring remedy for the results of his musings.

One may notice problems, but why extrapolate from them the notion that such problems are ubiquitous, regardless of considerations of context? — Ciceronianus

But isn't Philosophy about finding out the nature of the world, our knowledge of the world, and the limitation / boundary of our knowledge? What would your points of Philosophy be?

Does the present discussion meet its own criteria? Is it only those philosophical discussions that are anti-philosophical which are relatively free of affectation?
— Luke

It would seem to me that proposing that certain views are affectations isn't itself an affectation, as it would be to validate what we do all the time. — Ciceronianus

I don't understand the part after the comma. Are you saying: Proposing that certain views are affectations...validates what we do all the time?

I don't understand the part after the comma. Are you saying: Proposing that certain views are affectations...validates what we do all the time? — Luke

It's a play off of the definition of "affectation" appearing at the beginning of the thread. If I criticize the view that we cannot know what the "external world" is, or whether it is, as an affectation I'm claiming that view is unnatural because we act as if it is and know what it is all the time. So, the claim it is an affectation isn't unnatural or aberrant, because it reaffirms that we act as if the external world exists and that we know what it is.

Specific examples from the last 200 years please. — Joshs

Do you really think Levinas actually approached other people in daily life as if he was "infinitely responsible" for them? That he actually felt indebted to just everyone he met simply because that other person was "an other"?

Nietzsche. Hardly an exemplar of the Übermensch himself.

Pretty much every religious philosopher.

But isn't Philosophy about finding out the nature of the world, our knowledge of the world, and the limitation / boundary of our knowledge? What would your points of Philosophy be? — Corvus

We find out about the nature of the rest of world and the extent of our knowledge by our interaction with it, rather than by maintaining, without adequate evidence, that our interaction with it is inherently deficient.

One may notice problems, but why extrapolate from them the notion that such problems are ubiquitous, regardless of considerations of context? — Ciceronianus

I can think of two groups of reasons for this:

1. An authoritarian sense of entitlement; extreme self-confidence; the belief that when one opens one's mouth, the Absolute and Objective Truth comes out.

2. Existential dread; anxiety; the craving to make oneself feel less afraid, less vulnerable, and so taking for granted that everyone is experiencing that same anxiety as well, that this anxiety is part of "human nature".

We find out about the nature of the rest of world and the extent of our knowledge by our interaction with it, rather than by maintaining, without adequate evidence, that our interaction with it is inherently deficient. — Ciceronianus

Esp. older generations seem to have been taught that they are inherently deficient, by default. The belief that we are born bad and defective and yet need to be corrected.

Esp. older generations seem to have been taught that they are inherently deficient, by default. The belief that we are born bad and defective and yet need to be corrected. — baker

Ah, that's interesting, as it suggests there is a religious reason behind the affectation. That would be consistent with the view that philosophy is the handmaiden of theology. The belief is similar to the concept of Original Sin. We're condemned to insufficiency; doomed not to know the world merely because we're human, the spawn of Adam and Eve. Inherently deficient by our nature. We seek to know the world (eat of the Tree of Knowledge) but because we dared to do so God has arranged that we never will, absent his help.

I was tempted to say anything running over ten pages.

But then I recalled Wile's proof of Fermat's last theorem.

Specific examples from the last 200 years please.
— Joshs

Do you really think Levinas actually approached other people in daily life as if he was "infinitely responsible" for them? That he actually felt indebted to just everyone he met simply because that other person was "an other"?

Nietzsche. Hardly an exemplar of the Übermensch himself.

Pretty much every religious philosopher. — baker

It sounds like you’re seeing philosophers as advocating a way of life and then falling short of this ideal in their own life. But I would argue the central task of a philosophy is like that of a scientific theory, to present a model of the way things are. To then say Nietzsche or Levinas falls short of this model is like saying Einstein didn’t take seriously Relativity in his private life. If a philosopher seems to fall short of what their philosophy argues for, I suggest it is not because they are hypocrites or have somehow forgotten what they have written, but reflects the limitations of their philosophy.

It depends. If "sticking your head in the sand" works well enough, then you never have an incentive to go out and try to learn more. People tend to be, in economic parlance, utility satisfiers, not maximizers. They look for "good enough" in a lot of things. At a social level, this might be how peoples end up in "low level equilibrium traps" of sorts. E.g., in Why Nations Fail there is an anecdotal story of some Roman emperor, I forget which, being presented with a scheme for mass producing glass. He was impressed, but thought it might disrupt the labor force, and so ordered that the process be banned rather than leaning into the innovation.

