You still don't get it. — Banno

They would say that, wouldn't they :razz:. Keeping the joke going! I like a funny guy.

I just saw that quote.. If you are saying that Austin was in on the joke, then I'm not contesting that.

I get really annoyed about the examples one sees that are tiny thumbnails, which are treated as the whole story, when it is clear that a wider context would reveal complexities that are ignored. — Ludwig V

The fact that taking into consideration further or wider circumstances (and even responses) can change what is meaningful about an expression shows that the expression itself is just kind of “ya know what I mean?” and whether you do is based on so much more that came before it and is happening around it and what happens after, if necessary. There are times when the actual words matter, but much of the time they are as if a cue in a particular direction of what can already be expected in that situation. Thus why our words seem to move right past each other when we don’t take into consideration we might be standing in different worlds (of interest, implication, anticipation).

It seems to me that a form of words always suggests a context, no matter how tiny the thumbnail sketch… Context isn't everything, but it isn't an optional extra. — Ludwig V

And I agree but would double the bet. Words not only “suggest a context”, they require it. If I am going to say “I’m sorry” and there is no harm done, the expression itself here can only move along the attendant earmarks of an apology; so that we all know what the next thing is that will be said in this instance, as if it were required—as if it must be said. It’s not the words here that have the power, which seems even to overwhelm our free will in only being able to respond “Sorry for what?”. So maybe we could say the context isn’t always everything, but we definitely do not have certainty in what we “perceive” nor control over what is said in what we express.

Words not only “suggest a context”, they require it. — Antony Nickles

Yes. I didn't mean "suggest" in the sense of something that one might ignore or refuse - "How about some crisps with that?" something more like "Love and marriage go together like..." One might supply "meat and potatoes" or "horse and carriage" or "heaven and hell". Hence misunderstandings.

So maybe we could say the context isn’t always everything, but we definitely do not have certainty in what we “perceive” nor control over what is said in what we express. — Antony Nickles

I'll go with that.

Thus why our words seem to move right past each other when we don’t take into consideration we might be standing in different worlds (of interest, implication, anticipation). — Antony Nickles

Yes. But many jokes as well.

Given the accusation of a conservatism so strong that it refused to engage at all with politics, this is a point that it might be worth following up on. — Banno

I don't disagree. A question. Is this a critique of the people, or of the ideas? What conservatism are we talking about? Not philosophical, presumably. Political? Social? Cultural? Linguistic? Are we talking about what was conservative then, or what is conservative now?
It is true that Ayer and Austin were career academics. But I don't think their biographies, particularly in the period 1940 - 1945, support the idea they were "ivory tower" academics. Wittgenstein had a more complicated career, but didn't conform to that stereotype either.

There's a slogan associated with AI Wei Wei. "Everything is art. Everything is politics." He's in a good position to know. Of course, he should have added that "Everything is philosophy". But then, one may begin to feel that this is a matter of point of view rather than domain. Everything can be seen as art, philosophy, politics, etc. because those are aspects of everything. That doesn't mean that everyone should become either artist, or philosopher, or politician.

I really enjoyed the sketch. The parodies of philosophical arguments are very pointed. Like a politician who is anxious to be satirized, one could see it is as a back-handed compliment. But it isn't a criticism specifically on grounds of conservatism.

In favour of the criticism, there is the by now familiar point, less widely acknowledged at the time, that ordinary language can express undesirable, offensive and damaging stereotypes. A great deal of work has gone into exposing them. The good news is that ordinary language (well, a lot of it) has changed in response. (Which is not to say that there is no more to do.)

On the other hand, Austin does not claim that ordinary language may not need reform (p. 63), though admittedly his description of the process, especially the phrase "tidy up", could be described as an understatement and does largely ignore the practicalities of making the changes he is contemplating.

Curiously enough, at the time, OLP seemed to be very much on the side of the democratizing angels. True, in fact, it was not ordinary language but Received Pronunciation that was being promoted. But even Received Pronunciation was a relatively new invention (on the back of the BBC, which was less than thirty years old at the time), developed to facilitate nation-wide communication through speech, rather than writing. Whether OLP contributed to the changes in lexicography that have happened since, I could not say; but it was certainly an aspect of that wider movement.

But the issue of OLP is tangled up with at least two other issues. One is the very idea of the academy and its tendency to separate itself from the world, drawing in its skirts as it goes on its way. Well, specialization is not a bad thing, is it? Anyway, many academics are anxious to engage with the world as well as pursuing their academic work - some even do their academic work in the world and others aim to spread academic ideas outside the academy.

