The Eiffel Tower is indeed an idea, which has been realized (made real) in iron. Without the idea, no such thing could have been wrought. The resulting artefact is an ideal exemplar of the synthesis of matter and form. — Wayfarer
So how were you able to talk about "the matter of the Eiffel Tower", if you couldn't know it? Is it possible to know what "the matter" means? — Corvus
It sounds gross self-contradictory to say "matter existing in the world is noumena", and then keeps going on "noumena cannot be cognized, it cannot therefore be talked about". You cannot say X exists in the world, if you don't know what X is, can you?For Kant, matter existing in the world is noumena, and as noumena cannot be cognized, it cannot therefore be talked about — RussellA
How can "matter" be talked about as "unknown causes"? Do you mean they are the same? How so?I can talk about "matter" as unknown causes are named after known appearances — RussellA
It sounds gross self-contradictory to say "matter existing in the world is noumena", and then keeps going on "noumena cannot be cognized, it cannot therefore be talked about"......................How can "matter" be talked about as "unknown causes"? Do you mean they are the same? How so? — Corvus
There seem to be some problems here."Matter" and "red" are words in language and concepts in the mind. As I perceive a red postbox in the world, I can also perceive solid matter in the world. — RussellA
1. You are talking about only the things in your mind. It will not give you any further knowledge on the external world itself. You say you are seeing the red postbox, but it is in your mind, and it doesn't exist in the world. So it is not an empirical knowledge, but it is your belief in your mind, which you admit that it doesn't exist in the world. — Corvus
2. There is also high possibility of illusion and hallucination on the perception and also talking about them, which are not the reality in the empirical world. — Corvus
3. These are not what Kant thinks how perception works. He was seeking to establish a solid ground for infallible knowledge. He would be seriously worried to see someone looking at things not existing in the world, and keeps talking about them as if they do exist in the world, and at the same time saying they don't exist in the world — Corvus
Solid ground for infallible knowledge is about the objects in the empirical world. Noumena is for the A priori perceptions which have no objects in the world of appearance. Noumena has nothing to do with the solid material existence in the empirical world.Where does Kant get his solid ground for infallible knowledge of noumena? — RussellA
Noumena has nothing to do with the solid material existence in the empirical world. — Corvus
I understood Noumena is the placeholder for Thing-in-itslef, and Thing-in-itself is for the abstract existences which appear in our minds without the matching objects in the empirical world such as God, Souls, Freedom etc.It seemed fairly clear to me that Noumena is the placeholder for things in themselves, beyond sensible intuition - of whcih we can know nothing. Not that they aren't related... Just that we can't actually know anything of them. Or be certain they exist.. only infer. But as usual, im looking to be set straight, not offering an actual take. — AmadeusD
It gets all strange, if you place the ordinary objects like cups or trees into Noumena, and say they are Thing-in-itself, which are unknowable and cannot be talked about. — Corvus
Agreed. I do recall passages in which it's essentially said that by inference, we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions of them, but that our impressions are removed from the objects enough to make it impossible to access. — AmadeusD
Looked at this point again, but cannot quite follow what it means. Could you please elaborate with the CPR passage (if possible)? Thanks. — Corvus
Solid ground for infallible knowledge is about the objects in the empirical world. Noumena is for the A priori perceptions which have no objects in the world of appearance. Noumena has nothing to do with the solid material existence in the empirical world. — Corvus
It gets all strange, if you place the ordinary objects like cups or trees into Noumena, and say they are Thing-in-itself, which are unknowable and cannot be talked about. — Corvus
in the sense of transcendental idealism, is it not the case that the unity of perceptions of a given object actually represent a 'whole' object rather than merely a set of properties — AmadeusD
'Horseness' doesn't consist in any properties of the horse, but the totality of those properties, under certain concepts. Take away the 'brownness' and it's still a horse. Take away 'horse-hairy-ness' and it's still a horse. Take away the mane, the hoofs etc.. In parts, and Horseness remains. — AmadeusD
