What would be the ground of making him anything but what he made himself? — Mww

It must be all the recent Kant commentators who pigeonholed Kant to be an idealist, realist, or phenomenologist etc etc, and we are just to trying to find on what basis was Kant so and so-ist? Maybe Kant had all those characteristic tendencies in his writings? It is just part and parcel of trying to understand Kant better suppose. Of course Kant was a Kantian.

So a guy knows what TI stands for, then reads herein TI has nothing to do with idealism. What’s he to think, when he understands perfectly well that the I in TI intentionally represents idealism? — Mww

Could Transcendental have implied "Anti"? I am not quite sure what the true definition of "Transcendental" in Kant exactly means either. I am suspicious if it meant simply "prior to experience".
What are your definitions of "Transcendental" and "Transcendental Idealism" in Kant?

Possibly. The Wikipedia article on Direct and Indirect Realism does give alternate names:
In the philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, direct or naïve realism, as opposed to indirect or representational realism, are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences.

The problem is, is it possible to describe a theory about which millions of words have been written using just two words. — RussellA

Yeah, whenever I read "Indirect X", I always get curious, "Indirect" from what, how and why?

I think of "Indirect Realism" as a name rather than a description, as the Taj Mahal is the name of and not a description of a building. Similarly I think of "Transcendental Idealism" as a name rather than a description. — RussellA

Perhaps you could be right.

we are just to trying to find on what basis was Kant so and so-ist? — Corvus

Inevitably ending in making of him something for which he would be in no position to affirm or deny. So what’s the point? What does it matter with respect to his philosophy, which is all anyone should care about anyway.

I am not quite sure what the true definition of "Transcendental" in Kant exactly means either. — Corvus

It’s defined, without equivocation, in the very text from which his metaphysical philosophy gets its name. How could it be left to mere supposition, for his successors to guess about, that which is the formal ground of a paradigm shift in human thought? The fact of it, as you’ve hinted yourself, is completely irrelevant, even if its logical consistency and internal integrity are absolutely necessary.

Could Transcendental have implied "Anti"? — Corvus

No.
(I’m not aware of any indication that it does)

I am suspicious if it meant simply "prior to experience". — Corvus

It doesn’t.
(There is another term representing “prior to experience”)

What are your definitions….. — Corvus

Mine are his. But having the definition still requires understanding the myriad instances of the term in accordance with it. THAT’S the hard part.

The first of these is that if all the characteristics we are able to ascribe to phenomena are subject-dependent then there can be no object in any sense that we are capable of attaching to the word without the existence of a subject. Bryan Magee.

The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room. Bryan Magee. — Wayfarer

Neutral Monism denies the reality of the Earth

From the position of Neutral Monism, there is only one substance, elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time, and there is only one aspect of it, neither mental nor material, but rather, in some sense, neutral between the two.

From the position of Nominalism, universals and abstracts don't exist in the world.

From the position of Conceptualism, universals and abstracts don't exist outside the mind's perception of them.

From the position of Reductionism, complex systems are no more than the sum of their parts. For example, biological life can be explained in terms of its physical processes and the temperature of a gas can be explained by the average kinetic energy of its molecules in motion.

As regards the question, did the Earth exist before there was life, it depends on what one means by the Earth. In one sense it did exist and in another sense it absolutely didn't exist.

If the Earth is a concept in the human mind, amongst many other concepts such as apples, tables, angst, love, pain, fear, mountains, governments, then prior to the human mind, before there was life, then of course it didn't exist. How can a concept which depends for its existence on the human mind exist before there were human minds to have the concept.

If the Earth is a concept in the human mind, then from the viewpoint of today, I can say that "the Earth existed before there were human minds", as the Earth I am referring to is not something that existed prior to the human mind, but the Earth as it exists as a concept in my mind at this present moment in time.