The other is the socio-cultural dominance and consequent exclusivity of Oxbridge (and, now, some other universities). That has little to do with academia as such and a great deal to do with socio-cultural issues at least in the UK, if not more widely. On this issue, I can only applaud and wish there was more of such criticism now. In fact, much of the second half of the 20th century continued that battle, with some success. (Even Oxbridge has moved on. adjusting to the times, as it has no doubt done so often before) Sadly, this century has seen much (but not all) of that progress eroded.

Just some random points.

If the specifics don't conform to the generalization, it's a problem for the generalization, not for the specific. — Ludwig V

This is not true. The issue is the way that the specific is related to the generalization, and whether the relationship assumed is logical or illogical. Your example assumed a relation between the specific and the generalization which was not implied by the generalization. This fallacious or illogical relation produced a claim that there is a problem with the generalization, when the real problem was with misapplication of the generalization.. Andt since this supposed problem with the generalization is only produced through the means of an illogical relation with the specific, the claim that it indicates a problem with the generalization is not justified.

Here's an example which is analogous to the mistake you made. Suppose I make the proposition that we see electromagnetic waves as colour. Then you mention some specific wavelengths like ultraviolet, and infrared, which are outside the visible range, claiming that this is evidence that my proposition is false. The specifics do not conform therefore there is a problem with the generalization. But my proposition does not state that we see "all" electromagnetic waves, so the relation which that claim relies on is not justified by logic, it is illogical. What would really be the case in this instance is that you misunderstood, and therefore misapplied the generalization.

That is the same sort of illogical relation between the specific and the generalization, which your other argument relied on. I make the proposition that a chair produces interpretations. You say that a chair does not interpret what I say, therefore a chair does not produce interpretations.

How do you know that? Surely, if we can know that their perceptions of the world are different from ours, we can "relate" to them. — Ludwig V

This is a common epistemological problem. It is commonly represented in the form of 'We can know causes from their effects, without establishing a direct relation with the cause itself'. We do this through the means of generalization, principally inductive reasoning. But inductive reasoning does not have precise rules and therefore does not provide the level of certainty which some epistemologists require for "knowledge" so they expose problems like Hume did.

The issue you point to here is ambiguity in the use of the term "relate". There is a vast multitude of different ways which "relations" may be made, implying a multitude of types of "relations". Sometimes we do not properly distinguish between different types of relations, and ignore the fact that certain types produce a much higher degree of certainty than other types.

So you are correct to say that if we can know that other animals have perceptions, we can "relate" to these perceptions, but what happens with this type of reasoning is that the former, "animals have perceptions" is a generalization, while the latter "we can relate to these perceptions" expresses a proposition about some specifics. The relationship with the mentioned specifics, "perceptions" is established through the means of the generalization which is naturally lacking in certainty. The relation is not direct between the subject and the particular. This type of relation inverts the true order of necessity, so it is a completely different type of relation, i.e. it lacks in necessity due to the inversion.

Here's an example "all grass is green" is a generalization. We can say that this proposition provides a relation to individual blades of grass, that each one must be green, but it's really just a pretend relation to individual blades of grass. And because it's just a pretense, despite the fact that you may call it a relation, the knowledge derived here is only as reliable as the inductive reasoning which created the generalization in the first place. So if I tell you that I have a blade of grass in my hand, and you think that the generalization provides you with a relation to that blade of grass, you'll conclude that the blade of grass in my hand is green. But it might actually be brown, or some other colour, because the generalization is faulty. And that's why I say that this type of relation. though it is correct to call it a relation, is a sort of pretend relation, because it's not direct, it goes through the intermediary of a generalization and therefore is only as reliable as the generalization. Further analysis shows that the relation is not with actual individuals, but possible individuals.

I would say that this is the case with the generalizations I provided, first that other animals have perceptions, and second, that they are different from ours. These generalizations are to some extent unreliable as produced from a sort of inductive reasoning. Now you say that if we know that the perceptions are different from ours, then obviously we relate to them, but this is what I called a pretend relation, through the intermediary of the generalizations. My principle was that different people have different perceptions, and I extrapolated to other animals having different perceptions.

So if I talk about a person on the other side of the world, whom I know has different perceptions from me, through that generalization, this does not mean that I have established a relation with the perceptions of a person on the other side of the world. It's purely fictional, just a pretense, created by the generalization, but the generalization creates the illusion that I am actually saying something real about a real person's perceptions, and I actually have a relation with those perceptions.

