"One cannot move pawns backwards."

Is "objectively" true, but only in the context of playing a game of chess. Once that context is removed, it is objectively false: after all, I can move the piece backwards just as easily as any other direction. But note that the form of the sentence is no different than:

"One cannot transmute lead into gold."

Which is not dependent in its truth on any particular context.

So the question is, are the truths of moral statements context dependent or context independent? To satisfy a moral arealist such as Bob Ross I think they must be context independent. But either way, the form in which the statements are posed cannot tell you that. — hypericin

Yes, this is a very good point, and shows that the nuances of objective truth isn't quite captured by the "realism" in moral realism.

I've brought up mathematics before. Mathematical antirealists are not non-cognitivists, error theorists, or subjectivists; they believe in objective-like mathematical truths, albeit truths that do not depend on the mind-independent existence of abstract objects.

I'm not sure if there's a popular "ism" that is comparable to this in metaethics. Moral realism seems like it could include the moral equivalents of both mathematical realism and mathematical antirealism.

Facts about psychology do not entail the existence of moral facts. — Bob Ross

But what I was describing is not a fact about our “psychology”. That we are responsible for what we say and do is a fact of our position in the world and in relation to each other (even though we may not be held to it), which is real in the sense it has importance and power; it creates who we are going to be. A moral moment is when we do not know what to do and no one is in a better position to know what is right. The reality of that position does not make the fact of what I do next “relative” or “subjective”, though it might need to be individual and revolutionary (adverse to conformity).

I agree that it’s easier to talk about moral realism and moral anti-realism if we first specify what we mean by "real".

If we mean objectively “real” like rocks and trees and carrots, then no, moral values are obviously not real in that sense.

As has been mentioned, there are many human conventions that are agreed upon and made real by virtue of our agreement. We agree that certain bits of paper with pictures and numbers printed thereon are worth a certain amount in economic terms. But the value of money is contingent and not real in the same way as rocks are real. And money can fall in value. If we want to argue that moral values are real in the way that conventions such as money, companies, and contracts are real, it would mean that moral values are also contingent, mind-dependent realities which are real only insofar as we agree to recognize them for utilitarian purposes. But this does not seem right and moral realists generally want something more than this as a basis for morality.

Some argue that moral values could be real in the way that mathematical truths are real. I am not a mathematician but I know that we have proofs in mathematics that cannot be disputed in the way morality can be. There don’t seem to be any such proofs when it comes to morality. I cannot prove objectively or with logic that stealing or lying or murder are morally wrong. So morality does not seem to be like mathematics either, because moral assertions can be questioned in a way that 5+7=12 cannot be questioned. People can reasonably disagree about particular moral values but they cannot reasonably disagree about arithmetic. Therefore, I don’t think moral values can be real in the way mathematical truths are real. So where does this leave us?

It has been by thinking about all this that I have come to agree with Hume who says that morality is based in our sentiments. Hume says:

In these sentiments then, not in a discovery of relations of any kind, do all moral determinations consist. . . .… we must at last acknowledge, that the crime or immorality is no particular fact or relation, which can be the object of the understanding, but arises entirely from the sentiment of disapprobation, which, by the structure of human nature, we unavoidably feel on the apprehension of barbarity or treachery.

I feel that it is here, with our sentiments, that we get to some sort of bedrock. Our feelings, our sentiments seem to be about as real and as important to us as anything can be. If we think Hume may be right then we might want to ask where our moral sentiments come from. Perhaps answering this question could tell us something important about the sort of reality our moral values can have.

To satisfy a moral arealist such as Bob Ross I think they must be context independent. — hypericin

Moral facts, on Bob's view, cannot exist for they must be mind-independent(whatever they are), objective entities and given that all things moral directly involve unacceptable/acceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour and all unacceptable/acceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour is existentially dependent upon minds and contexts, then it only follows that there is no such thing as moral facts.

A large part of the problem involves the underlying dichotomies at work.

