If consciousness is physical and if we are conscious then anything that is physically identical to us is conscious and anything that isn’t conscious is physically different. — Michael

There are two different senses of consciousness. One is functional consciousness, such as the ability to sense and react to stimulus. The p-zombie has this kind of consciousness. What it lacks is phenomenal consciousness. There is no experience that accompanies its interactions.

If I want to make the argument that phenomenal consciousness is fully addressed by an explanation of functional consciousness, my argument is vulnerable to the p-zombie argument. Since it's conceivable that a person could have the functions without the phenomenal, I have the burden of proving that functionality explains phenomenality. That would require that I have a working theory of consciousness, which doesn't exist at this time.

The outcome is that the "hardness" of the hard problem is affirmed. You could cast it as a threat to physicalism, but if we more fully understand phenomenal consciousness, we'll probably just add that to the realm of the physical. That's what's happened with other discoveries that upended previous conceptions of physicality. So the p-zombie argument just ends up saying that there's a giant gap in our understanding.

So, physically identical except in respect of its lacking consciousness, possibly physical?

Or, physically identical but different non-physically, in respect of its lacking consciousness, presumed non-physical? — bongo fury

We can conceive of something that is physically identical to us not having consciousness, therefore it is metaphysically possible for something physically identical to us to not have consciousness, therefore consciousness isn't physical.

So, the latter?

We can conceive of something that is physically identical to us not having consciousness, therefore it is metaphysically possible for something physically identical to us to not have consciousness — Michael

How do you get from being able to imagine something, to that thing being metaphysically possible?

People can certainly imagine things that aren't physically possible. Why would the situation be different for metaphysical possibility.

How do you get from being able to imagine something, to that thing being metaphysically possible? — wonderer1

Logical and metaphysical possibility amount to the same thing. A thing is metaphysically possible if some god could make it so.

Logical and metaphysical possibility amount to the same thing. — frank

Philosophers disagree.

"Inflationists, such as David Chalmers (2002), hold “Modal Monism”, the view that there is only one modal notion or primitive, such that metaphysical and logical modality coincide."
SEP

Since the p-zombie argument is associated with Chalmers, we might want to consider the way he uses "metaphysical possibility."

I'd just say Chalmers has bad epistemic hygiene. Inflationism might be handy for making weak arguments appear strong, but I'm not seeing a good reason to take it seriously based on what the SEP says.

I'd just say Chalmers has bad epistemic hygiene. Inflationism might be handy for making weak arguments appear strong, but I'm not seeing a good reason to take it seriously based on what the SEP says. — wonderer1

How would you explain the difference between logical and metaphysical possibility?

And it's navigating the world and doing its job effectively, and it's doing all this without knowing anything??? How does that work, exactly?
— RogueAI

External stimuli such as light and sound stimulate its sense receptors, these signals are sent to the brain which then responds by sending signals to the muscles causing it to move in the manner appropriate to navigate the stimulus. — Michael

I keep trying to imagine a zombie version of me doing my job effectively without knowing anything and then coming home and kicking its feet up and having drinks without feeling alcohol cravings and I keep failing. I think the whole p-zombie is incoherent. Do you at least see where I'm coming from?

P-zombies are definitely incoherent by any normal standard of a good, coherent description of how the world probably works.

It makes absolutely no sense that there could be things out there with no conscious yet they routinely claim they are conscious and enter into debates about the hard problem of consciousness.

Moreover, because our brains are the things which are functionally responsible for our conscious claims, it follows that the reason I, as a conscious being, believe that I am conscious is for the exact same reasons that a p-zombie believes it is consciousness, even though the p-zombie is wrong and I just happen to be correct.
To me, science doesn't seem to give or necessitate any room for anything additional to routine physics and biology as explanations for why our brains behave the way they do so it is strange that a p-zombie would make these claims from the physical interactions of the brain. And the fact that my brain is only interacting with physical things brings up the question of how I can even know I am phenomenally conscious if the brain mediates all my knowledge. My knowledge about my own consciousness would be entirely incidental.

So it follows that phenomenal consciousness is entirely redudnant.

The simplest explanation is that there is no duality between the mind and brain. P-zombies are incoherent and don't make sense in the actual world at all.

You seem to think that certain bodily behaviours can only be caused by subjective consciousness. Why is that?

The body is a physical object. Muscles contracting, neurons firing, sense receptors responding to various stimuli; all of this is purely mechanical.

I think the problem is that you keep trying to think of the “why” in intentional terms, when in fact intentions have nothing to do with it. I’m sure you know of deterministic arguments against free will? So just consider them. P-zombies have no free will. Everything they do is a physical effect of prior physical causes.

They’re an advanced ChatGPT in an advanced Boston Dynamics robot.

You seem to think that certain bodily behaviours can only be caused by subjective consciousness. Why is that? — Michael

I think he's right, but that's because I'm a panpstychist. I suspect all causation is, at bottom, psychological. That avoids overdetermination.

