to which the answer is, it is kind of real, up until the time it is registered on plate. at which point it becomes definite. — Wayfarer

It becomes definite for us at that point; we can't say anything definite either way about its existence prior to that, but it does not follow that what we can say reflects what is the actuality of what appears to us as an electron. There must be a good reason why there is no consensus among those who might actually know what they are talking about when it comes to the question about ontological status of the collapse of the wave function.

I don't see why you would say this is unanswerable. If there is real possibilities then many do not ever become actual, otherwise they would not be real possibilities. Possibility means that actualization is not necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how it follows that there must be real possibilities which do not become actualized. If nature is fundamentally random there would be, but if it is fundamentally deterministic there would not be, and we have no way of telling whether nature is fundamentally random or deterministic.

No, simply because there is no material ultimate, materialism is like a kind of popular myth. — Wayfarer

We don't know whether there are "material ultimates" or not.

There must be a good reason why there is no consensus among those who might actually know what they are talking about when it comes to the question about ontological status of the collapse of the wave function. — Janus

That's right! As it stands, it is still an open question, something many here seem not to notice. The three main popular books I have read on it the last 5 years or so are: Manjit Kumar, Quantum: Einstein, Bohr, and the Great Debate about the Nature of Reality(best of them in my view); David Lindley, Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg and Bohr and the Struggle for the Soul of Science; and Adam Becker, What is Real? The Unfinished Quest for the Meaning of Quantum Physics. Notice all of them are about the 'debate over the nature of reality' and 'struggles for the soul of science'. It suggests that there's something important and real at stake.

Einstein represents the realist view - that what is real must be real independently of any act of measurement on our part. But it seems from those readings that in this philosophical respect, Einstein was mistaken (which probably has no bearing on his scientific discoveries).

The discomfort that I feel is associated with the fact that the observed perfect quantum correlations seem to demand something like the "genetic" hypothesis. For me, it is so reasonable to assume that the photons in those experiments carry with them programs, which have been correlated in advance, telling them how to behave. This is so rational that I think that when Einstein saw that, and the others refused to see it, he was the rational man. The other people, although history has justified them, were burying their heads in the sand. I feel that Einstein's intellectual superiority over Bohr, in this instance, was enormous; a vast gulf between the man who saw clearly what was needed, and the obscurantist. So for me, it is a pity that Einstein's idea doesn't work. The reasonable thing just doesn't work. — John Stewart Bell (1928-1990), author of 'Bell's Theorem' (or 'Bell's Inequality'), quoted in Quantum Profiles, by Jeremy Bernstein 1991, p. 84

We don't know whether there are "material ultimates" or not. — Janus

If a material ultimate can be conceived of in the classical sense of an atom, an indivisible point-particle, I think it's pretty definitively disproved. It is now said that sub-atomic particles are 'excitations in fields' - but what 'fields' are is an open question, as is whether there may be fields other than electromagnetic (which you would never detect with electromagnetic instruments, for example morphic fields.)

I read one of Paul Davies' books years back, around 1990, called: The Matter Myth, about just this this topic.

Put predictions aside for a moment. How would you deal with possibilities in the sense of "it is possible for me to do X, and possible for me to do Y", when X and Y are mutually exclusive? If I act for Y, then X is made to be impossible, and if I act for X, then Y is made to be impossible. However, at the time when I am deciding, both are possible.

How can we model this type of future in relation to this type of past, when both X and Y change from being equally possible in the future, to being one necessary, and one impossible in the past? What happens at "the present" to change the ontological status of these events? — Metaphysician Undercover

If I speculate that the past might change, then aren't I contradicting the very definition of what i mean by "the past"?

And If i speculate that the future is already decided, then aren't I contradicting the very definition of what i mean by "the future"?

I don't conceive of a clear distinction between the tenses and the modalities. I interpret both empirically within the context of the present, even I don't consider their meanings to be empirically exhausted by present observations, memories, intentions, actions and so on.

It doesn’t seem an apt analogy to me. At issue is the nature of the object in question and what it is that transforms it from a possibility to an actuality. — Wayfarer

Does it even make sense to consider the modalities (or tenses) to be the subject-matter of physics? For aren't the modalities the very essence of what is meant by an 'explanation' that are inevitably invoked when explaining any explicandum in any subject?

Unless physics is willing to collapse the explanans/explanandum distinction by appealing to circular reasoning (which for many would defeat the purpose of an explanation), then i cannot see how the metaphysical concepts of modalities can be treated as first-order physical propositions that warrant physical explanation.

