I didn't say it's an improvement. Just that it's more aware. — Patterner

If that's the case 'more awareness' would seem to have no (or little) significance.

There may be things we are not aware of that other creatures are. — Patterner

We have been using awareness in different ways. When people talk of a 'higher awareness' in consciousness they tend to mean something loftier (e.g., wisdom and understanding the true nature of reality), what you're referring to here as 'awareness' is more like different frame of reference.

I'm not on sure footing in a lot of this. I don't know if intelligence must increase before awareness does. At least in the sense of the "loftier" kinds of awareness, as opposed to what I said about us having a greater body of knowledge than our cave dwelling ancestors. At what point did our ancestors not have the capacity for wisdom and understanding the true nature of reality? At what point did they have the capacity, but simply hadn't yet thought of it?

Whose awareness is greater: the monarch butterfly's, whose innate wisdom let's it live perfectly in its niche, and migrate 3,000 miles to a place it's never been; or ours, which allows us to have these thoughts and conversations, create art (as opposed to making something fictional that pretty beings perceive as art, and build all manner of things that would not exist in the universe if not for such awareness? I wouldn't trade mine for theirs, but that doesn't mean I think they got the short end of the stick.

Whose awareness is greater: the monarch butterfly's, — Patterner

The assumption would be that ours is. If by awareness we mean metacognition - which is generally the starting point from these sorts of discussions.

At what point did our ancestors not have the capacity for wisdom and understanding the true nature of reality? At what point did they have the capacity, but simply hadn't yet thought of it? — Patterner

My view is that humans do not have the capacity to access a true nature of reality. I think this is a remnant of Greek philosophy. We seem to generate stories that describe our experince as we see it and some of these narratives are more useful for certain purposes than others. But people differ on this. I see human knowledge as an evolving conversation which is contingent and subject to change over time, not necessarily leading to progress.

Math may have beginning because we noticed repeatable patterns in material objects. But math is not a material object. The mathematical writings in book or on computer screens are material things, but they are not math. They are how we share mathematical ideas. — Patterner

What you claim has the strong fragrance of the welcome familiar and the commonplace good, both backed by seeming rigorous logic. Let's say out in the field I come upon a gathering of stones (perhaps another Stonehenge in the making) and set about counting them, just for heck sake. So, I'm counting stones. Counting things is doing math. Seeing the stones does more than facilitate their counting; it affords it. The stones, therefore, participate in the counting action. Stones herein cannot be reasonably considered mathematical with regards to number?

As for counting things unseen, what trenchman can unsee the missing fingers of his dead comrade?

• "Who says the countin' of gold coins is not properly mathematical? The blighter who stole me gold coins in the dark of night? I say, after a couple of pints, I can't even take me rest in yonder gutter without gettin' rolled. Bollocks!"

Firstly, your piece on the onticity of numbers has been very helpful to me. Thanks for doing the work and then offering it up to me on a silver platter.

...the mind is never an object of perception... — Wayfarer

Is not "mind" the overarching subject of our HPoC discussion?

...it is 'the unknown knower' to draw on a phrase expressed in Indian philosophy. — Wayfarer

This to me sounds like Aristotle.

It is never appears to us as object, but as us, as the subject. — Wayfarer

Are you perhaps getting your bearings twisted within the hall of mirrors? If the mind appears to us, then it's the object of our perception, is it not? One of the tricks of the mind is that it is, subjectively, the object of its self-perception. WRT the subject/object pairing, the disjunction operator is a semi-permeable membrane in both directions.

this essay (Nature of Number) takes for granted the division of mind (‘in here’) and world (‘out there’) as being, to all intents, separate realities. And that itself is a metaphysical construction!
— ucarr

Nowhere do I say that - that is your interpretive paradigm. — Wayfarer

I offer my public apology for anything I've attributed to you erroneously. Misquoting someone is a serious violation of that person's rights. I always try to be correct with my quotations. I do claim, however, that these words appear in your Medium article, The Nature of Number. Are they in there because you're quoting someone else?

Furthermore, no. It's not my interpretive paradigm. In fact, I'm on the other side of the aisle. My foundational premise says material and immaterial are two positions along the physicalist continuum.

Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.

This is the theoretical zeitgeist post quantum mechanics.

Try to do anything cognitive without special and temporal extension and you’ll soon discover you cannot. — ucarr

I see you make no comment on this statement. Is it because commentary would necessitate your acknowledgement doing cognition is not physical, which acknowledgement lands you squarely within mind/body dualism?

And by the way, doesn't

...the mind is never an object of perception... — Wayfarer

land you in the same location? If the mind is only subject, then clearly it's categorically isolated from a phenomenal world filled with objects.

what kind of existence do they [numbers] have? Mathematical platonists say that numbers are real independently of whether anyone perceives them or not, 'in the same sense', said Frege, 'just as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets'. But although they're independent of any particular mind, they can only be grasped by a mind. So they are 'intelligible objects', bearing in mind that 'object' is used in a metaphorical sense of 'the object of thought'. That is the sense in which there is an 'intelligible realm' that doesn't exist on the level of sensory perception (per Plato's analogy of the divided line) but is real in a noetic or intellectual sense. — Wayfarer

My ascription to you of mind body dualism I further propound by reference to the above quote as evidence. Firstly, it's funny that you make a case for mind as an isolate and pure subject by explaining how the mind "grasps" something, a physical action of the hand.

We can't get out of the physicality of verbal language, and numerical language (math) possesses unreasonable effectiveness in the natural sciences because it too is physical.

