The problem with Michael’s approach is that it disregards one’s responsibility to argue for a coherent moral theory and not contradict oneself. — Leontiskos
Michael has admitted that his own holdings are self-contradictory, but he ignores this fact and instead just argues with everyone. That is, he argues with noncognitivists, error theorists, subjectivists, and moral realists alike. Since his own position is self-contradictory he feels himself at his rights to argue against all possible positions simultaneously. It turns into argument for the sake of argument — Leontiskos
What does it mean for an obligation to be moral? Are moral obligations discovered or socially constructed (or other)? How does one verify or falsify a supposed moral obligation? — Michael
This captures neatly the problem with @Michael's writing."That's not moral and I refuse to say what I mean by 'moral'" — Leontiskos
It doesn't resolve it because I don't know which side to take. Do I accept that, as a categorical imperative, I ought not kick puppies, or do I accept that categorical imperatives make no sense? — Michael
"One ought not kick puppies" is both sensible and true. — creativesoul
One ought not kick puppies
Why not, pigs? — hypericin
Our decision to focus initially on metaphysical issues doesn’t get us any closer to what normativity is; it only tells us where to locate the initial important questions about normativity. But what would make a fact be a normative one? We started with some hand-wavy platitudes about normative claims being “action-guiding”, and “attitude-guiding”, and about their giving us reasons for action, or reasons for attitudes. We could also give lots of examples of normative claims, adding that, if they are true, they are true in virtue of the normative facts:
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But while platitudes and examples can give one a general sense of the extension of the normative, they don’t tell us what normativity is.
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This worry becomes deeper when we consider the possibility of reasons that are not “robustly” normative in the philosophically most interesting and important sense. In chess, there is a reason to castle early. In etiquette, there is a reason, when in Rome, to do what the Romans do. But it might seem that these reasons have no genuine claim on our attention in the way that the moral reason to be loyal to friends does. So it would seem that the normatively fundamental facts about reasons, if reasons fundamentalism is indeed on the right track, would be facts about robustly normative reasons. Perhaps, then, only some reasons are normatively fundamental – the robustly normative ones. If so, presumably the reasons fundamentalist would want to amend their view: what makes a fact normative is that it is, or depends on, a fact or facts about robustly normative reasons. But then it seems important for them to be able to say what makes a reason robustly normative – and it would be unsatisfying for them to answer that a robustly normative reason is one that makes its dependents robustly normative!
Perhaps those who like substantive theories will be less amenable to ought statements having a truth value because of the execs baggage they attach to truth.
I'm not sure where Michael stands in this regard — Banno
Going further, the metaphysical non-naturalists believe that, when we make irreducibly normative claims, these claims imply that there exist some ontologically weighty non-natural entities or properties.
Non-metaphysical non-naturalists make no such claims, since they deny that irreducibly normative truths have any such ontologically weighty implications.
One such view in this light is non-realist cognitivism, in which there are some true claims which are not made to be true by the way in which they correctly describe, or correspond to, how things are in some part of reality.
They throw out the babe with the bathwater, adopting convolute notions in order to avoid the simple fact that ought statements can be true. — Banno
There is more to the issue than you and some others seem willing to admit. — Michael
It doesn't resolve it because I don't know which side to take. Do I accept that, as a categorical imperative, I ought not kick puppies, or do I accept that categorical imperatives make no sense? You might be able to pick a side without justification but I can't.
Hence why I remain a skeptic. — Michael
Time to choose between the archaic taxonomy(categorical imperatives) and what you know is true despite not fully understanding how and/or why it is. — creativesoul
I find the focus on what counts as normativity as irrelevant to whether or not some utterances of ought are true. I'm open to be persuaded otherwise — creativesoul
It’s about not understanding what it means for a moral sentence to be true and not understanding how to verify or falsify a moral sentence. — Michael
Perhaps different sorts of claims are true by virtue of different means, or by virtue of corresponding to different sorts of things. — creativesoul
So by what means are moral claims made true? What sort of things (if any) do they “correspond” to? — Michael
If I can’t make sense of this then perhaps I ought abandon my dogma and either accept that all moral sentences are false or that no moral sentence is truth apt. — Michael
Are you questioning whether or not it is the case that we ought not kick puppies? — creativesoul
A correspondence theorist might well be rightly puzzled as to what it is to which an ought statements corresponds. But to my eye this is not a reason to think there are no true ought statements, but instead to question if truth is always correspondence. — Banno
Are you questioning whether or not it is the case that we ought not kick puppies?
— creativesoul
Realise you didn't ask me, but it's apt to my considerations of the discussion - I don't think it could be the case, as it's a judgement, not a state of affairs with with one's opinion could correspond. — AmadeusD
As if codes of conduct cannot be considered as a state of affairs? As if it is never the case that kicking puppies is forbidden? — creativesoul
Correspondence is an emergent relation between what is thought and/or believed about what is going on and what is going on. — creativesoul
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