From an instrumentalist perspective, scientific theories are conditional propositions that do not say how things are in themselves, but rather predict or describe the empirical consequences of performing a particular action or observation in a particular context. So according to this perspective, possibilities are what is directly expressed by scientific theories, but not what is represented or referred to by such theories.

From an instrumentalist perspective, scientific theories are conditional propositions that do not say how things are in themselves, but rather predict or describe the empirical consequences of performing a particular action or observation in a particular context. So according to this perspective, possibilities are what is directly expressed by scientific theories, but not what is represented or referred to by such theories. — sime

Not a perspective of philosophical interest, I'm afraid. I'm genuinely interested in the philosophical implications. As I said already, what is ostensibly represented or referred to by fundamental physics is, or at least was, considered to be the ostensible building blocks of material reality. Of course as far as studying physics and putting the results to work is concerned, none of that is particularly important. But I think it's important.

I don't see how it follows that there must be real possibilities which do not become actualized. If nature is fundamentally random there would be, but if it is fundamentally deterministic there would not be, and we have no way of telling whether nature is fundamentally random or deterministic. — Janus

The supposedly unanswerable question was, "whether there are real possibilities that never become actual or whether all real possibilities are determined to become actual". Within that question "real possibilities" is assumed. And "real possibilities" implies that not all of those possibilities become actual, because then they would be necessities rather than possibilities. They would just have the appearance of possibility but not really be possibilities.

So I really cannot understand your way of thinking here. The assumption of "real possibilities" as a primary premise, denies the possibility of determinism, leaving the proposition "nature is fundamentally deterministic" as necessarily false, therefore not relevant in this context.

If I speculate that the past might change, then aren't I contradicting the very definition of what i mean by "the past"?

And If i speculate that the future is already decided, then aren't I contradicting the very definition of what i mean by "the future"? — sime

I don't see that at all. It would require that "past" and "future" be defined in such a way so as to create those contradictions. But that is not the way that we normally define past and future. We normally define them in relation to time, as the time not yet come and the time already gone by, or in relation to physical events as those not yet occurred and already occurred. Notice that neither of those two stipulate whether the past might be changed, or whether the future might be already decided. To produce the contradictions you refer to, we need to add these metaphysical/ontological principles as premises.

I don't conceive of a clear distinction between the tenses and the modalities. I interpret both empirically within the context of the present, even I don't consider their meanings to be empirically exhausted by present observations, memories, intentions, actions and so on. — sime

I really don't understand what you are saying here. You appear to be saying that you see no clear distinction between past and future, because you interpret everything "within the context of the present". But isn't it the case that your reference to "the present" already implies a clear distinction between past and future? What could you possible mean by "the present", other than an assumed separation between memories of past, and anticipations of the future? Therefore your reference to "the present" seems to already imply a clear distinction between past and future.

Furthermore, you refer to "present observations", but this concept is logically flawed. There can be no such thing as present observations because "to observe" is to take note of what happens, and this implies that an observation, being what has been noticed is necessarily in the past. It is this idea, of "present observations" which is actually self-contradicting.

Notice all of them are about the 'debate over the nature of reality' and 'struggles for the soul of science'. It suggests that there's something important and real at stake. — Wayfarer

I can't see any reason to think the answer is not undecidable. Also, I can't see how it would make any difference to human life whether the collapse of the wave function is 'real' (whatever that could actually mean) as opposed to merely an artefact of our modeling.

I put 'real' in inverted commas and "whatever that could actually mean" in brackets because the only way I can conceive that the collapse of the wave function could be ontologically (as opposed to epistemologically or phenomenologically) real would be if it were independent of us and our models, that is if it were mind-independent.

If a material ultimate can be conceived of in the classical sense of an atom, an indivisible point-particle, I think it's pretty definitively disproved. It is now said that sub-atomic particles are 'excitations in fields' - but what 'fields' are is an open question, as is whether there may be fields other than electromagnetic (which you would never detect with electromagnetic instruments, for example morphic fields.) — Wayfarer

Perhaps fields are material ultimates. Remember the basic idea behind the concepts of materiality and physicality is that they denote that which exists in and of itself independently of human perception and understanding. Now of course we can say that it is logically possible that no such things exist, but it is not demonstrable that they don't, or even decidable whether they do or not.

So, our beliefs either way must be guided by what seems most plausible given the whole of human experience and understanding as far as we are able to comprehend it, or else guided by wishful thinking if the answer seems to matter enough to us to preclude the application of disinterested rational consideration.

