I argued how b was false
— creativesoul

You didn't. You just asserted it and threw out vague suggestions to "check the codes of behaviour" without explaining where to find these codes of behaviour and where they come from. Do I check the village noticeboard where the Elders have listed their decrees? — Michael

You're conflating two separate issues.

A few pages back I argued how an external judge was not necessary. You now offer a case where one is. I never argued that there are no such cases, only that it is not always the case. Your counterexample to my claim is of no issue, I've not made such a universally applicable claim... yet. The counterexample to b is most certainly an issue for your claims.

There is no single place where you can find all particular behavioural codes. The point is that they can be found sometimes. Wherever they may be kept, assuming you have access, that's where they are.

There is simply more to metaethics than just accept that some moral sentences are true. — Michael

I was under the impression that metaethics was entirely about how, and why moral sentences could be true and then what makes them so, if they can be.

This seems to preclude a "brute fact" analysis of any moral sentence. However, as should be clear to the forum by now, im early in my learning and look for setting-straight.
Though, i sheepishly acknowledge Banno's dismissive attitude is what got me this humble LOL

A few pages back I argued how an external judge was not necessary. — creativesoul

Can you link to the post in question? I don't recall an argument, only ever assertions.

The claim rests on the rule being the benchmark for truth. — AmadeusD

Nah. Sometimes codes are wrong/mistaken.

Metaethics

Metaethics is the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice. As such, it counts within its domain a broad range of questions and puzzles, including: Is morality more a matter of taste than truth? Are moral standards culturally relative? Are there moral facts? If there are moral facts, what are their origin and nature? How is it that they set an appropriate standard for our behavior? How might moral facts be related to other facts (about psychology, happiness, human conventions…)? And how do we learn about moral facts, if there are any?

It is about far more than just "are moral propositions truth-apt and if so are any true?"

I'll look...

Cheers... Seems to comport, at the rough level my current understanding rests, anyhow.

Nah. Sometimes codes are wrong/mistaken. — creativesoul

In light of? Other codes?

If you're appealing to a COC to establish that one it's rules is a state of affairs(i.e is true), i'm unsure what else that truth could be resting on?

I owe your last reply more consideration than that. :wink:

Seems like the demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment.
— creativesoul

Sure — Michael

Not an argument, but an agreement. That's adequate enough here.

This case requires rule giver and/or reward/punishment... an external judge. Granted.

So moral obligations are pragmatic suggestions? I ought not kick puppies because... they might bite me in retaliation?

I can accept that. But I don't think that's what moral realists mean.

I owe your last reply more consideration than that. :wink: — creativesoul

Forgive me if i've been a Jump-The-Gun Jones lol

No worries.

Yup, when our report of the utterance is qualified enough, we'll be talking about certain communities' codes. Not all.

So moral obligations are pragmatic suggestions? I ought not kick puppies because... they might bite me in retaliation?

I can accept that. But I don't think that's what moral realists mean. — Michael

That's not what I mean either. While you may get bit if you were to kick certain puppies, that's not why you ought not kick them.

Yup, when our report of the utterance is qualified enough, we'll be talking about certain communities' codes. Not all. — creativesoul

Sorry if i'm just dumb - to what specifically does this reply? I have a response in mind, but I don't want to waste time if it's not relevant.

That's not what I mean either. While you may get bit if you were to kick certain puppies, that's not why you ought not kick them. — creativesoul

But you just quoted yourself saying "demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment."

If this had nothing to do with explaining what it means for one to be forbidden from kick puppies then why did you bring it up?

If it is the case that kicking puppies is forbidden, then it is the case that one ought not kick puppies, and hence "one ought not kick puppies" is true.
— creativesoul

The bits in bold are the bits I'm trying to make sense of. Are they physical states-of-affairs — Michael

Those expressions reference states of affairs, the case as it was/is, the particular situation/circumstances at the time, etc.

Such things consist - in part at least - of that consists of things that are both physical and nonphysical, hence, I would not put it quite like that... "physical states of affairs".

Such things consist - in part at least - of that consists of things that are both physical and nonphysical, hence, I would not put it quite like that... "physical states of affairs". — creativesoul

Okay, so we're getting somewhere.

Obligations are non-physical states of affairs. As it stands it then seems that a moral realist cannot be a physicalist.

So what evidence – whether empirical or rational – suggests that non-physical states of affairs exist?

That's not what I mean either. While you may get bit if you were to kick certain puppies, that's not why you ought not kick them.
— creativesoul

But you just quoted yourself saying "demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment."

If this had nothing to do with explaining what it means for one to be forbidden from kick puppies then why did you bring it up? — Michael

Well, you were seeking verification. Hence... rules. Rules... are an example of b. At least you're consistent.

I personally do not feel the need to verify that we ought not kick puppies. I do not need a rule for that. I could also care less whether or not that particular claim could be verified. So, it's not so much that I brought it up for any other reason than to point out where the need for verification leads one sometimes.

Well, you were seeking verification. Hence... rules. Rules... are an example of b. — creativesoul

Rules require a rule-maker.

I personally do not feel the need to verify that we ought not kick puppies. I do not need a rule for that. — creativesoul

Right, so as I said, moral realism is a dogma. It doesn't even try to justify its assertions.

I personally do not feel the need to verify that we ought not kick puppies. I do not need a rule for that. I could also care less whether or not that particular claim could be verified. — creativesoul

This seems to give up the claim of truth, then.

That doesn't follow.

It seems your argument is something like if a claim cannot be verified it ought not be believed, or it doesn't make sense, or something like that?

I personally do not feel the need to verify that we ought not kick puppies. I do not need a rule for that. I could also care less whether or not that particular claim could be verified.
— creativesoul

This seems to give up the claim of truth, then. — AmadeusD

Well no. A claim need not be verified in order for it to be true.

Well no. A claim need not be verified in order for it to be true. — creativesoul

Then, again, how could you possibly establish it's truth? If the case is that you just trust that it's true, I can get on with that - But i think Michael and I are trying to find out on what basis that is the case?

I understand that things which are true, will be true whether or not anyone can be convinced of them/whether they can be verified. Not a problem. But i assume you've been convinced, by reason. I'm trying to understand why you think one ought assent to an argument that doesn't actually establish any truth of the claim? What reason you have for assenting to the statement

It seems your argument is something like if a claim cannot be verified it ought not be believed — creativesoul

I suppose I was unfairly equating "verified" with "justified". So rather than ask you how you would verify the claim that one ought not kick puppies I will ask you how you would justify the claim that one ought not kick puppies.

If, like above, you "do not feel the need to [justify the claim] that we ought not kick puppies" then your assertion is, quite literally, unjustified. Moral realism appears to be a dogma.

I make no claim that one ought not hold unjustified beliefs.

Okay, so we're getting somewhere.

Obligations are non-physical states of affairs. As it stands it then seems that a moral realist cannot be a physicalist.

So what evidence – whether empirical or rational – suggests that non-physical states of affairs exist? — Michael

That particular state of affairs consists of both physical and non physical things.

That particular state of affairs consists of both physical and non physical things. — creativesoul

So what evidence – whether empirical or rational – supports your assertion that there are non physical things?

A company is a thing, and is not physical. So is a promise, and a mortgage, and a marriage.

A company is a thing, and is not physical. So is a promise, and a mortgage, and a marriage. — Banno

And are we to be a realist or a nominalist about these things, mirroring the distinction between mathematical realism and mathematical nominalism?