Mind-independent empirical nature for Husserl is this relative product of constitution, a mere hypothesis. — Joshs
By investing the objective domain with a mind-independent status, as if it exists independently of any mind, we absolutize it. — Wayfarer
The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical ~ Husserl.
Now let's think about two people who have knowledge about that theorem and both people accept its universal truth. If the perspective adds something extra, this something extra cannot be the same for the two different perceptions and perspectives that each person has. And here comes the question: what does perspective add in each case? Does it add anything that would affect the theorem in its objective sense, to be different in each case? — JuanZu
we can deduce that the objective properties of things, the being of things, is not reducible to subjective experience — JuanZu
Well, in both cases it doesn't add anything that we can say is a property of this type of triangle. With this example we can deduce that the objective properties of things, the being of things, is not reducible to subjective experience, whether understood as perspective. A judgment, therefore, if it hopes to be true, must exceed the order of perception and perspective. — JuanZu
But there are many other kinds of matters where perspective might be relevant. Consider complex historical questions for example. There might be levels of complexity which a particular individual is familiar with and which result in their ability to arrive at a superior analysis of the subject — Wayfarer
You seem to have a restricted concept of a “real object.” It is also not clear to me how you deny that the Pythagorean theorem tells us anything about right triangles. — JuanZu
"Something about X" means that we are pointing out a property of X. In this case, an equality between the parts that constitute the object called "Right Triangle". — JuanZu
The problem is that there is no such equality between the parts, hence the irrational ratio between the two legs. This irrational ratio is known as the square root of two. If the proposition states that the two legs are equal then the straight distance between the two defined points, known as the hypotenuse, is an indefinite distance, unmeasurable. It is said to be irrational. This indicates that in actuality there is an incommensurability between the two legs which are assumed to be equal, such that they cannot actually be equal. The proposition that they are equal, forces the logical conclusion that the hypotenuse is indefinite, irrational, therefore the proposition that they could be equal must be rejected as illogical. — Metaphysician Undercover
But isn't that just for the case where the length of each leg is 1? — JuanZu
On the other hand, I would like to know what you mean by "Real Object." — JuanZu
This value of the square root of the sum of the squares of the legs would be closer –closer than anything– to X, with X being an irrational number. — JuanZu
On the other hand, you call a real object one that is logically consistent. I, however, regarding the case, would speak of a qualitative incompatibility in the objective nature of the right triangle as an object. Adding the term "Real" or "not real" would not make much sense once we consider it this way. — JuanZu
In my opinion the term "Real" has no place in the discussion because a thing like that, a thing like a triangle simply "gives itself" and presents itself to us as an object of study, without being able to be reduced to a psychological act. — JuanZu
To say that there is an incommensurability in its being does not add to or take away anything from the fact that it is presented and given to our knowledge and has effects on it. That is why it is objective, since an internal relationship can be established, whether one of incommensurability, which tells us what a triangle like this – is. — JuanZu
This is what i disagree with. I think that any instance of the conception of a triangle actually does reduce to a purely psychological act. If you assume that it "presents itself" to us, you need to ask how it does this. Then you see that it is a matter of learning, the concept must be learned, and learning is a psychological act. — Metaphysician Undercover
The obvious alternative is to follow Alfred North Whitehead in 1919-1920, and abandon classical Euclidean topology for a 'point-free topology' that refers only to extensionally interpretable "blobs", namely open-sets that have a definite non-zero volume, whose intersections approximate pointedness . Then it might be possible to extensionally interpret all such "blobs" in relation to a fixed basis of topological description in a more constructive fashion, meaning that extensional ambiguity is handled directly on the logical level of syntax, as opposed to on the semantic level of theory interpretation. — sime
Since we are talking about an internal relationship that is deduced from elements of an object that differs in its identity from the mind. That is, in order to reduce it to a psychological act you would have to express the internal relationship in terms of a relationship of psychic elements. — JuanZu
"In the life of practical needs certain particularizations of shape stood out and that a technical praxis always aimed at the production of particular preferred shapes and the improvement of them according to certain directions of gradualness. First to be singled out from the thing-shapes are surfaces—more or less "smooth," more or less perfect surfaces; edges, more or less rough or fairly "even"; in other words, more or less pure lines, angles, more or less perfect points; then, again, among the lines, for example, straight lines are especially preferred, and among the surfaces the even surfaces; for example, for practical purposes boards limited by even surfaces, straight lines, and points are preferred, whereas totally or partially curved surfaces are undesirable for many kinds of practical interests. Thus the production of even surfaces and their perfection (polishing) always plays its role in praxis. So also in cases where just distribution is intended. Here the rough estimate of magnitudes is transformed into the measurement of magnitudes by counting the equal parts."