So I really cannot understand your way of thinking here. The assumption of "real possibilities" as a primary premise, denies the possibility of determinism, leaving the proposition "nature is fundamentally deterministic" as necessarily false, therefore not relevant in this context. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are ignoring that fact that all possibilities remain such for us (since we cannot know the future). So even if what we think of as real (i.e. physically law-abiding as opposed to merely logical) possibilities are actually necessities (if determinism is true) they still remain just possibilities, epistemologically speaking.

About the ontological we can only speculate, and we cannot even be sure those speculations are coherent or even what it would mean for them to be coherent.

I can't see any reason to think the answer is not undecidable. — Janus

Too many double negatives in that to make sense of. But according to this blog post by Sean Carroll the question is undecideable.

quantum mechanics has been around since the 1920’s at least, in a fairly settled form. John von Neumann laid out the mathematical structure in 1932. Subsequently, quantum mechanics has become the most important and best-tested part of modern physics. Without it, nothing makes sense. Every student who gets a degree in physics is supposed to learn QM above all else. There are a variety of experimental probes, all of which confirm the theory to spectacular precision.

And yet — we don’t understand it. — Sean Carroll

Makes me wonder if it is a form of sorcery :yikes:

As for what is or isn't mind-independent, much of the argument over interpretation revolves around just that point.

Remember the basic idea behind the concepts of materiality and physicality is that they denote that which exists in and of itself independently of human perception and understanding — Janus

Capable of existing independently was the original meaning of ‘substantia’ in the philosophical sense. And that was never understood as 'physical' until Descartes' 'res extensia'.

You are ignoring that fact that all possibilities remain such for us (since we cannot know the future). So even if what we think of as real (i.e. physically law-abiding as opposed to merely logical) possibilities are actually necessities (if determinism is true) they still remain just possibilities, epistemologically speaking. — Janus

Sorry Janus, I just cannot follow you. It seems like we must each have a completely different idea of what "real possibilities" means.

I do not see how a real possibility could be "physically law abiding". The very nature of "possibility" implies that the selective process which decides which possibilities would be actualized, cannot be described by "physical law". If the selection was describable by physical law, then the thing selected would be necessitated by the reality which that law itself describes. So there would be no real possibility there, only a deterministic world with our lack of knowledge creating the illusion of possibility.

Too many double negatives in that to make sense of. — Wayfarer

You need to try harder.

And yet — we don’t understand it.
— Sean Carroll

Makes me wonder if it is a form of sorcery :yikes: — Wayfarer

If we don't undertsnd it, how can we draw any conclusions about it? Sounds like the very defintion of "undecidable' to me.

Sorry Janus, I just cannot follow you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not an auspicious omen for a fruitful conversation.

Not an auspicious omen for a fruitful conversation. — Janus

I think what was required is that you better explain yourself. What I explained to you is that I could not make sense of your description of real possibilities as "physically law-abiding". But you wrote it, so it must make sense to you, therefore you would probably be able to explain to me what you actually meant by this.

If we don't undertsnd it, how can we draw any conclusions about it? Sounds like the very defintion of "undecidable' to me. — Janus

I can assure you that people draw a lot of conclusions about things which they do not understand. That is what is known as misunderstanding and it's very common. It is not the case, that if a person does not understand, they will not draw any conclusions about that which they do not understand, because often they think that they understand when they actually do not understand.

So for example, I drew a conclusion about what you meant by possibilities which are "physically law abiding", and the conclusion was that this would be a self-contradicting proposition. But obviously you did not mean to present me with a self-contradicting proposition, so we can make a further conclusion, that I misunderstood you, and I made a conclusion about something which I did not understand.

I really don't understand what you are saying here. You appear to be saying that you see no clear distinction between past and future, because you interpret everything "within the context of the present". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, roughly speaking.

But isn't it the case that your reference to "the present" already implies a clear distinction between past and future? What could you possible mean by "the present", other than an assumed separation between memories of past, and anticipations of the future? Therefore your reference to "the present" seems to already imply a clear distinction between past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand the tenses to be closely related to modal distinctions made in relation to the present, but I don't deny the modal distinctions, nor the practical psychological distinction between past and future, or what McTaggart crudely referred to as the A series (is psychological time really a series?). But like McTaggart, I don't think the information content of the "A series" has any obvious relationship to the B series which is all that the public theory of physics refers to, or to the broader physical conception of time that Wittgenstein occasionally referred to as "information time" which i think of as a "use-meaning" generalisation of McTaggarts B series that also includes the practice of time keeping ( see Hintikka for more discussion on Wittgenstein's evolving views on the subject).

