Facts are observer-dependent as long as we are a society of observers. Since facts for us are usually our human contextualization of physical realities and not just physical realities themselves, then the contextualizations of observers, and of those engaging the observers and their observations, are observer-dependent

When we assume that facts exist, we are implicitly committing ourselves to a form of nominalism as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic. When we assert the ontology of the universe as facts and not things, we seem to be saying that objects are nominalist, but, as opposed to what? — Question

?

You should take another shot at that paragraph.

What part don't you understand?

Ontology of the universe as facts is a problem since facts are our views of the material reality of the universe, not the truths of the Universe itself.

The early Wittgenstein postulated that the world is the totality of facts, not things. — Question

History dulls the context.

The world does not consist of individuals - cats , mats, and so on; but of cats on mats.

Facts, unlike individuals, have predicate content.

Facts are observer-dependent as long as we are a society of observers. — Thanatos Sand

How a fact is presented is dependent on the social context; that does not mean that all facts are dependent on a social context.

Are all of these facts observer dependant? — Question

Some certainly are. The fact that I'm watching you, for example.

As for Wittgenstein, he says "facts cannot strictly speaking be defined, but we can explain what we mean by saying that facts are what make propositions true, or false".

So one might say that the proposition that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass is green. But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing? If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things. Are they different? If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? To answer the latter we must first determine how the fact that grass is green differs from the green grass.

Kind of. As Nietzsche pointed out, truth is interpretation, and there could theoretically be an infinite number of them for any given phenomenon, but that doesn't mean that all are equal good, useful, or relevant. Facts give the world form, and are ways of looking at it. Once formed they are for all intents and purposes, observer independent. Like bringing underlying regularities, or general principles to the surface.

I have a hard time seeing these facts about the world as observer-independent, as one would naturally assume. — Question

Each individual makes some observation.

When recalled from memory, the observer has a particular level of intensity of certainty about the observation, and will describe it using a range of words or other means as some sort of belief or fact. Something that is taught in school by a teacher may be recalled as a fact because of its association with a teacher or academia.

Something comes along (a new observation in memory) that questions the fact and the fact becomes degraded more or less, possibly to "I think this is what happened".

Facts are this beliefs with high level of intensity of certainty.

Certainty of beliefs may increase or decrease depending upon life experiences and observations (the credibility of a co-confirmer may come into question).

Facts are individual beliefs that may be shared with a higher level of certainty associated with it but no different than any other belief and equally fluid. It is a process.

The world does not consist of individuals - cats , mats, and so on; but of cats on mats.

Facts, unlike individuals, have predicate content. — Banno

Yes, but Wittgenstein specifically uses the term 'logical atomic facts' or 'simples'. These seem to point towards a nominalism of some sort. But, then how can one talk about individual facts without bearing their properties and characteristics in mind? Not sure if the crux of the matter is clear?

So one might say that the proposition that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass is green. But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing? If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things. Are they different? If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? To answer the latter we must first determine how the fact that grass is green differs from the green grass. — Michael

This seems to be a matter of where does one derive meaning from? Is it the fact or the subject-object relation that we're really talking about here, following that we have talked about our subjective vision of the world and the object itself. It's sounding awfully Kantian at this point.

Yes, but the limits of my language are the limits of my world. Thus, solipsism?

So one might say that the proposition that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass is green. But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing? If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things. Are they different? If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? To answer the latter we must first determine how the fact that grass is green differs from the green grass. — Michael

Easy. The green grass is grass, but the fact that grass is green is not. I water the grass, not the fact. What reason would anyone have to confuse facts and grass in the first place?

Without a good reason to believe that facts are dependent on observers, why would I believe that to be so? The belief often seems to be erroneously founded in the way that Banno highlighted.

Easy. The green grass is grass, but the fact that grass is green is not. I water the grass, not the fact. What reason would anyone have to confuse facts and grass in the first place? — Sapientia

So the fact isn't the observer-independent physical thing?

So the fact isn't the observer-independent physical thing? — Michael

The fact is not the thing, like I said. The fact is about the thing. It's like a picture.

The fact is not the thing, like I said. The fact is about the thing. It's like a picture. — Sapientia

Then how do we show that the fact is observer-independent? We can perhaps show that the thing is observer-independent, but if we say that the fact isn't the thing then this doesn't help us.

So even if we grant that physical things are observer-independent, it doesn't then follow that facts are observer-independent.

Then how do we show that the fact is observer-independent? — Michael

One can show that a fact is observer-independent by drawing attention to the absence of evidence of this kind of dependence where you'd expect it to be.

I agree with you that some facts are observer-dependent, such as the fact that I'm watching you. I could even concede that the fact that grass is green is one such fact, because that wouldn't be sufficient grounds to conclude that facts are observer-dependent.

So my thought process goes like this:

"Are 'facts' observer-dependent?"

Me: "Ah, might be a fun thread. I have an opinion on that."

"What is the ontology of 'facts'"

Me: "Okay, that seems way broader than what the subject line promised . . . um, I wonder what this poster really wants to talk about . . . ":

"The early Wittgenstein postulated that the world is the totality of facts, not things."

