the issue is not one of fallibility or error. — Joshs

Yes. The point was not well put. It comes back to the question of paradigm breakdown.

Perhaps Kuhn's concept of an anomaly is useful here, but that presupposes some sort of intrusion from "outside" - "actuality"?. It's important to remember (or point out - what I've read seems mostly to forget this) that paradigms/conceptual schemata are not static constructions but dynamic systems of thinking and practicing. So I don't think that anomalies are necessarily the only form of breakdown. Internal difficulties (contradictions?) seem to me just as plausible.

The forgery example makes clear the significance of subjectivity. — Hanover

"Subjectivity"? Whenever you see that word, ask what it is doing. No, it's about intentionality; the genuine note is made with the intent of building a system of exchange, which the counterfeit can then undermine. Subjectivity is unhelpful.

Which one is the accurate depiction? — Hanover

Accurate for what purpose?

...retain its validity. — Hanover

Valid in what argument?

Context. Your claim was that we can't see UV light. I showed a picture of a flower in UV light. We can see the picture. It's an accurate depiction of the reflection of UV on the flower, and a valid observation of the structure of a flower as shown in UV... and so on.

...arbitrary changes... — Hanover

The image is not arbitrary, but is determined by the reflection of UV and the subsequent filters and film used.

You are way off.

The question then becomes: once I have the phenomenal state of the flower in my consciousness, which one of those still represents the flower? — Hanover

It is a loaded question, but because it supposes the nonsense of "phenomenal state of the flower in my consciousness". Poor philosophical theories produce poor results.

That is, this is indirect realism... — Hanover

No, it's a flower, seen in UV. I know you can't drop all that nonsense about things in themselves and phenomenal states of consciousness, and although it provides a basis for some wonderful pretence, in the end it confuses you.

I rather doubt that your scenario is even likely, so I don't feel any need to decide that question. — Ludwig V

The point wasn't to determine the liklihood of how a forgery might or might not occur, but it was to point out that a forgery is a purely subjective determination. It's a judgment, having nothing to do with the physical composition of the object, unless the perceiver dictates it does. Two entirely similar US dollars, exactly the same in terms of ink, paper, and design can be different only in terms that one is forged and one not and that will affect the value of each. A forgery is a forgery due to the intent and authority of the maker, not due to the quality of the item.

I would say the object, the environment and me. However, whatever we say about these cases does not justify asserting that the same difficulties apply to everything we see. — Ludwig V

Give me a concrete case then of an object that is unimpacted by the perceiver so that you can say object A is described as having the qualities of a, b, and c in all instances.

We determined Banno's flower is not one such object and it seems your fish is not either. What then is that object you refer to?

Accurate for what purpose? — Banno

Accurate for reflecting what is really there, with the term "really" being used in the sense you use the term "real" in the terms direct realism and indirect realism. If we concede a pragmatism, then idealism works as well.

Valid in what argument? — Banno

I wasn't speaking in terms of maintaining the validity of a syllogism. I was speaking in terms of the photograph being an accurate representation of the flower.

The image is not arbitrary, but is determined by the reflection of UV and the subsequent filters and film used. — Banno

You do not see the UV light. You see the photographic representation of the flower of how it might look to someone who can see UV rays. What you see is a representation of a flower, which is then represented to you in your consciousness.

Anyway, which one is the flower, A or B? Both? C? I just want to know what color it is. If I'm colorblind, is it black?

It is a loaded question, but because it supposes the nonsense of "phenomenal state of the flower in my consciousness". Poor philosophical theories produce poor results. — Banno

I do have a phenomenal state in my consciousness and it goes away when I close my eyes, but the flower remains. It seems like two different things. Is it not?

and it goes away when I close my eyes, but the flower remains. — Hanover

Great idea for lyric too!

Great idea for lyric too! — schopenhauer1

I should weave that in to the upcoming short story contest.

what is really there — Hanover

But what is real depends on what is not real. On context.

I was speaking in terms of the photograph being an accurate representation of the flower. — Hanover

The photo is an accurate representation of the flower as seen with UV light. your asking if it validly represents the flower is confused. We can ask, quite validly, if the filter cut out sufficient red light, or if the emulsion might have emphasised some frequency a bit too much. Such considerations do not stop the photo being of the flower in UV light.

You do not see the UV light. — Hanover

Nor do you see red light. You see red.

