...a moral realist can say anything... — Tom Storm

Well, one hopes for coherence. And as you say, folk tend to agree on the basics.

I was assuming that to be a realist you had to have some sort of foundational guarantee for the belief — Tom Storm

That's a pretty widespread misunderstanding.

How useful is the term moral realism? The only people not covered by it would seem to be some types of relativist who say anything goes.

A sharp question.

The main motivation against moral realism, especially around here, is the naturalism that takes scientific fact as the only sort of truth worthy of the title. The notion has a strong place in pop science culture, and comes to us mainly from the logical empiricists, Ayer and Carnap and so on. They denigrate moral language as not based on scientific reality, and by extension seek to mark ethical statements as not truth-apt; as being mere opinion or taste or some such, and hence (somewhat inconsistently) as being neither true nor false.

This motivation was clear in the present thread.

How are moral facts discovered?

Also, of they contradict ones own values, how does one choose what to do?

Thanks for taking the time.

How are moral facts discovered? — bert1

Kant said through pure practical reason. Others say via ethical intuition.

Also, of they contradict ones own values, how does one choose what to do? — bert1

I asked this question myself several years ago.

They do not hold that tastes can be imposed on other people, and that is what you have consistently held.

Unless you mean something other than ‘preference’ by ‘taste’, then they absolutely do. Moral non-cognitivists, like emotivists, hold that our moral judgments are expressions of our emotions, like ‘Boo! Yayyy!’, and the vast majority don’t see anything wrong with doing that. They don’t end their articles or essays with ‘but this is all just irrational and we should stop doing it’.

why do you enforce and care about the moral facts?. Because you simply like it—not because there is a fact of the matter — Bob Ross

You're obviously begging the question.

How? Is your enforcement of the moral facts not a taste you have? It can’t be a moral fact, can it?

No, because what I "want" flows from my "subjectivity," and what I am bound by (morality) flows from something that is objective

Leontiskos, I never doubted that for a second, what I am saying is that the ‘what [that]...flows from something objective’ doesn’t entail nor imply that you should want to enforce or impose them on other people (which flows from subjectivity). So, why are you warranted in imposing that taste on other people?

My other point was that my position, like yours, does not entail that ‘I can do whatever I want’ in the colloquial use of that sentence, because I am not claiming everything is morally permissible.

If there is a speed limit of 55 mph that I am bound to obey, then I cannot do whatever I want. Suppose you repudiate the speed law. I conclude, "You can drive as fast as you want!" You respond that you have certain subjective inclinations that tend to limit your speed to 55 mph, and that, after all, we are both in the same boat with regard to a speed limit. But this is patently false, for we are not in the same situation at all. I can expand if you disagree.

Of course, I agree these are not equivocal, but they are analogous….and that’s my point. You upholding and caring about the speed limit (law) is subjective and you cannot ground it in objectivity. This is required for you to enforce yourself and others to go only 55 mph, but this does not negate that there is a fact-of-the-matter of a 55 mph speed limit. My point is that what is analogous is that you are subjectively enforcing the law, and I am subjectively enforcing my law: so, if, according to you, we are never justified in imposing subjectivity on each other, then why are you justified in subjecting me to the law if it requires your subjective enforcement (caring) of the law. This is the line between axiology and morality, such I am trying to get you to see that they are companions in guilt.

Your point is presumably that either I could also choose to repudiate the speed limit, or else that I am lying about my belief that the speed limit binds me. If I am lying then we are in the same boat, but of course I am not lying. I could choose to repudiate the speed limit, but I have not done so, and therefore we are not in the same boat.

I think you missed the point, and I refer you to what I noted above. You seem to skip over the fact that you have no objective reason to enforce the law.

Then, positively, if I saw someone imposing his ice cream taste, I would deem him irrational. It wouldn't matter at all if he really cares about that ice cream flavor. I would still deem him irrational

I think this is simply because it is so far out of the norm of things people really care about and you don’t approve of people caring that much about ice cream—not that there is some sort of fact out there that deems it false, nor that they are being logically inconsistent nor incoherent. What’s contradictory about imposing ice cream tastes on people? Nothing. It’s weird, odd, and most people will disapprove; but it is not logically inconsistent nor incoherent.

