It's a complex issue. It cannot simply be addressed with aphorisms. — Michael
This is about the ontology of chess, and ontological questions are not settled by authorities. — Leontiskos
How can it be simultaneously true that, "It is morally wrong because we agreed on it," and, "We agreed on it because it is morally wrong"? You have to pick one or the other. — Leontiskos
Again, if a moral theory were to advocate some horror, it is open for us to reject that moral theory on that basis. — Banno
They are if the ontology of chess is such that the rules are dictated by some relevant authority, which they are. Cavemen didn't just discover the rules of chess one day. — Michael
I did. Moral subjectivists say it's the former. — Michael
If the nature of chess is dictated by an authority, then it is not the result of a consensus. A vote and an appeal to an authority are two different things. Thus your chess case, as presented, is not a matter of consensus. — Leontiskos
I think you're being overly pedantic here. In the case of chess there was a majority consensus amongst the group authorized to decide the laws. In the case of laws there is a majority consensus amongst the legislature. In the case of morality it may be that there is a majority consensus amongst the general population. — Michael
On this account, our moral beliefs and intuitions are an expression of this cooperative system. To ask, "but what if they are *wrong*?", independently of the system, is to reintroduce moral realism, which this account leaves no room for. — hypericin
This to me is a good example of an anti-realist account. Morality is a conventionalized system devised to punishes uncooperative behavior and reinforce cooperative behavior. If moral claims are to be considered "true", they are only true in terms of this system. — hypericin
Again, if a moral theory were to advocate some horror, it is open for us to reject that moral theory on that basis. — Banno
So, to take on a biblical example, the Binding of Isaac can be seen as child abuse, sufficient to rule out Abraham as a moral authority. — Banno
So what.
Agreement is not a criteria here. The open question argument shows that.
I am not following whatever it is you are doing. — Banno
Cool! Fuck off and die, then. — unenlightened
Banno's point is that the common element in moral realism is that there are true moral statements. It turns out to be important that the SEP article on moral realism stops there, noting that "...some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments", while the SEP article on Moral Antirealism - the one you repeatedly refer to - needs these "additional commitments' in order to implement a critique of "moral realism".Despite Banno's comments there is more to the issue than simply whether or not some moral sentences are true. There are further considerations to be had. — Michael
I'll take your moral indignation as a sign that there is an implicit 'ought' in your account. — Leontiskos
There is no moral indignation. Just the end of communication. — unenlightened
If moral realism is correct then it is perfectly appropriate to ask "what if they're wrong?"
So to simply use this example of socially advantageous behaviour as a refutation of realism is to beg the question. — Michael
So even if I were to disagree with Banno on this, he would not be begging the question or committing any logical faux pas. Reductio's can act on systems, including moral systems. — Leontiskos
Banno's point is that the common element in moral realism is that there are true moral statements. It turns out to be important that the SEP article on moral realism stops there, noting that "...some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments", while the SEP article on Moral Antirealism - the one you repeatedly refer to - needs these "additional commitments' in order to implement a critique of "moral realism".
Could it be that without these "additional commitments" moral realism stands firm? I think so. — Banno
The virtue of this account is that it fully explains our moral notions, without need of some separate ontological category. Introducing it anyway is simply gratuitous. — hypericin
Of course. Are you expecting mere philosophical considerations will decide what you ought to do? They might help you phrase the issues, but they will no more solve all your moral quandaries than they will tell you the value of the gravitational constant. — Banno
I suspected this would finally provide a divergence in our opinions... — Banno
And "fuck off" is not a normative utterance, I suppose — Leontiskos
Nothing in the story here is incompatible with realism. We may well have "conventionalized system devised to punishes uncooperative behavior and reinforce cooperative behavior", and yet it is still open to us to ask if such a system is indeed moral. — Banno
This shows, yet again, that what you are calling "antirealism" is not what the rest of us are calling antirealism. — Banno
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.