Against this tendency to stick with what works, there is that drive to "know what is really true," that Plato talks about. However, this tendency seems to manifest in individuals, and then reverse when it comes to people, plural.



:up:

Right, and I agree there are more supportable versions of pragmatism. I was thinking of the rather primitive versions, Pascal's Wager in particular.

I was thinking of the rather primitive versions, Pascal's Wager in particular. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Interesting. I've never quite understood this one. Pascal's Wager does seem like an affectation to me. Firstly, I don't know how one can believe something just for its potential utility. You either believe in god/s or not. Something either provides utility (in real time) or not. I don't accept that an atheist can adopt a genuine belief position simply on the basis of, 'what if I'm wrong?' Thoughts?

Secondly how do you pick the religion you are going to believe in pragmatically? If you pick Catholicism, then you go to hell if the Calvinists are right. What if Allah is god and Yahweh is heresy? What if the Zoroastrian deities are real? It seems a pretty limited wager.

If "sticking your head in the sand" works well enough, then you never have an incentive to go out and try to learn more. People tend to be, in economic parlance, utility satisfiers, not maximizers. They look for "good enough" in a lot of things. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is an engaging question. What reason's do people have for pursuing philosophy? I would suggest that philosophy often comes from dissatisfaction and/or curiosity. Not everyone seems to need philosophy. It's not an appetite everyone shares. No doubt many of us can afford to examine our presuppositions and reflect on life with more 'critical thought' and compassion. But philosophy? Philosophy seems to me to be an umbrella term for many kinds of enquiry and speculative thought. Much of it superfluous (and dull) to the average person (I include myself in the average category).

Firstly, I don't know how one can believe something just for its potential utility. — Tom Storm

Good point. Can one will ones' self into a belief? Possibly in politics.

What reason's do people have for pursuing philosophy? I would suggest that philosophy often comes from dissatisfaction and/or curiosity. Not everyone seems to need philosophy. It's not an appetite everyone shares. No doubt many of us can afford to examine our presuppositions and reflect on life with more 'critical thought' and compassion. But philosophy? Philosophy seems to me to be an umbrella term for many kinds of enquiry and speculative thought. Much of it superfluous (and dull) to the average person (I include myself in the average category). — Tom Storm

It’s a matter of personality style. Think of the arc of a person’s life in terms of a sequence of creativity cycles. Each cycle begins with the most incipient hint of a way of being in the world, of understanding, valuing and being affected by it. At this delicate and uncanny point in the cycle, what we have is no more than a subliminal bodily feeling or impression. One might call this aesthetic intuition. From this wisp of a feeling, we may progress to a more sharpened and crisp articulation of our understanding that we can verbalize in a poetic or prose form, perhaps via a story. With more sharpening and clarifying, we may end up with a form hat has the concreteness of empirical fact. If we push our thinking even farther in the direction of completeness and comprehensiveness, we arrive at a philosophical worldview, which itself may have an aesthetic, literary, empirical, ethical or spiritual focus, depending on how fully we develop the philosophical thought. Eventually, the whole cycle begins again when we replace a failing interpretation of the world with a new one.

Some observations concerning the creativity cycle: First, we can correlate these phases to cultural modalities such as art, literature, science, philosophy and spirituality.
Everyone experiences all phases of this cycle in some rudimentary form, so each of us is an incipient artist, scientist and philosopher. Second, given the fact that all phases of the cycle will have to be repeated when we replace one worldview with another, no particular phase has any superiority over the other. So why do some end up as plumbers, some as bankers, others as musicians and still others as scientists or philosophers? This is where personality style comes into play. While all of us repeatedly go through all the phases of the creativity cycle over the course of our lives, each of us is particularly suited to emphasize and articulate one phase over the others. This is why a musician will claim that music provides the most primordial access to truth, a poet will insist that poetry is the most sublime art, a scientist will extoll their seemingly privileged access to what is truly there, and a philosopher will try to usurp all of these domains within their own.

https://images.app.goo.gl/n9ZCRD3VTj2CcKM88

I think this fits my general sense of things. The cartoon is funny.

