Certainly, let me see if I can break it into a simple and clear logic statement Bob.

1. Good is what "should" be.
2. If something 'should' be, there is a reason for it.
3. If there is a reason for something, that reason may also have a reason for why it 'should' be.
4. All chain of reasoning reduces down to the final question, "Should existence be, or not"?
5. As this is a binary, only one can be correct.

6. Attempt to claim that 'nothing' is what should be.
7. If it were the case that nothing should be, and it were possible to find a reason, this reason must exist.
7. There can be no reason behind why nothing should be, as there is 'no reason' behind 'nothing'.
8. Therefore it is not possible to claim that it is good for nothing to exist through any reason. This leaves the binary that existence is what should be.

But, you may not be satisfied with this, as we need to examine the other binary.

9. Attempt to claim that 'something' is what should be.
10. If it is the case that existence should be, there needs to be a reason behind it.
11. For there to be a reason, there must be existence.
12. Existence is, and has no prior reason for being besides the fact that it is. As such, it is the foundational good. It is the prime reason behind all questions of what should be. It is the prime reason upon which all other moral questions are built upon.
13. Thus, "Should existence be?" The answer is yes. If it is not, then nothing should be and there is no morality. But this leads to a contradiction. What should be for morality to exist? Existence.

Now let me address your points to see if I can continue to clarify this.

I would like to point out that the answer to this is subjective (by my lights) and if it isn’t then I would need to know how you know that moral properties subsist in something mind-independent and what that is. — Bob Ross

It is not subjective because it is necessary to avoid a contradiction in the question of morality, and necessary for morality to exist.

1. It is entirely possible to affirm that ‘nothing should exist’ without presupposing that anything exists, and I am not sure why you think this is false. Saying ‘nothing should exist’ entails that there shouldn’t be anything, and this certainly does not presuppose anything existing. — Bob Ross

No, I am stating it is not possible to affirm that 'nothing should exist' without a reason existing. 'Nothing' cannot justify that existence should not be.

Just because we cannot claim “nothing should exist” without accepting a contradiction it does not follow that there are any moral properties which are reducible to existence nor that any exist (mind-independently) at all. — Bob Ross

Yes, the moral property is, "There should be existence". Remember, the question is a binary. Should there, or should there not be existence?

I don’t think this is good epistemology: if you have two exhaustive options, A and B, and A cannot be justified as true, then it is not justified thereby to affirm B as true. B needs support for why it should be regarded as true or A needs to be demonstrated as false. — Bob Ross

You are correct. I've been approaching this a binary with an implicit argument. But its really not. I'll make that explicit not. First, let us clarify that this is a question of total nothingness. Should there be at least one thing, or only nothing.

A. Only nothing should be. - If this is true, then 'Something should not be'.
B. Something should be - If this is true, then 'Only nothing should be' is false.

Here's the implicit I am now making explicit because there is a second binary.

A. Morality exists
B. Morality does not exist

If morality does not exist, then the original binary is irrelevant. Neither nothingness nor somethingness should exist. The first binary only has relevance with the implicit notion that "morality exists".

So the question of "Should there exist at least something, or only nothing" implicitly has the assumption that morality exists. If we say, "Yes," then the foundational basis for morality is existence, because existence should exist for morality to be. But if the answer is no, then there is no morality.

I had concluded this long ago, and it suddenly came back to me. This is 'the choice'. Do you decide that morality exists, or not? If not, then we are done. There is no justification for anything, including the existence of yourself. There is only existential nihilism. But of course, if you do not end yourself, then you are saying you 'should' exist. In which case you are claiming there is morality. In which case, the only logical foundational basis for this morality is that there should be existence.

If however you do choose that morality exists, then logically, the only conclusion is that existence should be. For without existence, morality cannot exist.

I'm glad for your pointed questions, as this had brought back an issue that needed to be addressed. Hopefully this clarifies the initial set up a bit more.

I appreciate your 1-13 points, although I disagree with most of them, but to focus on the most core issue I have with it I am going to write out only the relevant parts in a syllogism. You are, in its most abstract, arguing:

P1: Either ‘something should be’ or ‘nothing should be’ is true, but not both.
P2: ‘nothing should be’ is false.
C: TF, ‘something should be’.