Me: "Ugh. Why are we bringing Wittgenstein up? This isn't going to turn out to be a 'Let's discuss Wittgenstein' thread, is it?" <As I suddenly start to lose interest.>

And then we move on to some other specific stuff that you brought up that's not necessarily the same thing as anything you brought up above:

I have a hard time seeing these facts about the world as observer-independent, as one would naturally assume. After all, if nobody is around to hear a tree fall, it still falls regardless of our observation of it falling or not. — Question

That seems to me like you didn't write what you wanted to write there. If you believe that if nobody is around to hear a tree fall, it still falls regardless of our observation, then it wouldn't be the case that you have a hard time seeing facts as observer-independent. So I'm not sure what you're saying there.

When we assume that facts exist, we are implicitly committing ourselves to a form of nominalism as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic. — Question

This makes absolutely no logical sense to me. Why couldn't one believe that universal, mutually dependent and holistic facts exist? I have no idea what you're thinking there implicationally.

When we assert the ontology of the universe as facts and not things, we seem to be saying that objects are nominalist, — Question

Again, I have no idea why you're thinking this. <shrugs>

Are all of these facts observer dependant? Because otherwise, everything would consist of thing's and not facts if it weren't. — Question

First, I wouldn't worry about what Wittgenstein said. A lot of what Wittgenstein said is a lot of nonsense in my opinion.

But I don't understand your reasoning there either. You'd have to explain it in more detail.

In any event, my answer to what you asked in the subject line is simply this: "Some facts are observer-dependent. Some are not."

One can show that a fact is observer-independent by drawing attention to the absence of evidence of this kind of dependence where you'd expect it to be. — Sapientia

I don't know what to make of this. I certainly don't think we can talk about expected evidence until we have a clear understanding of what a fact is. I know what green grass is – by deferring to biology/chemistry/physics – and I'll grant that the fact that grass is green is something else – by deferring to your reasoning above – but without a more positive account of the ontology of facts, how can we claim that there's an absence of expected evidence?

What evidence would you expect? It can't be empirical evidence, as empirical evidence is evidence of things.

And as a side question, are you promoting a Platonic approach to facts? Facts are abstract/intangible but observer-independent?

I don't know what to make of this. I certainly don't think we can talk about expected evidence until we have a clear understanding of what a fact is. I know what green grass is – by deferring to biology/chemistry/physics – and I'll grant that the fact that grass is green is something else – by deferring to your reasoning above – but without a more positive account of the ontology of facts, how can we claim that there's an absence of expected evidence?

What evidence would you expect? It can't be empirical evidence, as empirical evidence is evidence of things.

And as a side question, are you promoting a Platonic approach to facts? Facts are intangible but observer-independent entities? — Michael

What's wrong with what Wittgenstein said? Let's go with that. Facts are what make propositions true, or false. That the grass is green is what makes the corresponding proposition true. I don't think that that's Platonic. That the grass is green can be observed. Facts are like pictures, remember? Are you telling me you can't see the picture?

So one might say that the proposition that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass is green. But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing? If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things. Are they different? If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? To answer the latter we must first determine how the fact that grass is green differs from the green grass. — Michael

We could say that facts are (dynamic) things and relations. Of course, things are also dynamic relations--what we're calling grass is dynamic relations between chlorophyll and cellulose and so on, and on another level of examination, dynamic relations of carbon and oxygen and nitrogren, etc.

Part of the issue here is whether we have (and are using) a "technical definition" of "thing," and if so, what definition?

If we think of "thing" as being something like an abstracted item not necessarily in relation to other things, not necessary processual/dynamic, etc,, then I'd agree that facts are not simply things. Facts are things in dynamic relations with other things. (And again, things are really dynamic relations themselves, although maybe some microscopic level gets down to chunks of stuff that are not themselves dynamic relations).

What's wrong with what Wittgenstein said? Let's go with that. Facts are what make propositions true, or false. — Sapientia

The problem I have with stuff like that is that it's a "feature of facts," not an exhaustive definition of them, but philosophy has a tendency to treat stuff like that as if it's an exhaustive definition, and that leads to saying a bunch of nonsense.

Diagnosing philosophy's mental neuroses, I think that the tendency to do this arises from a "fear of saying too much," because the more you say, the more likely it's going to be challenged. So there turned out to be a drive to analyze everything from a sparse, abstract, linguistic perspective, as if that's all that things really are.

What's wrong with what Wittgenstein said? Let's go with that. Facts are what make propositions true, or false. — Sapientia

I might say that the green grass makes the proposition "the grass is green" true.

I don't think that that's Platonic

You're saying that the facts are not the physical things that they're about, but that they're observer-independent. So you're saying that there exists observer-independent non-physical things. That sounds like Platonism.

Facts are like pictures, remember? Are you telling me you can't see the picture?

This is a bad analogy, as pictures are physical things. You're saying that facts aren't physical things. Or are you saying that facts are physical things, but just not identical to the physical things that they're about? So I could, in principle, hold green grass is one hand and the fact that grass is green in the other?

