Are you parodying yourself now? It is the definition of scientific experimentation to control variables.

Good one. :up:

Good experimental design requires clearly defined objectives andcontrol of the major sources of variation.

The design of experiments is an example of decision analysis where the decision is to select the optimal experimental settings, d, under the control of the investigator in some design space of options

Experimental design is a scientific approach to data collection and measurement. The concept focuses on creating an intervention in a controlled environment

True words seem paradoxical. — FrancisRay

The paradox of words is that there would be no Daodejing without words. The text begins with a warning about words, but the warning cannot be given without words.

Chapter 32 of the Daodejing says:

When unhewn wood is carved up, then there are names.
Now that there are names, know enough to stop!

The Dao or Way is without name, but it must be named in order to say anything about it. But the name is not what is named. There is in this sense no "true words".

Thus it is easy to know the answers, albeit difficult to understand them. . — FrancisRay

To the contrary. It is easy answer "non-dualism" but the unity so named is not to be found in such questions and answers. With words the unity spoken of cannot be preserved. With words there is dualism.

Chapter 16 says:

Attain extreme tenuousness

By way of explanation a couple of quotes from Zhuangzi:

But exhausting the spirit trying to illuminate the unity of things without knowing that they are all the same is called “three in the morning.” What do I mean by “three in the morning”? When the monkey trainer was passing out nuts he said, “You get three in the morning and four at night.”
The monkeys were all angry. “All right,” he said, “you get four in the morning and three at night.” The monkeys were all pleased. With no loss in name or substance, he made use of their joy and anger because he went along with them. So the sage harmonizes people with right and wrong and
rests them on Heaven’s wheel. This is called walking two roads.

If we’re already one, can I say it? But since I’ve just said we’re one, can I not say it? The unity and my saying it make two. The two and their unity make three.

Thanks for proving my point that you have no idea what you are talking about, Pantagruel. :clap:

Can you provide examples?

o, if he challenges you, then just keep taking on his challenge, if you think you can. — universeness

My point was that as I’ve seen it, he doesn’t. He just dismisses. I’ve also been clear I’m not actually knocking the guy. I appreciate an unwillingness to go over the same arguments hundreds of times. I merely meant to illustrate that the appearance of him as I’ve described isn’t a wild thing to hear someone say.

Science is a process of selective limitation. — Pantagruel

Please clarify. Examples would be helpful. — 180 Proof

In relation to the scientific method of the empirical sciences—by which I mean falsifiable hypothesis, test with no or with restricted confounding variables, results, and the replicability of the later, all of which is verified via peer-review methodologies—here’s a partial listing of generally important things which science cannot address even in principle, this due to its intrinsic limitations of what it can address:

• What value is
• What meaning/significance is
• What justice is
• What goodness is
• What knowledge is
• The verity of the upheld epistemological tenets (e.g., fallibilism) and ontological tenets (e.g., the nature of time, space, and causality) upon which all empirical science is founded; otherwise expressed, the philosophical tenets encompassed by the philosophy of science which all empirical sciences make use of in their endeavors.

These, among others, cannot be addressed even in principle by science because scientific knowledge can only pertain to those aspects of reality which are in principle perceivable via the physiological senses by any and all people. This were one to have the inclination, and in some cases the technical requirements, to so look.

This isn’t to in any way detract from the importance of science, but it is to illustrate that science is quite limited in what it can address. And this because it has no choice but to select for understanding/knowledge in those topics which can be empirically verified and/or falsified.

I appreciate an u willingly to go over the same arguments hundreds of times. I merely meant to illustTte the appearance of him as I’ve described isn’t a wild thing to hear someone say. — AmadeusD

You might want to proof read that and edit it a little. i couldn't make much sense of it.

**an unwillingness + **illustrate (that) the appearance of him, as i've described it, isn't a wild thing to hear someone say, despite it being inaccurate.

There are some who are critical of the notion of a political or social science, but many in academic political science departments, wanting to mark and defend their territory, regard what they are doing as science.

With regard to value, a social or political scientist might study what it is that people value, putting aside or rejecting the question of what value is essentially. Does philosophy or any other discipline do any better?

Asking universal human questions, which is philosophy (in my view), is mostly irrelevant unless you DO something with it. Otherwise it’s more hobbyism.