Why P2 and P1 are true is irrelevant to my point, as I can grant those: this argument has no metaethical claims in it. I am almost certain now that you are conflating normative judgments with metaethical judgments.

You provide an argument, that I am granting each premise as true, for why ‘something should be’ which is a normative claim and then tacking on without justification that metaethically this claim is a moral fact. To demonstrate this clearly, I can accept the argument shown above and that moral subjectivism is true because it is a metaethical thesis and has nothing to do with normative ethics.

I would say, if I accepted this as a moral subjectivist, that the shorthand ‘something should be’ and ‘nothing should be’ are both moral statements which express something subjective and when evaluated relative to myself I do believe that ‘something should be’ and do not believe ‘nothing should be’. Now, you are claiming, on top of C being true, that ‘something should be’ is or is grounded in a moral fact: what justification do you have for that claim? The reason I think you are conflating normative judgments with metaethical ones is because every time I ask this question you give the above argument (more or less) which is a normative argument.

I don’t agree with most of your 13 points, but for now I would like to stay focused on the above because the other disputes don’t matter if we can’t make headway on the above. So, I am going to skip over the parts of your responses, for now, that don’t address this central issue for the sake of brevity and to keep up on track. Then, we can move on to the other stuff.

It is not subjective because it is necessary to avoid a contradiction in the question of morality, and necessary for morality to exist.

This is a metaethical claim, and what justification or argument do you have for it? Avoiding contradictions, as a normative judgment, is not necessarily a judgment that expresses something objective. For example, by contrast to my view, I accept that ‘one ought to abide by the law of noncontradiction’ but I reject that that judgment is expressing something objective. So you would have to argue a case for why you think that it is expressing something objective: that is the crucial prong-2 of the moral realist’s thesis (that I reject).

Yes, the moral property is, "There should be existence"

That is not a moral property: it is a moral (normative) judgment. Moral properties include ‘goodness’, ‘rightness’, ‘wrongness’, ‘shouldness’, ‘badness’, etc. Asserting ‘there should be existence’ just indicates that it is better for something to existence than to not; and does not mention what the moral property of ‘shouldness’ or ‘betterness’ subsist in or of, which is a metaethical question. I can affirm, as a moral subjectivist, that ‘there should be existence’ and reject that that judgment expresses something objective without being incoherent. You have to provide an argument for why I should accept not ‘there should be existence’ but that that moral judgment is expressing something objective.

A. Morality exists
B. Morality does not exist

This is too vague: what do you mean by ‘morality exists’? That there is at least one true moral judgment? That moral judgments are propositional? That they express something objective?

I had concluded this long ago, and it suddenly came back to me. This is 'the choice'. Do you decide that morality exists, or not? If not, then we are done

This seems like your argument collapsed into moral non-objectivism: if the truth of a moral judgment is contingent on my choice, then it is certainly not expressing something objective. However, if you are just noting that moral nihilism is incompatible with your view; well, then, you still have to give an argument for why there is at least one true moral judgment: it is not a valid defense to say “we are [just] done”.

I look forward to your response!

Bob

Why P2 and P1 are true is irrelevant to my point, as I can grant those: this argument has no metaethical claims in it. I am almost certain now that you are conflating normative judgments with metaethical judgments. — Bob Ross

Bob, this has nothing to do with the argument. I'm not conflating anything. When the author is not using vocabulary that you then introduce, then you say the author is not meeting the standards of that vocabulary you have introduced, you are committing a straw man fallacy. I am not using metaethical or normative claims in the argument. If you want to see it that way in your own head, that's fine. From my viewpoint, its unnecessary vocabulary that is leading you to misunderstand the simplicity of the argument.

