Basically, there is nothing controversial about this, things that are logically possible are not always physically possible. For example: "I am flying faster than light". The laws of physics state that is impossible, however, it is not logically impossible, as there is nothing logically necessary about the speed of light.
However, what would something metaphysically impossible but logically possible be? — Lionino
However, what would something metaphysically impossible but logically possible be? — Lionino
what would something metaphysically impossible but logically possible be? — Lionino
A metaphysical impossibility such as 'an infinite person' is logically possible, no? — 180 Proof
However it isn't metaphysically possible. — wonderer1
I came across Kripke and a posteriori necessity in my brief reading on the topic before making this thread. While I find his ideas very interesting and convincing even, I think the thesis is a bit too recent to make any definitive claims on it as a layman. — Lionino
But I kept the doubt in mind: is it not a matter of semantics even then? Because in epiphenomenalism, the mental changing the material is impossible within that metaphysics. But in epiphenomenalism, isn't the inability to change the material part of the definition of what is mental? And thus the mental changing the material becomes a logical contradiction within that metaphysics? — Lionino
Yes, metaphysiically, not logically. — 180 Proof
Without warrant ou ascribe the property of being "finite" to "person" which is not intrinsic to the concept. — 180 Proof
Also, circles (or spheres) are both infinite and finite simultaneously ... — 180 Proof
The leading example I've seen of a posteriori necessity is that of "Venus = Lucifer". I so far find this fishy. Any bloke on the street will tell you that "Venus" does not equal "Lucifer". That they both in part reference the same physical planet is not the whole of the story. — javra
180 Proof is right in a way. When formalised, "an infinite person" does not entail a contradiction. There is an X that is both i and p. No problem logically.
However if we think of the concept of a person, and then the concept of infinity, can they both be properties of the same subject? Well, inevitably it depends on what our concepts are. If we start with a concept of a person as a a thing with spatial limits, and infinity as without spatial limits, then an infinite person would be a conceptual impossibility. Is this what is meant by metaphysical possibility? — bert1
The sense/reference distinction. By sense it’s metaphysically possible that they’re different but by reference it’s metaphysically necessary that they’re the same. — Michael
Can you clarify the attempted distinction. Venus references love as well as a planet X. Lucifer references lucidity as well as the same planet X. The sense of each term is then obtained from the totality of what each term references - or so it so far seems to me. — javra
In the context of this discussion the terms refer to an object in the solar system. — Michael
But as I said, I think this is only the case if we consider the meaning of “morning star” and “evening star” in terms of their [physical] referent(s). I don’t think this is the case if we consider the meaning of “morning star” and “evening star” in terms of their sense(s). — Michael
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