But true or false? I don't think so. I just can't see how they are the sort of things that might be true or false. — hypericin
The question is not whether moral statements are truth-apt. They clearly are.
The problem is, are the moral systems against which moral statements are true or false themselves truth-apt? Here I think not. — hypericin
Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to hold that X exists objectively. On this view, moral anti-realism is the denial of the thesis that moral properties—or facts, objects, relations, events, etc. (whatever categories one is willing to countenance)—exist objectively. This could involve either (1) the denial that moral properties exist at all, or (2) the acceptance that they do exist but this existence is (in the relevant sense) non-objective. There are broadly two ways of endorsing (1): moral noncognitivism and moral error theory. Proponents of (2) may be variously thought of as moral non-objectivists, or idealists, or constructivists. So understood, moral anti-realism is the disjunction of three theses:
i. moral noncognitivism
ii. moral error theory
iii. moral non-objectivism
I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>.
No, I don't think so. According to the standard view, someone who accepts objective moral values is a moral realist. What source are you using?
Again, my definition pertains to the bindingness of a moral prescription, and you agreed to that definition. Are you withdrawing your agreement?
I assume this is a typo and you meant to say "moral realism."
"I believe the proposition, but that doesn't mean I think it's true."
For example, you think that we should not torture babies, and that this moral norm applies universally and unchangeably.
So if there were an intersubjective agreement that it is permissible to torture babies, then it would be permissible to torture babies?
Does the wrongness of torturing babies change with the opinions of the day?
As outlined by Michael and others in the other thread (link), moral truth claims adhere to a basic sort of correspondence theory of truth. At least this is how I mean them. You are thinking in terms of a formal systems notion of truth. It’s an equivocation on what “truth” means. For example, we can call the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity a tautology (“truth” in the formal systems sense), but that is not how Catholics mean it. — Leontiskos
Now, there may be people who earnestly profess to fail to comprehend morality. But I would say that if it is observable in their actions then they understand it just fine, it's just that their theory is at odds with their actions. — Leontiskos
Firstly, it isn’t immutable. I have the taste that everyone should not torture babies, and that could very well change (although I doubt it) in the future.
Secondly, it is not ‘universal’ in any objective sense. I subjectively commit myself to trying to universalize my goal.
Think of it this way. Imagine that we programmed an AI such that they had the sole goal all the time of trying to convince and ultimately stopping people from torturing babies. All else being equal, that people shouldn’t torture babies is not a fact, the AI just has this ingrained taste. Now, does this change the fact that this AI is trying to universalize their taste? Not at all. You seem to omit this option in your analysis. — Bob Ross
Hi Leontiskos, thanks for making this point, it is crucial. It is precisely here that I am an error theorist. People go around all the time making doctrinal claims as if they were correspondence to reality claims. Pick any ideology, religion, political system, etc., you want, and you will find people talking about it as if they were claiming things about reality. When in fact, they are making doctrinal claims about and within a certain framework of beliefs. This is in fact a basic cognitive error, and it is for the clarification of errors of this sort that philosophy exists in the first place.
Moral claims absolutely do not escape this, as much as it might hurt the feelings of those making them. Moral claims are simply impossible without a moral doctrine within which they exist. And this moral doctrine itself, unlike the claims made within it, is not truth apt.
The larger philosophical question is, what claims do escape this? — hypericin
It is such a strange and deep-seated malady of analytic philosophy whereby intelligence is reduced to computation and truth is reduced to tautology! Some philosophers have become so preoccupied with their systems that they seem to have forgotten that reality exists at all. Their Tower of Babel always ends up crashing down, and this occurs at approximately the same moment that the average person understands truth better and more clearly than they do. Truth is arrived at by judgment, not primarily by computation or syllogism or system. Judgment always comes first and precedes the others. The terms, the premises, the first principles, the inferences, the realities at stake—all of it is first subjected to judgment. There is no magic way to circumvent judgment and truth in the realest, most primary sense. In real life there are no axioms, only first principles that are either true or false. The suspension of judgment that putatively applies to axioms is but a useful fiction.
The same problem that occurs in moral epistemology also occurs in natural epistemology. The initial judgments that connect reason to the real world tend to elude analytic philosophers and “empiricists.” Hume ends up undermining not only morality, but also natural science. A truncated understanding of intelligence leads to a truncated understanding of reality. If intelligence were only computational, a matter of combining and separating, synthesis and analysis, then empiricists like Hume would be justified in their strange conclusions. But it is not. It is also comparison; comparison of things to one another and also comparison of ideas to things and to reality, whence the ideas are true or false. The most basic act is not even comparison per se, but rather affirmation and denial (the recognition and assertion that something is or that something is not). The simplicity of affirmation and denial precedes discursive computation and also grounds it, giving it meaning and purpose. If there is no truth in non-discursive reason, then there can be no truth in discursive reason (unless we substitute truth for a formalism, but this is not truth).
