So then it is a question to existence itself. Should existence be? The question of ought cannot be decided because 'nothing' has no opinion on the matter. So it is a choice. Exist, or not. Not existing will result in nothing. When there is nothing, there is no morality, no good, no evil, nothing. It is the “decision” or “insistence” of existing that creates a situation of morality. Continue to exist for the next second, or cease to exist.

So instead of starting with morality as relying on the fundamental “ought”, the fundamental of morality is what “is”. The question of whether to exist or not. If an existence exists, that is the fundamental step of what we might call “good”. For without existence, good cannot exist. For anything that exists, existence is the first fundamental step of being good.
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Taking existence as being good, we can finally calculate an objective measurement of what “ought” to happen
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1. If existence is good, then more existence is better.
2. Any existence which lowers overall existence is evil.

1 life * 10 hours = 10 unique life expressions.
…
10! * 1 hours = 3,628,800 unique potential life interactions

Meaning, while the unique life expressions are the same, the potential existence of what those unique life expressions dwarfs that of the single individual

Bob Ross requested some of our long term posters here to give their view points on an "objective" morality. — Philosophim

However, I also sort of get the notion that you may be saying the first good is existing, and 'the good' is thereby distinct from existence itself. So perhaps I am wrong on #1. — Bob Ross

Another way of thinking about key point #1 (that I described) that I just thought of, in terms of what I am thinking you are saying, is that existence is identical to 'the good'; but re-reading it I suspect I may have misunderstood and you are merely predicating the property of 'goodness' to existence — Bob Ross

1. Existence is the good; and
2. The good/right action is the one of which its consequences maximize the good. — Bob Ross

I am interpreting, so far, your use of 'time ticks', probability, and the like as merely measuring units and tools for maximizing the good. — Bob Ross

Wouldn't morality be in the end a subjective issue? Something that either is right or wrong, is usually something that a subject has to decide. — ssu

For example, do you think the morality I've posited is objective or subjective? — Philosophim

The question of “ought” means that there is some reason behind the decision, a fundamental that ultimately drives why the outcome should happen.

The problem with morality has been finding that fundamental. — Philosophim

Well, assuming I have understood you, I think you are looking for an objective answer. — ssu

Predication seems closest. The idea of good here is foundational. The fundamental question of what should be is the question of existence itself. Should there be anything, or not? In a universe of nothingness, if a lone atom appeared, should that exist or not? The question of "should" of course cannot exist with there being something. Meaning the foundational claim of morality is not what "should" be, but what is. The "should" of morality only comes afterwards. What should be as I note later, is the expression of that material existence. Thus the foundation of morality is "is", and then logically leads to "ought".

The idea of good here is foundational. The fundamental question of what should be is the question of existence itself.

Should there be anything, or not? In a universe of nothingness, if a lone atom appeared, should that exist or not?

In a universe of nothingness, if a lone atom appeared, should that exist or not? The question of "should" of course cannot exist with there being something. Meaning the foundational claim of morality is not what "should" be, but what is.

The "should" of morality only comes afterwards.

is ‘goodness’ grounded in some mind(stance)-independent feature in reality (i.e., is it objective) or not? Is there a moral fact-of-the-matter that makes ‘existence good’--or is it just good because you believe it to be, desire it to be, or something similar? — Bob Ross

Would you agree that the fundamental question of ‘what should be’ is separate from the foundational ‘idea of good’? — Bob Ross

This seems like any other normative question to me: is there a moral or normative fact-of-the-matter that you are using to determine the answer to “should there be anything, or not?”? — Bob Ross

Imagine there actually is nothing: no universe, no world, no you, no me, etc. This wouldn’t change the fact (if it is a fact) that ‘it is wrong to torture babies for fun’; and it seems like, just upon my initial read here of your quote, that morality is about what is foundationally because the foundational claim of morality is what is: is that correct? It seems like you are saying that it would be perfectly unintelligible whether ‘it is wrong to torture babies for fun’ if nothing existed. — Bob Ross

For example, I think it is perfectly intelligible to say "nothingness should be, rather than there being something": remove the linguistic limitations (e.g., nothingness should be still seems to linguistically presuppose existence, etc.) and I think it is clear that one can intelligibly convey that nothingness is morally better than existence, even if I don't actually agree with the proposition. — Bob Ross