Is it not the case the main reason you claim non-binary ideation for yourself is because you do, in fact, believe the phenomenal universe is a derivation and sub-set of immaterial mind?

Whose awareness is greater: the monarch butterfly's,
— Patterner

The assumption would be that ours is. If by awareness we mean metacognition - which is generally the starting point from these sorts of discussions. — Tom Storm

You asked these questions:

Is the modern mind an improvement on the pre-modern? How would you measure improvement? More reason, more science, less superstition, less religion? — Tom Storm

Have you just answered them?

Seeing the stones does more than facilitate their counting; it affords it. — ucarr

My apologies. I just don't know what you're saying.

Thanks for your kind words, and glad you found it helpful!

Are you perhaps getting your bearings twisted within the hall of mirrors? If the mind appears to us, then it's the object of our perception, is it not? — ucarr

But the mind does not appear to us! Sitting here in my study, all manner of things appear to me - obviously, a computer monitor and keyboard which I use to compose this reply, speakers, a piano keyboard, bookshelves and other iterms. Mind is nowhere apparent amongst this array of objects, rather it is that to which or to whom these objects appear. We can speak of the mind as object in a metaphorical sense, i.e. 'as an object of enquiry', but it is not an object of perception in the sense that objects are. There is no thing called 'mind'. I can think about my thinking, but the act of thought is not itself an object, for the stated reason, that a hand cannot grasp itself. And 'grasping' here is a pretty exact analogy - the mind 'grasps' ideas in an analogously similar way a hand grasps an object but ideas are not physical.

Is it because commentary would necessitate your acknowledgement doing cognition is not physical, — ucarr

I do acknowledge it. Pinter says:

In fact, what we regard as the physical world is “physical” to us precisely in the sense that it acts in opposition to our will and constrains our actions. The aspect of the universe that resists our push and demands muscular effort on our part is what we consider to be “physical”. On the other hand, since sensation and thought don’t require overcoming any physical resistance, we consider them to be outside of material reality. It is shown in the final chapter that this is an illusory dichotomy, and any complete account of the universe must allow for the existence of a nonmaterial component which accounts for its unity and complexity. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics (p. 6). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition

I sense in your analysis the inability to conceive of an 'immaterial thing or substance'. But note here I'm not claiming there is any such thing. The 'nonmaterial component' Pinter refers to is not something that exists objectively, rather it is in the operation of observing mind - which we ourselves can never be outside of, or apart from.

Notice that the realist objection to this argument is invariably along the lines that 'the world must exist anyway, regardless of any observing mind'. But say that this statement always includes an implicit perspective even while conceiving of a world in the absence of an observer. Without a perspective or scale, nothing meaningful can be said or thought about what exists.

Is it not the case the main reason you claim non-binary ideation for yourself is because you do, in fact, believe the phenomenal universe is a derivation and sub-set of immaterial mind? — ucarr

So, following on from the above, in a sense this may be true, but the mind is not to be conceived of as any kind of substance or thing (or reified) - which is the irresistible tendency as soon as it becomes the object of debate!

It's kind of a Zen thing.

Joshu began the study of Zen when he was sixty years old and continued until he was eighty, when he realized Zen.

He taught from the age of eighty until he was one hundred and twenty.

A student once asked him: "If I haven't anything in my mind, what shall I do?"

Joshu replied: "Throw it out."

"But if I haven't anything, how can I throw it out?" continued the questioner.

"Well," said Joshu, "then carry it out."

Holism is one of your main themes?
What are some specific ways materialism reasons erroneously when arriving at its reductionism? — ucarr

Yes, but it has nothing to do with New Age or Eastern religions. As a scientific concept, Holism is now called Systems Theory. Reductionism is appropriate (not erroneous) for scientific applications, such as chemistry, which depends on knowing how single elements affect combinations. For example, carbon typically contributes energetic bonds to compounds, such as coal and carbohydrates. But flammable hydrogen & oxygen combine to produce fire-quenching water H2O. Hence, its holistic properties are different from those of the elements.

Holism though, is more appropriate for philosophical applications that study complex combinations of elements. The Santa Fe Institute, near Los Alamos, New Mexico studies complex systems, both natural and artificial, to discover their properties & potentialities. The human Mind is an example of an extremely complex biological system that mysteriously gives rise to the non-physical topic of this thread : Consciousness. If you dissect a brain down to sub-atomic particles, you will not find any consciousness, because it is a holistic quality, that emerges only when all the parts are integrated into a multi-level functional system. :smile:

Systems Theory/Holism :
A holistic view of a system encompasses the complete, entire view of that system. Holism emphasizes that the state of a system must be assessed in its entirety and cannot be assessed through its independent member parts.
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Systems_Theory/Holism

Holism and Reductionism :
Holism emphasizes the interconnectedness and interdependence of different aspects of behavior, whereas reductionism breaks down behavior into simpler components. Holism considers the context and complexity of human behavior, while reductionism seeks to isolate and study individual components in isolation.
https://studymind.co.uk/notes/holism-and-reductionism/

What is an example of Complexity Science?
For example, the Internet can be represented as a network composed of nodes (computers) and links (direct connections between computers). Other examples of complex networks include social networks, financial institution interdependencies, airline networks, and biological networks.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complex_system

Since you cite this quote from Lund University, I assume it speaks for you. Is it your understanding principles, by definition, are theoretical and therefore subject to revision? . . . . I'm not sure I buy your distinction . . . — ucarr