You might have chosen a better example. — Banno

Haha, I did have a queasy feeling about it.

"One cannot transmute lead into gold using chemistry."

No. I'm clearly delineating, not implying, that all facts are events(what happened or is happening) and that moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'

So, correct me if I am wrong, a moral fact is an event such that there is someone in that event that is considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior? Am I on the right track? If not, then please elaborate on that portion (of the quote above).

Promising is voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match your words. Are you denying that much?

No, that’s fine; but I am only not going to break that obligation (when push comes to shove) if I have obligated myself to fulfilling my professed obligations (promises): are you denying that?

Okay. Good. Do you understand that I'm setting out the bit I bolded?

Here’s what was in bold:

it is strikingly hard to nail down with any accuracy just which claims count as moral and so are at issue in the debate....

What are you saying you are setting out to do? Setting out to denote how hard it is to nail down what counts as morally factual? Either way, you should be able to give a definition of what is a moral fact, no?

I do not recognize what I argued here
↪180 Proof
in your 'paraphrase' above, so my guess is that you're not on the right track.

The reason I am thinking that, in your view, concerns about species’ defects of natural beings is equivalent to morality due to them providing compelling reasons is because of this portion:

'defeasible reasons for moral statements about natural beings' (praxis). These 'moral reasons' are objective insofar as the functionalities or properties of natural beings to which they refer are objective

And:

(3) normativity that specifically concerns the species' defects (i.e. vulnerabilities to harm / suffering) of natural beings, however, is moral (i.e. obligates natural beings to care for one another) insofar as natural beings are cognizant (how can they not be?) of their species' defects as such; (4) and in the normative framework of moral naturalism, (our) species' defects function as moral facts¹ which provide reasons² (i.e. claims (e.g. "I do this³ because² 'not to do this' can/will harm¹ her")) for species-members (us) to care for³ – take care of³ – (our) species' defects as a rule we give ourselves.

I don’t know how to interpret this any other way: could you please elaborate?

For example, you say ‘species' defects function as moral facts’: wouldn’t it be accurate to then say that concerns about species’ defects [of natural beings] are equivalent to morality?

I don't see this either, which is why I did not make such an argument. If you're interested, Bob, go back and re-read the second paragraph (4 points), and then the parenthetical note on 'following a rule', and lastly the Derek Parfit quotation.

I did re-read it, and found the same conclusion; so perhaps it would be useful if you could elaborate on what I am misinterpreting?

It seems as though you are saying that moral facts are equivalent, in function, to facts about species’ defects, but then saying that the obligation exists outside of those species’ defects.

"One cannot move pawns backwards."

If a moral realist were to demonstrate that there was a moral fact which was analogous to the above proposition, such that I just needed to understand the context of the words (within the language) being used (e.g., ‘pawn’) and it would be true that (1) it is factual and (2) true; then I would accept it. My problem is that I don’t think there are any moral facts, period.

Do you believe in social realities? I can guarantee you behave as if you do. After all, nation, money, property, family, company, are all social realities, and it would be a difficult life indeed that didn't acknowledge any of them. So even if morality were "only" a social reality, that would still perhaps be a more formidable reality than you are giving it credit for.

If I am understanding your concept of ‘social realities’ correctly, then I would say that I accept them but not as objective: they are inter-subjective. It is not a fact that ‘a 0.5-carat diamond should be worth $1500’, but it is a fact that ‘currently, the economy values a 0.5-carat diamond at $1500’.

And what if morality had a biological origin? Unlike say money, which is purely a social construct (yet can literally move mountains), what if morality is rooted in an elemental, biologically predisposed notion of justice (as it is, imho)? If so, would it count as "real"?

If moral judgments could be traced back to biological aspects of our species, then, prima facie, that would count as a moral realist position. I just don’t think they can: I think it is entirely possible that I should resist my biologically wiring.

Ultimately I think the whole "is it real" question is just too vague. You have to specify what kind of "real" you are looking for.