...which is then represented to you in your consciousness. — Hanover

The homunculus. No.

which one is the flower, A or B — Hanover

Neither. They are photos. And both. The flower has structural features that cannot be seen in visible light, but can in UV. We now understand bee behaviour better, because they seek out these structures due to their sensitivity to UV. Context.

I do have a phenomenal state in my consciousness and it goes away when I close my eyes, but the flower remains. — Hanover

That's an affectatious way of saying that you don't see the flower when your eyes are closed.

What kind of conduct and thought makes us miserable and how to avoid them seems demonstrable enough in most cases. — Ciceronianus

I don't disagree with that, but my point was that these ancient schools had metaphysical ideas which underpinned their ethical practices. It is arguable that different ideas, different metaphysical assumptions, work for different people. It is also arguable that none of them are truth-apt. Thus, their truth or falsity is not the significant issue, but rather their efficacy in producing misery or happiness is.

I was looking for a stronger word than adopt because in some cases we don't choose or adopt them, they may more be like presuppositions for a world we think of as true. — Tom Storm

Yes, one might well want to tease out some details about them. They certainly are not ordinary, true-or-false beliefs. But whether they are beliefs or precognitions, they seem to involve propositions. Quite how to express it is another question. You seem to be verging on Kantian apriori. I'm thinking something more like grammatical or hinge propositions, after Wittgenstein.

those paradigmatic grounds for our beliefs are not themselves beliefs, so at this level the issue is not one of fallibility or error. — Joshs

I accept that the issue is not one of fallibility or error. But if they are beliefs, they involve propositions. So, not ordinary contingent propositions, but propositions of a different kind. Surely?

The point wasn't to determine the liklihood of how a forgery might or might not occur, but it was to point out that a forgery is a purely subjective determination. — Hanover

Well, any true-or-false statement is determined by someone, if that's what you mean. But that doesn't mean it is subjective. Since the definition is specified by law, I would say the question is objective.
Being a forgery is not a matter of its physical constitution. I never suggested otherwise.

Give me a concrete case then of an object that is unimpacted by the perceiver so that you can say object A is described as having the qualities of a, b, and c in all instances. — Hanover

How about Banno's flower? It has four petals, a definite height and flowers at a particular time of year.

You may have determined something about Banno's flower, but I didn't determine anything about it. I couldn't make head or tail of what you were going on about.

I would say the question is objective. — Ludwig V

I agree. But I baulk whenever someone says "It's subjective". It's a distinction I don't think is of as much use as some folk supose.

This statement seems not to be at all clear...much use for who and for what?

But I baulk whenever someone says "It's subjective". — Banno

Well, I agree. Perhaps I should not have characterized that question as objective. On the other hand, I did specify my reason for applying that term.

much use for who and for what? — Janus

Good question. One way of answering is to consider it's use in . The truism that perception always involves a perceiver, is associated with "beauty in the eye of the beholder", "nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so" and the conclusion that all perception is subjective looks plausible. How can I say that forgery or not is not in the eye of the beholder, or that thinking does not make forgery so (or not) without appearing to deny the truism?
I have to admit that my way of putting the issue might be taken to suggest that Hanover's motivation is suspect. So I have to clarify that I don't doubt that Hanover believes what he is saying.

The photo is an accurate representation of the flower as seen with UV light. your asking if it validly represents the flower is confused. We can ask, quite validly, if the filter cut out sufficient red light, or if the emulsion might have emphasised some frequency a bit too much. Such considerations do not stop the photo being of the flower in UV light. — Banno

Any inconsistency between the flower and the perception is defined as distortion. If the radio transmits a song filled with static, we don't say the static was part of the song. We say the song was distorted by the static. If you ask if I'm hearing the song, my answer is I'm hearing parts of the song and parts of other things as well, but, to the extent the song is X, I'm not hearing X. I'm hearing all sorts of other things.

What holds true of hearing the song holds true of all perceptions of things. We have to determine which part of Object X I am sensing against those perceptions I am having of things imparted upon Object X if we want to distill what Object X is. What is the undistorted X?

My position is that it is unknowable because the perception necessarily is filled with all sorts of distortions from within me and from the environment. Pragmatically, I live my life dealing with distortions of varying degrees, but the thing is not the distortion.

Neither. They are photos. And both. The flower has structural features that cannot be seen in visible light, but can in UV. We now understand bee behaviour better, because they seek out these structures due to their sensitivity to UV. Context. — Banno

What the bee can sense is that which assists in its survival, regardless of whether it bears any resemblence to the flower.

