While we ought keep modality in mind, it is a small thing at this stage of the discussion. There's indexicals and quantification to deal with, too.

Agreed. Beliefs are best kept in a state of flux. Well, most of them, anyway.

Do we conclude that there are no such things as facts?

That might sound as if I am being tricksy.

What I am wondering is, if you believe that the keys are in car, then don;t you also believe that it is true that the keys are in the car; and hence, that it is a fact that the keys are in the car?

That is, we haven't entirely thrown facts away, at least not yet.

How a fact is presented is dependent on the social context; that does not mean that all facts are dependent on a social context. — Banno

That the keys are in the car can be represented in English, French, Arabic... or sign language, if you like.

But that the keys are in the car will be true regardless of how it is represented.

Personally, I don't think in terms of facts. What is happening is that I observe the keys, I check the doors, I wonder how the keys can be in the car and the doors unable to open and then then start figuring out what to do next based upon my judgement of what is transpiring. It is a very
fluid situation as I work on the problem. Beliefs well change as more observations and judgements are made by me or someone else.

I might also add, there is a also a semantic issue here. For example, I may think that the doors are locked, but exactly at what point? Suppose I try the door, it is stuck, I believe it is locked, I try again and it opens. Defining situations via symbolic language is very tricky.

If the keys are locked in the car, they will be locked in the car regardless of how you present or represent them.

Is a deduction not a fact.

Sure. Talking in terms of facts is something that philosophers do, not mechanics. But are we going to say that there are no facts?

What I am suggesting is that if you believe something, then you believe that that something is true.

And if you believe that it is true, then you believe that it is a fact.

If you like, I'm trying to wheedle out the connections between belief, truth and facts.

Isn't it sometimes the case, as I think you are suggesting, that we change our beliefs because we find them incompatible with the facts?

You think?

Seems to me that if someone were to come along and claim that the keys were not locked in the car, when they clearly are, that they have either misunderstood, or they are wrong.


Edit: I may be misunderstanding you. Are you saying that, that the keys are locked in the car is a deduction, not a fact?

Or are you saying that "If the keys are locked in the car, they will be locked in the car regardless of how you present or represent them" is a deduction, not a fact?

I personally don't believe there are facts for one fundamental reason, that is a fact represents some immobility in a universe which I believe is in a constant state of flux. In other words duration annihilates facts. I could imagine this as a piece of clay that when molded changes everywhere at once.

When testing this belief, it seems to hold. When presented with a problem, it appears that I cannot find the immobile fact. Everything is too fleeting and too fluid. Of course, this all may change because every idea I ever have is always changing as I learn more.

I might add that I find no downside to not believing in facts other than accepting the fluidity of life. New beliefs will modify old beliefs in radical or subtle ways.

The trite reply would be to point out that it seems you think it a fact that there are no facts.

But it might be better to say that there is a remarkable degree of coherence and consistency in the world. Enough, at the least, for this conversation to be taking place.

I think that you and I agree about more than we disagree. We agree that this conversation is in English, with all that is entailed therein; that we are on a philosophy forum, that what you are typing is pretty much what I get to read, and so on.

When I give consideration to the issue, it seems incontrovertible that coherence vastly outweighs chaos.

No one ever meant that seeing a star amounted to your eye actually touching the star, so he's setting up a ridiculous straw man.

A primary, fundamentally existent material reality Is not a "brute-fact," as a brute-fact is something that cannot be explained and a primary, fundamentally existent material reality can be explained. Michael doesnt' know what "brute-fact" means. — Thanatos Sand

Then explain why there is the metaphysically-primary, fundamentally existent material reality that you (or at least some people) believe in.
.
Michael Ossipoff

You just supported its existence by writing on it and successfully communicating on it to me. Thanks.

I personally don't believe there are facts for one fundamental reason, that is a fact represents some immobility in a universe which I believe is in a constant state of flux. In other words duration annihilates facts. I could imagine this as a piece of clay that when molded changes everywhere at once. — Rich

It's well established that the physical world has facts. The physical constants are either constant, or very nearly so. The laws of physics don't seem to be changing either (...and no, the ongoing discovery in physics doesn't mean that the laws are changeng, as physicists find out more about them).