Furthermore, you refer to "present observations", but this concept is logically flawed. There can be no such thing as present observations because "to observe" is to take note of what happens, and this implies that an observation, being what has been noticed is necessarily in the past. It is this idea, of "present observations" which is actually self-contradicting. — Metaphysician Undercover

The word "present" is only used to stress the distinction between the A and B series and the fact that observations are always in the present tense, even when they are used to evaluate past-contigent propositions (which are understood to be past-contigent in the sense of the B series, but not necessarily in the sense of the A series)

So yes, observations are not of the present but they are always in relation to the present tense. Furthermore, if the B series isn't reducible to facts that are obtainable in the present-tense then the existence and usefulness of the B series can be doubted or denied, and at the very least cannot be reconciled with the the present-tensed practice of physics.

What I explained to you is that I could not make sense of your description of real possibilities as "physically law-abiding". — Metaphysician Undercover

A logical possibility is anything which is not self-contradictory, while a real possibility is something that could actually come to be. For example, it may or may not be a real possibility (epistemically speaking of course) that there are unicorns on some distant planet, whereas as there is no possibility that there may be perfectly round perfectly square rocks on some planet somewhere.

I can assure you that people draw a lot of conclusions about things which they do not understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't denied that unjustified conclusions are often drawn.

I understand the tenses to be closely related to modal distinctions made in relation to the present, but I don't deny the modal distinctions, nor the practical psychological distinction between past and future, or what McTaggart crudely referred to as the A series (is psychological time really a series?). But like McTaggart, I don't think the information content of the "A series" has any obvious relationship to the B series which is all that the public theory of physics refers to, or to the broader physical conception of time that Wittgenstein occasionally referred to as "information time" which i think of as a "use-meaning" generalisation of McTaggarts B series that also includes the practice of time keeping ( see Hintikka for more discussion on Wittgenstein's evolving views on the subject). — sime

This is what I don't understand. How can you accept the modal distinctions based in the present, and the psychological distinction between past and future, of the A series, yet then say that this has no relation to "the broader physical conception of time". Obviously, "present", and the distinction between past and future are temporal concepts, so they must have some relation to the broader concept of time. Or would you be assuming that either one or the other, A or B, provides a complete represent of time, and the other is simply misguided or wrong, so that there is no relation between the two?

The word "present" is only used to stress the distinction between the A and B series and the fact that observations are always in the present tense, even when they are used to evaluate past-contigent propositions (which are understood to be past-contigent in the sense of the B series, but not necessarily in the sense of the A series)

So yes, observations are not of the present but they are always in relation to the present tense. Furthermore, if the B series isn't reducible to facts that are obtainable in the present-tense then the existence and usefulness of the B series can be doubted or denied, and at the very least cannot be reconciled with the the present-tensed practice of physics. — sime

Nor do I understand what you say here. Observations are most often stated in the past tense, X happened, Y happened, or x was observed. Of course the past tense is "in relation to the present tense", but this does not mean that we can characterize them as being in the present tense.

We often will make an inductive generalization from a number of observations, and state the general principle in the present tense. But a generalization is not itself an observation, it is a conclusion drawn from a number of observations.

This draws into question what you say about the B series. The B series representation is obtained exclusively from the past. It is completely derived from past observations, and any statements about "the present" suffer the problems discussed by Hume. Observations of the past can only be related to the present through some form of inductive generalization. Therefore the potential problems which you indicate for the B series are very real.

It is not logical to say that if the B series did not relate to the present tense this would produce problems for the practice of physics, and conclude therefore that the B series must relate to the present tense. In reality, all we need to do is take a good look at the problems of modern physics, and we can see the possibility that many of the problems which it has encountered are likely created because the B series which it employs does not adequately relate to the present.

A logical possibility is anything which is not self-contradictory, while a real possibility is something that could actually come to be. For example, it may or may not be a real possibility (epistemically speaking of course) that there are unicorns on some distant planet, whereas as there is no possibility that there may be perfectly round perfectly square rocks on some planet somewhere. — Janus

I don't see any difference here. If it is something which could actually come to be, then it is "not self-contradictory". And if it is not self-contradictory then it s something which could actually come to be. Your examples support this. You have just said the same thing in two different ways, "not self-contradictory", and "could actually come to be", are just different descriptions of the same type of possibilities. So all you've done is defined "real possibilities" as being the same as logical possibilities, rather than describing a distinction between these two.