I would say, if I accepted this as a moral subjectivist, that the shorthand ‘something should be’ and ‘nothing should be’ are both moral statements which express something subjective and when evaluated relative to myself I do believe that ‘something should be’ and do not believe ‘nothing should be’. — Bob Ross

Yes, and there is nothing wrong with that. For the clarity of the conversation, lets us also understand 'subjective' in the normative view, not your own interpretation. Meaning a subjective moralist would be one who believes that what is moral is based on one's personal benefit, or even collective subjective culture. But then I would ask, "Why should someone's personal benefit matter?" This leads to: "Why should humans even exist?" And finally we arrive once again to, "Why should anything exist?" All claims of morality lead to this ultimate question Bob. It is the eternal "Why" from a child until we finally get to the point where there is nothing prior. :)

Even going down the chain to its ultimate point, you'll also notice I added a very subjective viewpoint as an option in my last post. "Does morality exist?" You can decide it doesn't. This leads to consequences however that I don't think anyone truly believes in. I suppose the real question is, "Does objective morality exist?" If you say no, then of course we're left with either subjective morality or existential nihilism. The argument is not proving that objective morality exists. Its simply proving that all moral questions boil down to this binary, and proving what objective morality must be if it does exist. Lets make sure we're on the right page of for 'objective' as well. We're using the normative definition. To simplify, objective means that any human using logic and deductive evidence must come to the same conclusion regardless of their individual viewpoint of the world. Subjective and objective claims are all things a subject makes, not an object. The word 'object' has nothing to do with them.

To enter the discussion, you do not have to agree that objective morality exists, you simply have to assume it does. If it does, what logically would it be, and how would it build? So going forward in this discussion, simply assume objective morality exists. We really can't continue to discuss until that happens. Don't worry, it doesn't mean you agree with it personally, we're just exploring the logical consequences if this is the case.

Avoiding contradictions, as a normative judgment, is not necessarily a judgment that expresses something objective. For example, by contrast to my view, I accept that ‘one ought to abide by the law of noncontradiction’ but I reject that that judgment is expressing something objective. — Bob Ross

First, lets remove 'normative judgements'. I'm not using that vocabulary in my post. My argument is that within a binary argument in which one option must be false while the other is true, proving one option as false necessarily makes the other true. If an objective morality exists, then this is the binary we are left with.

You have to provide an argument for why I should accept not ‘there should be existence’ but that that moral judgment is expressing something objective. — Bob Ross

And this sums up why we're having difficulty. My point here is not to argue that there is an objective morality or argue against a subjective morality. Its taking an objective morality as assumed, then logically piecing together what that would be if true. Go with that and I think we'll have some fun exploring this Bob.

This is too vague: what do you mean by ‘morality exists’? That there is at least one true moral judgment? That moral judgments are propositional? That they express something objective? — Bob Ross

That there is an objective measure of what should be.

I had concluded this long ago, and it suddenly came back to me. This is 'the choice'. Do you decide that morality exists, or not? If not, then we are done

This seems like your argument collapsed into moral non-objectivism — Bob Ross

Its a little more than that. It is a choice between moral nihilism and moral objectivity. I believe that subjective morality also descends into moral nihilism, but lets not have that discussion here. I think we're having that discussion in another of your threads. To keep the discussion on track here, we'll just use the assumption of, "What if there was an objective morality? What would that logically look like?"

Alright, so assuming that there is an objective morality (It doesn't mean you agree!), lets look at the rest of the argument and see if it has any merit. Great points as well Bob. If we need to revisit at some point whether we need to see if a subjective morality can exist as a viable alternative, I will gladly revisit it. Its just out of the scope of the argument at this time and not what I really want to explore at this time.

Bob, this has nothing to do with the argument. I'm not conflating anything. When the author is not using vocabulary that you then introduce, then you say the author is not meeting the standards of that vocabulary you have introduced, you are committing a straw man fallacy. I am not using metaethical or normative claims in the argument.

With all due respect, you are though! It doesn’t matter what terms you call them. At the end of the day you are claiming that “morality is objective” without providing any justification for it; or the justification you have given doesn’t prove it is objective, because it has nothing to do with that metaethical claim.

For the clarity of the conversation, lets us also understand 'subjective' in the normative view, not your own interpretation. Meaning a subjective moralist would be one who believes that what is moral is based on one's personal benefit, or even collective subjective culture

My biggest quibble here is just that you are claiming, on one end, to not be making metaethical claims and then, on the other, making metaethical claims in the next breath. When I point out how you haven’t provide any basis for those metaethical claims, you say I am straw-manning your position because you don’t use the term ‘metaethical’.