So we formulate a judgement, which is not an interpretation, and then promote it to an interpretation and then decide whether it is correct or not? At first sight, it would resolve my problem. But what is this promotion process? — Ludwig V

No, I think what I said is the inverse of that. We form an interpretation, but the interpretation is not a judgement at all. Then afterwards the interpretation is judged as correct or not. I might have confused you though, because I then said that the interpretation is itself is purposeful, intentional, and therefore aimed or directed by some form of good. So I would not characterize the interpretation itself as a judgement, but an action which is the product of this more base form of intention, which may be called a form of judgement. Interpretation is more like a tool of intentionality which lies between two distinct forms of judgement, the judgement which directs its production, and the judgement which judges the correctness of it, afterwards. The judgement which is prior to the interpretation is a judgement of what is needed, the interpretation itself is the act deemed as required to fulfil the need, and the posterior judgement determines successfulness. The process of trial and error can be understood in this way. Far too often though, the judgement made prior to the trial and error action is represented as non-intentional, to avoid an infinite regress of intentional acts.

To put the point another way, surely to make a judgement is normally to evaluate it as correct? — Ludwig V

I think we really need to recognize two very distinct forms of judgement, the prior and the posterior, in relation to the act. The prior judgement, as a judgement of what is needed, the act required, or means to the end, cannot really be characterized as a judgement of correctness. It can sometimes be seen as a judgement of "the correct act" but most often it cannot. If we start to characterize the prior judgement as a judgement of correctness, we start to portray all intentional act as a matter of following rules. The act would be determined by a rule, and this rule would produce a judgement of the correct act for the circumstances. But this is not how we think and act in real situations. The need to act is influenced by emotions and all sorts of subconscious things which cannot be described as judgements of correctness.

Some interpretations seem to be based on a process that we are not subjectively aware of. The usual term for that is unconscious, which is distinct from non-conscious. Non-conscious beings neither have nor lack an unconscious. — Ludwig V

Yes, this is the point. If interpretation is a form of action, then the judgement which is prior to the action, which brings the action into existence, must be subconscious (I don't understand the distinction between unconscious and non-conscious which you point to). This produces the need to consider distinct forms of judgement, the prior and posterior, as explained above.

I'm not trying to disassociate it. I'm trying to understand it. I'm arguing that there is a problem with the standard model of interpretation. — Ludwig V

I don't believe there is a standard model of interpretation.

Here's an example "all grass is green" is a generalization. We can say that this proposition provides a relation to individual blades of grass, that each one must be green, but it's really just a pretend relation to individual blades of grass. And because it's just a pretense, despite the fact that you may call it a relation, the knowledge derived here is only as reliable as the inductive reasoning which created the generalization in the first place. — Metaphysician Undercover

So am I entitled to conclude from your last sentence that "all swans are white" is only as reliable as the induction that created it in the first place? Fair enough. So "Swan A is white" and "Swan B is white" etc are the premises of the induction? Fair enough. So now I reason that "all swans are white" Then I discover that Swan Z is black. So my generalization and the preceding induction is not reliable. So I need to do one of three things: a) abandon the generalization b) modify the generalization ("swans are white, except in Australia") c) change my definition of a swan ("A swan may be black or which" or the quantifier ("Most swans are white".) True, the new generalization is also subject to the same hazards. But what am I supposed to do - abandon all generalizations? I don't think so. There's no pretence involved at any stage.

You say that a chair does not interpret what I say, therefore a chair does not produce interpretations. — Metaphysician Undercover

If my chair does not interpret ("produce interpretations") what I say, there are two possibilities: a) that it produces interpretations of some other thing(s) or (b) causes me to produce interpretations. I deduce that you meant the latter. My mistake. But that does not give any ground for supposing that the chair has a mind or is conscious.

Far too often though, the judgement made prior to the trial and error action is represented as non-intentional, to avoid an infinite regress of intentional acts. — Metaphysician Undercover

You do represent the prior judgement as intentional, so how do you avoid the infinite regress?

The need to act is influenced by emotions and all sorts of subconscious things which cannot be described as judgements of correctness. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are missing the cognitive element in most? all? emotions. If I am afraid of snakes, I have made a judgement about snakes and that judgement is an important part of the judgement about what is needed. Prejudices may be erroneous or ill-founded, but they are nevertheless judgements about what is appropriate in various circumstances - even if I am not aware of them.

(I don't understand the distinction between unconscious and non-conscious which you point to). — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, unconscious and subconscious are a bit tricky. But non-conscious, for me at least, means "not capable of consciousness or unconsciousness" or "the distinction between conscious and unconscious does not apply".

I don't believe there is a standard model of interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

1. Something before the interpretation, a text, a picture - something that means something. Call it the original. "Interpretation of...."
2. The interpretation. "Interpretation of .... as ...."
The third stage is not normally necessary when there is only one interpretation available.
3, Evaluation or justification of the interpretation.