If the Earth is not a concept in the human mind but exists independently of any human mind, then there are serious problems as to what exactly judges in the absence of any human mind when something is the Earth and when it is no longer the Earth, as the Earth is in a continual process of change. For example, the Earth formed about 4.54 billion years ago by accretion from the solar nebula, a mass of dust and gas left over from the formation of the Sun. What decided that 5 billion years ago the mass of dust and gas was not the Earth, but 4 billion years ago the mass of dust and gas was now the Earth. A human mind could make the judgement, but Bryan Magee is not saying that, he is inferring that in the absence of any human mind, something has judged at what moment in time a mass of gas and dust becomes the Earth.

I agree that if all the characteristics that we are able to ascribe to phenomena are subject dependent then there can be no object in any sense. I agree that if the subject is the human mind and the object is the Earth, if there is no human mind then there can be no Earth. But this ignores Neutral Monism, where if there is no subject, the human mind, there can still be an object, elementary particles and elementary forces existing in space and time.

Yeah, whenever I read "Indirect X", I always get curious, "Indirect" from what, how and why? — Corvus

In this case, the prefix "in" means "not". Therefore, some people are direct realists, and some people are not-direct realists.

The problem is then knowing what "direct" refers to. Does it mean causally direct or cognitively direct?

I think your belief in the mind-independent nature of existence is innate. — Wayfarer

Yes, as with Chomsky, I believe in a certain amount of Innatism. As the Wikipedia article on Innatism writes:
In the philosophy of mind, innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. The opposing doctrine, that the mind is a tabula rasa (blank slate) at birth and all knowledge is gained from experience and the senses, is called empiricism.

Such Innatism can be combined with the principle of Enactivism. As the Wikipedia article on Enactivism writes:
Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment.

For me, Kant's references to the "a priori" are explained by what we know today as Innatism, a natural consequence of life's 3.7 billion years of evolution in a dynamic dance with the world of which it is a part.

As Bryan Magee wrote: "the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect"

What are your definitions…..
— Corvus

Mine are his. But having the definition still requires understanding the myriad instances of the term in accordance with it. THAT’S the hard part. — Mww

What is Kant's own definition of Transcendental Idealism? I was under impression that he hadn't given out clear definitions on TI as such. According to your answer, it sounds like it is highly challenging or even impossible to come up with a clearcut definition of TI. But there got to be one, if you claim that yours is Kant's definition.

The problem is then knowing what "direct" refers to. Does it mean causally direct or cognitively direct? — RussellA

Another case of linguistic aberration?

…."the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect"…. — Wayfarer

Instinct?

What is Kant's own definition of Transcendental Idealism? — Corvus

Find A491/B519.

It will tell you what you want to know, but not what you should be asking, at least with respect to Kantian metaphysics in general and CPR in particular.

I am not quite sure what the true definition of "Transcendental" in Kant exactly means either. I am suspicious if it meant simply "prior to experience".
What are your definitions of "Transcendental" and "Transcendental Idealism" in Kant? — Corvus

(well aware you did not ask me.. Just adding a perspective as I'm reading CPR right now for the first time so feel like i need this type of thing to nut out whether i understand.. any.. of it LOL)

My understanding of 'Transcendental' is that it denotes the concepts which transcend phenomena/experience. So these 'a priori' concepts are transcendental, as are the processes by which we make use of them but the concepts are how we experience sensory data. I don't think its strictly a placeholder for 'a priori' but it does encapsulate that there are concepts necessarily experienced in a representation-to-come, yet understood prior to experience of the representation, making the 'giving' of the object possible to our senses. I've not gotten far enough to tease out whether this could (as seems obvious to me) apply to things that don't actually exist (i.e, if: there is no object which could be 'given to' us, could we yet ascribe these transcendental concepts to figures of hte mind not ever present to our senses?). Issue is, it seems to me Kant denies the 'actual' existence of the object aside from the inner sense of it, so... I need to read more lol.

(well aware you did not ask me.. Just adding a perspective as I'm reading CPR right now for the first time so feel like i need this type of thing to nut out whether i understand.. any.. of it LOL) — AmadeusD

Thank you for your post. It is always good to have more different opinions on the topic, which makes discussions more diverse and interesting.

