It is unclear what you mean by "immoral" and therefore that these are "possible worlds".Here are two possible worlds:
1. It is immoral to harm others
2. It is not immoral to harm others — Michael
No.Are you saying that if I were to harm others in world (1) then I would be miserable but that if I were to harm others in world (2) then I wouldn't be miserable?
Your false dichotomy doesn't work.How does that work?
I see. My bad, I should have read the first page of this thread at least. A naturalistic hybrid of 'eudaimonism and disutilitarianism' is my position, not deontologism.Also the OP is directed at categorical imperatives, not the kind of hypothetical/pragmatic imperatives that you’re describing.
It is unclear what you mean by "immoral" and therefore that these are "possible worlds". — 180 Proof
How would it have been determined that it is right?But what if what is right is what we find reprehensible? What if we ought to kill babies for fun? — Michael
1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies. — Michael
Assuming ethical non-naturalism, whatever "immoral" means the sentence "it is not immoral to harm others" is not a logical contradiction, — Michael
That's just reasserting that it's not a contradiction. — Banno
Again, "Why be moral?" is an infelicitous question - being moral is what you ought to do. Hence the answer to "ought you be moral?" is "yes!" — Banno
But what difference would being correct make to being incorrect? Presumably, regardless of what is or isn't the case, you wouldn't kill babies. Or would you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral? In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make? — Michael
As if "physical or emotional injury" were not evil. — Banno
if ethical non-naturalism is true then these are two possible worlds:
1. It is immoral to harm others
2. It is not immoral to harm others
Assuming that in either case we believe that it is immoral to harm others, does it even matter which world we're in? — Michael
Why does it matter if we're wrong? It makes no practical difference to our lives. — Michael
This assumes a consequentialist justification is necessary for morality, which means your beef isn't against non-naturalism, but it's with deontolgy. — Hanover
If ethical non naturalism is true then it seems to be that whether or not our moral beliefs are true has no practical import. Our lives go on the same. — Michael
Why would it be different if ethical naturalism were the case? It might just be that murdering babies is moral in such a possible world. — Hanover
There would be a significant observable difference between living in that world and living in the world we're in now. — Michael
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