No. I know nothing about Lund, beyond the words of the quote. I found that definition on Google, to provide you with an "expert" opinion on "theoretical philosophy", since you seemed to be unaware of the concept. My "distinction" between "theoretical" math and "practical" science is that math deals with abstract (mental) concepts, while science works on concrete (material) objects. For that reason, Math is more like philosophy than chemistry. :nerd:

Can pure mathematics be considered a branch of philosophy? :
Pure mathematics can be considered a branch of philosophy in the sense that it deals with fundamental questions about the nature of reality
https://www.quora.com/Can-pure-mathematics-be-considered-a-branch-of-philosophy

What’s important for Enformaction is that it not distort the degree to which its multi-mode holism differs from my unary physical holism. The difference is small, not large. The former parallels material/undefined/immaterial whereas the latter subsumes these three categories. — ucarr

I don't understand your characterization of "multi-mode" vs "unitary". I call EnFormAction a "shapeshifter", because like physical energy, it can transform into a variety of manifestations. The most famous example is Einstein's E=MC^2 equation of invisible Energy and tangible Matter and a non-dimensional number. They are different expressions of the same essential substance.

But my thesis goes even further to postulate that several "modes" or phases of unitary EFA are : Energy, Matter, and Mind. I also apply that notion of transformation to the common-but-mysterious physical Phase Transitions, such as plasma-water-steam-ice. In terms of Deacon's triad, EFA serves the causal functions of Thermodynamic, Morpheodynamic, and Teleonomic. Are you familiar with the Holistic concept of Emergence? Will you explain how your "unitary physical holism" works? :smile:

EnFormAction :
For technical treatments, I had to make-up a new word to summarize the multilevel and multiform roles of generic Information in the ongoing creative act of Evolution. I call it EnFormAction. . . . As a supplement to the mainstream materialistic (scientific) theory of Causation, EnFormAction is intended to be an evocative label for a well-known, but somewhat mysterious, feature of physics : the Emergent process of Phase Change (or state transitions) from one kind (stable form) of matter to another. These sequential emanations take the structural pattern of a logical hierarchy : from solids, to liquids, to gases, and thence to plasma, or vice-versa. But they don't follow the usual rules of direct contact causation.
https://bothandblog3.enformationism.info/page23.html

Holism, reductionism and emergence :
Emergence is the opposite of reduction. Holism is the opposite of separability.
The difference is subtle, but emergence and reduction are concerned with concepts, properties, types of phenomena, being deducible from other (lower level) ones, while holism is concerned with the behaviour of parts [in relation] to a whole [system].
https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/21419/holism-reductionism-and-emergence

I've been saying math started when humans caught onto patterns based on numbers of physical things. Fingers, being a permanent and handy instance of countable things, launched human understanding of number. Two fingers look different from five fingers. Hah! Now we've started the process. Why do two fingers look different from five fingers? Is it not because fingers, and the like, possess an inherent attribute that can be labeled "number?" Different numbers of the same things look different because things possess the attribute called "number." When their number differs, they, as a group, differ. Indeed, if your piggy bank suddenly becomes possessed of fewer gold coins than yesterday, you become emotionally charged up by the numerical attribute of things.

Aside from your discussion with Wayfarer, I think the idea of grasping is at least worth going over.
So if non-physicals exist one possibility is the only place and way for them to exist, at all, is in this biological grasping. It seems to be a physical circumstance were non-physicals can exist in an identifiable physical form. If non-physicals are showing up you should observe they always can be mapped to a physical brain in location and time.

It seems to be a physical circumstance were non-physicals can exist in an identifiable physical form. If non-physicals are showing up you should observe they always can be mapped to a physical brain in location and time. — Mark Nyquist

Well said. This conveys, in a nutshell, something akin to the essence of what I been arguing regarding the scope of physicality and its extension into phenomena that some, in my opinion, erroneously label categorical immateriality.

Yes. If we map the so-called immaterial ideas back to the empirical navigations of humans through our phenomenal world, en route to their ideas, we find that linkage only seems to disappear because the interval of time extends cognitive discovery across different positions upon the landscape that are not all simple, line-of-sight configurations. Knowing a green-shirt clad golfing tourist lost on Street A and, remembering a throng of green-shirt clad golfing tourists on Street B, fuels the mind, thus allowing it to make the inference the solitary tourist is a member of the throng but now separated from them and lost.
We call this abstract thinking but, as you say, it can be mapped back to empirical experience remembered and thus, abstract thinking is still an empirical thing, albeit a multi-part thing.

If non-physicals are showing up you should observe they always can be mapped to a physical brain in location and time. — Mark Nyquist

Not so. That is where the 'multiple realisability' argument comes into play. This concept, which emerged in the philosophy of mind, argues that a particular mental state, like pain, can be realized by many different kinds of physical states across varied organisms. In other words, different physical configurations can all give rise to the same mental experience.

The significance of this theory lies in its challenge to reductionist views, particularly those in the realm of mind-brain identity theory. This theory posited that each mental state is identical to a specific physical state of the brain. However, the multiple realizability argument suggests that this one-to-one correspondence is overly simplistic. Since different organisms with different physical makeups can all experience something like pain, it implies that a mental state cannot be directly and exclusively equated with a specific physical state.

But it can also be extended to the idea that propositional content can be correlated against brain states. The argument of brain-mind identity theorists, who posit that every thought or mental state is identical to a brain state, faces major difficulties when dealing with semantic content. The core challenge is this: while neuroscience can identify and map various brain activities and states, it struggles to find a direct and consistent correspondence with the semantic content of thoughts or propositions. This issue arises partly because thoughts and propositions are abstract, involving meaning, context, and interpretation, while brain states are physical, observable phenomena.