Issue is, it seems to me Kant denies the 'actual' existence of the object aside from the inner sense of it, so... I need to read more lol. — AmadeusD

Yes, I think this is quite interesting point and also where there are different interpretations between the traditional and contemporary commentators on Kant.

From my understanding, Kant was elucidating the both side of pure reason i.e. TI side which assumes the perceived objects belonging to Thing-in-Itself, which appears in minds as mere representation of the objects into the schema of a priori form of space and time which are all internal. We don't know anything about Thing-in-itself, hence we cannot even ask about it.

And then there is material empiricism side of pure reason, which takes the perceived objects as the real objects in the external world as they are. The reason sees the appearance, which are the actual objects that one can grab touch feel and manipulate. Thing-in-itself is part of the world we don't fully know, but is conceivable.

Pure reason deals with this conflicting nature of our perception. That's why Kant is explaining about them in the section called "Antinomy of Pure Reason". Therefore Kant was not committing himself as either idealist or realist at all in CPR. His aim was to investigate what Pure Reason does, and how it does it viz. the limitation and methodology of Pure reason.

I am also in the middle of reading Kant, and trying to understand him better. I use read him a few year ago, but stopped for a while doing other things. Recently I have been trying to get back to reading him again.

Find A491/B519.

It will tell you what you want to know, but not what you should be asking, at least with respect to Kantian metaphysics in general and CPR in particular. — Mww

Could it be the part of CPR where Kant explains the antinomy of Pure Reason? The reason has to deal with two controversial cases in perception.

First case is, TI, that perceived objects appear in mind as internal representations, and even space and time must be regarded as internal forms of the mind. In this case, the perceived objects are treated as the existence in Thing-in-itself, and we are not supposed to know anything about them at all.

The other case is that objects in perception exist as external to the mind as real objects. You see the appearance, but you realise that they are actually the real objects, which you can grab, touch, feel and manipulate. Even space and time feels external, where space is the external existence and time is the external process. This is the case of material empiricism.

The pure reason has both sides to deal with, and both are true. Kant seemed to be NOT committing himself as either an idealist or realist at this part of CPR.

Find A491/B519.
— Mww

Could it be the part of CPR where Kant explains the antinomy of Pure Reason? — Corvus

The explanation of the antinomies, the exposition of what they are, is A407/B434, wherein pure reason is concerned only with itself and the troubles it causes itself. However such examples of these conflicts manifest, isn’t as important as recognizing how they occur.

Kant states for the record he considers himself a transcendental idealist. Being that kind of idealist grants to empirical conditions their just warrant, so his favoring one name for a philosophy, doesn’t negate his regard for the world with the other.

Kant's references to the "a priori" are explained by what we know today as Innatism, a natural consequence of life's 3.7 billion years of evolution in a dynamic dance with the world of which it is a part. — RussellA

I get the idea that Plato’s appeal to the ‘innate wisdom of the Soul’ can be explained naturalistically with reference to evolutionary psychology. Makes sense, kind of. But that is a Darwinian account of mind, which I think tends towards biological reductionism (in other words, reducing all our faculties to the biological). After all, Darwinian theory is not a theory about the mind, it is a theory about the evolution of species. And evolution is concerned with no other end than successful reproduction.

But no other evolved species has the capacity for abstract reasoning and language in anything more than rudimentary forms. H. Sapiens alone is able to peer into the domain of reason and symbolic form. (Speaking of Chomsky, he co-authored a book on this very question, Why Only Us?, with Robert Berwick.) So my rather more idealist stance is that the human being is able to transcend the biological - that we are more than physical (and therefore more than simply biological). So our cognitive horizons are greater than those of purely sensory creatures. And that is without denying the facts of evolution, although it may be calling what is generally taken as its meaning into question.