Though changes of various kinds are happening in the universe, there are some constant facts.

In any case, the facts that I was referring to, systems of inter-referring hypothetical facts can't not be.

Some particular, familiar, and quite undeniable physical facts are mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts, such as some of our obvious syllogisms, and truth-tables, etc.

Those are facts, and they're well established to be facts. And the Pythagorean theorem hasn't changed much lately, unless I just haven't heard about it. :)

Those are examples, but possibility-worlds additionally consist of other facts about hypotheticals. ...and facts that, themselves, are hypothetical. ."If there were these physical laws (hypothetical relational facts between hypothetical physical quantities, and if certain quantities had these values, then..."

As I said, the "things" that the facts refer to can be regarded as part of the facts, instead of being separated as separate "things".

As I've been saying, all these mutually inter-referring hypothetical facts referring to hypothetical things don't, and needn't exist in any context other than there reference to eachother.

When you claim they don't exist, you're making an implausible claim that needs explanation and justification.

Anyway, mathematical theorems, and the abstract logical facts that I mentioned are enough to establish that there are abstract facts.

Michael Ossipoff

The second interpretation.

"If the keys are locked in the car, they will be locked in the car regardless of how you present or represent them"

has an If-then, inferential form. The fact is "...the keys are locked in the car..." the rest is deduced

It's well established that the physical world has facts. — Michael Ossipoff

I guess this is what is being discussed. Notice the OP with "facts" in quotes.

So, in my opinion, and in cohort with the pragmatists, it seems that facts are the physical laws and mathematical truths that govern the world at play.

Again, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it, it still falls.

Again, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it, it still falls.

The tree physically moves in that way "it falls" aims to represent, but the action itself is not fully represented by the phrase "it falls;" "it falls" only fully represents the symbols of the English language working to point to other symbols in the English language to best represent the action of the tree.

The tree physically moves in that way "it falls" aims to represent, but the action itself is not fully represented by the phrase "it falls;" "it falls" only fully represents the symbols of the English language working to point to other symbols in the English language to best represent the action of the tree. — Thanatos Sand

Semantics. It falls just means that it falls. What else can be said?

The tree physically moves in that way "it falls" aims to represent, but the action itself is not fully represented by the phrase "it falls;" "it falls" only fully represents the symbols of the English language working to point to other symbols in the English language to best represent the action of the tree.
— Thanatos Sand

Semantics. It falls just means that it falls. What else can be said?

No, that's not semantics; it's linguistic reality. I'm sorry you can't get that.

It's also physical reality since "it falls" doesn't come close to fully representing the action that occurs.

No, that's not semantics; it's linguistic reality. I'm sorry you can't get that. — Thanatos Sand

Then,

It's also physical reality since "it falls" doesn't come close to even representing the action that occurs. — Thanatos Sand

How is something a linguistic reality and then becomes a physical reality? If we assume that linguistic reality accurately depicts physical reality (for which there are no grounds to even doubt that fact), then there's nothing more that can be said about the tree falling.

How is something a linguistic reality and then becomes a physical reality? If we assume that linguistic reality accurately depicts physical reality (for which there are no grounds to even doubt that fact), then there's nothing more that can be said about the tree falling.

I hope you're being coy. Everything is part of physical reality, but some things are part of certain areas of physical reality, like linguistic reality as I showed in my original post. I can't believe I had to explain that to you. My second statement mentioned physical reality since it wasn't primarily a matter of linguistic dynamics but the physical reality that the phrase "it falls" does not fully capture the physical dynamics of the tree falling.

In other words, Physicalism's unsupported assumption is an assumption within Physicalism, rather than an external assumption about Physicalism, like an assumption that Physicalism is correct.

Skepticism doesn't share that un-parsimony,,,doesn't make an internal unsupported assumption.. — Michael Ossipoff


What in the world do "internal" and "external" refer to there exactly? — Terrapin Station

It's really not difficult, Terrapin:

There can be an assumption that one metaphysics true instead of another one.