True. My ‘moral fact’ I am looking for a normative propositions or statements that inform us ‘what one ought to be doing’ which correspond to a state-of-affairs in reality (where ‘reality’ is the ‘totality of stance-independently, existent things’).

That we are responsible for what we say and do is a fact of our position in the world and in relation to each other (even though we may not be held to it), which is real in the sense it has importance and power

But would you say that this ‘fact of our position in the world’ exists mind(stance)-independently and has ‘moral’ signification? I wouldn’t. Having importance or power doesn’t make something a fact.

So, correct me if I am wrong, a moral fact is an event such that there is someone in that event that is considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior? Am I on the right track? If not, then please elaborate on that portion (of the quote above). — Bob Ross

Yes. The basic dichotomy I'm setting out and working from is moral and not.

Promising is voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match your words. Are you denying that much?

No, that’s fine; but I am only not going to break that obligation (when push comes to shove) if I have obligated myself to fulfilling my professed obligations (promises): are you denying that?

Yes, I am denying that.

By virtue of promising, one already obligates themselves to make the world match their words(keep their promise). That's the whole point of promise making. If one does not already obligate themselves to keep their word, then they do not intend to make the world match their words, and hence they've not made a promise at all, for they did not believe what they said. They've just plain lied. The moral obligation remains regardless. The moral fact is such that one made a promise. True statements about that moral fact will correspond to it.

Hence, if today you promise to plant me a rose garden on Monday, then come Tuesday I ought to have one. That's true by virtue of corresponding to the relevant moral fact of the matter at hand.

What are you saying you are setting out to do? Setting out to denote how hard it is to nail down what counts as morally factual?

No.

Either way, you should be able to give a definition of what is a moral fact, no?

Yes, and I have repeatedly done so from the very beginning of this exchange.

Yes, this is a very good point, and shows that the nuances of objective truth isn't quite captured by the "realism" in moral realism. — Michael

While there may be some daylight between us in terms of reflecting on our interactions; the point that you're responding to here is largely what I was trying to get across throughout our interactions around moral realism.

If the context is what gives a moral statement its validity, I have no issue with that (and, to be fair, i expounded on this much more clearly in the exchange with Banno) - but I see the requirement for context in actualizing the validity of statement to implicitly confirm its subjectivity. And this may be that the bullet it bite is an extremely Kantian one of idealism, in some form, to support the idea that if everything needs context, nothing is objective.

I have work to do :lol:

I did re-read it, and found the same conclusion; so perhaps it would be useful if you could elaborate on what I am misinterpreting? — Bob Ross

Fwiw, for both of you ( @180 Proof ) i read the same ideas into the post/s.

I'm still seeing the same as Bob Ross in those passages.

My problem is that I don’t think there are any moral facts, period. — Bob Ross

Your problem just may be the terminological usage you've confined yourself with. Are you using the terms "moral" and "facts" consistently? If so, exactly what counts as "moral" and "fact"?

...nothing is objective. — AmadeusD

If that's the case, then the term "subjective" loses all its meaning and use because it loses the ability to discriminate between different kinds of things. Hence, it is best to abandon the dichotomy altogether, which is what I've done...

which is what I've done. — creativesoul

Interesting. As you'll have seen, It appears i must necessarily be heading toward that conclusion. But i will explore every alcove on the way down haha

Interesting. As you'll have seen, It appears i must necessarily be heading toward that conclusion. But i will explore every alcove on the way down haha — AmadeusD

Strictly speaking, everything ever thought, believed, and/or uttered comes through a subject, so in that sense, nothing thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise expressed/uttered is strictly objective. The dichotomy also fails in all the same ways as the internal/external dichotomy fails. That is, they are both inherently incapable of taking account of that which consists of both, and thus is neither one or the other. Truth, thought, belief, and meaning are all precisely such things. But I digress... that's another topic altogether.

Those dichotomies as well as a few others add nothing but unnecessary confusion/overcomplication to philosophy.

