Why are electrons negatively charge particles? — Michael

It's arguably because of a decison made by a relatively uninformed Ben Franklin.

'Santa does not exist' can't be objectively true because it refers to no object. — AmadeusD

Why does something need to refer to an object to be objectively true? To be objectively true just means that it's true irrespective of subjective opinion.

If everyone believes that Santa exists then everyone is wrong because Santa doesn't exist.

there is no objective.

Objective means with respect to the object rather than the subject.
If there is no object to refer, where’s the objectivity? The “fact” that Santa doesn’t exist is a product of your subjective imagining that Santa could exist (well, that’s one path).
But it doesn’t refer to anything in the world. The objectively true thing is the state of affairs which excludes Santa.

Morality is the awakening of compassion through identification of one's self with the selves of others. With identification with others compassion arises, and one's self-interest is thought to be the collective self-interest of our common selves. It is a social process common to like kinds in nature, and serves well as a survival mechanism. Self-interest is what is acquired through this process of socialization through what is best for all like kinds of selves. This is determined through the experience of a meaningless outer world, the outer world's effect on the organism becomes meaning to the organism, which then bestows that said meaning to the outer world. The apparent reality of the organism is that of its experiences projected upon an otherwise meaningless world. Biology is the measure and the meaning of all things.

If that's what you mean by "objective" then I will use the term "non-subjective" instead.

Some truths are non-subjective, i.e. are true even if everyone believes otherwise.

The sentence "Santa does not exist" is true, and is so even if everyone believes that Santa does exist. If everyone believes that Santa does exist then everyone is wrong. "Santa does not exist" is non-subjectively true.

Moral realists claim that some sentence "one ought not X" is true, and is so even if everyone believes that one ought X. If everyone believes that one ought X then everyone is wrong. "One ought not X" is non-subjectively true.

The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" does not depend on the existence of some particular physical or abstract object. The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" does not depend on the existence of anything. The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" has nothing to do with existence at all.

Exactly like the non-subjective truth of "1 + 1 = 2".

It just is the case that 1 + 1 = 2 and just is the case that one ought not X, and if everyone believes otherwise then everyone is wrong.

Moral realists claim that some sentence "one ought not X" is true, and is so even if everyone believes that one ought X. If everyone believes that one ought X then everyone is wrong. "One ought not X" is non-subjectively true. — Michael

I would agree(with this description of the position). But I do have a problem equating something which can be necessarily inferred from a state of affairs, to something which truly is malleable to opinion (that one ought not x). There is nothing that makes this true if no one believes it. I think that’s probably a fairly comprehensible difference. I know that may not be your position - just giving my position on that, given we appear to have come to terms.

The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" does not depend on the existence of anything — Michael

This seems, too, to be both a bit silly given the kind of claim it is, but more interestingly a stark difference - where the object can be inferred to not exist from a state of affairs we have some reason to take it seriously. In the moral realist case (and this seems plainly evident with a fellow such as Banno) the claim is made…. And that’s it. It’s not inferred or exemplified or entailed by or understood in relation to anything which does exist. As much as it can be stated that its “the way things are” so to speak, that is incoherent as there’s zero evidence for it let alone good evidence.
It’s the norm. That’s it.

You can verify the equation. You can’t verify a moral claim.

But I do have a problem equating something which can be necessarily inferred from a state of affairs, to something which truly is malleable to opinion (that one ought not x). There is nothing that makes this true if no one believes it. I think that’s probably a fairly comprehensible difference. I know that may not be your position - just giving my position on that, given we appear to have come to terms. — AmadeusD

All you seem to be saying here is that you're not a moral realist. Obviously moral realists disagree with you; that one ought not X isn't malleable to opinion and there is something that makes "one ought not X" true if no one believes it: that one ought not X.

In the moral realist case (and this seems plainly evident with a fellow such as Banno) the claim is made…. And that’s it. It’s not inferred or exemplified or entailed by or understood in relation to anything which does exist. — AmadeusD

The same is true of mathematics. It is true that 1 + 1 = 2 even though this has nothing to do with the physical existence of anything. There are some, i.e. mathematical realists, who explain this by positing the existence of abstract mathematical objects, but I don't think that this is required. Mathematical anti-realists can believe that 1 + 1 = 2 even if everyone believes otherwise.

And perhaps some moral realists explain moral realism by positing the existence of abstract moral objects.

As much as it can be stated that its “the way things are” so to speak, that is incoherent as there’s zero evidence for it let alone good evidence.

You can verify the equation. You can’t verify a moral claim. — AmadeusD

Some think you can verify a moral claim. Kant attempted to prove the categorical imperative using what he called pure practical reason.

But even if you can't, it doesn't then follow that moral realism is false. It is possible that a) there is some sentence "one ought not X" that is non-subjectively true and that b) it is impossible to verify or falsify this sentence.

There are plenty of truth-apt sentences that cannot be proven or disproven, e.g. "the universe was created by a transcendent intelligent designer" and "if Hitler hadn't killed himself then he would have been arrested."

As I said before, if your only objection is that moral realists haven't proven that there are brute moral facts then I won't object. My only argument here is to refute the suggestion that all brute facts must have something to do with physical (or abstract) existence.