I've been thinking about other cases in which we know the socio-political tendencies of philosophers. Locke, Berkeley, Hegel, Sartre, Heidegger, Adorno, Russell all spring to mind. Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and Kierkegaard have pretty clear religious affiliations. (There's no point in going further back than that in this context.) I don't think that philosophers pay much attention to them in their philosophical readings of them, do they? How seriously should we take the possible conservatism of OLP?

It might be more relevant to ponder why their work has been so widely disregarded. Likely, it would be speculative to suggest reasons, but here goes, anyway.

There's a theoretical issue. Many philosophers have thought to refute their predecessors. Few of them have thought to bring philosophy as such to an end. Mind you, the twentieth century differs from earlier times in that a successor appeared to be waiting in the wings, to take over all the interesting questions - and, to a considerable extent, it has. (Science, of course.) (I'm reminded of the problem for conventional painting when photography developed. The artists worked out a way forward pretty quickly, Philosophy is still trying.) So, perhaps OLP was too successful. It convinced its adherents, who either spread out to pass on the word or gave up philosophy. Not a recipe for a thriving tradition. (It is possible, however, that the same problem afflicts analytic philosophy in general - there seems to be an under-current of concern nowadays that it is not going anywhere and has nowhere to go.)

There is a practical issue. Simply, that the style of argument that Ryle, Austin and Wittgenstein deploy is much, much harder than it looks.

Additionally, many thinkers wrote with reverse transcendence in mind , where they really qualified the state of social representation, as an observation of things as they are, not trying to preserve a modus operans to intentionally change the status quo.

“Far too often though, the judgement made prior to the trial and error action is represented as non-intentional, to avoid an infinite regress of intentional acts.”

— Metaphysician Undercover




…an example of how thinkers of the day dealt with the issue of describing a reverse ability between determined and undetermined presentations of facts, as noted , unsupported above by using the same argument.

Just some random points. — Ludwig V

I can't offer much more. Ayer was more politically active, supporting the Labor movement and advocating decriminalisation of Homosexuality. Biographers note that Austin was more interested in teaching than writing, and I think his influence is there in the Four Women, who were all political an attended his sessions, although none were in his circle. There'd be a PhD in arguing that case.

I don't think OLP disappeared. OLP provided philosophers with a new toolbox, and while the details changed as philosophy became both more formal and more about cognition, I think there is another PhD in showing that the tools did not disappear but instead became ubiquitous. Analytic philosophy takes the sort of conceptual analysis pioneered by the OLP philosophers as granted.

I can't offer much more. — Banno

There'd be a PhD in arguing that case. — Banno

There a technique in history called "prosopography". That's what we need here. But it is very labour-intensive. Wikipedia - Prosopography

Analytic philosophy takes the sort of conceptual analysis pioneered by the OLP philosophers as granted. — Banno

It's true that I keep seeing traces or reminders of OLP in discussions that seem far removed and it's true that when something is taken for granted, the need to give explicit references is less important.

@Banno

On the other hand, Austin does not claim that ordinary language may not need reform (p. 63), though admittedly his description of the process, especially the phrase "tidy up", could be described as an understatement and does largely ignore the practicalities of making the changes he is contemplating. — Ludwig V

Wittgenstein refers to this as well, but what I take it to mean is that sometimes OLP’s method does not work because the things we say in a particular situation distort the mechanics of that practice, rather than reflect the criteria we ordinarily judge it by (which is OLP’s means of insight). So, when they talk of “tidying up” or “rearranging” (PI #92), they are not talking about word politics, but simply using the means of OLP, say in “substituting one form of expression for another” (#90). Sometimes this just means simply drawing out multiple examples to see a wider view of how it is that a practice works despite first impressions given only one way of speaking about it. Other times we’ve taken one way of speaking and created metaphysics.

How seriously should we take the possible conservatism of OLP? — Ludwig V

On the face of it, OLP seems to be pitting what we usually say against what philosophy says. The interpretation that OLP is conservative (usually taken from Moore) is that it is just common sense refuting skepticism. Austin will appear conservative because of his snobbishness about how language is just being used clumsily, lazily, haphazardly, etc. In both cases there is the underlying condescension that skepticism is folly or abnormal. Wittgenstein shows us how our fear is warranted (that we cannot know the other, know for certain what is right). In all, I take the suggestion that we look around at the variety of the world to be license to explore our own interests, and that it is democratic to think anyone can reflect and learn.

