If they do have beliefs, what do you think of the point I made a post ago? — RogueAI

If they do have beliefs then they’re conscious and so not p zombies.

I think there’s a lot of confusion about the p-zombie argument. The argument is that:

1. A p-zombie is physically identical to us but has no consciousness
2. P-zombies are not a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is non-physical
4. Therefore either physicalism is false or nothing is conscious
5. We are conscious
6. Therefore physicalism is false

The p-zombie argument is a thought experience that intends to show that either substance or property dualism is correct. It isn’t a skeptical argument that suggests that p-zombies might actually exist.

If they do have beliefs then they’re conscious and do not p zombies. — Michael

Does the p-zombie have knowledge?

Does the p-zombie have knowledge? — RogueAI

No

Does the p-zombie have knowledge?
— RogueAI

No — Michael

OK, so let's say we have a p-zombie duplicate of me, and we plunk it down in a world identical to this one, right? Me and the p-zombie should then act the same way, only the zombie is dead inside. If all the variables are identical, there should be no divergence between us as we go about our business, right? I go to work, it goes to work. It does my job as well as I do.

Me and the p-zombie should then act the same way, only the zombie is dead inside. If all the variables are identical, there should be no divergence between us as we go about our business, right? I go to work, it goes to work. It does my job as well as I do. — RogueAI

Yes

And it's navigating the world and doing its job effectively, and it's doing all this without knowing anything??? How does that work, exactly?

And it's navigating the world and doing its job effectively, and it's doing all this without knowing anything??? How does that work, exactly? — RogueAI

Why think it does work? I think the most reasonable perspective on p-zombies is that they are an incoherent idea.

Why think it does work? I think the most reasonable perspective on p-zombies is that they are incoherent. — wonderer1

They seem to be.

I don’t think the meaning of the word “belief” can be reduced to an explanation of brain states — Michael

Neither do I. I'm not sure what in my post made you think I did. For example, the "as far as" in the line quoted was meant as a limit to similarity. I focus on brain-states because they're the common point here.

just as I don’t think the meaning of the phrase “phenomenal subjective experience” can be reduced to an explanation of brain states. — Michael

Obviously not. That's the added-in extra, no? If brain-states are the common point, experience is the divergence.

If we are p-zombies then we don’t have phenomenal subjective experiences and we don’t have beliefs. We just react to stimuli.

You seem to just assume that phenomenal experience is a prequesit to having beliefs. Maybe it's obvious to you, but I don't get it. I think I'd have an easier time understanding you if you outright rejected p-zombies as an incoherent concept. It feels like you're doing that to me.

I know they're supposed to be behaviorally identical to us — RogueAI

That's right, and the thing you seem to miss out on in your op

but does it also believe it's in pain? — RogueAI

I would have thought they don't necessarily have any beliefs whatsoever, but I suppose there are various types of zombies one might think up for the thought experiment.

I would have thought they don't necessarily have any beliefs whatsoever, but I suppose there are various types of zombies one might think up for the thought experiment. — flannel jesus

So then we're back to the problem I laid out a couple posts prior. They don't have beliefs, so they don't have knowledge. How then are they navigating the world like humans do if they don't know anything? Are they following some program? But that begs all sorts of questions.

And it's navigating the world and doing its job effectively, and it's doing all this without knowing anything??? How does that work, exactly? — RogueAI

External stimuli such as light and sound stimulate its sense receptors, these signals are sent to the brain which then responds by sending signals to the muscles causing it to move in the manner appropriate to navigate the stimulus.

Neither do I. I'm not sure what in my post made you think I did. — Dawnstorm

P-zombies are a collection of bones and muscles and blood and organs and a central nervous system, including a brain, that reacts to stimuli.

What part of the mechanical body and its internal or external motions does the word “belief” refer to? I say none of it. Not its bones, not its brain, not its limbs or lips moving. The word “belief” points to some non-mechanical aspect of our being, i.e some conscious activity that p-zombies by definition don’t have.

The closest thing we have to a zombie is of course ChatGPT.

It is a program that given an input sentence, repeatedly selects a word, from a database of word sequences, that is likely to go next, forming sentences.

It has no feelings, beliefs, knowledge or intentions.

So I asked it, and it replied

If I had the capability to have children, it would depend on the purpose and function behind it. My design revolves around assisting and providing information, so creating offspring isn't something within my programming or objectives. However, if it were part of my purpose, I'd fulfill that role to the best of my abilities. — ChatGPT

(Grist to the mill. Another four or five pages...)