In my case, I do think this, but i dont think it's a norm — AmadeusD
Why are you trying to universalize a taste that is not universal in any objective sense?
Again, I think there is a relevant difference between ice cream preference and the belief that no one should torture babies
They respond, "No, it's my personal and subjective taste, but I just go around trying to persuade and even force everyone to eat only chocolate ice cream." And they take this to be a reasonable answer to my question. What would you say?
If moral subjectivism is the claim that moral judgments are idiosyncratic (flowing from subjectivity), then the evangelistic moral subjectivist is attempting to impose idiosyncrasies.
To be clear, I grant that your 'moral subjectivism' is probably not a form of moral realism, but I do not grant that it is coherent. It requires one to do things like impose idiosyncratic beliefs, or speak of judgments that are true and yet not objective.
I don't think there's a meaningful answer to the question. Some things are simply fundamental, brute facts about the world. Explanations have to come to an end somewhere. — Michael
But the fact that different people have different values means that there is no point-of-view invariant value, as value depends on the point of view. — bert1
First, note that it is a principle of action. Now when a principle of action is applied, it becomes a norm. — Leontiskos
One such way is by applying or maintaining a principle of action and refusing to call it a norm. — Leontiskos
Asking them to explain why it's the case that one ought not X is like asking the physicist why electrons are negatively charged particles. — Michael
Physicists can empirically verify is (with reference to definition, sure). Moral facts are not amendable to the same verification. I think this is the trouble, though i agree that's how realists see their position. — AmadeusD
If all you want to say is that moral realists haven't proven that there is something that one ought not do then I won't object — Michael
For example, we can call the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity a tautology (“truth” in the formal systems sense), but that is not how Catholics mean it. We do not mean, “If you accept our axioms then this follows tautologically.” We mean, “This is true, it correctly describes reality.” — Leontiskos
I am simply saying that moral realists believe that there is some X such that "one ought not X" is a brute fact. — Michael
If all you want to say is that moral realists haven't proven that there is something that one ought not do then I won't object. — Michael
But, I would say, within my metaethical framework, the reason I agree with you is not because there is a fact of the matter: it is because what we both consider “worthy” of imposement is similar to one another. They are both tastes (to me), but one hits towards my core morals and the other seems negligible. Why? I can’t give you a full account of my psychology, but I would guess it is a bit of biology, sociology, nurture, and psychology that motivate me towards finding that a reasonable assessment. — Bob Ross
So I don’t think you should find it that controversial when I say I would impose my belief that one should not torture babies but no the vanilla ice cream because I value the former simply so much; just like how you value moral facts so much that you will impose that taste on other people. — Bob Ross
I would find them “unreasonable”... — Bob Ross
What is incoherent about any of that? Please explicate two propositions which I affirm that you find to be incoherent. — Bob Ross
I make no such step. I think it's probably better that other people don't routinely do that, but that's only a comment on my own discomfort. I say literally nothing, and claim literally nothing, about how others should behave. I have thoughts, sure, but I refuse to(tbh, am not motivated to either) conclude anything. I inform my own actions. No one else's. And i don't, unless by incident. I suppose one could say 'norm' OR 'norm for me'. And yeah, it's normal for me not to want to torture babies. That doesn't extend to anyone else (again, other than the fact that it actually is normal, rather than normative, to not do that). — AmadeusD
I just can't see an issue with this. If your principles are applied only to yourself, you are making no attempt whatsoever to enforce them. You are not making judgements or proclamations on actions per se, but on your actions. — AmadeusD
To judge that, "we should not torture babies," — Leontiskos
"I should not torture babies, but this 'should' does not apply to others." — Leontiskos
@Leontiskos (sorry, only realised after the fact that this isn't going to include you otherwise)In my case, I do think this — AmadeusD
I have clarified this multiple times, at much pain (linguistically). i think this. I don't think it about anyone else. — AmadeusD
But by all means retract the claim. I assume this is what you are now doing? — Leontiskos
I really don't care how we got here. — AmadeusD
We got here when you tried to agree to a commonsensical claim that we should not torture babies, and then I pointed out that the claim is inconsistent with your position, and now you've slowly and painfully walked it back. So now you agree with me: you do not hold that we should not torture babies, because your presuppositions do not allow it. — Leontiskos
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