Do you know you can edit a post after you have posted it? Just click on the three dots option and then on the pencil icon.

Yep - often do. I just happened to be getting off a train at the time LOL. Have edited now.

:up:

Asking universal human questions, which is philosophy (in my view), is mostly irrelevant unless you DO something with it. Otherwise it’s more hobbyism. — Mikie

Couldn't agree more. Stoicism, Pragmatism, Experimentalism. To me, these are essential. It's all about application.

There are some who are critical of the notion of a political or social science, but many in academic political science departments, wanting to mark and defend their territory, regard what they are doing as science. — Fooloso4

They're worthy academic fields of study, but the vast majority of social sciences, and of political science more narrowly, do not make use of the scientific method which pertains to the empirical sciences. In rough parallel, many deem theoretical mathematics to be a science, which it is in the now largely archaic sense of "knowledge obtained via study" - but it in no way utilizes the scientific method as I've outlined it in my previous post. But then, in this archaic sense, in which social and political science are sciences, so too can be philosophy, here granting that knowledge can be obtained via its study.

With regard to value, a social or political scientist might study what it is that people value, putting aside or rejecting the question of what value is essentially. Does philosophy or any other discipline do any better? — Fooloso4

This can enter into an utterly different direction. My sole contention has been that the empirical sciences - again, which utilize the scientific method - cannot address what value is, this even in principle. Philosophy, on the other hand, can - in both principle and practice - with value theory as a primary example of this. That the field of philosophy arguably hasn't been so far very successful at pinpointing what value is will however be entirely unrelated to the stance I'm taking regarding empirical science's innate limitations.

This can enter into an utterly different direction. My sole contention has been that the empirical sciences - again, which utilize the scientific method - cannot address what value is, this even in principle. — javra

Suppose "value" is a fallacious reification, and instead there is only valuing as a process that occurs. Could science study human valuing?

Suppose "value" is a fallacious reification, and instead there is only valuing as a process that occurs. Could science study human valuing? — wonderer1

Suppositions can get rather arbitrary. Value is a standard English noun, and value was only one of the examples I've provided. It is fully synonymous to "worth". That said, as someone who upholds process philosophy, of course I take it to be a process - just as much as all other nouns in language are. But my only point remains, empirical science cannot be used to give us better understanding or knowledge of what value/worth is - even if it is rephrased as "valuing"/"worthing".

Your claim is that:

science cannot address even in principle [what value is] — javra

Can the question of what value is be addressed without regard to what it is that people value? Whatever answer we might give to the question "what is value?" wouldn't it be rejected if it is something that no one values? Is there a tipping point? Would it be an adequate answer if one person values it or only a few people? Does it matter who it is that values it?

What it is that people value is an empirical investigation. People often provide what others might regard as acceptable answers. How we might distinguish between what people say they value and what they actually value is something that experiments can help determine.

science is quite limited in what it can address. — javra

Isn't this true of every field of endeavor?

You are my example. :zip:

Of course, science cannot address non-scientific topics (and vice versa).

science cannot address even in principle [what value is] — javra


Can the question of what value is be addressed without regard to what it is that people value? Whatever answer we might give to the question "what is value?" wouldn't it be rejected if it is something that no one values? Is there a tipping point? Would it be an adequate answer if one person values it or only a few people? Does it matter who it is that values it? — Fooloso4

Your questions do not address my contention. Value is experiential, but in no way empirical (in the modern sense of the term); therefore, the empirical sciences can only presuppose its reality via non-scientific means, and cannot discern what value is via the scientific method. And, as to "what is value" a dictionary will provide commonly upheld definitions.

Maybe more concrete examples might help out:

What empirically falsifiable hypothesis can be produced to determine if “value” is a fallacious reification of a process? Moreover, by what empirical means could this hypothesis then be tested?

Whether value is a process cannot be determined by the empirical sciences, this in principle, because - be it in fact process or not - it is not something that can be directly perceived via the physiological senses, but can only be inferred from empirical observations that presuppose its reality. For the same reason, neither can the empirical sciences determine whether “extrinsic value” is an accurate conception of what can in fact occur. Nor can it (needless to add, via the scientific method) better delineate what intrinsic value might be, or if it is real. And so forth. While these are all experience-based issues, none of them are empirical (again, in the modern sense of the term).