Concepts in the mind must refer to something. They cannot be empty terms. — RussellA

I appreciate the care you've taken in your replies. I think the view I’m coming to is that we have nowadays a very restricted view of what is real. You’re saying, ideas must refer to something - they must have a real referent that exists ‘out there somewhere’ as the saying has it. That is what I think Magee is referring to when he wrote "the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect". It is what later phenomenology refers to as ’the natural attitude’.

//Incidentally I acknowledge that the above is not directly relevant to Kant per se, although as I've said in the Mind-Created World OP, I believe my philosophy is convergent with Kant's.//

Another case of linguistic aberration? — Corvus

Not really, it depends what the word "direct" is referring to.

The Phenomenological Direct Realist would say that they have both a direct perception (causally direct) and direct cognition of the postbox as it really is in a mind-independent world.

The Semantic Direct Realist would say that they have an indirect perception (causally indirect) but a direct cognition of the postbox as it really is in a mind-independent world.

The Indirect Realist would say that they have an indirect perception (causally indirect) and indirect cognition of the postbox as it really is in a mind-independent world.

I believe that Kant would say that he has both an indirect perception (causally indirect) and indirect cognition of the postbox as it really is in a mind-independent world, ie, the same as what an Indirect Realist would say.

I believe that Kant would say that he has both an indirect perception (causally indirect) and indirect cognition of the postbox as it really is in a mind-independent world, ie, the same as what an Indirect Realist would say. — RussellA

What do the Indirect Realist say about A priori concepts and space and time? Can these be mind-independent?

I get the idea that Plato’s appeal to the ‘innate wisdom of the Soul’ can be explained naturalistically with reference to evolutionary psychology...But no other evolved species has the capacity for abstract reasoning and language in anything more than rudimentary forms....................So my rather more idealist stance is that the human being is able to transcend the biological. — Wayfarer

Trying to keep the post relevant to Kant through understanding the word "transcendence".

Why cannot abstract reasoning and language be explained within biology?

If abstract reasoning and language could be explained within biology, then it would not be necessary for any transcendence of the biological.

Biological processes are capable of many surprising things. Taking one example at random, the ScienceDaily has a 2009 article Scientists Show Bacteria Can 'Learn' And Plan Ahead

Bacteria can anticipate a future event and prepare for it, according to new research at the Weizmann Institute of Science. In a paper that appeared June 17 in Nature, Prof. Yitzhak Pilpel, doctoral student Amir Mitchell and research associate Dr. Orna Dahan of the Institute's Molecular Genetics Department, together with Prof. Martin Kupiec and Gal Romano of Tel Aviv University, examined microorganisms living in environments that change in predictable ways. Their findings show that these microorganisms' genetic networks are hard-wired to 'foresee' what comes next in the sequence of events and begin responding to the new state of affairs before its onset.

Other examples can be found showing simple mechanical structures looking surprisingly life-like.



The word "transcendental " has different senses

From the Merriam Webster dictionary, "transcend" as a transitive verb can mean
1a to rise above or go beyond the limits of
1b to triumph over the negative or restrictive aspects of
1c to be prior to, beyond, and above (the universe or material existence)
2 to outstrip or outdo in some attribute, quality, or power.

There seem to be two distinct uses. The first is that of being explainable, as in "Great leaders are expected to transcend the limitations of politics". The second is that of being unexplainable, as in "certain laws of human nature seem to transcend historical periods and hold true for all times and all places".

But the fact that something is unexplainable today does not mean that it will be forever unexplainable.

Today we may say that "language transcends biology" in the second sense of the word as unexplainable, but it may well be the case that in the future as we gain more knowledge we may say that "language transcends biology" in the first sense as explainable.

Similarly for Kant in 1781, he may be using the word "a priori" as "transcendental" in the second sense as unexplainable, but today, over 200 years later, with our knowledge of Innatism and Enactivism, we can use the word "a priori" as "transcendental" in the first sense as explainable.

