By the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't objective/absolute/intrinsic/inherent/unconditional/categorical or however you want to phrase it. — Michael
I think the problem is that you have a realist conception of the meaning of "ought" that you (rightly) find incompatible with an anti-realist conception, but your seeming suggestion that anti-realist obligations aren't "real" obligations is begging the question. — Michael
We can also defend this with reference to Wittgenstein. In our ordinary language use, as understood by any competent speaker, when someone claims that one ought not X we understand them as attempting to express an objective fact. As such, moral subjectivism is inconsistent with ordinary language use, and so it must be that if moral statements are truth-apt then either moral realism or error theory is correct. — Michael
The only possible meaningful obligations are those that are conditional on some relevant rule-giver. Asking why one ought obey this rule-giver is a meaningless question given the actual meaning of "ought". — Michael
I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>. — Leontiskos
Ok. That all makes sense. It's sounds like more of a long term project than a thread, hence the large bibliography. — Banno
I agree with Banno that glancing attacks on moral realism are occurring. — Leontiskos
I apologise :P
At least i now have some understanding, and grasp what i'm denying :sweat: — AmadeusD
Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy"
This remains for me the central and most troubling article in Ethics. It's what drove me to virtue ethics. — Banno
Every ought is . . . necessarily conditioned by punishment or reward. . . . But if those conditions are thought away, the concept of ought or obligation is left without any meaning: and so absolute obligation is certainly a contradicto in adjecto. . . . Putting ethics in an imperative form as a doctrine of duties, and thinking of the moral worth or worthlessness of human actions as the fulfillment or violation of duties, undeniably spring, together with the obligation, solely from theological morals, and accordingly from the decalogue.[42]
42. Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, trans. E. Payne (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), 55-56, quoted in Roger Crisp, “Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, in O’Hear, 75-93, 77, note 7. — Schopenhauer criticizing Kant
“what does the word ‘ought’ mean? A child ought to do such-and-such means that if he does not do it something unpleasant will happen. Reward and punishment. The essential thing is that the other person is brought to do something. “Ought” makes sense only if there is something lending force and support to it—a power that punishes and rewards. Ought in itself is nonsensical.”[50]
50. This is Wittgenstein according to Friedrich Waismann in Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, trans. Schulte and McGuinness, Oxford, 1979, 118, quoted in Charles Pigden, “Anscombe on ‘Ought,’ ” The Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 150 (January 1988): 20-41, 32-33, note 10. — Wittgenstein
To conclude: Anscombe’s conceptual thesis is based on an historical claim—that the moral Ought is a Christian product. Cicero’s On Duties demonstrates that this is false. Analogues of the modern moral concepts antedate Christianity. Her argument for giving up the moral Ought fails since it is founded on factual error.[54]
54. Charles Pigden, “Anscombe on ‘Ought,’ ” The Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 150 (January 1988): 40. — Charles Pigden
...But Anscombe’s thoughts on the cause of the problem are speculative. Her main claim is that contemporary philosophers use words such as ‘ought’ in bad ways. Nothing about Cicero can disprove this. If Anscombe is making much the same claim about ‘ought’ as Wittgenstein made, after all, then it is noteworthy that there is nothing historical in what Wittgenstein is reported to have said. It is true that Anscombe’s history is questionable (I am not saying that it is wrong). It is not true that this matters much except to historians and, perhaps, Catholic propagandists (of whom Anscombe was undoubtedly one). But if the best defense that I can offer of Anscombe’s history is that it is irrelevant to her main point, then we should perhaps return to that point. — Duncan Richter, Anscombe's Moral Philosophy, ch. 3
her historical thesis is flawed — Leontiskos
Interesting. Working through this post and it's references (only insofar as they are directly relevant and retrievable) I got the feeling that I agree with Schopenhauer on the nature of obligations, but didn't think it required any kind of relegation to theology to support. — AmadeusD
Here is the straightforward interpretation in simple modus ponens form:
(1) If religiously based ethics is false, then virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy ought to be developed.
(2a) Religious based ethics is false (at least for her interlocutors)
(3a) Therefore, virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy should be developed.
But one person’s modus ponens is another person’s modus tollens:
(1) If religiously based ethics is false, then virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy ought to be developed.
(2b) It is not the case that virtue ethics is the way to develop moral philosophy
(3b) Therefore, it is not the case that religiously based ethics is false. — SEP | Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe
3. There are no obligations without a rule-giver — Michael
Having not read Anscombe, but knowing she was a Catholic, that seems more like protecting the roost than it does actual historicity (which i guess Richter points on half of). — AmadeusD
Not actually, given that Anscombe's thesis is contrary to Catholic tradition — Leontiskos
Also, very interesting. I have a good number of Catholics friends who are practicing, and as best i can tell, they practice virtue ethics. I should probably say, if their calculations conflict with a piece of scripture they can bring to mind at the time, then that raises obstacles... — AmadeusD
Granted, that doesn't say much about Catholic tradition... — AmadeusD
lol.How do you think we could send atheists to Hell if they don't know right from wrong? — Leontiskos
Is it this idea? — Leontiskos
I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory. If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then this makes it incoherent. If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. — Leontiskos
The meaning of a word is its use in an utterance. — Banno
I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory. If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then this makes it incoherent. If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. Folks in this thread flip back and forth between those two options, wanting to have their cake and eat it, too; to have obligations while simultaneously holding that nothing is truly obligatory. — Leontiskos
Remember when you yourself made the same point I am making? — Leontiskos
b) (as mentioned by Anscombe, Wittgenstein, and Schopenhauer) the very concept of obligations sans a rule-giver or punishment and reward is vacuous, and — Michael
Seems like the demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment. — creativesoul
Because there is no need for a rule giver(God) or reward/punishment but rather just good ole knowledge of causality. Hence, it is not the case that obligation is vacuous sans a rule giver and/or reward/punishment. — creativesoul
My use of the phrase "reward and punishment" was an inclusive phrase to account for any desirable or undesirable consequence. — Michael
Unnecessarily multiplying entities. Reward and punishment requires a judge. Causality does not. — creativesoul
What I was getting at is that the unconditional phrase "one ought not X" being true is vacuous. It is only meaningfully true if implying something like "according to Y, one ought not X" or "one ought not X or Y will happen". — Michael
"One ought not kick puppies."
How does your claims quoted above cover that one? Seems perfectly meaningful and true from where I sit despite not needing to be bolstered by what you suggest all such claims require. — creativesoul
So that serves as a clear cut counterexample to the notion that all claims in the form of "One ought not X" imply conditions. — creativesoul
Perhaps dropping the notions of categorical and hypothetical imperatives would help? — creativesoul
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