Either the flower is red or the flower is white. Either the flower has certain structural features or it does not. What is different about color in that it can vary from perceiver to perceiver but not change the fact that it's the same flower but if the structural feature of the flower is different from one flower to the next it's a different flower?

That's an affectatious way of saying that you don't see the flower when your eyes are closed. — Banno

If I have an image of the flower in my mind after I close my eyes, I experience the phenomenal state of the flower with my eyes closed. If I open my eyes and that elicits a flower experience, then I then have that experience. Phenomenal states are brain created, often elicited by our senses, but not always.

How about Banno's flower? It has four petals, a definite height and flowers at a particular time of year. — Ludwig V

That's just a restatement of naive realism.

You may have determined something about Banno's flower, but I didn't determine anything about it. I couldn't make head or tail of what you were going on about. — Ludwig V

Then re-read it and see if you can better understand what I said.

I don't disagree with that, but my point was that these ancient schools had metaphysical ideas which underpinned their ethical practices. It is arguable that different ideas, different metaphysical assumptions, work for different people. It is also arguable that none of them are truth-apt. Thus, their truth or falsity is not the significant issue, but rather their efficacy in producing misery or happiness is. — Janus

I'm uncertain what metaphysical ideas you think underpin feelings of pain or unhappiness and judgments regarding how to avoid it. If they amount to "ideas" such as that there is an "external world" which has things in it which cause us pain or unhappiness, then I think we're speaking of what I've been calling affectation. I don't think this sort of metaphysics was indulged in by the Stoics, at least.

If I have an image of the flower in my mind after I close my eyes, I experience the phenomenal state of the flower with my eyes closed. — Hanover

Do you really think there is an image of the flower in your mind? Is that image the phenomenal state you refer to, or is the image distinct from the phenomenal state?

If I have an image of the flower in my mind after I close my eyes, I experience the phenomenal state of the flower with my eyes closed. If I open my eyes and that elicits a flower experience, then I then have that experience. Phenomenal states are brain created, often elicited by our senses, but not always. — Hanover

Or we could say that these are two types of phenomenological experience, experience given to us in distinctly different modalities. If I see an actual flower, the object I actual see is already shaped by my expectations, which I draw from memory. It is a concatenation or amalgam of expectations and the meager data that is given to me from the world. When I close my eyes I eliminate the data from the world ( which as I said is already concept-laden) and draw strictly from memory. In either case, the flower with its petals is not something there i. the world but a subjective construction. More precisely, the concept of flower is an intersubjectively constructed object. Its objectivity is thus a socially constituted ideal. We judge error and illusion in perception in relation not to a world as it is in itself but in relation to our constructed idealities, which, being relative, can always be other than how we now constitute them as objectively existing.

Do you really think there is an image of the flower in your mind? Is that image the phenomenal state you refer to, or is the image distinct from the phenomenal state? — Ciceronianus

I have a phenomenological state that seems to me to be elicited by an external stimuli, but I know that it can be elicited without it because people dream and some people have hallucinations elicited by brain injury, direct brain stimulation, drug use, or perhaps some sort of mental illness.

I say all this because I do think it to be an image that is distinct from the flower.

The phenomenological state is the full brain state, which would include the image, the smells around me, my hunger, my thoughts of getting home in time for dinner, my slight headache, and whatever other fleeting thoughts that might be within me.

Despite there being all sorts of more elementary components you might be able find within a phenomenological state, the conscious state presents as a holistic event. I typically refer to this idea as the transcendental unity of apperception when I'm hanging out with my friends.

More precisely, the concept of flower is an intersubjectively constructed object. Its objectivity is thus a socially constituted ideal. We judge error and illusion in perception in relation not to a world as it is in itself but in relation to our constructed idealities, which, being relative, can always be other than how we now constitute them as objectively existing. — Joshs

This just seems doubtful. I would expect that an infant sees what I see when it looks at a flower, despite it not having any sense of what is socially agreed upon. This concept would apply cross-culturally as well, lending support to the idea that we reach out to the flower to pick it not due to some inter-subjective, socially agreed upon basis, but because we think the flower it out past our hand ripe for picking.

- Right, and if we are forced to choose between Hanover's and Joshs' account, Hanover's should win every time. Theories which undermine the most well-known facts are bad theories, and exceptions do not always disprove the rule. Just because there are cases where perception diverges along cultural lines or somesuch, does not mean that perception is inherently divergent. The example of the infant is helpful because it approximates a baseline.

I've been struck by the lack of clarity in several recent discussions revolving around subjectivity, objectivity, truth and belief. Hence this thread, which I doubt will contain anything new, but only stuff that seems in need of repeating.