It might be more relevant to ponder why their work has been so widely disregarded. — Ludwig V

I don’t take OLP as wanting to end philosophy (nor refute skepticism). I think Austin thought he had finally found a way to get started (though in his mind this was just going to be a kind of cataloguing). Wittgenstein took on the same nemesis, however, seeing that the skeptic was part of himself, he realized the desire for certainty is a reoccurring part of all of us, thus, the battle was not to kill the hydra, but only cut of (charm?) each snake as it comes up. And in the face of our fundamental fear and desire, to merely offer as alternative the vast complex flawed variety of the world, is rather like saying eat your veg and exercise to someone who just wants a pill.

There is a practical issue. Simply, that the style of argument that Ryle, Austin and Wittgenstein deploy is much, much harder than it looks. — Ludwig V

Austin and Wittgenstein both make what they are doing look obvious, so people take the point as simple, or trivial.

Austin and Wittgenstein both make what they are doing look obvious, so people take the point as simple, or trivial. — Antony Nickles

As Horace observed long, long ago "The "true/real) skill is hiding your skill". (Ars est celare artem)
But then it looks easy and people think it is easy. Perhaps then, there is a role for rhetoric in philosophy - making it look portentous helps to persuade people to take it seriously.

On which note, has anybody else noticed Austin's rhetoric in Sense and Sensibilia? He gives the impression of someone at the end of his patience rather than a dispassionate analyst. Yet he is also very fair to Ayer. Puzzling, and complicated.

I don’t take OLP as wanting to end philosophy (nor refute skepticism). I think Austin thought he had finally found a way to get started (though in his mind this was just going to be a kind of cataloguing). — Antony Nickles

Yes, if you look more closely, that is what they (all, I think) had in mind. But people (especially conventional/traditional philosophers, perhaps) focused on the initial phase and the second phase got overlooked. It reminds me of the reputation of Descartes, Berkeley and Hume; their constructive phases seem to get swallowed up in the first phase.

In all, I take the suggestion that we look around at the variety of the world to be license to explore our own interests, and that it is democratic to think anyone can reflect and learn. — Antony Nickles

It certainly seemed democratic at the time, in comparison to the condescension of their predecessors - analytic and other wise.

So, when they talk of “tidying up” or “rearranging” (PI #92), they are not talking about word politics, — Antony Nickles

Yes, I cited those example (with some trepidation) in order to show that the technique was capable of being usefully applied where live social and cultural issues are at stake. Inevitably, politics gets involved and sometimes people get things out of proportion.

So am I entitled to conclude from your last sentence that "all swans are white" is only as reliable as the induction that created it in the first place? Fair enough. So "Swan A is white" and "Swan B is white" etc are the premises of the induction? Fair enough. So now I reason that "all swans are white" Then I discover that Swan Z is black. So my generalization and the preceding induction is not reliable. So I need to do one of three things: a) abandon the generalization b) modify the generalization ("swans are white, except in Australia") c) change my definition of a swan ("A swan may be black or which" or the quantifier ("Most swans are white".) — Ludwig V

Another possibility you have not considered, the black thing you saw is not a swan. This is a real possibility, and it is the bigger problem with "seeing" things according to essential properties produced from induction. If swans are known as necessarily white, then your eyes may be closed to many other properties when judging things as a swan. When you see a black thing you would not see it as a swan. And so, if someone suggests that it is a swan, this proposal must be justified by reference to something else, other than colour. That is a real problem with "essential properties".

The swan example is very simple, and so it might not elucidate the principle I'm trying to express, about how the way we see things, is greatly influenced by the way that we learn to see essential properties. We might find better examples in the way that science looks at dividing things into parts, each part having essential properties which make it the part which it is, and that guides us in the way that we divide the thing into parts. The thing must be divided so that the parts have the essential properties which we've expressed as necessary. So for example, an electron is negative and a proton is positive, and we cannot divide the atom in any other way because we've created these categories of essential properties of the parts. However, adhering to these principles produces the need to assume "anti-matter". This should indicate a problem with the restrictions we have dictated.

True, the new generalization is also subject to the same hazards. But what am I supposed to do - abandon all generalizations? I don't think so. There's no pretence involved at any stage. — Ludwig V

You don't seem to have grasped the "pretense" I referred to. Let me try to explain in a different way. The pretense is in the claim that the generalization has provided us a relation with the particular thing. The generalization guides the acting, thinking human being, in one's relation to the particular. So the human being who applies the generalization, as a tool, is really between the generalization and the particular. The relation with the particular, is between the person and the particular, and the generalization is something outside this relation, created for the purpose of enhancing this relation.