Why cannot abstract reasoning and language be explained within biology? — RussellA

That's a big question, but again, because biology is the science of living organisms and their environments, their physiology, reproduction, evolution and so on. It's not logic, mathematics or linguistics. I'm familiar with those materials you mention, all of which serve to illustrate the falsity of mechanistic reductionism. All living things, from the very simplest, display intentional behaviours and perform tasks which mechanical devices do not (although they can of course nowadays be modelled in software but again I question the degree to which that could be described as 'mechanical'.) To the extent that we ourselves are biological creatures then we share all of those basic traits with the entire organic kingdom.

But by 'transcending the biological' I mean h. sapiens has capacities and abilities which are beyond those biological functions, amazing though they might be. I see that as having occurred in the process of social development over many hundreds of thousands of years, with the appearance of art, literature, religion, language and story-telling. I think there are many human capacities which have no rationale or even utility from the viewpoint of evolutionary biology (although Dawkins suggests that just as a peacock's tail evolved because it was attractive to peahens, certain memes, like language, spread and evolve because they are attractive or useful to their human hosts. The idea is that language, like a peacock's tail, may have originally arisen for one purpose such as communication but then took on additional roles and became more elaborate, partly due to social selection - that is, being attractive or impressive to other humans. But I see that as reductionist - it reduces culture to a utility in the service of reproduction, or a byproduct of it, rather than having an instrinsic reality. I also include religious consciousness (though not all forms of religious belief or ideology) for which I don't think there is a biological rationale.

I'm using the term 'transcendent' more in the dictionary sense above, although I'm also drawn to the traditionalist idea that reason itself is a higher form of cognition. (This shows through in debates about Platonic realism and the nature of universals, i.e. that man 'the rational animal' is able to grasp through reason principles that are not perceptible to the senses alone and to other creatures.) So I think the attempt to account for human capacities purely through the lens of biological evolution is generally reductionist (see Anything But Human.) Of course I also understand that many people will say 'but what else is there?' as evolution to all intents is the 'secular creation myth'.

Incidentally, as this thread is about Kant, we should mention his distinction between the two terms:

Transcendental: In Kant's philosophy, "transcendental" refers to the conditions that make knowledge possible. It is not about the objects of knowledge themselves but about our mode of knowing those objects prior to the experience of them. Transcendental concepts are a priori, meaning they exist prior to experience. They are necessary conditions for the possibility of experiencing and understanding the world. For example, time and space are transcendental ideas; they are not derived from experience but are the necessary conditions under which any sensory experience can occur.

Transcendent: On the other hand, "transcendent" refers to that which goes beyond the limits of experience and possible knowledge. It deals with things that lie beyond what we can cognitively grasp. In Kant's view, transcendent ideas are those that venture beyond the boundaries of human understanding and into the realm of the unknowable. For instance, the concept of God, the soul, or the totality of the universe are transcendent ideas because they are beyond the scope of empirical investigation and human comprehension.

What do the Indirect Realist say about A priori concepts and space and time? Can these be mind-independent? — Corvus

Does what we perceive as time and space exist outside our perception of it?

I can only see a red postbox because I was born with the innate ability to see wavelengths of between about 400nm to 700nm, meaning that I cannot see ultra-violet, as it has a wavelength lower than 400nm.

It is not so much that I have a priori knowledge of the colour red, but more that I have the a priori ability to see the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 650nm.

I can reason that time exists independently of the mind, but as I can only exist in one moment of time, I can only ever perceive one moment in time. This means that I can never perceive the passage of time, as I can never perceive two different moments in time at the same time.

So our perception of time is an illusion

I can reason that objects such as apples exist in a mind-independent world, but this depends on the ontological existence of spatial relations in a mind-independent world, such that the top of the apple is "above" the bottom of the apple. But the ontological existence in a mind-independent world of spatial relations is problematic, because, although matter may experience forces acting upon it, matter doesn't experience spatial relations acting upon it.

So our perception of space is also an illusion.