I would have thought when we infer things, it is the internal operation in the mind, which doesn't involve the external objects. In that case, would it not just work of intuition itself involving the concepts? When you say phenomenal impressions, it reminds me of the Humean impression which is for the external sensical objects. I am not sure if Kant uses the term sense impression for the external objects. As far as I can recall, he doesn't use the Humean terms such as impressions and ideas.My understanding of this point is that, while we must infer something "in-itself" causes our phenomenal impressions, which in turn create our perceptions, our perceptions are not those impressions and cannot, in any meaningful sense, access them or the object which causes them. — AmadeusD
Could this be further explicated using real life examples of perception?"The estimate of our rational cognition à priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere. " — AmadeusD
Kant just explains how our perception works with the existence in the empirical world. He is not concerned with them too much. It is our intuitions and concepts which interact immediately with the objects for producing experience - it sounds like he was a direct realist.Then where does Kant get his solid ground for infallible knowledge of solid material existence in the empirical world? — RussellA
I feel that when you say a postbox with red roof exists, then both the postbox and red colour patch must be in one object. It doesn't make sense to me, when you say, the postbox exist in the empirical world, but the red patch exists in your mind. They must be one entity, not separate. The postbox with red roof exists in the reality as one object. What you have in your mind is an image of it.Do you believe that the colour red exists in the world? — RussellA
we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions of them — AmadeusD
we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions — AmadeusD
…we must infer something "in-itself"… — AmadeusD
things in themselves, while possessing a real existence — AmadeusD
It seemed fairly clear to me that Noumena is the placeholder for things in themselves — AmadeusD
Reason can only deal with the objects appearing in our sensibility via experience, and that is the limit of pure reason. — Corvus
If Thing-in-itself exists in the empirical world, and thought to appear in phenomenon, then it would be contradiction. — Corvus
It doesn't make sense to me, when you say, the postbox exist in the empirical world, but the red patch exists in your mind. — Corvus
That is nothing to do with Berkeley's idealism. Berkeley's idealism treats your perception identical to the existence. In Kant, you need the empirical object affecting your sensibility. He doesn't deny the existence of empirical reality. He says what appears in your sensibility can be dealt by reason, but what doesn't appear in your sensibility, but what you can think of, are Thing-in-itself.Reason can only deal with the objects appearing in our sensibility via experience, and that is the limit of pure reason.
— Corvus
This sounds like Berkeley's Subjective Idealism, which denies the existence of material substance in the world and contends that familiar objects like tables and chairs are no more than ideas perceived by the mind, and as a result cannot exist without being perceived. IE, reason is limited by what we are able to perceive. (Wikipedia - George Berkeley) — RussellA
No, I change my mind. Kant can't be a direct realist. He really doesn't say much about what he is i.e. he doesn't care about isms. He just says there are objects in the world which appear in your sensibility, and the intuition and reason deal with them to produce judgements. That's all he says. If you really have to brand him what he was, he would more likely had been a transcendental realist.For the Direct Realist, the thing in itself in the world does appear in appearance as phenomena, ie, when we perceive the colour red there is a colour red existing in the world. This is why Kant is not a Direct Realist. — RussellA
Now that is Berkeley's immaterial idealism, because you deny the existence in the world, but think they all exist in your mind.Perhaps because that's not something I said. As an Indirect Realist, as the colour red exists in the mind and the not the world, the postbox also exists in the mind and not the world. — RussellA
Reason can only deal with the objects appearing in our sensibility via experience, and that is the limit of pure reason. — Corvus
All reason is pure in the sense that it is not a product of experience. Reason judges and analyses the content of experience. Knowing and thinking are psychological activities. Reason is a priori property of the mind.That’s the whole problem: pure reason has no limit. The sole raison d’etre for the Critique of it, is what can be done about that problem. — Mww
Acts of knowing and thinking are topics of psychology. How and what can be known and thought, are the topics of Epistemology.I’m ok with that. I don’t like the notion of psychological activities particularly, but modern times finds value therein, somehow. — Mww
When reason sees the intuitions with no objects, it will resort to either scepticism or conclude unknowability. If it keeps asserting the existence without the objects in empirical reality, it would be a dogmatism.Just remember…reason does not apply directly to experience, so that part of your comment that says reason only deals with objects, etc, etc,. Isn’t the whole story. — Mww
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