I think he's right, but that's because I'm a panpstychist. I suspect all causation is, at bottom, psychological. That avoids overdetermination. — bert1

The p-zombie argument is an argument against physicalism. If you're a panpsychist then the p-zombie argument is irrelevant. You already accept the conclusion that the mind is non-physical.

The p-zombie argument is an argument against physicalism. If you're a panpsychist then the p-zombie argument is irrelevant. You already accept the conclusion that the mind is non-physical. — Michael

Yes, that's pretty much true. I just wanted to point out the problem of over-determination, which RogueAI is approaching. He may have an overdetermination problem if he thinks causation in humans is psychological, and I wonder how he handles it.

The p-zombie argument is an argument against physicalism. If you're a panpsychist then the p-zombie argument is irrelevant. You already accept the conclusion t — Michael

Or the p-zombie argument shows that we would need to expand the concept of physical in order to accommodate phenomenal consciousness. It also puts the burden of proof on a reductive physicalist.

You seem to think that certain bodily behaviours can only be caused by subjective consciousness. Why is that? — Michael

Because it's so obviously true. Are you going to tell me you've never done anything purely based on psychological reasons or because you were compelled by desire or rage or passion?

Are you going to tell me you've never done anything purely based on psychological reasons or because you were compelled by desire or rage or passion? — RogueAI

That I did it for psychological reasons isn’t that it couldn’t have been done for non-psychological reasons.

That I did it for psychological reasons isn’t that it couldn’t have been done for non-psychological reasons. — Michael

What would the non-psychological reason be for, say, killing a cheating spouse for revenge?

What would the non-psychological reason be for, say, killing a cheating spouse for revenge? — RogueAI

Physical determinism.

Physical determinism. — Michael

Which takes us back to consciousness and mental states. Physicalism would be on much more solid ground if it could explain consciousness, but it loses bets like this: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-25-year-old-bet-about-consciousness-has-finally-been-settled/

and I predict it will keep losing those bets because it's a dead end.

See this.

My apologies for replying to days-old posts, but I've been otherwise occupied.

The argument is that:
1. A p-zombie is physically identical to us but has no consciousness
2. P-zombies are not a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is non-physical
4. Therefore either physicalism is false or nothing is conscious
5. We are conscious
6. Therefore physicalism is false — Michael

This argument seems to depend on consciousness having zero benefit or purpose. It would never have been selected for since it brings zero benefit. The argument makes somewhat more sense if one is in denial of evolution of course.
The p-zombie can function identically without the consciousness (as I do). It reports the same experience (except I don't in this conversation because I've been stripped of the vocabulary necessary to do so). So line 3 should be "Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is undetectable". It seems to be more of an argument for epiphenomenalism.
Lines 1 and 5 beg the conclusion, making the argument fallacious. I claim I am not 'conscious'. I would be lying if I said I was.

If physicalism was true, the non-conscious being would make the exact same argument as above, per line 1, demonstrating that the argument carries no weight.

We can conceive of something that is physically identical to us not having consciousness — Michael

This also begs the conclusion.

External stimuli such as light and sound stimulate its sense receptors, these signals are sent to the brain which then responds by sending signals to the muscles causing it to move in the manner appropriate to navigate the stimulus. — Michael

How do you know that this isn't a description about how you work? I mean if it was, then by definition you would not know it, so I guess I am asking how you would report that you know that this isn't a description of how you work.

P-zombies have no free will. Everything they do is a physical effect of prior physical causes. — Michael

How do you know that you have this sort of free will? Given many definitions of free will (that your choices are not the result of physical causes), I agree with your argument above. But then this zombie has no idea why anyone would benefit from that sort of free will. It sounds like a curse.

I think they're impossible too. — flannel jesus
Impossible because conscious experience is physical ... — Michael

By your definition it cannot be. You've made that very clear.

I wouldn't say impossible, but it's ludicrous to think there would be a couple of p-zombies carrying on, what to us would appear to be a deeply personal heartfelt conversation, while in fact their conversation is simply meaningless noises they are making for no reason. — wonderer1

Only because the language forbids using half those words for what the zombie is doing. It very much claims 'heartfelt', 'meaningful', etc, but they're apparently all lies. The zombies doesn't know that they're lies.

Lines 1 and 5 beg the conclusion, making the argument fallacious. — noAxioms

Line 1 is just a definition.

Line 5 doesn't beg the question because it doesn't claim that consciousness is non-physical. It just claims that whatever consciousness is we have it. A physicalist can also accept this premise.

We can conceive of something that is physically identical to us not having consciousness — Michael

This also begs the conclusion. — noAxioms

Yes, this is one of the common counterarguments against the p-zombie argument.

