Maybe we should listen to the ghost of Nelson Goodman and argue for moral irrealism: that there are incompatible different versions of value systems, and in any given context at least one of them needs to be taken so seriously as to be called 'moral'. — mcdoodle
So the question becomes: is there any measure of quality? (Robert Pirsig Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance comes to mind.)
just because "one ought..." is usually linguistically interpreted as a fact of the matter, it does not follow that they actually are. — Bob Ross
Are there personal desire facts? "I like to breathe." sort of thing?
To the same extent there can be moral facts. "Societies like truthful communication."
Humans need social nurturing as well as food and shelter. Parents need to love and nurture their children, and children need to be nurtured. Are you having any difficulty with the reality of these things I am saying?
which is really an intuition based off of ordinary language (that moral realism is true) — Bob Ross
Yes, but, as I said, I don't think it is a strong argument when it depends on ordinary language. It doesn't actually negate moral subjectivism, it just states "ordinary language is used in accordance with moral realism, regardless of whether moral realism is true or not"--and the italicized is what is missing in premise 2. I can agree with the fact that ordinary language aligns with moral realist positions while refraining judgment or even negating that moral realism is true. — Bob Ross
The meaning of a word is its linguistic use. That's what Wittgenstein tries to show in his Philosophical Investigations. How can meaning be anything else? — Michael
Indeed, our aggrieved “ordinary language” response to such a situation, if it's revealed, is, “You didn’t mean it!” So what’s going on here? — J
The meaning of a word is its linguistic use. That's what Wittgenstein tries to show in his Philosophical Investigations. How can meaning be anything else?
— Michael
Easily. If I promise you something but don’t mean it – that is, I’m lying – this use is indiscernible (in that moment, and assuming a talented liar) from a sincere promise. So what makes the difference in meaning? Indeed, our aggrieved “ordinary language” response to such a situation, if it's revealed, is, “You didn’t mean it!” So what’s going on here? — J
I express my intention to lie, — Joshs
Well, but that's just it -- you don't. We stipulate that your listener can't tell the difference. You may have the intention, but it's not expressed. BTW, I agree that we're going to need some appeal to intention as a way of explaining what's going on, but I'm not sure a hardcore OL proponent would — J
“Each of the numerous ways in which I may respond will attribute or lend to your utterance a specific kind of meaning. The utterance has no commanding presence in itself. Its meaning is revealed only in the manner of my response--in the coordination between my response and your utterance. Still, we should not conclude that I create your meaning. For my responses are not in themselves meaningful or, rather, they are not full of meaning ready for transfer. Absent the utterance of your proposals, my seeming acts of disagreement lapse into nonsense.”
These things exist through a sort of consensus, or consensual understanding, and they aren't simply arbitrary as they have some kind of foundation in our nervous systems. When you feel shame, for example, you blush and you can feel it right down to your bones, it affects you physically. This isn't simply an imaginary or arbitrary phenonemon, and it's not merely about preferences or an intellectual exercise — GRWelsh
just because "one ought..." is usually linguistically interpreted as a fact of the matter, it does not follow that they actually are — Bob Ross
Yes, we have. The moral realist will say that that one ought not harm another is a state of affairs. — Michael
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