Look critically at the way you presented your swan example please. First, you produced the inductive premise, "all swans are white". Then, you proposed "swan Z is black". Surely you see that the proposition of a black swan is contradictory to your inductive premise. What does this indicate? It indicates that you have allowed a relation to the particulars of the world which is distinct from, and not controlled by, nor dependent on those universals, those inductive generalizations. This relationship with the world which you have, allows you to say "Z is a swan" regardless of what the generalizations (rules and regulations) dictate. Therefore we ought to consider that the person's real relationship with the particulars of the world is direct, and the universal, or generalization, is a sort of tool which the individual can use or not use, as one wills.

That is why I said that this idea, that the person relates to the particulars of the world through the generalizations is just a pretense. But that's an ambiguous and finnicky kind of statement because we actually do relate to the particulars through the means of the universals. However, the universals can be looked at as tools, and they are not essential to that relationship, as the direct relationship is prior to, and precedes the existence of the tool, which is created by the desire to enhance or augment the relationship. It is the idea that the universal is prior to, and fundamental to the relationship (as in Platonic idealism), as the medium between the individual person and the particular, which is the pretense.

If my chair does not interpret ("produce interpretations") what I say, there are two possibilities: a) that it produces interpretations of some other thing(s) or (b) causes me to produce interpretations. I deduce that you meant the latter. My mistake. But that does not give any ground for supposing that the chair has a mind or is conscious. — Ludwig V

No, I meant a). Even if we can produce conclusive evidence that your chair does not interpret the words that you say, we cannot exclude the possibility that it is interpreting some other things. We really do not know many aspects of the world, like at the quantum level. So we cannot claim to know exactly what the chair is doing in the basic activity it is engaged in, especially in relation to "interpretation" which is not a clearly defined term with clearly expressed essential properties.

You do represent the prior judgement as intentional, so how do you avoid the infinite regress? — Ludwig V

The infinite regress is avoided in the way outlined by Plato, by assuming the reality of "the good". As explained by Plato, "the good" as the fundamental base for action, activity, or actuality, is unknowable to us human beings, though it is in its essence highly intelligible. That it is essentially intelligible indicates that there is no infinite regress. The appearance of infinite regress is produced by a misrepresentation of what is unknowable to human beings as unknowable in general, or absolutely, like infinite regress.

You are missing the cognitive element in most? all? emotions. If I am afraid of snakes, I have made a judgement about snakes and that judgement is an important part of the judgement about what is needed. Prejudices may be erroneous or ill-founded, but they are nevertheless judgements about what is appropriate in various circumstances - even if I am not aware of them. — Ludwig V

I am not "missing the cognitive element" within the cause of action, I am downplaying it as inessential. This is evident in involuntary acts, reflex, etc.. It is simply not true that you must have made a cognitive judgement to be afraid of snakes. Creatures are born with many such innate fears, prior to the capacity of making cognitive judgements.

1. Something before the interpretation, a text, a picture - something that means something. Call it the original. "Interpretation of...." — Ludwig V

What I am talking about as prior to the interpretation is the condition of the interpreter, before the interpretation. The individual must be capable of interpreting, attentive, and motivated, as interpretation is an act carried out by the thing which interprets. How can you have a "standard model of interpretation" without a representation of what constitutes an interpreter? It is only by properly modeling "the interpreter" that we might exclude the chair as an interpreter.

“ I am not "missing the cognitive element" within the cause of action, I am downplaying it as inessential. This is evident in involuntary acts, reflex, etc.. It is simply not true that you must have made a cognitive judgement to be afraid of snakes. Creatures are born with many such innate fears, prior to the capacity of making cognitive judgements.”

Metaphysician Undercover


That is correct. However it appears to reinforce the idea of reversibility of the essential idea from a intensive sentiment, that always appears as a tentative presentation, never able to catch its faith Ian’s confidence of running out of air up ahead.

The mouse may simply be afraid of small spaces, as unable to fathom that essentially up ahead the largesse of quantum objects are relative to the time it might take to see in the darkness, and indeed it has been shown that the vampire bat is not too far away from a mouse, and such gross distinctions are extremely difficult to make, as an analogous comparison between dusk and dawn, that is uncertain at that juncture.

So reversibility is essentially a necessary pretense prior to its cinceotiin

That is a real problem with "essential properties". — Metaphysician Undercover

I was alluding to that possibility when I said I could change the definition of a swan. I was a bit abbreviated when I wrote "Swan Z is black". On the other hand, if the object I see is not at all like a swan, then I won't be tempted to modify my generalization, so it isn't problematic.

