No, I don't. And i have explicitly covered why not multiple times, so i'm refrain from repeating my very much coherent answer to this charge again. — AmadeusD
The T-sentence is exactly about truth. It does not address belief.It sits on it's own, while completely failing to rise to the status of truth. — AmadeusD
Maybe your answer is not as clear as you think.
But keep working on it. — Banno
Engineering is not necessarily good preparation for such conceptual work. — Banno
I don’t see it: can you elaborate? That’s just a hypothetical imperative being used to with modus ponens to derive the consequent. Or are you saying it is world-to-word direction of fit because it is hypothetical, since it is subjective? I could get on board with that, but I don’t see how there’s such a thing as a fact which has a world-to-word direction of fit. ‘You ought to bring an umbrella’ (P2) is non-factual (to me). — Bob Ross
But isn't your claim tautological at that point? Obviously moral claims must be situated somewhere within "the totality of existence."
No, I don't think that makes any sense. If it is not objectively wrong for others to torture babies then you should not get angry at them when they do. You get angry and intervene because you believe it is wrong for them to torture babies. Moral anti-realism is too often
Let me offer another story. One fellow responded to my moral anger argument as follows. "Anger presupposes justice, but because moral realism is false justice does not exist. Therefore anger is irrational. Nevertheless, I myself do get angry with other people. This is only because I am irrational. If I ever succeed in becoming perfectly rational I will no longer get angry."
Now we have been through this discussion, set out where this goes astray. — Banno
I think you should not torture babies, irregardless of whether you think you should not torture babies, and if that is true then I should be trying to stop you. Where’s the inconsistency or incoherence with that? — Bob Ross
Values are not morals: they are our subjective tastes of what we hold as worth something. I can value vanilla ice cream, and you not so much—irregardless of what the moral facts say. Now, imagine there’s a moral fact such that ‘one shouldn’t torture babies’ and you catch me in the act of torturing a baby: you cannot impose the moral fact without simultaneously imposing your taste that I should value moral facts. — Bob Ross
"Chocolate ice cream is the best," is a preference. Perhaps you construe, "Do not torture babies," as a preference as well. The difference is that when we see someone torturing a baby, we prevent them; whereas when we see someone eating vanilla ice cream, we do not prevent them. — Leontiskos
If you say “hey! You shouldn’t be doing that because it violates this moral fact!”, and I just say “why should I care about moral facts?” — Bob Ross
I think moral realism sometimes paints the false narrative that, even under that metaethical theory, we cannot impose tastes on one another; but I can provide a parody argument, which equally applies to moral realism and anti-realism, which illustrates how false this notion really is. — Bob Ross
But I am not the one saying anything; you are. That's the whole point. You are the one enforcing a prohibition on the torture of babies. — Leontiskos
↪AmadeusD - Sorry, I've read enough of your exchange with Banno. I don't think your position makes a lick of sense, and I think you are only engaging in hand-waving when met with the contradictions in your thought. It looks to be an exercise in evasion. If that's how you treat contradictions, then there's really no reason for me to try to lead you to another one. So yeah, "Keep working on it," I suppose. — Leontiskos
So far, it's not been addressed very well. Moral statements are instances of a subject expressing their taste as a universal rule. What makes this not true? — AmadeusD
Those who hold the type of emotivism you are describing do not generally also hold that moral statements are binding. Taste does not bind, and is not the stuff of argument. To say that the moralist is expressing a taste is to make an excuse to ignore them. — Leontiskos
I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>.
So if you think that, "Thou shalt not torture babies," is a prescriptive statement that is objectively binding on all, then you are surely not a moral anti-realist.
I think you should not torture babies, irregardless of whether you think you should not torture babies, and if that is true then I should be trying to stop you.
Now we usually speak about objectively binding statements as true statements, but I'm not especially interested in the moral cognitivism debate, which I think is misguided. I'll leave that debate to the side.
Values are not morals: they are our subjective tastes of what we hold as worth something. I can value vanilla ice cream, and you not so much—irregardless of what the moral facts say. Now, imagine there’s a moral fact such that ‘one shouldn’t torture babies’ and you catch me in the act of torturing a baby: you cannot impose the moral fact without simultaneously imposing your taste that I should value moral facts. — Bob Ross
Answered here:
"Chocolate ice cream is the best," is a preference. Perhaps you construe, "Do not torture babies," as a preference as well. The difference is that when we see someone torturing a baby, we prevent them; whereas when we see someone eating vanilla ice cream, we do not prevent them. — Leontiskos
If you say “hey! You shouldn’t be doing that because it violates this moral fact!”, and I just say “why should I care about moral facts?” — Bob Ross
But I am not the one saying anything; you are. That's the whole point. You are the one enforcing a prohibition on the torture of babies. Why must we all obey your so-called "taste"? What makes it special? You are the one on the bench, here. You are the one engaged in moral realism. Whether you can square this with your rhetorical utterances remains to be seen.
Why must we all obey your so-called "taste"?
You are the one on the bench, here. You are the one engaged in moral realism. Whether you can square this with your rhetorical utterances remains to be seen.
You are presumably saying, "The moral realist imposes his tastes, so why can't I impose mine!?”
First, the notion that the moral realist is imposing tastes begs the question at hand.
Second, tastes are not imposable by their very nature. When we talk about a taste that's part of what we mean
Third, just because your opponent engages in a practice you believe to be arbitrary does not give you license to engage in arbitrary practices, and this is particularly true when you are in the process of criticizing the supposed arbitrariness.
Fourth, if you are imposing a moral standard of any kind then I would say you aren't a moral anti-realist.
But for some reason, folk refuse to apply this to statements counting "ought". Special pleading. — Banno
Those who deny this usually claim either that moral statements are not truth-apt; or that they are, but are all false. Which path will you choose? — Banno
I am not saying that you should be convinced that you shouldn’t be doing X because I think you shouldn’t be doing X: I am saying that I am going to try and stop you. First, I will try to intellectually and rationally convince you otherwise. — Bob Ross
The T-sentence is exactly about truth. It does not address belief.
— Banno
It is a statement of belief. — AmadeusD
Was that your argument?You can act without believing your act to comport with truth. — AmadeusD
If saying that it is true means that they are saying it is a stance-independent fact... — Apustimelogist
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