There are several reasons why mapping semantic content to brain states is challenging:

Variability Across Individuals: Different individuals may have different neural activations for the same thought or proposition. This variability makes it hard to pinpoint a universal brain state corresponding to a specific thought.

Context and Interpretation: The meaning of a proposition can change based on context, individual understanding, and interpretation. This subjective aspect of semantic content is difficult to capture in the objective framework of brain states. (This is the subject of the discipline of semiotics.)

Complexity of Language and Thought: Language and thought are highly complex and dynamic. The same proposition might involve different cognitive processes depending on factors like language proficiency, attention, or prior knowledge.

The Problem of Qualia: There's also the issue of subjective experience or qualia. How a person experiences understanding a proposition might not be directly translatable to a measurable brain state.

And to top it all off, it is recognised that the subjective unity of consciousness - the fact that we're aware of ourselves as unified subjects of experience - is not something that neuroscience has been able to account for. This is called the neural binding problem.

Which brings us back to the problem of consciousness.

Okay, you agree and added something.
Wayfarer disagrees.
Anyway, I'm done for the day.

I'm not sure about that, but I do know that people use philosophy in this way. I wonder why you have introduced cynicism when nothing I have written is cynical. — Tom Storm

I apologize. I was merely looking for an alternative to "Pessimistic". And the colloquial usage of Cynical seemed to imply a generally gloomy outlook. The ancient Cynics were merely dispassionate. I didn't mean to label you as a fault-finding person. Merely one who can't smell the flowers among the thorns. :joke:


What is it called when someone is cynical?
The words misanthropic and pessimistic are common synonyms of cynical. While all three words mean "deeply distrustful,"

Why did you drop this question into your response? When did evolution come up? When did progress come up? Are you on a kind of automatic pilot of pedagogical didacticism? — Tom Storm

Your post seemed to imply that the world was going to hell in a handbasket. So, I thought I'd cheer you up with some more positive news --- on an evolutionary scale --- not breaking news of the latest broken bones & spirits. I don't classify myself as either Pessimistic or Optimistic, but more like a Peptomist. I see the bad stuff peripherally, but I prefer to focus on the good stuff. And I "see" evidence of long-term progress in the world on a cosmic scale, that gives me hope that there is light at the end of the tunnel. :wink:

Didactic pedagogy means the procedure of teaching that follows guiding principles in a scientific approach. In other words, is a strategy of presenting knowledge, information, and ideas to students in a structurally organized way.

If non-physicals are showing up you should observe they always can be mapped to a physical brain in location and time. — Mark Nyquist

Immaterial (abstract) entities (essences), such as Consciousness, only "show-up" when a rational Mind infers*1 an invisible immaterial Function associated with a complex material object (brain). You can't "see" the function with your eyes, only with your rational faculty. The mind-function of a brain exists only as a mental representation of an invisible immaterial process of transforming incoming data (grist for the mill) into meaningful outputs (baked bread).

So, to equate Mind with Brain is to commit the Map/Territory semantic fallacy*2. A Function*3 is not a material object, but a mathematical & semantic relationship. For example, "computation" is a function of a mechanical computer. But it's also a function of a human "computer"*4. In such cases, the relevant input & output are mathematical concepts, such as numbers. And the physical materials (copper, steel, plastic, proteins, neurons) are irrelevant to the causal calculation*5, they are merely carriers of information, not the content. Mind is what the brain does, not what it is. Matter is merely the vessel (cup), Mind is the wine. :smile:


*1. An inference is the process of reasoning from what we think is true to what else is true.

*2. Map–territory relation :
Mistaking the map for the territory is a logical fallacy that occurs when someone confuses the semantics of a term with what it represents.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map%E2%80%93territory_relation

*3. What is function and example?
In particular, a function maps each input to exactly one output.
https://study.com/academy/lesson/what-is-a-function-in-math-definition-examples.html

*4. What did it mean to be a human computer?
Before there were actual computers, they were people. At NASA, women had to do all the math and science calculations for aircraft and space missions. From 1935 to 1942 more women began to work at NACA because many men volunteered to be in the war. The women that worked for NASA were often called "Human Computers".
https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/amst_humancomp/

*5. Aboutness and function, says Deacon, is not something added on top of things, but something that emerges from constraints on matter and process. Deacon sees constraint as a form of causality which can be generated intrinsically, simply by processes interacting with each other.
https://somatosphere.com/2014/terrence-deacons-incomplete-nature.html/

Your language paints a picture of a man who knows himself. Since, as you say,

...the mind is never an object of perception... — Wayfarer

and also as you say,

It is never appears to us as object, but as us, as the subject. — Wayfarer

the reader knows, from your two statements, that, in your understanding, your mind is your self. So, if you know yourself, because you perceive yourself, then you both perceive and know your mind. I don't expect to find we disagree on what I've claimed so far. We disagree whether the situation of you knowing yourself as mind involves your mind in the position of object. Your mind knows objectivity, so it also knows conceptually the objects that populate categorical objectivity. Since the mind is, by definition, a processor that deals in concept processing, and metaphor is a concept, then we know that mind dealing in metaphor is not metaphorical but literal if, as you claim, mind is only conceptual.

I want you to respond to the specifics of my argument: a concept processor processing concepts (such as metaphor) is not a figurative action; it is a literal action. In light of this, the mind examining itself is not an action done in a metaphorical sense. If it were the case that the latter holds, that would be higher-order metaphor, i.e. metaphor of metaphor.