I don't think definitions are necessarily about "essential properties" in the metaphysical sense. That is, they are only essential so long as we treat them as essential.

Therefore we ought to consider that the person's real relationship with the particulars of the world is direct, and the universal, or generalization, is a sort of tool which the individual can use or not use, as one wills. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, it's a bit more complicated than that. Generalizations are indeed like a rule, and every application is a new decision. But they are subject to inter-subjective agreement. So, if I want to communicate with others, in unusual circumstances, I need to carry their agreement with me.

Your representation of the relationship between me, the rule and the case is a bit odd, but I'm not a Platonist so it is not worth arguing about.

No, I meant a). — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I'll just skip this issue. You are clearly speaking a language different from mine, so there's not prospect of mutual understanding.

The infinite regress is avoided in the way outlined by Plato, by assuming the reality of "the good". — Metaphysician Undercover

You implied that you are not a Platonist. Now you adopt his idea of the good. ???

It is only by properly modeling "the interpreter" that we might exclude the chair as an interpreter. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have a point. But then, you don't want to exclude the chair as an interpreter, so I don't know what's going on.

Regarding how our perceptions provided by the senses occur, I am very close to Kant. There is no pure and passive receptivity. For Kant, such a thing would be undifferentiated chaos. For example, taking the case of the snake mentioned above: One does not simply have a glance, but there is recognition of the thing lasting, having a duration and a location in space, which will allow us to carry out the action. (let's say an act of evasion).

Let's take the case according to the assumption that our perceptual apparatus is a kind of film camera: The snake is not shown simply as a frame but as a series of frames. How can we say that it is the same snake that appears through different frames? In this case there is a sitensis, a non-passive activity of consciousness and sensitivity, although this is not voluntary. The activity is the work of a "something in general" that enables something like a recognition of the snake through duration and through upcoming events. That is, there is an act of transcendence applied to sensitivity, in the sense of inscribing something in the conscious system in order to be repeated under similar conditions [thus The memory functions as a trace register. And the trace is abstract enough as a written sign] This is where something like "the snake" appears, which is repeated for all the others, the concept, one can say.

In Buddhism, the ‘flow’ presumes a sensibility that an infinite duration has established through pretended repetitions. The film breaks, as was the case in the early days of black and white film, to reveal one frame, referencing specific action, where the thought of that referential frame can evoke the sense of transcended intention, through it’s own sense .

The tentative pretense as it approaches the sense of sensibility, conduits the repetitive progression of variable, relative uncertainty , as far as that sensibility concerns the overall generally accumulated impression of it’s self through both systems of aporehension, is indeed such a process best described as gnostic.

There is no pure and passive receptivity. — JuanZu

That much is obvious, and not just from Kant. Our understanding of perception has progressed somewhat in the time since he wrote anything substantive.

Welcome to the Forum.

I've been unable to make sense of your posts.

prosopography — Ludwig V

Interesting, Yes, something like that, tracing the influence Austin had on his students by examining what they did and said.

And in the face of our fundamental fear and desire, to merely offer as alternative the vast complex flawed variety of the world, is rather like saying eat your veg and exercise to someone who just wants a pill. — Antony Nickles

:grin:
This is evident in the present series of threads on moral antirealism, started by @Bob Ross. The attempts at conceptual clarification are rejected because they do not directly solve the Grand Problem Of What To Do.

Austin and Wittgenstein both make what they are doing look obvious, so people take the point as simple, or trivial. — Antony Nickles

Especially in a forum such as this, where dilettante abound. The sight seems to disproportionately attract retired or unemployed lab assistants and engineers. Some pay attention to the details. Others come already supplied with the answers to all our philosophical quandaries, ready to explain where we have gone wrong. This might be amusing: A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesn’t exist. Here’s why he’s mistaken

Anyway, I wanted to thank you both for making this thread far more interesting, informative and certainly longer than I expected.

It's true that I keep seeing traces or reminders of OLP — Ludwig V

I was thinking of examples, an then

This is a "philosophical" account of morality whose connection to lived reality is dubious at best. For a more reasonable approach see here — hypericin

The article uses Austin's approach, even talking of misfires.

Anyway, I wanted to thank you both for making this thread far more interesting, informative and certainly longer than I expected. — Banno

:up:

For what it is worth, I couldn't agree with you more on the free will debate article you shared: most scientists just assume there's no free will because the world is determined.

Cheers.

However it appears to reinforce the idea of reversibility of the essential idea from a intensive sentiment, that always appears as a tentative presentation, never able to catch its faith Ian’s confidence of running out of air up ahead. — Bella fekete

Sorry Bella, I just can't make out the principle of reversibility which you are proposing.

