I think what you say about brute facts is correct, but it raises an interesting question in this context. Your other two examples -- about the words in the sentence, and the acceleration -- are more or less incontestable. No one, to my knowledge, disputes them (leaving aside the vexing question of interpretation). How, then, do we account for the fact that "It is wrong to harm people" -- supposedly also a brute fact -- has engendered endless debate over the centuries? The debates often focus on circumstantial codicils, such as "Is it wrong to harm people if it will help your family?" etc., but this is part of the reason why it seems odd to invoke "brute fact" here. If we're honest, the standard thoughtful response to "Is it wrong to harm people?" is "Usually, but it depends." I'm not saying that's right, only that it's the standard response, rather than "Yup, it's a brute fact."

I think many moral truths are facts, but I'm skeptical (and nervous) about justifying them with these kinds of analogies. Interested as always to hear your thoughts.

I think many moral truths are facts, but I'm skeptical (and nervous) about justifying them with these kinds of analogies — J

Do you have a suggestion of how to justify a moral 'fact'?

I note that verification is what gives this statement veracity. — AmadeusD

Sure. Analytically, verification is other folk, or the same folk at other times, testing and agreeing with the proposition. I don't see any prima facie reason that could not be done with a moral brute fact.

Yeah, there's a way in which "one ought not do harm" is tautological if harm is just what we ought not do. There'd be work here in sorting out harm in a way that pays out.

How, then, do we account for the fact that "It is wrong to harm people" -- supposedly also a brute fact -- has engendered endless debate over the centuries? — J

Direction of fit, again, in addition to ambiguities and hedging and so on. I'm piggybacking on that term, which was used b y others; my main interest here is that there seem to be true moral statements, and that for some of those it is odd to demand a justification. Talk of brute statements is a bit strong, and probably pulls in too much baggage. How about "hinge"? At least it has different baggage...

Yeah, there's a way in which "one ought not do harm" is tautological if harm is just what we ought not do. There'd be work here in sorting out harm in a way that pays out — Banno

Ok, i think we've probably come to terms here then. Thank you :)

This example doesn't work. The "ought" isn't derived from the is, it is an implicit part of the statement itself.

my main interest here is that there seem to be true moral statements, and that for some of those it is odd to demand a justification. Talk of brute statements is a bit strong . . . — Banno

That works for me.

Do you have a suggestion of how to justify a moral 'fact'? — AmadeusD

I was afraid someone would ask me this! The question has occupied me throughout my life, and I don’t know the answer. But since you’ve only asked for a suggestion . . . I suggest that facts about values are to be found in a different “world” than, say, scientific facts. I also suggest that we don’t arrive at moral facts using the standard philosophical questions, such as “What ought I to do?” or even “What is the good?” The world of values is, perhaps, one of spiritual recognition, more like being in love than achieving knowledge.

Gadamer is a philosopher who might also have good suggestions. He emphasizes the importance of tradition in talking about values, since it’s unrealistic to expect every single person to have a transcendental, mystical experience of the Godhead! No more would you expect everyone to prove general relativity for themselves. It’s often appropriate and necessary to take someone else’s word for it. Gadamer uses the metaphor of a well to describe the “world” of values, “which is at one and the same time the soil, source, and water of life, but which is not knowledge in the strict sense.” Invoking the importance of both tradition and non-strict-sense knowledge are of course like poking a hornet’s nest for some philosophers . . . So, a final word from Jean Grondin, who writes a lot about Gadamer: “To recognize that thought has limits is not to silence it, but to allow it to better apprehend itself and to open itself more easily to dialogue.”

For my dollars, moral certainty is a furphy.

No algorithms for deriving moral facts. Only heuristics, and then only if you have time.

There's just making choices, something that one can become better at with age.

Hence, virtue ethics.

moral certainty is a furphy — Banno

Thanks for introducing me to a new word!

Yes, there's a difference between having the courage of your convictions and being convicted beyond the shadow of a doubt that you're right and They are wrong.

I'm presuming the tanks are empty. The horse could not possibly pull that many full tanks.