“Out of the praxis of perfecting, of freely pressing toward the horizons of conceivable perfecting "again and again/' limit-shapes emerge toward which the particular series of perfectings tend, as. toward invariant and never attainable poles. If we are interested in these ideal shapes and are consistently engaged in determining them and in constructing new ones out of those already determined, we are "geometers." In place of real praxis—that of action or that of considering empirical possibilities having to do with actual and really [i.e., physically] possible empirical bodies—we now have an ideal praxis of "pure thinking" which remains exclusively within the realm of pure limit-shapes. Through a method of idealization and construction which historically has long since been worked out and can be practiced intersubjectively in a community, these limit-shapes have become acquired tools that can be used habitually and can always be applied to something new—an infinite and yet self-enclosed world of ideal objects as a field for study.
Like all cultural acquisitions which arise out of human accomplishment, they remain objectively knowable and available without requiring that the formulation of their meaning be repeatedly and explicitly renewed. . It is understandable how, as a consequence of the awakened striving for "philosophical" knowledge, knowledge which determines the "true," the objective being of the world, the empirical art of measuring and its empirically, practically objectivizing function, through a change from the practical to the theoretical interest, was idealized and thus turned into the purely geometrical way of thinking. The art of measuring thus becomes the trail-blazer for the ultimately universal geometry and its "world" of pure limit-shapes.
Well, you can't. Since we are talking about an internal relationship that is deduced from elements of an object that differs in its identity from the mind. That is, in order to reduce it to a psychological act you would have to express the internal relationship in terms of a relationship of psychic elements. For example, if we assume that the psyche is nothing more than synaptic processes between neurons, your claim would have to be represented in the form: "this synapse is the relationship of equality between two elements, and it is also an incommensurability." Which is obviously doomed to failure. — JuanZu
It is for this reason that you cannot reduce knowledge to a creation of human genius, even if it has no other origin than humanity. Because knowledge is something like the relationship with something objective. In no case can it justify the objectivity of knowledge based on the particular psychological movements of, in this case, Pythagoras. You may say, “but logic is the condition of objectivity” Well, what you say about geometry (its reduction to psychological acts) you say a fortiori about logic. — JuanZu
If the meaning is nothing more than psychological acts... how can you say that it is the same meaning in each case if they are two different psychic phenomena? — JuanZu
The particularity of each case denies its universal formulation, and is not able to justify why it is the same meaning and is repeated in different minds, different languages, different cultures, etc. — JuanZu
I do not reduce the psyche to synaptic processes, so I do not see how this reply is relevant at all. You have in no way addressed the points I made. — Metaphysician Undercover
Furthermore, as I indicated, you have in no way justified your claim of objectivity in knowledge. And now you simply repeat your unjustified assertion that knowledge is "objective", and use this unsound premise to support your insistence that knowledge cannot be an artificial creation. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point is that this idea, that "it is the same meaning and is repeated in different minds" is simply false. Each mind relates to the same words in ways exclusive, and unique to that mind. We might say that it is "essentially the same", but we cannot ignore the accidentals which actually make it not the same. — Metaphysician Undercover
Maybe you think it's not relevant because you're not understanding it very well. For example, if you don't talk about neuronal synapses, you can talk instead about cognitive processes, or psychological acts. So what I have said about neural processes a fortiori is said of any theory that attempts to reduce (reductionism) one field to another. — JuanZu
I did. As I have exposed an internal relationship between the elements of a closed field, in this case geometry. — JuanZu
Or can u say that geometry theorems are different through different cultures? ). — JuanZu
Now, you will say "but geometry does not represent anything and is something created." Quantum physics is also something created, logic is too. But of course the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective (even if we follow ur argument no one can say that a computer or a sintetic chemical element is non-objective just because it's artificial) . — JuanZu
Ur argument, if I understand correctly, is based on a sense of objectivity as representation wich grounds it. That is, as the correspondence between the theory and a referent wich is provided by the sensory system. But if we abandon that idea of objectivity as representation we also abandon what you say about geometry as something non-objective. And let me tell you: We have to abandon your sense of objectivity as a representation or as a necessary link between theory and an empirical reference that must correspond to. In the case of geometry it can be said that it is its own reference, and to the extent that we discover its internal relationships we discover things, regardless of the fact that it has no other origin than Humanity.
