Yes, I notices you moving the goalposts. It doesn't help you, unless you can show how you hold a value without holding that value to be true, in which case we are entitled to conclude that you think values truth apt. — Banno
...although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way
I've said before I don't really care what you call it. the interesting bit is that moral statements have a truth value. — Banno
I can hold a moral value without holding that it is true in the same way I can have a taste preference without holding that the preference is true. — hypericin
I'm not surprised. The term is a pest.The main disagreement seems to be precisely on its objectivity. — Michael
The main motivation against moral realism, especially around here, is the naturalism that takes scientific fact as the only sort of truth worthy of the title. The notion has a strong place in pop science culture, and comes to us mainly from the logical empiricists, Ayer and Carnap and so on. They denigrate moral language as not based on scientific reality, and by extension seek to mark ethical statements as not truth-apt; as being mere opinion or taste or some such, and hence (somewhat inconsistently) as being neither true nor false. — Banno
Depends on the statement in question. "One ought keep one's promises" is a bit like (2) in that it depends on convention. "One ought not kick puppies for fun" is in some ways not like (1) because the fit is reversed.Are moral truths like (1) or like (2)? — Michael
All moral truths are true. — Banno
All very good questions. Have you any answers? — Banno
So we have:
1. Moral sentences are not truth-apt (non-cognitivism), or
2. It is not wrong to eat babies (error theory), or
3. It would not be wrong to eat babies if everyone said so (subjectivism), or
4. It would be wrong to eat babies even if everyone said otherwise (realism) — Michael
1. The diamond is made of carbon
2. The diamond is worth $1,000
We can all be wrong about (1) but can't all be wrong about (2). (2) is true because of social conventions/intersubjective agreement, etc. whereas (1) is true even if we all believe otherwise.
Are moral truths like (1) or like (2)? — Michael
If the "deeper fact" is itself moral, then this is not a rebuttal. — Leontiskos
But more simply, to rebut "moral statements are brute," with, "moral statements cannot be brute," is obviously begging the question. — Leontiskos
Thank you very much for this. Hmm. Maybe I'm conflating what's being rebutted then and missing that entirely.. because I just reject this entirely as to what i've attempted to do (stick with me, lol).. So: would it make sense of what i've been saying if it were transposed to be a rebuttal to that claim viz.
Claim: "One ought not kick puppies" (as a brute fact, ostensibly supporting the ethical position)
Response: Hey, that is actually not a brute fact (because XYZ underlying facts/data)
would be a rebuttal of that claim, but not the ethical framework? If this is what it appears to be, that would solve any issue i had with the exchange previous. — AmadeusD
showing that they cannot, surpasses this though, surely.
I guess what i mean to say here, is that I am claiming that the position that Moral facts are brute consists in them not being reducible. But if they are necessarily reducible, they are not brute facts.
Assume that's true - Am i just fucking up on applying this to the framework rather than any particular claim? — AmadeusD
But no one has attempted such a thing. I — Leontiskos
n different ways we have all been trying to show that the schema upon which the arguments against moral realism depend is fatally flawed. — Leontiskos
Banno. — AmadeusD
This has not been clear to me. And having now gone back over the thread I see no fatal flaw - if the objection goes : person A is a moral realist and the objector (B) simply considers morality subjective; what’s the catch? — AmadeusD
What's happening in this thread and in your threads generally is a shifting of the burden of proof. What begins as, "I am going to argue for moral antirealism," always ends up in, "Prove to me that moral realism is true!" — Leontiskos
Can you explain how “it hurts the puppy” is a moral fact? It seems to just be the actual result of kicking a puppy. — AmadeusD
That one ought not kick puppies for fun is an obvious moral truth — Leontiskos
When I said that moral anti-realists lost the day in this thread, my point was that the thread is about disproving moral realism, and the arguments have failed — Leontiskos
I don't think it is. See: ↪Michael ↪Michael ↪Michael. — Leontiskos
So, this is the crux of my issue. No, it's not an 'obvious moral truth'... — AmadeusD
Hmm. Noted, But, I don't see that they've failed. — AmadeusD
The fact that I don't see morality as truth-apt, and that no one can give me any reason to think it is other... — AmadeusD
I don't think either that statement of itself, or the resulting harm/hurt impart 'truth' beyond it being empirically true that a puppy is hurt by being kicked. — AmadeusD
The point here was not that you must believe it, but rather that Banno is not presenting it as a brute moral fact. He is presenting it as an obvious moral truth. Your argument above requires that he be presenting it as a brute moral fact. — Leontiskos
This is the shifting of the burden of proof that I spoke about. This thread is not about proving moral realism, and in fact no one has really tried to do that in any significant sense. — Leontiskos
Right. Never said you did. Again, the point is that, "It hurts the puppy," is not a moral fact, even though it could function as a non-moral premise in a moral syllogism. — Leontiskos
Anyway, go do your work you procrastinator. :razz: — Leontiskos
This is purely confusing. If the point is that it could serve as a non-moral fact, why would it be suggested it is a further moral fact? — AmadeusD
I'm home now. Its quarter to 7pm. Which is early for me tbf LOL. I prefer wasting away here, now that i've found it! Or the mats. — AmadeusD
Banno — AmadeusD
. For my part, I don't see that "one ought not kick puppies for fun" needs any justification. The problem with "brute" is that it carries some empiricist baggage. — Banno
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