We can speak of the mind as object in a metaphorical sense, i.e. 'as an object of enquiry', but it is not an object of perception in the sense that objects are. There is no thing called 'mind'. I can think about my thinking, but the act of thought is not itself an object, for the stated reason, that a hand cannot grasp itself. And 'grasping' here is a pretty exact analogy - the mind 'grasps' ideas in an analogously similar way a hand grasps an object but ideas are not physical. — Wayfarer

You're attempting to use "metaphor" as an escape clause liberating you from the self-contradiction inundating your denial. Your bigger problem is that you're caught in a rook's forking attack - to use a chess metaphor - if you avoid acknowledging the mind can be an object, in so doing, you lose the war because you position yourself as a Binary Existence Idealist: there is the phenomenal world of objects and, in a parallel world, there is the pure subjectivity of mind. This scheme doesn't even work in terms of the realm of Platonic ideals because its parallelism precludes the intersection of ideal model and imperfect copy central to Platonism.

Try to do anything cognitive without spatial and temporal extension and you’ll soon discover you cannot.
— ucarr

I see you make no comment on this statement. Is it because commentary would necessitate your acknowledgement not doing cognition is physical? Such acknowledgement lands you squarely within mind/body dualism — ucarr

In this statement, I made an error. I have corrected the error, a negation, by lining it through.

I sense in your analysis the inability to conceive of an 'immaterial thing or substance'. But note here I'm not claiming there is any such thing. The 'nonmaterial component' Pinter refers to is not something that exists objectively, rather it is in the operation of observing mind - which we ourselves can never be outside of, or apart from. — Wayfarer

You raise and important point here. The distinction you point out is helpful to my understanding and I appreciate your sharing of it. This configuration of cognitive operations is complicated and interesting. I think an exhaustive examination is beyond my ability. Let me attempt making some claims.

If observing mind holds a concept of objects and, moreover, holds capacity to perceive particular objects conceptually, and if, as you imply, there are no extant immaterial objects that can be perceived conceptually, then you negate, by implication, the objective world of immaterial objects as perceived by observing mind. This categorical negation carries two competing implications: 1) conceptual mind exists in isolation, perceiving nothing or 2) conceptual mind fabricates imaginary conceptual objects perceived via solipsistic dreaming.

If observing mind does perceive conceptual objects not fabricated as imaginary objects perceived via solipsistic dreaming, then observing mind literally perceives conceptual objects via physical processing within the brain. This must be true because we know the conceptual contents of observing mind are funded by the physical processing of the brain.

I want you to respond to the specifics of my argument: cognition by the observing mind, which is tied to the physical processing of the brain, is both literal and physical.

You claim we can never be outside of our subject-only mind. An essential attribute of observing mind is self-awareness. Sentient beings survive threats to life via feedback looping memory circuits monitoring their body's interactions with the environment. This is self-awareness. Self-awareness cannot exist without the observing mind being subjectively aware of itself as object. Likewise, sentient being cannot be aware of another sentient being without observing mind being subjectively aware of its objective self in society with the other. If it were not subjectively aware of its objective self, it would not be able to differentiate itself from the world. This subjective awareness of the objective self is literal, not figurative. When another being strikes you in the face with its fist, the pain you experience is literal, not figurative.

The pink elephant in the room of this discussion is the complex surface. It is a cognitive processor that links self and world via mind. It is cognitive processing rooted in the physical, as consciousness is physical.

You've written a lot, and I may not be able to give sufficient time to respond to all of it, as Christmas is looming. But this is an incorrect analysis, for reasons I will go into below.

If observing mind holds a concept of objects and, moreover, holds capacity to perceive particular objects conceptually, and if, as you imply, there are no extant immaterial objects that can be perceived conceptually, then you negate, by implication, the objective world of immaterial objects as perceived by observing mind. — ucarr

This is a complex issue of epistemology, and there are various models that I consider and draw from. As I've said, I hope that my philosophy is compatible with Kant's 'copernican revolution', which is that 'things conform to thoughts, thoughts don't conform to things'. It is the representation that makes the object possible rather than the object that makes the representation possible. This introduces the human mind as an agent, an active originator of experience rather than just a passive recipient of perception. The world is the experience-of-the-world.

Where 'immaterial objects' come into the picture, is as cognitive and intellectual formations which comprise the basis on which judgements are made (similar to what @Gnomonsays in the post above). When I say that they don't exist as an object, I mean they don't exist as a sensible object, as phenomena ('what appears'). But formative ideas such as number are real nonetheless as constituents of reason. They are not the product of thought, but can only be apprehended by thought, and they are constitutive of the judgements we make about the objective world. That is made abundantly clear in science, is it not, which is grounded in quantitative analysis.

Your mind knows objectivity, so it also knows conceptually the objects that populate categorical objectivity. — ucarr

Well, again, consider number. Are numbers objects? You can point to a number, 7, but that is a symbol. The same number can be written in different languages and symbolic form, VII, seven, sieben, etc. What is denoted by the symbol is an intellectual act, the apprehension of a quantity. But they're not actually 'objects' so much as 'intellectual acts', but we use the term 'object' to facilitate discussion.

you position yourself as a Binary Existence Idealist: there is the phenomenal world of objects and, in a parallel world, there is the pure subjectivity of mind. — ucarr

It is precisely that conception of the world as separate from the self that I am calling into question. The subjective and objective are, as it were, co-arising and mutually conditioning - there is no self without world, and no world without self. Again I feel that is basically conformable with the Kantian model.

.

