Apropos, what would your take then be regarding this generalized proposition: every "ought" translates into "an optimal means" of actualizing some future "is" (i.e., some conceived of future state of being that can in the future become reality) which is desired.

Of course this in part leads into the question of "desired by whom"; still, as a statement of fact all the same, do you find reason to object to this just offered proposition being true?

One such brute fact might be “it is wrong to harm people.” — Michael

I'm sure you can appreciate that this is not always true in terms of normative values. There are certainly situations in which harm (for instance to prevent harm) is warranted, morally. Sometimes, it's called for morally. So you have to add further objects to the statement to justify it. To my mind, that precludes it from being brute.

I would ask, I suppose, what about that statement sets it aside from the need for justification?

It was just an example. I am trying to explain moral realism. Some facts are brute, and the moral realist will claim that some brute facts are brute moral facts.

There is some X such that "one ought not X" is objectively true because it is a brute fact that one ought not X.

This meta-ethical position need not then address normative ethics.

There is some X such that "one ought not X" is objectively true because it is a brute fact that one ought not X. — Michael

I think i can lay out here (to the point that we need not actually go any further) why this makes no sense to me:

Facts are derived from states of affairs. We agree there.
"One ought not x" (or any other behavioural command) is a thought, not a state of affairs. It's literally just the language enunciating a thought.
I cannot take a thought to be a state of affairs, which are necessarily mind-independent (in my understanding).

So, if you're seeing that statement as a state of affairs, we're just not talking about hte same thing as so we couldn't be wrong or right by each others lights :)

You should look up the use-mention distinction.

"The cat is on the mat" is a sentence. That the cat is on the mat is a state-of-affairs.
"One ought not harm another" is a sentence. That one ought not harm another is a state-of-affairs.

"The cat is on the mat" is a sentence. That the cat is on the mat is a state-of-affairs.
"One ought not harm another" is a sentence. That one ought not harm another is a state-of-affairs. — Michael

How? You've not addressed my reason for it not being one. I also, again, do not think we can get any further if you see that as a state of affairs, rather than a thought with no external referent, which is necessarily true, whether it could be construed as a state of affairs as well or not - it certainly doesn't refer to anything external to the mind.

You said:

"One ought not x" ... is a thought, not a state of affairs.

Firstly, "one ought not x" is a sentence, not a thought. Specifically, in this case, it is a written sentence.

Secondly, I'm not saying that "one ought not x" is a state of affairs; I'm saying that that one ought not x is a state of affairs. Note the lack of quotation marks; it's important. Again, see the use-mention distinction.

it certainly doesn't refer to anything external to the mind. — AmadeusD

It doesn't refer to anything that exists external to the mind, but as I have been at pains to explain, something doesn't need to exist for it to be a state of affairs. That Santa doesn't exist is a state of affairs.

Firstly, "one ought not x" is a sentence, not a thought. Specifically, in this case, it is a written sentence. — Michael

I covered this. It's the linguistic representation of a thought, not a state of affairs. If your position is that a sentence is necessarily representative of a state of affairs, i find that bizarre and hard to grasp.

No, i understand the distinction you're making. Perhaps you're not groking my objection - support that it is a state of affairs, rather than a falsity.

It's the linguistic representation of a thought, not a state of affairs. If your position is that a sentence is necessarily representative of a state of affairs, i find that bizarre and hard to grasp.

No, i understand the distinction you're making. — AmadeusD

You clearly don't understand the distinction.

"The cat is on the mat" is the linguistic representation of a thought, but that the cat is on the mat is not the linguistic representation of a thought; it's a state of affairs. Note the difference that removing the quotation marks makes.

I do. I'm sorry, but i'll need to pull away if this gets adversarial.

It makes no appreciable difference unless you're quoting a particular instance of speech. The cat is on the mat refers to something outside of the utterance/quotation/sentence. It is referential. The quote marks literally make no different to the substance of the statement. Whether it's spoken, or thought, it is the same statement making the same reference.

That it has no quote marks around it, doesn't change it's actual content, and merely it's source. But even then, ultimately, the source is a thought about something.

"One ought not x" is only referential if you have a state of affairs to refer to. In this case, you haven't established it. You end up on 'brute fact' but i don't accept that position, so, as i actually began this part of the exchange - we have no further to go on this journey together.

If I may...

There are certainly situations in which harm (for instance to prevent harm) is warranted, morally. — AmadeusD

Situations in which a greater harm is avoided?

That reinforces, rather than contradicts, the brute fact.

Situations in which a greater harm is avoided? — Banno

That was not my contention. They could be equal, but considered less or more justified on either side.

They could also be inverse. Causing a greater harm, to prevent a lesser harm to a less deserving target (Israel/Hamas comes to mind.. )

Harm is not, in brute fact, amendable to judgement. It just is a fact that we experience harm. And can cause it.

That aside (i mean to say, please respond to this next question separately, rather then within your answer to the above):

How do you take claims of desiring harm? Either due to mental illness, or lets say some BDSM proclivity? Is that an except, or is there some reason this doesn't fit the definitions your using?

They could also be inverse. Causing a greater harm, to prevent a lesser harm to a less deserving target (Israel/Hamas comes to mind.. ) — AmadeusD

Obvious special pleading.

Obvious special pleading — Banno

Vehemently rejected. It was a direct response to your claim that proportionality has somethign to do with establishing the fact. It doesn't on my account, and i'm not ignoring, but rejecting the crux of your claim that proportionality matters.