"not self-contradictory", and "could actually come to be", are just different descriptions of the same type of possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're not getting the distinction between what is logically impossible and what may be, due to the nature of things, physically impossible, even though not logically self-contradictory.

An example that should be simple enough for you to understand: It is not logically impossible that tomorrow you may be able to fly like a bird. Is it physically impossible? We cannot be 100% sure that the law of gravity will not change between now and tomorrow thus allowing you to fly, even though it seems most improbable, so we don't know for sure what is physically impossible and what is not, without adding the stipulation that the law of gravity must not change. With that condition added, we do know that it is physically impossible for you to be able to fly tomorrow.

You're not getting the distinction between what is logically impossible and what may be, due to the nature of things, physically impossible, even though not logically self-contradictory. — Janus

When you say, "what may be ... physically impossible", all you are doing is signifying a possibility. So the use of "impossible" carries no weight, has no force, because you are simply saying that it is possible that such is impossible. Therefore "what may be physically impossible" is sort of meaningless except to signify a possibility. In fact it would be better off understood as self-contradictory. To say "it is possible that X is impossible" is just another way of saying "X is possible". And this means "X is not impossible". Your example ought to demonstrate this to you.

What you wrote there reads to me like nonsensical philosobabble.

Presumably what is physically impossible is physically impossible, but it is also epistemologically (if not ontologically or metaphysically) possible that nothing is impossible; we just don't know. When I say "what may be" I am speaking from the epistemological standpoint which is that we may not know, or even, taking the radical position, do not and cannot know.

Taking the radical Humean position, we don't know with certainty that the sun will rise tomorrow, because the habits (laws) of nature might change, or the Sun might in the interim go into supernova, on account of some factor that we were unaware of in our understanding of solar physics. It follows that we don't know whether it is physically possible that the sun will not rise tomorrow.

Try using actual examples; I think it will help you to clarify your thinking.

What you wrote there reads to me like nonsensical philosobabble. — Janus

This would explain why you haven't addressed the point I made. Your example serves to demonstrate that your presumption of "what is physically impossible" is not justifiable. Therefore, as I explained in my last post, you use "physically impossible" in a self contradicting way, to refer to things which are actually possible, not really impossible. That is to say that "physically impossible" is just a possibility, and therefore not really impossible.

You say "Presumably what is physically impossible is physically impossible". What could this mean other than that the physically impossible is physically impossible? Therefore we must conclude that there could be no such thing as what is physically impossible, because that itself would be physically impossible. But you have in no way even defined what you mean by "physically impossible" and why you would presume that it is physically impossible for anything to be physically impossible, so to use your word, it's all just "philosobabble" anyway.

why you would presume that it is physically impossible for anything to be physically impossible, so to use your word, it's all just "philosobabble" anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't presume that all at all. It seems you misunderstood this

Presumably what is physically impossible is physically impossible — Janus

which was very badly expressed. I didn't mean to claim that it was physically impossible that anything should be physically impossible which would be a contradiction, The redundancy of expression there was just for emphasis; what I meant was that presumably some things are physically impossible.

That is to say that "physically impossible" is just a possibility, and therefore not really impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Physical impossibility is admittedly just a possibility for us; we are epistemologically limited, so we don't know with certainty whether anything is physically impossible or not. But it seems reasonable to think that some things are physically impossible given the way nature works. Fort example it may be physically impossible to transmute lead into gold, or for me to grow to be a thousand light years tall, or for that matter to travel faster than light.

what I meant was that presumably some things are physically impossible. — Janus

Then you gave the example, of the sun not rising tomorrow as something which appeared to be physically impossible, but isn't really physically impossible. So you just disproved your own presumption, that some things are physically impossible.

Physical impossibility is admittedly just a possibility for us — Janus

Now you're back to the contradiction I explained early, where "impossibility" is reduced to a type of possibility.

The problem you are demonstrating is due to a failure in your representation of "real possibility", which you incorrectly try to oppose with "physically impossible".

Physical impossibility is admittedly just a possibility for us; we are epistemologically limited, so we don't know with certainty whether anything is physically impossible or not — Janus

We are limited by what we do not know that which we do not know. What is beyond our realm of perception is to some extent beyond our realm of conception. As my late algebra student, my Corgi, Jake, would attest.