You claim we can never be outside of our subject-only mind — ucarr

What I mean by saying that, is that when you try and adopt the view of the world as if from no perspective - the world as it exists in itself, absent any perceiver, then you're trying to get outside your perceptual framework and see the world 'as it is in itself', as it would be with no observer. But we can't stand outside ourselves in that way. In scientific terms, we understand the cosmos is vast in space and time and that, as phenomena, h. sapiens are a mere blip or flash in space and time. But there is still an implicit perspective in that supposition, which is in the sense in which the mind provides the framework within which that judgement is meaningful. That is the limitation of naturalism - naturalism assumes a 'view from nowhere', as if its method of quantitative analysis shows us reality as it is with no observer. But the mistake is to interpret this stances as conveying some absolute truth, which it does not. See The Blind Spot .

I want you to respond to the specifics of my argument: cognition by the observing mind, which is tied to the physical processing of the brain, is both literal and physical. — ucarr

Plainly not. Mathematics, semiotics, many other elements of the mind, are not physical in nature. Cognition draws on all manner of influences and inputs, literal, symbolic, mythological, and many other factors. I think you're grasping at straws, because the denial of the primacy of the physical opens up too many difficult metaphysical questions, in a culture which has proclaimed that metaphysics is dead. We want it to be dead.

As for the mind's inability to grasp itself, the text I referred to is from Indian philosophy, the Upaniṣads, which are the central texts of Advaita Vedanta. The specific passage can be found here.

Thanks again for your comments and feedback but as mentioned Christmas is upon us and I'll be logging out for a few days. And, compliments of the season!

I don't understand your characterization of "multi-mode" vs "unitary". I call EnFormAction a "shapeshifter", because like physical energy, it can transform into a variety of manifestations. The most famous example is Einstein's E=MC^2 equation of invisible Energy and tangible Matter and a non-dimensional number. They are different expressions of the same essential substance. — Gnomon

Question - Are not both mass and the speed of light invisible?

But my thesis goes even further to postulate that several "modes" or phases of unitary EFA are : Energy, Matter, and Mind. I also apply that notion of transformation to the common-but-mysterious physical Phase Transitions, such as plasma-water-steam-ice. In terms of Deacon's triad, EFA serves the causal functions of Thermodynamic, Morpheodynamic, and Teleonomic. — Gnomon

If I remember correctly, you deem both mind and consciousness as being immaterial.

My notion of unary physicalism, like your EnFormAction, encompasses the four phase states you name and furthermore, I currently speculate it also encompasses mind and consciousness via absential materialism, a label that I use to name Deacon's hierarchy of dynamisms: thermo, morpho and teleo.

You take the position material and immaterial entities are encompassed by one essential substance; I think causal information is how you name it. In distinction from you, I speculate about all entities being material, even highly-ordered, emergent properties such as sentience and consciousness.

My single-axis notion, inspired by Deacon, centers on a continuum of upwardly evolving dynamisms.

Might it be correct to say your theory encompasses a system that, going forward from antiquity, encompasses both scientific method and ontic grammar.

Maybe we can say of the two narratives that one is unary and the other holistic.

Notice that the realist objection to this argument is invariably along the lines that 'the world must exist anyway, regardless of any observing mind'. But say that this statement always includes an implicit perspective even while conceiving of a world in the absence of an observer. Without a perspective or scale, nothing meaningful can be said or thought about what exists. — Wayfarer

With no background in academic philosophy, I have little depth in the Dualism debate, so I'm just reaching here, not "grasping". My self-acquired quantum physics & information-based worldview seems to require an Idealist foundation ; yet my mundane activities require a Realist belief system. As I have expressed it before : "for all practical (scientific) purposes, I am a Materialist, but for theoretical (philosophical) considerations I am a Mentalist". So, I'm a hybrid animal : an innocent mind in a cartesian demon's lair, so to speak.

My justification for a Mind-first ontology is based --- not on subtle philosophical deduction --- but on the scientific ubiquity of multiform Information, which includes mathematical Ratios, mental Reasoning, and physical inter-relationships, that include so-called "forces"*1 (gravity, sub-atomic bonds) that we observe as "spooky action at a distance"*2. Causal/Absential Information is common to both matter and mind. Therefore, for completely different reasons I came to the same conclusion as Spinoza : that the essence of the world is not a material substance, but a labelled-yet-undefinable abstract concept : God or Nature . . . or demon?.

The Realist worldview seems to assume that Matter is the primary onticity*3, and the only kind of thing that exists. This is understandable, because our 5 senses are tuned for detection of non-self objects outside the Mind. But the Idealist presumption is that Mind-itself is the primary kind of being, hence Body/Matter must be dependent upon or emergent from Mind-stuff. So, the Idealist belief requires a Universal Other Mind (God or what?) to provide the "implicit perspective" that somehow creates the "substance/essence" of a real world, for our senses to sense.

Since several millennia of dualistic debate have not resolved the tension between opposing "implicit" perspectives, why can't we take a lesson from Einstein's Relativity, and conclude that both views may be ultimately true, but the local framing is contingently true? If your frame requires worship, so be it. But my hybrid frame only invites curiosity. :smile:



*1. Physical Forces : that by which we measure changes in matter
Consciousness : that by which we know changes in the world

*2. Do forces actually exist or are they merely mathematical constructions that explain real phenomena?
Forces are real phenomena that exist in the physical world. In physics, forces are described and understood through mathematical models, but they are not merely mathematical constructions. Forces can be observed and measured, and they have real effects on the motion and interactions of objects in the universe.
https://www.quora.com/Do-forces-actually-exist-or-are-they-merely-mathematical-constructions-that-explain-real-phenomena
Note --- Forces are not "observed" by the senses, but inferred by the rational faculty of Mind. The physical effects are real, but the mental knowledge is ideal.