1. What is moral is what “should” or “ought” to be done.
2. Many arguments believe morality is human-centric. Why “ought” this be the case?
3. There is nothing inherent in looking at humanity that shows it “ought” to be.
4. There is nothing inherent in any other identity, race, thing, species etc that “ought” to be.
5. This leads down to the true question of foundation for morality: “Why “should” existence be?
6. Looking at existence, it cannot be destroyed. It simply “is”. There is no “ought” or “should”.
7. Looking at what is, we can come to a conclusion of what “ought” to be. Existence is good.
8. This conclusion is a choice, not forced. Existence could very well one day “not be”. But since existence “is”, and we are composed of what “is”, we act with the will of existence “to be”. — Philosophim

The organism has goals and purposes which it either meets or fails to meet. Human cognitive-affective functioning, including our moral oughts , are elaborations of the basic normative oughts characterizing living self-organization. — Joshs

Can we have some explication of how that connection obtains?It feels intuitively sensible to me, but I can;'t enumerate any kind of necessity between our function and morals - which may just be my failing, hence asking for a hand — AmadeusD

“Rudimentary understandings of right versus wrong are essential to sustaining patterns of coordination. Deviations from accepted patterns constitute a threat. When we have developed harmonious ways of relating-of speaking and acting--we place a value on this way of life. Whatever encroaches upon, undermines, or destroys this way of life becomes an evil..centripetal forces within groups will always operate toward stabilization, the establishment of valued meaning, and the exclusion of alterior realities. It is not surprising, then, that the term ethics is derived from the Greek ethos, the customs of the people; or that the term morality draws on the Latin root mos or mores, thus affiliating morality with custom. Is and ought walk hand in hand.”

Let me put forth an argument that life is centered around a central ‘ought’. What distinguishes living from non-living things is that the latter predict and maintain a pattern of interchange with an environment under continuously varying conditions. This means that their function is normative in character. The organism has goals and purposes which it either meets or fails to meet. Human cognitive-affective functioning, including our moral oughts , are elaborations of the basic normative oughts characterizing living self-organization. Moral oughts are designed to protect and preserve certain ways of life. — Joshs

For cognitive beings like ourselves it is not existence which is moral but intelligible forms of social interaction. The use of truth-apt propositional logic is one particularly narrow way to attempt to achieve moral intelligibility, at the expense of a more expansive and effective understanding of the moral. — Joshs

Ken Gergen puts it this way — Joshs

Form this vantage, for a living thing it is not existence which is good but self-consistent functioning. For cognitive beings like ourselves it is not existence which is moral but intelligible forms of social interaction. The use of truth-apt propositional logic is one particularly narrow way to attempt to achieve moral intelligibility, at the expense of a more expansive and effective understanding of the moral. — Joshs

Deviations from accepted patterns constitute a threat. When we have developed harmonious ways of relating-of speaking and acting--we place a value on this way of life. Whatever encroaches upon, undermines, or destroys this way of life becomes an evil..centripetal forces within groups will always operate toward stabilization, the establishment of valued meaning, and the exclusion of alterior realities.

This again is nothing more than self-interest. This is not an argument for why humanity ought to even exist apart from its own desire from the reasoning you've given. — Philosophim

This isn’t self-interest, its shared interest, which is not simply the sum of selfish drives. — Joshs

To say we prefer coherence over chaos is a kind of circularity. The sense of identity disintegrates in chaos and incoherence, so of course we perceive existence as ‘good’. — Joshs

Then what if two separate cultures or civilizations want different things? Are we saying the victor is in the right? — Philosophim

. I'm saying existence is the foundational good — Philosophim

The question or morality starts from, "should" there be something at all, and arrives at the conclusion that it is the wrong question to start with. The answer is "there is something instead of nothing". We cannot even ask the question, "should" something be, without there first being something. That's the foundation. In the case of material existence, what "should" be, starts with "what is".

. We cannot say, "should" they exist, because that would imply some other existence that dictated that they should or should not be

But if there is no existence, there is nothing to dictate such a thing.

Hopefully I clarified it earlier, but such a question of "should" cannot be asked without there first being a foundation of "is"

This is like asking, "Should oneness exist". It is the base upon which we use to discuss if we should add or subtract one.

The issue of what should be done, or morality, is the addition and subtraction of existence. To add and subtract without existence is impossible.

For example, I think it is perfectly intelligible to say "nothingness should be, rather than there being something": remove the linguistic limitations (e.g., nothingness should be still seems to linguistically presuppose existence, etc.) and I think it is clear that one can intelligibly convey that nothingness is morally better than existence, even if I don't actually agree with the proposition. — Bob Ross

Certainly, its perfectly intelligible to say such a thing. But is there a reason behind the claim? I'm very open to someone claiming this as long as they can back it.