Strictly speaking, everything ever thought, believed, and/or uttered comes through a subject, so in that sense, nothing is strictly objective — creativesoul

It has always appeared to me that 'objective' refers to the 'best of the lot' type of thinking rather than a strict entailment of necessity. That said, I am yet to find a convincing passage/chapter/paper that convinces me the gap between 'ding en sich' and my impression of it is such that It can't be a 1:1 match. That we can't know this seems inherent in sensibility - but I can't quite grasp that the gap is wide enough to matter (until imagination comes in, anyway - which may be the place in which the problem actually lies).

Well, I reject Kant's Noumena as well as phenomenalist approaches on the obvious grounds that drawing the distinction between the world and perception of it requires a comparitive analysis of both. By definition, we have no access to Noumena. By definition, all we have are our perceptions(Stove's gem). Hence, if that is the case, there is no way to know that our perceptions do not match up to the world, so...

Seems to me that such positions are inherently flawed in that they are untenable and/or self-defeating.

i will explore every alcove on the way down haha — AmadeusD

That's up... out of the bottle. Not down.

:wink:

Seems to me that such positions are inherently flawed in that they are untenable and/or self-defeating. — creativesoul

Sorry, just to be clear, you're indicating a Kantian "We know we don't see things as they are" position is untenable (I suppose this entails the inverse also is lol)?

If a moral realist were to demonstrate that there was a moral fact which was analogous to the above proposition, such that I just needed to understand the context of the words (within the language) being used (e.g., ‘pawn’) and it would be true that (1) it is factual and (2) true; then I would accept it. My problem is that I don’t think there are any moral facts, period. — Bob Ross

"One cannot move pawns backwards"

Is true within the context of the social practice of chess. Moreover, it is the social practice of chess that makes it true; without this practice, the truth of it loses its foundation.

So you are granting that if there was a moral statement true in, and because of, its social context, then this statement is a moral fact?

"One cannot transmute lead into gold using chemistry." — hypericin

...and now do you not see that the context is important?

Seems to me that such positions are inherently flawed in that they are untenable and/or self-defeating.
— creativesoul

Sorry, just to be clear, you're indicating a Kantian "We know we don't see things as they are" position is untenable? — AmadeusD

Yes. In order to know that there is a difference between two things, one must have access to both in order to compare them.

...and now do you not see that the context is important? — Banno

Yes, that was my point

Yes. In order to know that there is a difference between two things, one must have access to both in order to compare them — creativesoul

That's up... out of the bottle. Not down. — creativesoul

Gotcha; thank you :pray:

Don't thank me, thank the one I adopted that from... probably A.J. Ayer.

If moral judgments could be traced back to biological aspects of our species, then, prima facie, that would count as a moral realist position. I just don’t think they can: I think it is entirely possible that I should resist my biologically wiring. — Bob Ross

In fact, animals also exhibit moral behavior. Isn't the most natural explanation that it is instinctive?

Wouldn't it be incredibly odd if a highly cooperative species like ours *didn't* evolve instinctive sentiments that reinforce cooperation and discourage anti cooperative behaviour? If instead, all this was left to the uncertain vagaries of cultural transmission?

Look at the earliest moral claim of many (all?) children:

"It's not fair!"

In other words, "I have been treated unjustly". Are parents going around teaching their kids what is justice and how to identify injustice? I think not.

I think it is entirely possible that I should resist my biologically wiring. — Bob Ross

You have a forebrain capable of overriding most any impulse. What of it?

I, too, strongly suspect that morality is inevitable as an evolutionary feature/consequence of our being interdependent social creatures.

In fact, animals also exhibit moral behavior. Isn't the most natural explanation that it is instinctive? — hypericin

Can you give an example that comports with what humans envisage morality to be viz. contemplated outcomes resulting in a judgement informing the decision to act with regard to other sentient beings?

I necessarily see instinct as separate to this. Though, determinism might trump me, if true.