*3. Onticity : essence of being

I hope that my philosophy is compatible with Kant's 'copernican revolution', which is that 'things conform to thoughts, thoughts don't conform to things' — Wayfarer

Kant's maxim is one of your foundational premises.

In the middle of the night, en route to the loo, you stub your toe on the bedpost. This is an instance of you directing the world to crush your flesh and you directing yourself to scream appropriately?

It is precisely that conception of the world as separate from the self that I am calling into question. The subjective and objective are, as it were, co-arising and mutually conditioning - there is no self without world, and no world without self. — Wayfarer

Question - How does the self as subject-only have presence within a phenomenal world populated by objects?

Question - How does your project to promote the merger of self and world proceed simultaneous with asserting the subject-only mind?

Notice that the realist objection to this argument is invariably along the lines that 'the world must exist anyway, regardless of any observing mind'. But say that this statement always includes an implicit perspective even while conceiving of a world in the absence of an observer. Without a perspective or scale, nothing meaningful can be said or thought about what exists. — Wayfarer

Your two quotes in bold comprise in tandem a position antagonistic to your subject-only mind. By your own values, you tilt towards a complex surface in spacetime converging the subject/object duet.

You then, however, shoot yourself in the foot with your immaterial, subject-only mind. Is it not the epitome of anti-philosophy? Consider the maxim that the examined life is the central aim of philosophy. Well, what does the examining and, most important, what object is central to its examination? If you and your subject-only life are one and the same, how can you practice philosophy?

Question - Are not both mass and the speed of light invisible? — ucarr

Yes, both are numbers quantifying qualities (properties). Properties (attributes) are rationally inferrable, but not sensibly visible. Why do you ask? :nerd:

My notion of unary physicalism, like your EnFormAction, encompasses the four phase states you name and furthermore, I currently speculate it also encompasses mind and consciousness via absential materialism, a label that I use to name Deacon's hierarchy of dynamisms: thermo, morpho and teleo. — ucarr

I was not familiar with the term "unary", and I still don't how it is different from "Unitary" or "Holism". Unitary may describe a unique system of parts that together can be considered a single Form (morpho). Holism is similar, but focused more on the internal interrelationships that allow the parts to function together as a unit (teleo).

For my personal philosophical purposes, I make a distinction between "physical" and "material". Material (morpho) typically includes the stuff our senses perceive (what is seems to be), while Physical (thermo) includes the invisible forces & properties that cause a thing to act & react as it does. Please give me a brief definition of "unary physicalism" and "absential materialism". :smile:

Might it be correct to say your theory encompasses a system that, going forward from antiquity, encompasses both scientific method and ontic grammar. — ucarr

Please remember that I have no formal training in academic Philosophy. So please tell me how you distinguish between "scientific method" and "ontic grammar". Is the latter unscientific speculation? If so, how does it differ from philosophical speculation or scientific hypothesis? :wink:

Question - Are not both mass and the speed of light invisible? — ucarr

Yes, both are numbers quantifying qualities (properties). Properties (attributes) are rationally inferrable, but not sensibly visible. Why do you ask? :nerd: — Gnomon

I call EnFormAction a "shapeshifter", because like physical energy, it can transform into a variety of manifestations. The most famous example is Einstein's E=MC^2 equation of invisible Energy and tangible Matter and a non-dimensional number. — Gnomon

You have described Einstein's equation as an expression of three states of being: a) invisible; b) tangible; c) non-dimensional. On one side of the equation you have the invisible state; on the other side of the equation you have mass and the speed of light as tangible matter. You agree that mass and the speed of light, contrary to your description of $e=mc^2$, possess invisibility.

I was not familiar with the term "unary", and I still don't how it is different from "Unitary" or "Holism". — Gnomon

With "unary" I'm trying to express my take on physicalism in a math context wherein one continuum, the real number line, expresses one mode of existence, physical. The real number continuum is, by my language, equated with a unary math operation such as $√X$. So, the real numbers measure along one mode, the continuum of the physical. Let me add that, in my view, numbers, like the environment in which they have meaning, are physical.

If numbers are not precisely physical, then they're a good candidate for the bridge between the material and immaterial worlds. Such a bridge function, in my opinion, doesn't refute my unary physicalism notion because two worlds that can be bridged are situated within Deacon's hierarchy of higher-order dynamisms: thermo, morpho, teleo. The debate between material/immaterial, as clarified by Deacon, comes to a crux at the notion of emergent properties of matter, such that the emergent properties, while dependent upon the lower substrates, operate under different parameters. This radical difference, as in the cases of numbers and mind, gives the appearance of an immaterial world, but its really the cause of emergent components of the physical world.

Absential materialism, as taken directly from the work of Deacon, names dynamic, physical processes that function on the basis of what's not contained in spacetime. The big picture starting to emerge from the hierarchy of physical dynamisms is how constraints compel dynamisms to do work ordering the necessary absences that teleodynamically organize toward the end-directed dynamisms essential to life, sentience and consciousness. Teleodynamically organized, end-directed work tilts the mind away from immediately tangible cause/effect relationships via a dynamism of emergent functions that operate within empirical experience as if they're invisible agents from another, non-sensory realm.