Line 1 is just a definition. — Michael

A begging definition then.
1. A p-zombie is physically identical to us but has no consciousness[/quote]

Physically identical implies that the difference is non-physical. 'We' have something non-physical that the physically identical zombie doesn't. That's very much begging the conclusion. I mean the conclusion is drawn by step 3 without any additional unreasonable premises.Step 1 defines consciousness to be supernatural, and step 5 asserts that we have it, per that definition. How is this possibly not begging?

So I attempted to interpret this in a non-begging way, allowing consciousness to be a physical process. In that case the p-zombie would not by physically identical, but rather some physical difference rendering him unconscious,and an unconscious person does not plausibly behave like a conscious one. It would be like asserting that you with all your senses cut off (not to mention voluntary motor control), would still be able to function without anybody noticing the difference.
Under physicalism, both the conscious and unconscious people would behaves as their physical circumstances dictate. Somebody behaving as his physical circumstances dictate does not imply that he is not conscious, at least not until the argument is accepted, but it is fallacious.

An unconscious being is not a metaphysical impossibility, but I do notice that nothing in the 6 points mentions the fact that the zombie behaves like the conscious one, with no way to detect the difference. It doesn't take a medical professional to detect the difference between a conscious and unconscious person. They're in different physical states, so they might be physically identical except for whatever states render him unconscious, such as say sleep or anesthesia.

Step 1 defines consciousness to be supernatural — noAxioms

Step 1 doesn't define consciousness. It defines p-zombies. Here's a different argument:

1. A p-zombie is physically identical to us but has no consciousness
2. P-zombies are a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is physical

If step 1 defined consciousness as being supernatural then the conclusion would be a contradiction, but it isn't. Therefore step 1 doesn't define consciousness as being supernatural.

To make it clearer, here's another argument:

1. A foo is a four-sided triangle
2. Foos are a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore triangles, if they exist, do not have four sides

Step 1 does not define "four-sided" or "triangle". It only defines "foo".

Step 1 doesn't define consciousness. — Michael

It doesn't define what it is, but it blatantly defines it to be something not physical. You've not refuted this in any way.

Here's a different argument:

1. A p-zombie is physically identical to us but has no consciousness

No different than before. This is the same statement, stating right up front that consciousness is non-physical.

2. P-zombies are a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is physical

3 doesn't follow from the prior statement. 1 asserts that consciousness exists, so 3 cannot say 'if it exists'. 3 should read 'consciousness exists, and is not physical'. It follows directly from 1 and line 2 is superfluous.

The argument is valid.

It isn't. 3 directly contradicts 1, regardless of the actual nature of consciousness.

It doesn't define what it is, but it blatantly defines it to be something not physical. — noAxioms

No it doesn't. See my other argument in that post:

1. A foo is a four-sided triangle
2. Foos are a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore triangles, if they exist, do not have four sides

Premise 1 doesn't define "four-sided" or "triangle". It only defines "foo".

So:

1. A p-zombie is a non-conscious organism physically identical to a conscious human
2. P-zombies are (not) a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is (non-)physical

Premise 1 doesn't define "non-conscious organism" or "physically identical to a conscious human". It only defines "p-zombie".

No it doesn't. See my other argument in that post: — Michael

OK, we're at an impasse. I did see the argument, and it begs, and you don't see that. We can both just repeat our stances forever.

1. A foo is a four-sided triangle
2. Foos are a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore triangles, if they exist, do not have four sides — Michael

This is yet again a begging argument. The whole purpose of the argument is to somehow determine how many sides a triangle has, which means we need to start from an agnostic position of not knowing. You don't do that. Step 2 says that Foos are impossible, which you cannot demonstrate unless you beg that triangles have something other than 4 sides.

The analogy is also poor since the Foo and the not-4-sided triangle are not physically identical.

The other issue isn't a begging one, but seems to hinge on another sort of fallacy.

We can conceive of something that is physically identical to us not having consciousness, therefore it is metaphysically possible for something physically identical to us to not have consciousness, therefore consciousness isn't physical. — Michael

So I can conceive of a universe that is physically identical to ours, except momentum being conserved isn't the result of supernatural intervention. A rock, in the absence of an external force acting on it, could continue at its velocity indefinitely without help from the supernatural entity carrying it, or however that works. Therefore it is metaphysically possible for something physically identical to us to not require the magic, therefore momentum isn't physical.

That I do believe leverages the same logic, but I don't know the name of the fallacy. Never mind the fact that I also leveraged the begging of the magic. This example was meant to point out the fault in concluding that momentum (or anything of your choice like say mass or a clock running) isn't physical.

And yet there are people who pretty much live like zombies, at least some of their time. Not people in a coma, but people who mindlessly peruse Facebook and such.
— baker
Those people are not physically identical to us, and so aren't relevant to Michael's argument. — wonderer1

What do you mean? That people who mindlessly peruse FB have mush for brains?