This is why a musician will claim that music provides the most primordial access to truth, a poet will insist that poetry is the most sublime art, a scientist will extoll their seemingly privileged access to what is truly there, and a philosopher will try to usurp all of these domains within their own. — Joshs

Yes, I've seen that. I've never developed enough of a passion for any subject to master it or become so focused or monomaniacal. Although perhaps my common man's 'can't be fucked' is a lens of its own.

I don't understand the part after the comma. Are you saying: Proposing that certain views are affectations...validates what we do all the time? — Luke


It's a play off of the definition of "affectation" appearing at the beginning of the thread. If I criticize the view that we cannot know what the "external world" is, or whether it is, as an affectation I'm claiming that view is unnatural because we act as if it is and know what it is all the time. So, the claim it is an affectation isn't unnatural or aberrant, because it reaffirms that we act as if the external world exists and that we know what it is. — Ciceronianus

Thanks, I see what you're saying now.

However, although I agree that we naturally act without any doubt about what the "external world" is or whether it is, and although I might agree that it is unnatural to question such things, I would also question how natural it is to criticise those who question such things. It is one thing to act without question regarding things such as the existence of the "external world", but another thing to engage those who do question its existence. I think there is a clear distinction between acting without doubt about such things and engaging those who do doubt such things, and I question whether engaging the doubters is as much an affectation as is the doubting itself.

And, if not all of philosophy (or all philosophising) is an affectation, then by what criteria do you determine which parts of philosophy are affectation and which parts are not?

This posted here from another thread:

I don't think you could blame the monks who ended up beaten to death in fights over nominalism versus realism of being guilty of affectation. Even less the people who were tortured to death over questions surrounding transubstantiation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps this is why people nowadays can get away with affectation -- because there is no you-shall-burn-at-the-stake-for-heresy attached.

It sounds like you’re seeing philosophers as advocating a way of life and then falling short of this ideal in their own life. — Joshs

This is what it looks like, yes. But I make no claim about their intentions in this discrepancy; in fact, their intentions in this discrepancy is what I want to understand to begin with.

But I would argue the central task of a philosophy is like that of a scientific theory, to present a model of the way things are.

A model of the way things are -- for whom?

It would hardly be a first that someone presents a model of the way things are -- but which _other_ people, or _only some categories of people_ are supposed to believe.

If a philosopher seems to fall short of what their philosophy argues for, I suggest it is not because they are hypocrites or have somehow forgotten what they have written, but reflects the limitations of their philosophy.

I find this too hard to believe. I don't think it is possible to write a philosophical text, publish it (leaving aside for the moment the shenanigans surrounding the publication of some texts), without the author being aware that there are some, perhaps serious problems with what he has just presented.

C: Look, there's Sulla across the street
X: I had no idea he's only 5 inches tall.
C: What the hell are you talking about?
X: Well, look at him. Look at my finger. He's only slightly bigger than it.
C: Are you serious?
X: Oh my God, he's growing!
C: He's just crossing the street towards us.
X: How do you know he's not growing? He looked small, now he looks bigger. If you're right, then we can't trust our own sense of sight.
C: Do you actually think he's growing?
X: Well, he might be. He might not. Why do you think differently? What's wrong with you? You're the crazy one.

C: Look, there's Sulla across the street
X: I had no idea he's only 5 inches tall.
C: What the hell are you talking about?
X: Well, look at him. Look at my finger. He's only slightly bigger than it.
C: Are you serious?
X: Oh my God, he's growing!
C: He's just crossing the street towards us.
X: How do you know he's not growing? He looked small, now he looks bigger. If you're right, then we can't trust our own sense of sight.
C: Do you actually think he's growing?
X: Well, he might be. He might not. Why do you think differently? What's wrong with you? You're the crazy one. — Ciceronianus

I don't see how this addresses my previous post.

Your OP question presupposes that some philosophy (or philosophising) is affectation while other philosophy (or philosophising) isn't. I am questioning this presupposition. As I alluded to in my last post, I don't see what criteria you use to judge that some philosophy (or questions or assumptions) is or is not affectation.

Your exchange above appears to suppose that X's comments are affectation without explaining why they are affectation. Is it because they are counterintuitive or controvert common sense? Is the critieria for affectation any philosophising (or any questions or assumptions) which is abnormal or contrary to common sense or to accepted wisdom? If so, then should philosophy (and science, too, I suppose) be restricted only to questions or assumptions that remain within the bounds of currently accepted wisdom and common sense; only to what is currently accepted or understood to be true? That wouldn't seem to leave much ground for any new ideas.