That the grass is green can be observed. — Sapientia

And green grass can be observed. So what's the difference between observing green grass and observing the fact that the grass is green? If nothing then surely there isn't a difference between green grass and the fact that grass is green?

I might say that the green grass makes the proposition "the grass is green" true. — Michael

But that's just a lack of grammatical clarity. It isn't proper to say "green grass", therefore the grass is green. It's proper to say that the grass is green because there is green grass, i.e. that there is green grass is what makes the proposition true. And that's what I've been saying. That there is green grass is a fact.

You're saying that the facts are not the physical things that they're about, but that they're observer-independent. So you're saying that there exists observer-independent non-physical things. That sounds like Platonism. — Michael

Plato went beyond independence. Plato posited a separate realm that only special people can access. That's not what I'm doing. Facts are ordinary and accessible. They can often be observed, but they don't depend on it.

This is a bad analogy, as pictures are physical things. You're saying that facts aren't physical things. Or are you saying that facts are physical things, but just not identical to the physical things that they're about? So I could, in principle, hold green grass is one hand and the fact that grass is green in the other? — Michael

What do you mean by that? There are facts which have been discovered through physics, relate to physics, are about physics. Those are physical facts. I don't see the need to categorise facts as physical in any other way, nor as ideal. They are what they are. But no, you can't hold a fact in your hand.

But that's just a lack of grammatical clarity. It isn't proper to say "green grass", therefore the grass is green. It's proper to say that the grass is green because there is green grass, i.e. that the grass is green is what makes the proposition true. And that's what I've been saying. That the grass is green is a fact. — Sapientia

Why does grammar matter? If we're using the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if it corresponds to a state-of-affairs, and if we're a materialist then states-of-affairs (in a lot of cases) are physical things. The green grass is a state-of-affairs, and it's the state-of-affairs that the proposition "the grass is green" corresponds to.

Plato went beyond independence. Plato posited a separate realm that only special people can access. That's not what I'm doing. Facts are ordinary and accessible. They can often be observed, but they don't depend on it.

How are they observed? I know how things are observed; they direct light towards my eyes. But how are facts observed? See my prior comment on the (non-)difference between observing the green grass and observing the fact that the grass is green.

What do you mean by that? There are facts which have been discovered through physics, relate to physics, are about physics. Those are physical facts. I don't see the need to categorise facts as physical in any other way, nor as ideal. They are what they are.

Physics discovers things. A particular arrangement of matter is detected and measured by a machine. Are you saying that, as well as detecting and measuring these physical things, they're also detecting and measuring facts? How do the facts that they detect and measure differ from the things that they detect and measure?

Why does grammar matter? — Michael

Grammar matters important demonstrated is sentence by.

How are they observed? I know how things are observed; they direct light towards my eyes. But how are facts observed? — Michael

Can you see that the grass is green? Yes or no? I can. Is this a mystery? I don't think so.

Physics discovers things. A particular arrangement of matter is detected and measured by a machine. Are you saying that, as well as detecting and measuring these physical things, they're also detecting and measuring facts? How do the facts that they detect and measure differ from the things that they detect and measure? — Michael

So the fact that that there is an upper limit to the efficiency of conversion of heat to work in a heat engine was not discovered through physics? Odd. I thought that it was discovered by the French scientist Sadi Carnot in 1824.

Grammar matters important demonstrated is sentence by. — Sapientia

You're deflecting.

Can you see that the grass is green? Yes or no?

Yes. But this is identical to seeing the green grass. Yes or no?

So the fact that that there is an upper limit to the efficiency of conversion of heat to work in a heat engine was not discovered through physics? Odd. I thought that it was discovered by the French scientist Sadi Carnot in 1824.

I didn't say that facts weren't discovered. I said that scientific measurements are measurements of observer-independent things. You're the one who's saying that facts are distinct from things (and also observer-independent). So I'm asking you to make sense of this. What's the difference between measuring a thing and measuring a fact? How do scientific instruments distinguish between the two?

. I said that scientific measurements are measurements of observer-independent things. — Michael

I don't think it is possible to have a measurement within a system without an observer. Everything is entangled. Any measurement (a process) will immediately entangle observe and observed. If there is something independent of the observer it is forever inaccessible and unknown in any manner.

That seems to me like you didn't write what you wanted to write there. If you believe that if nobody is around to hear a tree fall, it still falls regardless of our observation, then it wouldn't be the case that you have a hard time seeing facts as observer-independent. So I'm not sure what you're saying there. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, but we've already presupposed that the tree falls. Get the paradox?

This makes absolutely no logical sense to me. Why couldn't one believe that universal, mutually dependent and holistic facts exist? I have no idea what you're thinking there implicationally. — Terrapin Station

The rationale is that there are elementary facts of which nothing can be said about in isolation. This is a hard form of nominalism. Now, here's the issue. We are presupposing that elementary facts exist in isolation, which can only be talked about in relation to other things.The elementary fact or logical atomic fact or object exists as a sort of noumena if you see where I'm getting at.