All you seem to be saying here is that you're not a moral realist. Obviously moral realists disagree with you; that one ought not X isn't malleable to opinion and there is something that makes "one ought not X" true if no one believes it: that one ought not X. — Michael

Well yes and no - yes; that’s right, but no I was attempting to explain why. Their claim of truth doesn’t amount to anything.

And perhaps some moral realists explain moral realism by positing the existence of abstract moral objects. — Michael

Perhaps they do. I can’t bring myself to ascribe a defence I’ve never seen to them though. But more than this, you can verify that equation with objects. The equation works with any two objects you like. Morality isn’t open to this verification. As stated.

b) it is impossible to verify or falsify this sentence — Michael

I only really agree with this part (which seems the most important anyway).

My only argument here is to refute the suggestion that all brute facts must have something to do with physical (or abstract) existence. — Michael

I don’t really think that works. Morality isn’t maths. It talks about behaviour which are actual events in the world so I personally think there needs to be a connection. But that’s an immature and undeveloped idea about it.

I should also be clear here I’m
Merely discussing these positions. Not holding you to any of them. Your comments elsewhere seem to agree with my overall position.

This, in summary, is where the confusion lay: I was thinking you were saying us contemplating what is acceptable/unacceptable counts as moral facts when, if I am understanding you correctly now, you are not saying that. — Bob Ross

Not what I said then or now.

So, to me, both of these statements have the same truth-maker — Bob Ross

The post you are responding to already addressed this claim (my emphasis):

That there is no ball in your room is a truth maker.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different truth maker.

This must be the case otherwise it would be the case that "there is no ball in your room" is true iff there is no elephant in your room, which is of course false.

If your room is the only thing that exists then it is the case that a) just one thing exists and b) there are (at least) two different truth makers. — Michael

I would suggest you read my response again: I don't see how anything you noted helped further the conversation.

Well maybe "should" was too strong a word but I think similar kinds of skepticism as with moral realism can lead you to drop other realisms. Where to draw the line? Depends who you are I guess. It doesn't seem to me a big leap from dropping moral facts to modal facts which do not seem to be anymore facts about actual events as morality is. Dropping normativity in the context of morality does not seem such a stretch either from dropping normativity about beliefs all together which I am sure a lot of moral anti-realists would not find easy. I think the idea that there is no objective fact about what someone ought to do would also cover beliefs if it covers moral facts, ceteris paribus. I think there's probably other parallels too where some argument against moral facts might apply to other facts.

I guess there is no good well-defined place for deciding where you should stop in terms of skepticism though. Even the most stringent anti-realist I am sure will not give up everything. — Apustimelogist

Sorry it took me so long to respond. This gave me a lot to think about. :up:

I've got more mulling to do, but I agree with your penultimate sentence.

Your point about modality I find especially interesting, in that it seems that consideration of alternate possibilities (of past and future) is a rather important aspect of what our brains do. On the other hand, on the space-time block view that relativistic physics suggests, such possibilities are figments of our imagination. On the third hand, it seems rather undeniable that our imaginings of future possibilities (whether accurate or not) can play a significant role in how the future turns out (at least within the context of the suface of one tiny planet).

Still mulling...

What do you mean here by "responsibility"?
— baker

Responsibility for what you say and do; to answer for it, to make it intelligible, clarify, qualify, be read by it, judged by it, held to it, make excuses for it, etc. That words not only do not stand outside of the circumstances in which they are spoken, but that an expression is an event that has an afterwards, to which you are tied. — Antony Nickles

Responsible to whom? Answer to whom? To make it intelligible, clarify, qualify, be read to/by whom? Judged by whom?

This is the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics. Moral realism – like non-cognitivism, subjectivism, and error theory – is a theory in metaethics. Utilitarianism and deontology are theories in normative ethics. — Michael

I don't understand how metaethics can be so neatly separated from normative ethics.
All ethics are, by their nature, normative, that's the point of ethics. How can there be any talk about ethics that is not normative?

I don't understand how metaethics can be so neatly separated from normative ethics.
All ethics are, by their nature, normative, that's the point of ethics. How can there be any talk about ethics that is not normative? — baker

There's a simple description of the distinction on the Wikipedia page for normative ethics:

Normative ethics is distinct from meta-ethics in that the former examines standards for the rightness and wrongness of actions, whereas the latter studies the meaning of moral language and the metaphysics of moral facts.

Metaethics:
1. Moral propositions are not truth-apt (non-cognitivism)
2. Moral propositions are truth-apt (cognitivism)
3. All moral propositions are false (error theory)
4. Some moral propositions are objectively true (moral realism)
5. Some moral propositions are subjectively true (moral subjectivism)

Normative ethics:
1. Pleasure is good (hedonism)
2. Maximising happiness and well-being is good (utilitarianism)
3. Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (categorical imperative)

Responsible to whom? Answer to whom? To make it intelligible, clarify, qualify, be read to/by whom? Judged by whom? — baker

Anyone? Myself included. Like if I make a claim and you question it; I clarify, or provide evidence, stand by my words, or rescind them, try to weasel out of the implications, etc. And we judge based on the criteria for a thing (or make it personal). I’m not sure what to say as I don’t know what the confusion or contention is.