Namely, if I saw someone imposing something like an ice cream taste, that would be irrational. You say that you are willing to impose things that are like ice cream tastes, and therefore I deem you irrational.

I personally would not impose tastes that are like ice cream tastes, but what I am saying is that fundamentally how we decide what is worth imposing with respect to tastes is just what we care enough about. I don’t care enough about ice cream flavors to impose that on other people: it seems very trivial and it violates my own moral law. I very much believe in human rights, believe it or not...they just aren’t derived from something objective (;

By ‘taste’ I don’t just mean superficial preferences, I mean all preferences; and perhaps you are excluding deeper preferences from the term ‘taste’ because you keep going back to the ice cream example.

Imposition requires more than that.

What exactly does it require? And how are you not being incoherent with respect to axiology?

I suspect that you know this. You know it is irrational to impose ice cream tastes, even if one cares about them a great deal. And you know that if X is not imposable, and Y is like X, then Y is also not imposable.

I am saying that what is imposable is fundamentally subjective and determined by the degree of interest a person has in something. By ‘interest’ I don’t just mean superficial hobbies, I mean things like ‘I am very interested in not letting people torture other people’ or ‘increasing human rights’. Personally, I don’t approve of imposing ice cream tastes because I don’t care about it enough nor approve of other people caring about it that much to impose it on each other. I think the world is a (subjectively) better place where people can eat whatever ice cream they want.

I do appreciate these long and detailed posts of yours, but if I tried to engage them in detail I would soon run short on time. I cannot responsibly enter into such long-form discussions at this point. This seems to have been a difficulty throughout: you have much more time than I do, and that discrepancy becomes problematic.

I totally get being low on time, but this is the major issue of this conversation is that you keep ignoring large chunks of my responses and then hostilely respond with less relevant information. We are making no progress because, I would say, you are not genuinely contending with the majority of what I am saying. You just keep defaulting to “you can’t impose tastes”, “that’s irrational”, etc.

I would respectfully ask that you wait and respond when you do have time, because I appreciate responses with substance over quick responses.

I will say, though, that the central problem is that you mistake states of affairs with physical reality, and Michael has addressed this in detail in the other thread.

Interesting: can you elaborate? I specifically put in a paragraph addressing this because it is a common objection: I would say that ‘state-of-affair’ is referring to any arrangement, atemporal or temporal or spatial or aspatial alike, and not physical reality. I know non-naturalists and theists are generally going to want to escape going this route, but I don’t think they can. I am also talking about moral facts from God’s nature, and platonic forms. If you beg to differ, then I am all ears!

Of course if you assert an ontological position which denies the possibility of normative realities then normative realities will be excluded from your ontology.

The reason I deny it is not dogmatic: it is because of P1. You would have to reject P1 to accept normative realities that are supersensible.

But as I have noted, beginning with totalizing, abstract, categorical systems is just a poor way to do philosophy, or to think in general. If you are not able to consider individual propositions independently of your a priori system, then you have walled yourself off from new data, information, and insight.

I have consider moral naturalist, theist, and non-naturalist realist positions with respect to as many as I can get my hands on. I can assure you I have not just whimsically decided to cut myself off from a rich subset of moral realism. I don’t think any of them work, and my argument boils down to that one I shared previously and because I just don’t buy the positive arguments for those positions themselves.

If you disagree, then please provide me with some arguments or a contention with my argument.

The closest anyone has got is Banno's weirdo move of just claiming 'brute fact' without anything whatsoever to establish that claim — AmadeusD

If Banno's view is realism, it is an extremely thin, watered down realism where "truth" is nothing more than how we use the word, regardless of what "truth" actually means. Neither does it rule out moral truth relativism. Its therefore probably not a kind of realism that is problematic for an anti-realist.

Can any realist name any nonmoral proposition, that is neither logically derivable nor in principle empirically verifiable, that you nonetheless are certain is true?

You're not following. A chess claim is true, but not because it follows from an arbitrary system. — Leontiskos

Then what does a chess claim follow from, if not the arbitrary system of chess?