As an Indirect Realist, I am not saying that there isn't a cause in a mind-independent of our perceptions, but am saying that what we perceive to be in the world doesn't actually exist in the world. When I perceive the colour red, my reason tells me that there is something in the world that caused me to perceive the colour red, but what is in the world is not how I perceive the colour red. Similarly, when I perceive time and space, my reason tells me that there is something in the world that caused me to perceive time and space, but what is in the world is not how I perceive time and space.

So our perception of time is an illusion — RussellA

So our perception of space is also an illusion. — RussellA

But in Kant, Space and Time are a priori condition for our experience of the external world. He doesn't see them as illusion. On that basis, can Kant be branded as an Indirect Realist?

:cool: :ok:

But in Kant, Space and Time are a priori condition for our experience of the external world. He doesn't see them as illusion — Corvus

It wouldn't be an illusion if I saw an Ichthyocentaur, but to think that Ichthyocentaurs exist in the world would be an illusion.

I agree that for Kant, Space and Time are a priori condition for our experience of the external world, and doesn't see them as illusions.

However, there are different aspects to the meaning of "illusion". For example, if I walk outdoors and see an Ichthyocentaur walking along the road, one the one hand this is not an illusion as this is what in fact I see, but on the other hand, I may reason that because of its improbability, this is in fact an illusion .

My innate ability to see the colour red is a prior condition of my ability to experience an external world, but this does not mean that the colour red exists in the external world.

On the one hand the fact that I see the colour red is not an illusion, as I truly see the colour red, though on the other hand I can reason that as the colour red doesn't exist in a mind-independent world, my seeing the colour red is in fact an illusion.

Similarly, one the one hand the fact that I perceive things in time and space is not an illusion, as it is a fact that I do perceive things in time and space, but on the other hand, I can reason that what I perceive is not what exists in the world, and in this sense it is an illusion to think that what I perceive also exists in the world.

An appearance can never be an illusion, though one can reason that the appearance is an illusion.

his distinction between the two terms — Wayfarer

Transcendent: one of two domains to which cognitions relate.
Transcendental: that mode of pure reason by which certain modes of cognition are determined.

Humans are a funny bunch. They create for themselves those things to which they actually attribute the impossibility of experiencing in the same way as they experience material things, from which follows they immediately prevent themselves from knowing those things they create, in the same way they know rocks roll downhill. That one domain in which cognitions of knowledge is abolished in favor of mere cognitions of belief, or, which is the same thing, any knowledge of its objects is impossible, is called transcendent.

But humans also create for themselves that which they may or may not then construct as things in the real world. Insofar as knowledge of objects in this domain is at least possible, it is called immanent.

Transcendent is that in the juxtaposition of domains in which experience is the arbiter.
—————-

That humans in general can create as thought, what is not yet, and even may never, be constructed in the world as real, is possible insofar as the human intellect is endowed with a particular capacity, and anything which follows in accordance with that capacity, regardless of the reality of its objects, is transcendental.

Transcendental is, then, the mode of pure reason as an intrinsic human intellectual capacity, by which all its exercises relate to those pure a priori cognitions it creates for itself, thus having nothing whatsoever to do with experience as such.

The discipline in which all such exercises of this one faculty relate to, and legislate the operation of, the other higher cognitive faculties, re: understanding and judgement, is metaphysics.

The system in which this discipline administers the natural world, and by which experience is possible, is transcendental philosophy.

Or not…..

It wouldn't be an illusion if I saw an Ichthyocentaur, but to think that Ichthyocentaurs exist in the world would be an illusion. — RussellA

Aren't illusions to do with unfounded or mistaken sense perception?
"For example:

Auditory Illusions: These involve the sense of hearing. An example is the Shepard tone, an auditory illusion that sounds like a continuously ascending or descending pitch but is actually a cyclically repeating pattern.

Tactile Illusions: These involve the sense of touch. The rubber hand illusion is an example, where a person can be made to feel as if a rubber hand is their own by simultaneously stroking their real hand and a rubber hand.