Please remember that I have no formal training in academic Philosophy. — Gnomon

No need to cop a plea. Your understanding of the science is equal (if not superior) to mine. I, like you, and most people, have a checkered academic grounding.

Scientific method = experiment/verification methodology: measurable, repeatable, public.

Ontic grammar = the ground rules governing the content, nature and scope of existence (metaphysics).

Question : Does your commitment to immaterial reality contain a moral component?

If you will, let your responses marinate in the following sallies:

• Intangibles offer cold comfort for flesh ‘n blood mortals.
• Perishable things physical possess the sweet touch of certain presence.
• After ascension, no saint has ever given comfort to mortal infant in distress. Mother’s arms, pock-marked though they be with sin, better quell the cutting slashes of earthly woes than all equations combined.
• Eternity, known only by grasp of mind, is but faint medicine for wounds of the flesh.
• No one denies the road from the physical to the mental lies tortured with complexity.

I've been saying math started when humans caught onto patterns based on numbers of physical things. Fingers, being a permanent and handy instance of countable things, launched human understanding of number. Two fingers look different from five fingers. Hah! Now we've started the process. Why do two fingers look different from five fingers? Is it not because fingers, and the like, possess an inherent attribute that can be labeled "number?" Different numbers of the same things look different because things possess the attribute called "number." When their number differs, they, as a group, differ. Indeed, if your piggy bank suddenly becomes possessed of fewer gold coins than yesterday, you become emotionally charged up by the numerical attribute of things. — ucarr

I have never thought about this topic to any degree. Now that I am, I think I disagree. I don’t think the things being counted have an attribute called "number."

The universe is consistent. Laws of physics, mathematics, and whatever else, are the same everywhere. (Maybe not in a black hole.) If they were not, we would have chaos, and I doubt life would have arisen at all. (Although I suppose there are any number of sci-fi scenarios…) We evolved, and exist, in this universe, with its consistent principles. Meaning they are within us. I think counting is our recognition of these attributes, these consistent principles, of the universe. It makes sense that we recognize the principles of our own existence when we see them outside of ourselves. It wouldn't make sense if we were surprised every time we added 2 and 2, and came up with 4.

Do you believe a brain confined to a vat will eventually start counting?

We evolved, and exist, in this universe, with its consistent principles. Meaning they are within us. I think counting is our recognition of these attributes, these consistent principles, of the universe. It makes sense that we recognize the principles of our own existence when we see them outside of ourselves. It wouldn't make sense if we were surprised every time we added 2 and 2, and came up with 4. — Patterner

:up:

Do you believe a brain confined to a vat will eventually start counting? — ucarr

Certainly not. I don't believe a human could come to any intelligence or consciousness under those circumstances. I believe sensory input is essential.

The universe is consistent. Laws of physics, mathematics, and whatever else, are the same everywhere...If they were not, we would have chaos, and I doubt life would have arisen at all. — Patterner

You argue that our phenomenal universe of forces and material objects has an innate order founded upon principles likewise innate. You go on to declare that life wouldn't be possible without the designed and pervasive order of the universe as its ground. You present a picture of naturally ordered life arising from pre-existing order.

We evolved, and exist, in this universe, with its consistent principles. Meaning they are within us. I think counting is our recognition of these attributes, these consistent principles, of the universe. It makes sense that we recognize the principles of our own existence when we see them outside of ourselves. — Patterner

You acknowledge designed order is imbibed into human genome from the forces and materials from which it has arisen. This is your description of cosmic mind meeting human mind. The human mind, once attaining to the requisite cognitive prowess, recognizes essential attributes of order of the surrounding creation. So, order, and number, the peerless marker of position and therefore of order, are discovered within the natural world. You don't believe numbers are a human invention:

Do you believe a brain confined to a vat will eventually start counting? — ucarr

Certainly not. I don't believe a human could come to any intelligence or consciousness under those circumstances. I believe sensory input is essential. — Patterner

You make it clear human mind and the innate order of the natural world are an interface, a complex surface interwoven from the coming-together of the two conversationalists. You answer the question: Why do two fingers look different from five fingers? It is because Aristotle was right and Descartes was wrong: human learns from natural world as part of an Aristotelian Duet wherein Agent Intellect meets intelligibility.

You go on to declare that life wouldn't be possible without the designed and pervasive order of the universe as its ground. — ucarr

No. I did not, and do not, declare the order is designed.

You present a picture of naturally ordered life arising from pre-existing order. — ucarr

Yes. The order pre-existed the life that arose within it.

You acknowledge designed order is imbibed into human genome from the forces and materials from which it has arisen. — ucarr

Again, I did not, and do not, acknowledge design.

This is your description of cosmic mind meeting human mind. — ucarr

No, I did not, and do not, describe cosmic mind.

You don't believe numbers are a human invention: — ucarr

I think humans noticed an attribute of the universe's order. This attribute existed before any being able to notice did so. So no, we didn't invent it. We noticed it, and named it. Then we worked to understand it better. Then we expanded the field of study in ways that we never noticed - indeed, could not possibly notice - by observing objects.

But it seems, from my limited musings on the topic, that the attribute we named is of the universe's order, not of objects. But, serious question, does it ever make a differences? It we treat it as an attribute of things, do we run into trouble somewhere down the line? Same question if we treat it as an attribute of the universe's order.

But it seems, from my limited musings on the topic, that the attribute we named is of the universe's order, not of objects. But, serious question, does it ever make a difference? — Patterner

Well you have a computer to record that idea. That is a consequence of noticing attributes and making minute distinctions which were discoveries i.e. disclosing aspects of nature that were previously hidden.