And without the taxonomical system that makes the apple sentence seem obvious to us, it is no more comprehensible than, "Bloofas are common in ariondus." Your notion of a "system" is arbitrary, and it is supporting your question-begging. — Leontiskos

"Taxonomical system" is a puffed up way of saying, "knowing what the words mean". Every single proposition requires knowing what the words mean. So can our already devolving discussion account for two systems simultaneously? I.e., the system of chess, and the language system within which the claims are made? Or can we agree to ignore the system that is common to every claim?

Oh, I gave my definition of a moral judgment — Leontiskos

Your definition is an arbitrary assertion that flies in the face of actual usage. A verbal bolus pulled straight out of your ass, no better than if I said

"Airplanes are things that fly."
"But, birds are not airplanes."
"Well, according to my philosophical definition they are!"

You intend to assert that your moral claims are system-bound, but you are unable to understand that your intention is actually supra-systematic. — Leontiskos

Just because you come from a culture that believes its values are decrees from God doesn't mean everyone is running around thinking that way. The fact that people, including philosophers, confuse their values for objective facts hardly amounts to a conspiracy. People get this wrong about their food and music preferences. Why shouldn't they get it wrong about moral values?

Arguendo, why can't the same hold of morality? Again, your non-parity continues to struggle. — Leontiskos

Its you realists that struggle, that throw up your hands and say "whelp, its a brute fact, what else can I say! Explanation's gotta stop somewhere!". This is an anti-scientific, anti-philosophical attitude.

One could attempt to answer the question, "Why are electrons negatively charged?," but the attempt is only worthwhile if the interlocutor accepts that, in practice, there is a limit to explanation. Once it is recognized that the interlocutor will not admit this (and is not therefore not being serious), one will not attempt an answer. — Leontiskos

Total non-argument. One can attempt to answer any question, independent of what their interlocutor thinks or not. This is a powerfully weak excuse for your refusal to answer anything. How can you accuse us of asking endless "why's", when you have not answered even one?

In any case, it's nowhere near a philosophical account of truth. — Leontiskos

Why on earth would I waste time on a philosophical account of truth on someone who can't even stick to the right dictionary definition?

If you don't think moral anti-realism lost the day in this thread, then you simply don't understand the OP or the purpose of this thread. — Leontiskos

:lol: :rofl:

Double post

Its therefore probably not a kind of realism that is problematic for an anti-realist. — Apustimelogist

I would whole-heartedly agree. But his persistence in pretending his proclamations amount to 'truth-making statements' is absurd, and in service to pretending moral realism is a done deal. At least, that's his version.

Its you realists that struggle, that are throw up your hands and say "whelp, its a brute fact, what else can I say! Explanation's gotta stop somewhere!". This is an anti-scientific, anti-philosophical attitude. — hypericin

:ok: It always amounts to this. I wonder if Banno is actually a secret theist.

and by extension seek to mark ethical statements as not truth-apt; as being mere opinion or taste or some such, and hence (somewhat inconsistently) as being neither true nor false. — Banno

That's true of moral statements, and it is not inconsistent. It is true of all moral statements.

The cool thing about the position i hold is, is that nothing you or Leontiskos have asserted has any affect on the premise that 'There are no objective moral standards'. So, without a 'chosen' system there literally are no true moral statements, and that hasn't even been addressed by continually just stating that kicjking puppies for fun is wrong. Yep, that's your view.

On with yee. LOL

Its you realists that struggle, that are throw up your hands and say "whelp, its a brute fact, what else can I say! Explanation's gotta stop somewhere!" — hypericin

It's either that or infinitism.

Brute facts seem more reasonable to me than an infinite regress.

Why on earth would I waste time on a philosophical account of truth... — hypericin

Because this is a philosophy forum, and when you critique someone else's definition of a term such as 'moral' or 'truth' while simultaneously refusing to offer your own definition, you come off as a petulant child who hacks away with their naive intuitions, incapable of rigorous thought or reflection.

Brute facts seem more reasonable to me than an infinite regress. — Michael

That's a fair thing to intuit. I intuit the other way. Any interest in hashing that out?

You are the child playing with essentially homonyms of "true": "True likeness!" "True levelling plane!". Just because I refuse to engage with this rhetorical idiocy does not obligate me to the labor of providing a philosophical definition of truth, which is a mare's nest and really an activity you only intend as deflection and distraction from your mistake.