Isn't the point that morality grows out of a sense making process? — Tom Storm

I’m sure there are plenty of people out there who still believe in quaint notions like ‘foundational good’. I wouldn’t say they are simply wrong. I would say that if you delve into the presuppositions such a notion relies on you recognize that what appears as eternal is only eternal within the context of a relative cultural context. — Joshs

P1: If there is something instead of nothing, then there should be something.

P2: there is something instead of nothing.

C: TF, there should be something. — Bob Ross

I say "there should be an apple on that table" and you go "ahhh, but there has never been an apple on a table, and we cannot even ask the question 'should there be an apple on that table' without there first having been an apple on at least one table!". — Bob Ross

. We cannot say, "should" they exist, because that would imply some other existence that dictated that they should or should not be

I don’t see why this would be true. The question ‘should they exist’ is despite whether there is anything that could exist more fundamentally than them: it could be the case that there is nothing more fundamental than a quark and it be immoral that they exist—no? — Bob Ross

just like how I can validly ask ‘should this baby have been tortured for fun’ even if there is no actual way in which reality could have been such that the baby wouldn’t have been tortured for fun. What is is despite what ought to be. — Bob Ross

Likewise, it seems like you are saying existence dictates what is good, which would imply that it is not itself predicated as good but rather is identical to 'the good'. It seems to be a standard of morality for you, but then you also say it isn't because there is nothing factual which makes it 'the good'. I am sort of confused about that. — Bob Ross

You seem to be saying that what should be the case is tied to what is actually the case. — Bob Ross

I totally agree that normative judgments cannot exist without something factual to judge about, but I am failing to see how the normative judgments themselves are grounded in something factual, including how existence is non-subjectively good — Bob Ross

By my lights, something that ought to be the case is a separate consideration from how things are currently arranged or how they exist. — Bob Ross

To me, if ‘existence is good’, I would say that is true subjectively and if it is not, then I am not sure how that is the case (yet). — Bob Ross

You are essentially saying (as far as I understand) that we need something to exist to create prescriptions, therefore there is a true moral judgment that states ‘existence is good’. In other words: — Bob Ross

I don’t think it is true that ‘existence is good’ because morality presupposes existent entities: I just don’t see how that inference is being made. — Bob Ross

My point is not to make a case for nothingness being good: I am merely pointing out that, to me, it isn’t incoherent to claim this because I don’t see why normative claims presuppose that existence is good. — Bob Ross

The first issue I have is you are claiming ‘existence is good’, where ‘is good’ is predication, and do not seem to offer any account of (1) why it is good nor (2) what goodness actually is. — Bob Ross

I know you don’t like ‘isms’, but I am being careful not to attribute claims which are not directly implied of your view. If I do make that mistake, then please let me know. — Bob Ross

I'm heading out for the holidays and won't be online again until Monday at minimum next week. Sorry Bob if this didn't address everything, but I'm out of time. I look forward to answering more questions then!

I am assuming you affirm #1 and #3, but I am inquiring about #2. You still have not provided what ‘goodness is’ in the sense of what those moral properties subsist in or of or are reducible to. E.g., is goodness identical to ‘well-being’, ‘happiness’, ‘existing’, ‘psychological approval’, ‘societal approval’, ‘conative emotions’, etc. ? — Bob Ross

If you claim ‘goodness’ is identical to ‘what should be’, but where do properties of ‘what should be’ subsist in or of? E.g., are they identical to ‘well-being’, <...>, etc.? — Bob Ross

Moreover, I think ‘existence is good’ is pretty vague: is it ‘existing is good’, ‘preserving existence is good’, or/and ‘creating more existence is good’ (I’ve read you claiming things similar to all three)? For now, I will continue using ‘existence is good’ because the worry I am expounding isn’t really contingent on getting that clarification. — Bob Ross

If the property of goodness is being predicated of ‘existence’, then ‘the good’ is not ‘existence’ because it is not identical to it: so what it is? — Bob Ross

Thank you for your patience Bob. I'm back from vacation!

Goodness is simply material existence and its expressions. It has nothing to do with culture, intention, emotions, and would be whether humanity had opinions about it or not.

It is the end result we come to when we ask the question, "Why should X exist?" This is because it all reduces to the ultimate question of "Why should anything exist?"

This leads us with the binary of existence, or non-existence. I cannot justify non-existence as what should be without there being existence to make the justification. I cannot justify existence without there being existence to make the justification.

I cannot justify non-existence as what should be without there being existence to make the justification.

If it helps to see where we are going, simply see if you can justify that non-existence is preferable to no existence at all. If you cannot, then what I've stated is the only alternative, and what we have to build on.