On the other hand, if the object I see is not at all like a swan, then I won't be tempted to modify my generalization, so it isn't problematic. — Ludwig V

It cannot be true that it isn't problematic because you've already labeled it as "swan Z". So you are clearly seeing it as a swan, despite it being the wrong colour. If you did not see something about it which made it look like a swan, despite being the wrong colour, you would never have called it "swan Z". Then that black thing would be irrelevant, and you would not even have the example you gave me, because the naming it as a swan was essential to the example.

Well, it's a bit more complicated than that. Generalizations are indeed like a rule, and every application is a new decision. But they are subject to inter-subjective agreement. So, if I want to communicate with others, in unusual circumstances, I need to carry their agreement with me.

Your representation of the relationship between me, the rule and the case is a bit odd, but I'm not a Platonist so it is not worth arguing about. — Ludwig V

The way that I represented generalizations as tools, used in our lives of relating to particulars, makes the fact that they are subject to intersubjective agreement irrelevant. What is important is that the individual's relation with particulars is direct. That the generalizations require intersubjective agreement only reinforces the idea that they are secondary, or posterior to that primary relation (the individuals of the intersubjective relations are themselves particulars).

I think I'll just skip this issue. You are clearly speaking a language different from mine, so there's not prospect of mutual understanding. — Ludwig V

What I think is that "Platonism" in its modern form, what is understood by, and referred to by, that term, is not a good representation of the actual philosophy of Plato. So I disagree with "Platonism" in its modern representation, but I find within the philosophy of Plato, the ways and means to get beyond the problems associated with what is known today as Platonism. The modern conception of Platonism, if intended to represent the philosophy of Plato, is a straw man.

You have a point. But then, you don't want to exclude the chair as an interpreter, so I don't know what's going on. — Ludwig V

It's not that I don't want to exclude the chair as an interpreter, intuition strongly tells me that I ought not believe that the chair does any type of interpreting at all. However, I do not see the principles required to exclude the chair, and that is why I argued that we cannot exclude the chair. That would not make sound logic, to simply adopt the propositions which you desire.

The problem is, as I explained, that we do not have a clear and accurate understanding of what it means to interpret. So, despite the fact that you provided the principles of what you called a standard model of interpretation, that model I found to be extremely deficient because it provided no description of the interpreter. Since interpretation is the act of an interpreter, I do not see how one could ever claim to have a model of interpretation which has no reference to the interpreter. So until we know what an "interpreter" is, we cannot exclude the chair as a possible interpreter.

What is important is that the individual's relation with particulars is direct. That the generalizations require intersubjective agreement only reinforces the idea that they are secondary, or posterior to that primary relation (the individuals of the intersubjective relations are themselves particulars). — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, for me, it is a hen-and-egg relationship and I don't see what is important to you, or what you mean by "direct" here. So we'll have to agree to disagree.

The modern conception of Platonism, if intended to represent the philosophy of Plato, is a straw man. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh, I'm sure one can find all sorts of things in Plato if one looks hard enough. But it's not something I'm into at the moment. It would help if you specified, when you mention Plato, whether you mean the modern Plato or the ancient one.

Then that black thing would be irrelevant, and you would not even have the example you gave me, because the naming it as a swan was essential to the example. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, the unproblematic black thing is not a problem for the issue at hand. The problematic black thing is the problem, and therefore the relevant case. I didn't go into the intricacies because I thought they were obvious - and indeed it is clear that you understood the situation. So what's the problem?

So until we know what an "interpreter" is, we cannot exclude the chair as a possible interpreter. — Metaphysician Undercover

An interpreter is a person, normally a human being, a person. (I do not rule out the possibility of non-paradigmatic cases). A chair is not a human being, a person, and not even sentient. That's background understanding in normal circumstances. If you want to consider that a chair might be an interpreter, I don't know where to begin. I'm not really interested in a long dissection of the idea of a person vs an insentient object. To make a discussion of this, you need to give me a problem. Simply announcing your question is not enough.

The article uses Austin's approach, even talking of misfires. — Banno

I have to read this. In context, this use of misfires speaks volumes. Isn't language wonderful?

Anyway, I wanted to thank you both form making this thread far more interesting, informative and certainly longer than I expected. — Banno

It was a surprise to find the thread and a great pleasure to participate, and I'm very grateful to you and . And I learnt some things into the bargain.

For what it is worth, I couldn't agree with you more on the free will debate article you shared: most scientists just assume there's no free will because the world is determined. — Bob Ross

Well, they are free to assume whatever they want, aren't they?