- Mmmk then. :roll:

I would respectfully ask that you wait and respond when you do have time, because I appreciate responses with substance over quick responses. — Bob Ross

Then I will just end the conversation with an analogy. Consider the case of a fellow who, for whatever reason, does not currently engage in the act of visual sight. We can leave aside the question of 'why' (maybe it is because he has his eyelids closed and has never learned to open them; maybe he was born without eyes or without sight; maybe he has gouged out his own eyes; maybe there is some other reason).

He hears others argue and speak about so-called "visual objects." Impatiently, he says, "What are you talking about!? There is no such thing as visual objects! Prove to me that they exist. I admit that there are auditory, sensory, olfactory, and taste-based objects. I absolutely deny any other sui generis category of object. Prove to me, on the basis of these four objects, that visual objects exist." The others don't know what to make of the challenge. Perhaps they tell him to open his eyes. Perhaps they attempt an eye-surgery. Perhaps they try for some manner of artificial sight. They know as well as he that the challenge he has provided is logically impossible to fulfill. He has painted himself into a corner, and he cannot be gotten out on his own terms. Either something breaks through his logical system from without, or else he remains in darkness.

Good luck.

It's either that or infinitism.

Brute facts seem more reasonable to me than an infinite regress. — Michael

In science, brute facts are a last resort. Scientific analysis doesn't stop, "why does an election have a negative charge" is not a brute fact, and has an explanation in terms of particle physics, afaik. Science may some day arrive at an ultimate fact that explains itself. Until then, they will keep pushing deeper.

Whereas here, the moral realists seem to use the notion of brute facts to excuse them from offering any explanations whatsoever.

How are moral facts discovered? — bert1

I don't think they are.

This seems to me to be a result of direction of fit. When we discover a new thing we investigate it, and then we talk about it, making words that fit the thing discovered. The direction of fit here is from word to world, we change what we say to match what we find.

But for moral truths the direction of fit is reversed.We would change the world to match how it ought to be. We don't discover moral truths so much as enact them.

Also, of they contradict ones own values, how does one choose what to do? — bert1

I doubt that there could be a general answer to this question, any more than there might be a general answer for when, say, a scientific investigation does not match the expected result. Is it a fault of the experiment? A mistake in the calculations? Is there something not understood in the theory? Or does the theory need major modification? Finding the answer is not easy.

If you reject moral realism, you somehow have to maintain that we should not cause suffering, and yet deny that "we should not cause suffering" is true. — Banno

It's called a "value". One can hold values, tastes, preferences, without being obligated that any of these is "true" in an objective sense. One is only obligated to the trivial claim that "That I hold this value/taste/preference is true".

Whereas here, the moral realists seem to use the notion of brute facts to excuse them from offering any explanations whatsoever. — hypericin

If moral facts are brute facts then there is no explanation.

If moral facts are brute facts then there is no explanation. — Michael

How do you know they are brute facts? By your inability to explain them?

If moral facts are brute facts then there is no explanation. — Michael

The thing is, there are areas of research pointing to there being explanations beyond mere brute fact. See Jon Haidt's The Rightous Mind. There is value in understanding one's tendencies to moral judgement in order to deal with those tendencies skillfully.

We don't discover moral truths so much as enact them. — Banno

So to be clear, the Nazis were also enacting moral truths?

How do you know they are brute facts? By your inability to explain them? — hypericin

If moral facts are not reducible to non-moral facts (whether physical or mathematical or magical) then they must be brute.

The thing is, there are areas of research pointing to there being explanations beyond mere brute fact. See Jon Haidt's The Rightous Mind. There is value in understanding one's tendencies to moral judgement in order to deal with those tendencies skillfully. — wonderer1

You seem to be confusing metaethics with descriptive ethics. Moral facts, as per moral realism, are independent from our moral judgements.

If moral facts are brute facts then there is no explanation. — Michael

This is true - But i think the fundamental problem you, Bob Ross, and I have all come across these last weeks - is that it may not be the case that there is no explanation - but that realists can't grok/don't notice the deeper facts that explain their position, or the competing position. When a moral claim is made and called Brute, I can recognize the deeper facts it rests on, generally. It is the plum non-engagement with them that frustrates the discussion, from my view.