"One ought not x" is only referential if you have a state of affairs to refer to. In this case, you haven't established it. You end up on 'brute fact' but i don't accept that position, so, as i actually began this part of the exchange - we have no further to go on this journey together. — AmadeusD

As I said above, it doesn't refer to anything that exists external to the mind, but as I have been at pains to explain, something doesn't need to exist for it to be a state of affairs. That Santa doesn't exist is a state of affairs.

You seem to be suggesting that something is a state of affairs if it is (or was? or will be?) a physical thing. Realists reject this assumption. There are non-physical states of affairs; that Santa doesn't exist, that 1 + 1 = 2, that certain arguments are valid, that it is irrational to believe in something if the evidence suggests otherwise, etc. Moral realists argue that that one ought not harm another is another such non-physical state of affairs.

There are non-physical states of affairs; that Santa doesn't exist, — Michael

That is a physical state of affairs.

In any case, it's plain to see that your reliance on the brute fact isn't something i accept, and so we can't come to terms.

That is a physical state of affairs. — AmadeusD

Santa's non-existence isn't a physical thing. By definition it's the lack of a physical thing.

What?

Which is extant in the state of the physical world - Santa isn't in it.

Which is extant in the state of the physical world - Santa isn't in it. — AmadeusD

Santa doesn't exist even if nothing exists. There are states of affairs even if there is no physical world; indeed, if a physical world doesn't exist then that a physical world doesn't exist is a state of affairs.

And I had other examples too: that 1 + 1 = 2, that certain arguments are valid, that it is irrational to believe in something if the evidence suggests otherwise, etc.

What? — Banno

I understood your response to be that, if i claim that using harm (level 2, lets say) to prevent harm level 6, this would support the brute fact of 'one ought not harm'.

I provided that the concept of justification can render that irrelevant. The brute facts remain:

1. We exist
2. We can be harmed
3. We can harm others.
4?????? (this is where i'm not seeing any work being done)
5. One ought not harm.

The brute facts remain:

1. We exist
2. We can be harmed
3. We can harm others.
4?????? (this is where i'm not seeing any work being done)
5. One ought not harm. — AmadeusD

We don't need (4). (5) isn't derived from (1) - (3); it's brute (much like you have taken (1) to be brute).

Santa doesn't exist even if nothing exists. — Michael

If nothing existed, that would be a state of affairs that included Santa not existing. Though, that would require 'soemthing' no notice that ffact, which is fairly much incoherent if nothing exists.

It's not. 4 is required to get from the facts of hte matter, to the judgement about htose facts.

And you've done nought to show otherwise. It's just your belief.

If nothing existed, that would be a state of affairs that included Santa not existing. — AmadeusD

Exactly. There are states of affairs even if there is no physical world. Something can be a state of affairs even if it does not "correspond" to something that physically exists. Therefore, your claim that if obligations do not "correspond" to something that physically exists then we have no obligations is a non sequitur.

4 is required to get from the facts of hte matter, to the judgement about htose facts. — AmadeusD

(5) isn't a judgement; it's a fact.

Yep.

That's the answer to

Demanding a justification for a brute fact is... incongruous. Indicative of a misunderstanding of brute.

But there are folk here who demand a justification for the chair they are sitting on, as if it were justifications all the way down instead of turtles.

my position is is not a brute fact, though. What makes it a brute fact?

Do we have to just rely on “brute disagreement” to resolve, at least in terms, the conflict?

my position is is not a brute fact — AmadeusD

Well, that's right. The mooted brute fact is “it is wrong to harm people.” At issue is whether this is to be accepted as it stands, or if it needs to be grounded in some other proposition.

So, do you think it true?

And if you agree that it is true, do you do so as a result of other considerations, or does it appear to you to stand on its own?

Compare "This sentence has five words". Presuming you agree that it is true, are there some other statements that imply its truth, or does it stand on its own?

Or "The acceleration due to gravity is 9.8m/s/s". Sure, we can add sentences specifying how we measure acceleration. But leaving aside rules for interpretation, that gravity accelerates objects at that rate is just a brute fact...

To be sure, there are folk here who adopt an antirealist view and will argue that there is no acceleration without that interpretation, but i somehow don't think that's you. I might be wrong.

but i somehow don't think that's you — Banno

As I understand the position, I would agree that's not me. But i'm young in this - so that may change, or be revealed as I go.

that gravity accelerates objects at that rate is just a brute fact... — Banno

I note that verification is what gives this statement veracity. You could have noted a different rate, and been wrong, in the face of the verification of the rate you've noted. You're right in that there is a rate of gravitation acceleration, as a brute fact, and if we're wrong, that doesn't change the fact of it. But,. that we note it at THAT rate, is a custom. Our scale could just be something different. Borders of London could be different too. But hte difference is, the rate of acceleration remains what it is without that conventional rate-signifier. London does not exist at all without the convention.

are there some other statements that imply its truth — Banno

My immediate intuition is yes, but I'd need to do more work to identify what they are, and may end up conceding.

So, do you think it true? — Banno

I do not. I believe 'wrong' must be established as an actual criteria, rather than just a word to be referred to in relation to harm. Why is it wrong? Because it's harm? That's tautological.
That many people ascribe wrongness to harm doesn't do much for me. Still just extends convention. There is nothing in my experience of the world that indicates harm is wrong, ipso facto so I, at least, require some further grounding of it's wrongness with reference to the world.