Before commencing the main argument, it may be worth pointing out that belief and truth are not the same. One can believe stuff that is not true, as well as disbelieve stuff that is true. Believing something does not imply that it is true, and being true does not imply being believed. I mention this because it is a simple, but ubiquitous error, and may well underpin other problems.

And so to the argument. The words subjective and objective are such that we are prone to allow them to lead us up and down various garden paths. It is especially important, therefore, to keep an eye on their use in mundane contexts.

Certain statements are labeled subjective because they set out an individuals taste or feelings. In contrast, other statements are called objective, as they do not set out an individual's taste, feelings or opinions.

Supose that "I prefer vanilla to chocolate ice-cream" is a subjective fact - or if you prefer, it is a subjective truth. It's truth is dependent on my own taste.

That this text is written in English is not dependent on my own taste or feelings. Hence it is an objective truth.

That's an end to it; don't allow the notions of subjectivity and objectivity to take on any more significance.

in particular, don't pretend that there are either only subjective facts, or that there are only objective facts. — Banno

That's just a restatement of naive realism. — Hanover

Maybe. But it is what you asked for. Where have I gone wrong?

This may not be a strictly philosophical observation, but does it not occur to you that calling that doctrine "naive" realism may be an instance of the rhetorical tactic of giving a dog a bad name? I think you'll find that "direct" realism is less tendentious. Names for doctrines are harder to get right than you might think.

Maybe. But it is what you asked for. Where have I gone wrong? — Ludwig V

If I were to see a small blip on a radar screen showing me an airplane, would that be an airplane or a representation of one?

If I see an actual flower, the object I actual see — Joshs

Why do you think that when you see an actual flower, you actually see something else?

More precisely, the concept of flower is an intersubjectively constructed object. — Joshs

Quite so. Thought it is a bit odd to refer to a concept as an object. Still, it would be picky to object. It is, I submit, a concept of a living think that grows, flowers, sets seeds and so forth - planted, say, in my front garden. Some flowers manage all of that without any help from me at all. Others need a hand and some TLC.

Its objectivity is thus a socially constituted ideal. — Joshs

I think that you misunderstand what objectivity is. It is something that happens irrespective of any socially constructed ideal

I would expect that an infant sees what I see when it looks at a flower, — Hanover

William James thought that what an infant sees in the beginning is "a buzzing, blooming, confusion", just because it doesn't have any sense of what has been socially agreed upon. Sadly, they can't tell us, and we can't see it.

The example of the infant is helpful because it approximates a baseline. — Leontiskos

Are you looking for the "raw" experience? I'm not sure you'll find it there. Since it will be before any concepts are applied (since they are not yet acquired), it will be indistinguishable from seeing nothing.

If I were to see a small blip on a radar screen showing me an airplane, would that be an airplane or a representation of one? — Hanover

Well, it depends what you mean by a representation. There's the kind of representation that is a picture and the kind that is a symbol. The blip is a representation in the symbolic sense.

William James thought that what an infant sees in the beginning is "a buzzing, blooming, confusion", just because it doesn't have any sense of what has been socially agreed upon. Sadly, they can't tell us, and we can't see it. — Ludwig V

I think we all see flowers fairly consistently cross-culturally, indicating the way in which we perceive relates to biology as opposed to culture. That is, tribe members from the rain forest see flowers as I see flowers, despite our not sharing social norms. They may worship flowers and hold them as sacred objects, but they don't see them in the chaotic state you're describing how James suggests infants see things.

This just seems doubtful. I would expect that an infant sees what I see when it looks at a flower, despite it not having any sense of what is socially agreed upon. This concept would apply cross-culturally as well, lending support to the idea that we reach out to the flower to pick it not due to some inter-subjective, socially agreed upon basis, but because we think the flower it out past our hand ripe for picking — Hanover

I didn’t mean to suggest they a baby has to wait till it is informed of a social construct till it can recognize an object as a flower. What I meant was that the baby constructs the idea of a unitary object like a flower out of constantly changing perspectives, which it coordinates with its own movements. This personally synthesized construction
is not the same thing as the intersubjectively constructed empirical concept of flower, the identical flower for everyone. This ‘identical flower for all’ is something that no one actually sees, since it is an abstraction derived from multiple vantages.

The blip is a representation in the symbolic sense. — Ludwig V

It's all symbolic. You can't just remove the instances that show indirect realism and call them the indirect sort without having some basis for that.