And whether value is a process or not, to claim that it is unimportant is to directly engage in hypocrisy, for this would be an affirmation of value.

Etc.

How we might distinguish between what people say they value and what they actually value is something that experiments can help determine. — Fooloso4

Sure, but this, again, presupposes the reality of what value is. It, however, does not, and cannot, establish its reality through the scientific method of the empirical sciences.

You are my example. — 180 Proof

I'm flattered.

You shouldn't be. :sweat:

Value is experiential, but in no way empirical — javra

I am not sure what your claim that value is experiential means. We might not value the negative effects of certain medical treatments but those treatments might have value. We might not value to experience of exercise but value its benefits. Those benefits are evidential.

what value is ... "what is value" — javra

Are you making a distinction between what value is and what is value?

What empirically falsifiable hypothesis can be produced to determine if “value” is a fallacious reification of a process? — javra

If I understand the question, consider snake oil remedies. The experience of drinking the original Coca Cola or Dr Pepper may have made you feel better for a while but the claims of their medical value was fallacious and determined empirically through medical science.

Whether value is a process cannot be determined by the empirical sciences, this in principle, because - be it in fact process or not - it is not something that can be directly perceived via the physiological senses, — javra

The value of what? I don't think the question of value can be addressed without considering what it is that is valued and what it is valued for.

I am not sure what your claim that value is experiential means. — Fooloso4

I simply mean that value (i.e., worth, or importance) is experienced by us and that we can only know of it via our experiences - although not through any experience we obtain due to our physiological senses (such as those of sight, sound, smell, touch, and physiological taste).

Are you making a distinction between what value is and what is value? — Fooloso4

not in the context you've quoted

What empirically falsifiable hypothesis can be produced to determine if “value” is a fallacious reification of a process? — javra


If I understand the question, [...] — Fooloso4

no. The statement was indirectly addressing this post's question, to which I've already replied:

Suppose "value" is a fallacious reification, and instead there is only valuing as a process that occurs. Could science study human valuing? — wonderer1

The value of what? — Fooloso4

The value of anything. Say, the value of any post in this thread. Take your pick. As to whose attribution of value, for the time being address your own.

Value - aka importance or worth - is neither a sight, nor a sound, nor a smell, nor a tactile feeling, nor a gustatory taste (nor a proprioception of one's own body; etc.). Again, it is not something we experience via any particular physiological sense.

Can the question of what value is be addressed without regard to what it is that people value? Whatever answer we might give to the question "what is value?" wouldn't it be rejected if it is something that no one values? Is there a tipping point? Would it be an adequate answer if one person values it or only a few people? Does it matter who it is that values it? — Fooloso4

That reminds me of a long-ago book, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. In it, Pirsig argues that Western metaphysics too often focuses on the duality of mind and matter, with an emphasis on the rationality and objectivity. Pirsig proposes a different approach. He suggests that the this metaphysical framework has limitations when it comes to understanding the value or quality of things.

Pirsig argues that there is an inherent quality or value in everything, and this quality is not merely a subjective human judgment but something real. He believes that this quality can be discovered and understood through a process of "Quality" inquiry, which involves a deep examination of and insight into the relationships between things and the recognition of patterns and value inherent in those relationships.

Pirsig's metaphysics of quality was exemplified in his exploration of motorcycle maintenance and the idea that the quality of one's actions and the care put into them can be a source of meaning and fulfillment whilst also having practical consequences (namely, a beautifully maintained motorcycle!) He suggests that this metaphysical perspective can be applied to many aspects of life, including art, science, and the pursuit of personal excellence.

The connection with Zen is not made that explicit in the book, but Soto Zen , one of the two major Zen Buddhist sects, also places a strong emphasis on the integration of aesthetic qualities into everyday life. This practice is often referred to as "everyday Zen" or "Zen in daily life," and it involves applying mindfulness and a deep sense of presence to ordinary activities, such as cooking, calligraphy, gardening, and various forms of traditional arts.

In Soto Zen, the idea is that there is no clear separation between the sacred and the mundane. Instead, the practice of mindfulness and being fully present in each moment can elevate even the most routine tasks to a level of artistry and spiritual significance. Again in this respect Soto sidesteps or short-circuits the customary divisions between mind and matter, fact and value, that seem to bedevil the complicated Western psyche.