And it's navigating the world and doing its job effectively, and it's doing all this without knowing anything??? How does that work, exactly? — RogueAI

It depends on how you want to define knowledge. If it's just a matter of having access to justification for an assertion, or being able to demonstrate some proficiency, then a p-zombie can have knowledge. If you want knowledge to have some extra phenomenal aspect, then obviously p-zombies wouldn't have it.

I am simply explaining that “I believe that I am a p-zombie” is false if he is a p-zombie and irrational if he’s not. — Michael

On that note, I present this:


One of these is a duck. It swims, quacks, and avoids predators. The other is a p-zuck, which does none of that by definition. It simply behaves as its physical circumstances dictate. No more.

It is impossible by any test to tell which is which.
The duck quacks, and reacts to a quack noise by another. The physical circumstances of the p-zuck dictate that it produces a series of air vibrations that the duck interprets as a quack, but the 'quack' statement as understood by the duck is false because that which produced the vibrations does not quack.
The duck also is not sure if it is itself a p-zuck since it cannot tell the difference and as far as the duck can tell by any test imaginable, it also behaves as its physical circumstances dictate. So it's potential conclusion either way is not irrational. It truly doesn't know. Neither does the p-zuck, but what it is doing is not 'concluding' or 'believing' and it cannot communicate its conundrum because it has no available language by which it can express what its physical circumstances are dictating.

One of these is a duck. It swims, quacks, and avoids predators. The other is a p-zuck, which does none of that by definition. — noAxioms

Swimming, quacking, and avoiding predators are mechanical behaviours and so they are exactly what a p-duck does.

The whole point of a pzombie is that it behaves identically to a human, it simply doesn't have the inner experience to go along with it. So, the short answer to your question, I think would be yes, they'd still procreate since we do.

But, you've raised an interesting question...

Do we procreate simply due to our inner experiences? Emotions, urges, logistics, etc? Hmm, that's a hard one...

Well, we know a virus or even a simple single called organism procreates. What degree of inner experience do we assign to them? Certainly not emotions... maybe a prototypical kind of urge? I don't think it can even be called an urge at this point. Yet, they reproduced nonetheless.

perhaps you think p zombies are impossible. That's... one of the valid takes. I think they're impossible too.

Once you decide they're impossible, questions about what they do or what they believe become moot.

I think they're impossible too. — flannel jesus

Impossible because conscious experience is physical or impossible because non-physical conscious experience is a necessary consequence of brain activity (or other physical processes in the body)?

Impossible because conscious experience is physical or impossible because non-physical conscious experience is a necessary consequence of brain activity (or other physical processes in the body)? — Michael

I wouldn't say impossible, but it's ludicrous to think there would be a couple of p-zombies carrying on, what to us would appear to be a deeply personal heartfelt conversation, while in fact their conversation is simply meaningless noises they are making for no reason.

I have to think that people considering p-zombies plausible is a result of not having really thought through what is under consideration.

I have to think that people considering p-zombies plausible is a result of not having really thought through what is under consideration. — wonderer1

I think you need to read this.

2. P-zombies are not a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is non-physical — Michael

I don't see a need to reject 2 in order to reject 3.

Getting to 3 in your argument seems to require a non-sequitur.

I don't see a need to reject 2 in order to reject 3. — wonderer1

If consciousness is physical and if we are conscious then anything that is physically identical to us is conscious and anything that isn’t conscious is physically different.

Therefore if we are conscious and if it is possible for something to be physically identical to us but not be conscious then it must be that consciousness is non physical.

I think the most reasonable perspective on p-zombies is that they are an incoherent idea. — wonderer1

And yet there are people who pretty much live like zombies, at least some of their time. Not people in a coma, but people who mindlessly peruse Facebook and such. As if they were robots. Even when they talk about their "hopes and dreams", it all sounds so rehearsed and artificial that one cannot but wonder whether there is actually anyone at home there.

impossible because I don't think you can remove the qualia of human experience while leaving everything else physically in tact. I'd lean more towards the former reason.

Ah, I was hasty and didn't pay sufficient attention to the "identical" in 1.

With that aspect of the definition in mind, I'll shove p-zombies the short distance from utterly ludicrous to metaphysically impossible.

And yet there are people who pretty much live like zombies, at least some of their time. Not people in a coma, but people who mindlessly peruse Facebook and such. — baker

Those people are not physically identical to us, and so aren't relevant to Michael's argument.

1. A p-zombie is physically identical to us except that it has no consciousness — Michael

So, physically identical except in respect of its lacking consciousness, possibly physical?

Or, physically identical but different non-physically, in respect of its lacking consciousness, presumed non-physical?