Let's call that an assumption about metaphysicses--in particular, about which metaphysics is the correct one. It's an assumption that's external to the particular metaphysicses.

There could be an an assumption that a metaphysics depends on. Such an assumption could be said to be internal to that metaphysics. It's part of that metaphysics.

These are two entirely different kinds of assumptions.

Physicalism assumes that there's a physical world that isindependely existent, metaphysically-primary, and is the funamental-existent.

That's an assumption. Here's a homework problem: Which of those two kinds of assumption is it?

Alright, i'll give you the answer:

It's an assumption that's internal to a metaphysics, part of a metaphysics. It's an assumption that a metaphysics depends on.

Now, you've said that I assume that the metaphysics that i call Skepticism is true.

Actuallly, i don't ask any one to assume that.

In any case, it's an assumption that's external to the metaphysicses. ..an assumption that one metaphysics is correct instead of another.

I'm not saying that you should assume that metaphysics is correct.

I'm merely pointing out that Skepticism doesn't need, depend on, or make any assumptions.

If someone wants go assume that Skepticism is true, that's something else. I'm not suggesting that you assume that Skepticism is true.

But I suggest that a metaphysics that depends on an assumption, a metaphysics that posits a brute-fact, thereby incurs a distinct demerit, for the purpose of comparing it with a metaphysics that doesn't need, depend on or make any assumptions, or posit any brute facts.

Oh, and how about you explain why there's an independently-existent, fundamentally-exixtent, metaphysicall-primary physical world.

Michael Ossipoff

the physical reality that the phrase "it falls" does not fully capture the physical dynamics of the tree falling. — Thanatos Sand

The last line of the Tractatus is: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”

If the issue is with representing the fact that the tree fell linguistically, then its representation will be fully elucidated by the observation that it fell.

Then you should be silent as you've shown a clear incapability of discussing the matter. And if you think observation fully elucidates representation, you should remain silent on those matters, too.

Then you should be silent as you've shown a clear incapability of discussing the matter. And if you think observation fully elucidates representation, you should remain silent on those matters, too. — Thanatos Sand

Yeah, but you haven't demonstrated that the representation of a tree falling by, 'it fell' or 'it has fallen', as incomplete. If it is, then you can always say more about the manner in which it fell.

So, in my opinion, and in cohort with the pragmatists, it seems that facts are the physical laws and mathematical truths that govern the world at play.

Again, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it, it still falls. — Question

I don't believe in supernatural forces that govern things and create truths such as a God, gods, or Laws of Nature.

However, there are scientific descriptions in the form of mathematical equations, that are useful for practical purposes. Quantum physics only describes quantum states of systems per the Schrodinger equation. There is nothing else there other than quantum states that continuously change over time. Descriptions and deductions about the tree in question are products of the human mind not any scientific theory. Concepts such as tree and falling do not appear in the quantum equations.

Actually, I did in my first post, and you just confirmed I was right by showing that another English phrase ("it has fallen") could represent the action, meaning "it fell" doesn't succeed in fully representing it. And there are thousands more such phrases in English that could partially represent the action but fail to fully represent it as my first post and your last posts have just shown.

So, thanks for the help and we're done. I'm aware you're mostly trolling, so I will move on to other conversations.

Terrapin:

Actually, what you said was:

That there's no "stuff" isn't any better-supported, haha

No, and I've made no claim to prove that there isn't "stuff", or that Physicalism isn't true. As I've often repeated, I doubt that any metaphysics can be proved.

It's just that I don't assume that there are such things a phlogiston or "stuff", and Skepticism needs no such assumption.

It's a question of whether a metaphysics depends on an assumption.

And no, neither do I advocate an assumption that thereisn't stuff.

The point is, that Skepticism doens't need to assume anything. Skepticism doesn't need any assumption, to explain our lives, the physical world, and the results of physics experiments and observations.

Physicalism posits an independently-existing, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world.

I've asked you to explain why there is one.

Michael Ossipoff