To me, your post addresses a very worthwhile perspective.

To reaffirm what I was previously expressing, value's ontological standing - with the perspective you've mentioned being one outlook of such - is not something that can be tested via the scientific method and, hence, by the empirical sciences. This, for yet one more example, no more than the empirical sciences can test for whether teleology occurs within the cosmos - despite all of us experiencing intentions and, hence, actively held teloi, with each of us being an aspect of the cosmos.

But again, nice post.

Pirsig argues that Western metaphysics too often focuses on the duality of mind and matter — Wayfarer

a process of "Quality" inquiry, which involves a deep examination of and insight into the relationships between things and the recognition of patterns and value inherent in those relationships. — Wayfarer

Isn't there a duality here of mind and things that matter? Doesn't a deep examination into relationships involve an examiner and what is examined? Doesn't that examination require mind? What is the inherent value of the relationship between humans and blood sucking disease carrying ticks?

Instead, the practice of mindfulness and being fully present in each moment can elevate even the most routine tasks to a level of artistry and spiritual significance. — Wayfarer

Do you find artistry and spiritual significance in clearing a clogged toilet?

Isn't there inherent value in a quality inquiry that discriminates between positive and negative value? A farmer's ordinary activity of spreading pesticides and petroleum based fertilizers certainly is significant, but by doing so while being present in the moment may sidesteps or short-circuit the ability to see the harm being done. One must be mindful that the ordinary activity of burning fossil fuels, say, to keep that beautifully maintained motorcycle running should not be raised to the level of artistry and spiritual significance.

Isn't there a duality here of mind and things that matter? Doesn't a deep examination into relationships involve an examiner and what is examined? Doesn't that examination require mind? What is the inherent value of the relationship between humans and blood sucking disease carrying — Fooloso4

Rather than a duality, what is implied here is a reciprocal dependence. Mind is defined by what matters to it, which is contributed by the material relations we are immersed in.

Do you find artistry and spiritual significance in clearing a clogged toilet?

Isn't there inherent value in a quality inquiry that discriminates between positive and negative value? A farmer's ordinary activity of spreading pesticides and petroleum based fertilizers certainly is significant, but by doing so while being present in the moment may sidesteps or short-circuit the ability to see the harm being done. One must be mindful that the ordinary activity of burning fossil fuels, say, to keep that beautifully maintained motorcycle running should not be raised to the level of artistry and spiritual significance. — Fooloso4

What Pirsig was onto was what is now called skillful coping, a contextually sensitive immediate embeddedness of subjectivty in relevant activity with the world. Skillful coping is not some rarified offshoot of cognition but the basis of all thinking. What we call logical, rational reasoning is only a narrow derivative of skillful coping, and one which prevents us from seeing all the relevant connections between the aspects of the world that the dualistic thinking of formal logical reasoning conceals from us.

Rather than a duality, what is implied here is a reciprocal dependence. — Joshs

A dependence of one thing on another. I suppose it comes down to what counts as a duality, but as I count it one and one I don't get one.

The second part is missing the bracket that closes the quote and thus your claim is misattributed to me.

What we call logical, rational reasoning ... — Fooloso4

There is not one well defined practice that we are united in calling logical, rational reasoning.

... one which prevents us from seeing all the relevant connections between the aspects of the world that the dualistic thinking of formal logical reasoning conceals from us. — Fooloso4

I do not think that this is an accurate description of what actually happens in our "ordinary activities" in and thinking about the world. In addition it is often the case that science reveals rather than conceals connections between things.

Doesn't a deep examination into relationships involve an examiner and what is examined? Doesn't that examination require mind? — Fooloso4

You will encounter an expression in various schools of philosophical spirituality, 'the union of knower and known'. It is interpreted very differently in different cultures - for example the Zen doctrine of no-mind, mushin, elaborated in D T Suzuki's books (although rather difficult to compress into a forum post.)

In scholastic philosophy, the union of knower and known is seen as the process of assimilation which is foundational for the Thomist view of truth, where knowledge is seen as the conformity between the intellect (the knower) and the reality (the known).

But the key point is the falling away of the sense of separateness or otherness which characterises the egological attitude.

What Pirsig was onto was what is now called skillful coping — Joshs

:100: You'll like this, if you haven't seen it already.