U can call this "objetive constructivism". — JuanZu
In my opinion the term "Real" has no place in the discussion because a thing like that, a thing like a triangle simply "gives itself" and presents itself to us as an object of study, without being able to be reduced to a psychological act. To say that there is an incommensurability in its being does not add to or take away anything from the fact that it is presented and given to our knowledge and has effects on it. That is why it is objective, since an internal relationship can be established, whether one of incommensurability, which tells us what a triangle like this – is. — JuanZu
It is not false. You are pointing out particular accidents to say that we are not referring to the same thing. But obviously in the act of communication an identity and repetition must take place so that there is a minimum of understanding, this is the meaning. If you say to a Greek and an Egyptian to give you 5 units of that fruit and not 4, they will probably both give you the 5 units; Well, this fact is not a simple coincidence and must be explained. But obviously we cannot explain the same from what is different. We cannot explain, for example, why the Egyptian and the Greek acted in the same way based on the sound differences that each one heard, on their culture wich they belong, on their language, etc. — JuanZu
Isn't the limit something that is imposed on us from the things themselves? (I.E. imagine a perfect triangle-square) We cannot impose that limit on ourselves at will, it is shown as something foreign to our will. — JuanZu
I still don't know what you are trying to say JuanZu. My point was that one is prior to the other, as the cause of the other. Minds are prior to ideas as the cause of ideas. Since ideas and minds are subjects of the very same field, there is no attempt to reduce one field to another here, and your supposed "a fortiori" assertion is irrelevant. You seem to be wanting to claim that ideas are prior to minds, so please address the arguments I've made, instead of attempting to change the subject and using that very change of subject as the basis for your claim of a fortiori. — Metaphysician Undercover
Geometry is not a "closed field", there is no such thing as intelligible objects which exist in total isolation from others. So geometrical terms get defined by a wider field of mathematics, and concepts of spatial dimension. This issue is often addressed by philosophers, such as Wittgenstein in On Certainty, because it appears like it may produce an infinite regress of meaning, leaving no concepts truly justified as "ideal", in the sense of perfect, absolute certitude. — Metaphysician Undercover
A more modern, and also very clear example, can be found in numerical systems. Currently we use what is known as "Arabic Numerals". — Metaphysician Undercover
Why are you arguing against yourself now? You used "objectivity" as evidence that ideas are discovered, presented or given to us, rather than created by us. Now you claim "the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective", so you've just undermined your entire argument. — Metaphysician Undercover
With respect to the identity of an object, each accidental of that object must be accounted for, or else two distinct objects, with different accidentals would have the same identity, and therefore be the very same object. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, I precisely maintain that they are different fields, not only in terms of validation but in their terms, their relationships and operations. — JuanZu
But you are assuming it is the same field (psychological acts) by simply repeating it, ignoring all the evidence I have presented to you and in no way refuting it. — JuanZu
you are saying that it is not a closed field but without giving any justification or argument. — JuanZu
And yet you continue to refer to both cases as "numerals". You have not yet understood that you cannot speak of the different as the same. That is, if you speak of two cases (Greeks and Arabs) as species of the same phenomenon (numbers) , you are only arguing against yourself. I say again, you do not explain the same thing by what is different. — JuanZu
What you see as a contradiction between creating and discovering is actually a difference between the pair of concepts called "genesis" and "structure." — JuanZu
What you see as a contradiction between creating and discovering is actually a difference between the pair of concepts called "genesis" and "structure." That is, the first geometer may have imagined a line, the first line in the world; However, this line was already the object of a length, and the object of union with other lines that formed a triangle. But then the lines autonomously maintain a relationship with each other, which, depending on the measurement or value of their length, is equivalent to this or that other value. The key here is autonomy and the internal relationship between a set of elements. This relationship between elements can no longer be thought of as a psychological act of the imagination. Why? Because these relationships are said of the elements and not of the imagination. That is why geometry is objective, created and discovered at the same time. — JuanZu