Olfactory Illusions: These involve the sense of smell. Sometimes, our brain can interpret smells in a way that doesn't match the actual stimuli, creating olfactory illusions.

Gustatory Illusions: These involve the sense of taste. Flavor perception can be influenced by various factors, leading to illusions in the perception of taste." - CHATGPT

OR Visual illusions like from your own case, seeing an Ichthyocentaur, when it was actually a next door neighbor's dog, or a shadow of a chair.

You wouldn't say your thinking that 1+1=5, or your belief that there are Martians dancing in Mars are illusion.

To think that something exists in the world when it doesn't is misunderstanding or fallacies. To believe in something that is not the case is a groundless belief or fallacies, but not an illusion.

So our perception of time is an illusion
— RussellA
So our perception of space is also an illusion.
— RussellA
But in Kant, Space and Time are a priori condition for our experience of the external world. He doesn't see them as illusion. — Corvus

Here is a perfect transcendental illusion:

One intelligence puts forth a certain proposition, in which there resides in the subject a certain conception.

Another intelligence, upon reception of the proposition as an appearance, attaches to the subject of the received proposition, a conception that was not antecedently contained in it, thus does not consequently belong to it.

PERCEPTION (of space is an illusion) becomes SPACE (is an illusion).

If it be assumed the second intelligence understands the conceptions contained in the originating proposition, and judges them as united without contradiction in it, but nonetheless projects an understanding of his in the form of his own proposition, in which the subject in his does not relate to the subject in the other’s, his reason has deluded itself without his conscious awareness.

Such is not the least a slight on intelligence in general, but on reason itself, to which every intelligence is susceptible. These, while entirely unremedial, can be nonetheless guarded against.

PERCEPTION (of space is an illusion) becomes SPACE (is an illusion). — Mww

What are the differences on PERCEPTION of space and SPACE?

You’re saying, ideas must refer to something - they must have a real referent that exists ‘out there somewhere’ as the saying has it. That is what I think Magee is referring to when he wrote "the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect". It is what later phenomenology refers to as ’the natural attitude’. — Wayfarer

Yes, I cannot have an idea without the idea being about something, in that I can have a concrete idea, such as the idea of a house, or I can have an abstract idea, such as the idea of angst. Such ideas refer to something, which could be a concept such as house or angst, or an instantiation of a concept such as this house or my angst.

Are concepts such as house or angst real? Are instantiation of concepts such as this house or my angst real? Depends what is meant by "real".

Do concepts such as house or angst exist? Do instantiations of concepts such as this house or my angst exist? Depends what is meant by "exist".

I see a house and I feel angst, naively this is just a fact, not to be questioned but accepted for what they appear to be, taking no position as to the reality of what I see, and withholding any conscious opinion as to the ontological status of what I see. What I see is part of a world existing prior to my having perceived it. The Natural Attitude of the phenomenologist and the inborn realism of Bryan Magee.

Within the Phenomenalist's Natural Attitude, my concept of a Thing-in-Itself is then just its appearance .

So far so good, yet the Phenomenologist goes further than this naive Natural Attitude by freeing themselves of the restrictions of the Natural Attitude by using the principle of Phenomenological Reduction. This recognizes that others are not objects but subjects like myself, where my experience becomes inseparable to the experiences of others and by revealing a transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

Within the Phenomenalist's Reduction, my concept of a Thing-in-Itself is then more than just its appearance.

But how can my concept of a Thing-in-Itself be more than just its appearance, if by definition it is impossible to conceptualise a Thing-in-Itself outside of its appearance?

(Marc Applebaum, Key Ideas in Phenomenology: The Natural Attitude)

Perception is an activity; space is a pure representation.

In so far as space is merely itself a representation, and perception of representations is impossible, perception of space is incomprehensible.

Yours was valid as a question, but dialectically irrelevant.

Perception is an activity; space is a pure representation. — Mww

Ehyyyy - I was not asking about Perception, but Perception of space.