Here I repeat the argument that I have presented in relation to your example of numbers. — JuanZu
So you're argument amounts to "I stipulate that these fields are different", and you think that this validates your perspective. That's called begging the question — Metaphysician Undercover
You've presented exactly zero evidence, only some blabbering about relationships between fictitious imaginary elements. On the other hand I've presented the example of learning, the problem with infinite regress if concepts are only learned, Plato's proposal of "recollection", the problem with this, and Aristotle's resolution to that problem. — Metaphysician Undercover
I explained why no field is a closed field. You don't seem to know how to read Juan. Or do you prefer just to ignore evidence which does not support what you believe? — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, two very different instances of the same type of phenomenon. This implies a difference between the two specified things, and in no way implies that the two are the same thing. However, two different things may be of the same type, so your objection "that you cannot speak of the different as the same" is ridiculous. Two different things cannot be the same, yet they can and often are, said to be the same type. So, very commonly we speak of the different as the same, so long as we maintain the distinction between particular and universal, and recognize that "the same type" does not mean "the same individual". — Metaphysician Undercover
What I saw as contradiction was that you said a right triangle is "objective" because it "gives itself" and presents itself to us. This was the alternative to my claim that the right triangle was created by us. Later, you said "But of course the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective."
Therefore we need to conclude that whether or not the right triangle is objective, is irrelevant to whether or not it "gives", "presents itself" to us, or whether it has been created by us. And all this talk about objectivity is just a ruse. — Metaphysician Undercover
The argument which amounts to an ignorance of the difference between 'being the same thing', and 'being of the same type'? — Metaphysician Undercover
Among the evidence is the impossibility of carrying out a process with the same results based on certain terms and operations. The terms and operations of psychology and geometry are radically different. The terms and operations carried out in geometry reveal internal relationships that you cannot discover by exchanging these terms for others in psychology. — JuanZu
You didn't . The only thing you said is that geometry objects are not isolated objects. But that's assuming you can delimit the field of geometry from every other field, which is not the case, I assume you can't do that. — JuanZu
On the other hand, I have exposed the incommensurability between one field (geometry) and another (psychology). Relative to the field of psychology the field of geometry is closed in the sense that none of its terms, operations and relationships can determine the nature of the field of geometry. — JuanZu
They are the same insofar as they are numbers, they are different insofar as they are different types of numbers. — JuanZu
Have you ever read about being as equivocity, as univocity and as analogy? Well, it seems that you speak from equivocity (all things are different and none can be the same in any sense), but contradicting yourself by using the same numerical system sign. — JuanZu
A geometric object is presented to us and given to us even though it is a human creation. But it is given to us as a set of internal relationships and meanings that transcends the acts of its creation. It is in this sense that it gives itself: — JuanZu
We can say that it is something created and discovered for the reasons I have given (genesis and structure). A straight line could perhaps have been imagined once, or imagined by three different people at different times, or simply be an imaginary act repeated three times. That doesn't matter (and it's important that it doesn't matter), the important thing is when those lines entered into a relationship and crossed forming a triangle (three angles appeared). Something like a leg and a hypotenuse appeared and relationships emerged between these elements, regardless of how the lines were created. — JuanZu
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