The meaning of subjective is absolutely not used in the sense of ‘one who believes that what is moral is based on one’s personal benefit, or even collective subjective culture’: this is a clear misapprehension of the literature. The claim that morality is ‘subjective’ is a metaethical claim, and your definition of was a normative claim: again, conflating them. A person who believes that what is moral is based on one’s personal benefit is a moral egoist—which may or may not be grounded in a moral subjectivist view or not. Likewise, a person who believes that what is moral is based on societies benefit is not necessarily a moral subjectivist, that could be also a moral realist or a different anti-realist theory.

"Does objective morality exist?" If you say no, then of course we're left with either subjective morality or existential nihilism.

Again, you say I am straw-manning you, and then explicitly invoke the central metaethical prong (#2) that I referenced before. You are assuming moral realism is true without giving any justification for it.

Also, moral anti-realism does not leave us with either moral subjectivism or moral nihilism: there’s also moral non-cognitivism.

The argument is not proving that objective morality exists. Its simply proving that all moral questions boil down to this binary, and proving what objective morality must be if it does exist

What’s the proof for the underlined portion? That’s a metaethical claim.

To enter the discussion, you do not have to agree that objective morality exists, you simply have to assume it does. If it does, what logically would it be, and how would it build? So going forward in this discussion, simply assume objective morality exists. We really can't continue to discuss until that happens. Don't worry, it doesn't mean you agree with it personally, we're just exploring the logical consequences if this is the case.

I am more than happy to grant that your view demonstrates the three prongs of the moral realist thesis and seeing where that goes. Let’s just move on, because I don’t think we are making any headway in the metaethical sphere here.

My argument is that within a binary argument in which one option must be false while the other is true, proving one option as false necessarily makes the other true. If an objective morality exists, then this is the binary we are left with.

That’s fine, and this goes back to my syllogism:

P1: Either ‘something should be’ or ‘nothing should be’ is true, but not both.
P2: ‘nothing should be’ is false.
C: TF, ‘something should be’.

What is your syllogistic argument for P2?

My point here is not to argue that there is an objective morality or argue against a subjective morality. Its taking an objective morality as assumed, then logically piecing together what that would be if true. Go with that and I think we'll have some fun exploring this Bob.

I am more than happy to just grant moral realism for the sake of the conversation, but this seems backwards to me. If you haven’t even attempted to justify moral realism then it makes no sense to me why your position would move on to normative ethics. Why assume moral realism is true? Or are you just saying I should for the sake of the conversation?

It is a choice between moral nihilism and moral objectivity.

Again, forgive me, but I have to stress this point: you are making a metaethical claim here and then saying that you aren’t; and this is just a plain misrepresentation of the literature in metaethics. The options are not ‘moral objectivity’ or ‘moral nihilism’. You haven’t even, as of yet, recognized moral non-cogntivism as a valid position within moral anti-realist positions.

I believe that subjective morality also descends into moral nihilism, but lets not have that discussion here. I think we're having that discussion in another of your threads.

Fair enough. I do think, though, that it counts against your theory that it does not at least cite what moral realist account it is making. I have no problem with assuming it for the sake of normative ethics.

If we need to revisit at some point whether we need to see if a subjective morality can exist as a viable alternative, I will gladly revisit it. Its just out of the scope of the argument at this time and not what I really want to explore at this time.

Fair enough, but I just would like to note that moral subjectivism is not a contender or a normative ethical theory. Every argument you have given is can be made compatible with moral subjectivism just as much as moral naturalism/non-naturalism and moral non-cognitivism. My moral subjectivism thread does not offer a normative ethical theory: it is strictly laying out a metaethical theory.

Anyways, to move forward, I will ask: what is your argument for P2? Or is that argument I gave not what you were getting at with your depiction of it as 'binary'?

With all due respect, you are though! It doesn’t matter what terms you call them. At the end of the day you are claiming that “morality is objective” without providing any justification for it; or the justification you have given doesn’t prove it is objective — Bob Ross

It is perfectly fine that what I describe fits normative and metaethical within your head. I do this often in philosophy, translating terminology into my own, but then translating it back out into the language of the speaker where I can. I do not want to have a debate about what normative and metaethical are. As I've mentioned in prior discussions, I find words like this often unintentionally hide clarity, especially when they are introduced by someone else. First lets see if you understand the terms as given, then lets see if more vocabulary or other ethical theories are needed for comparison.

But I'm glad we can just agree to get to the point because I want to have some fun thinking about something new Bob! Let me repost the argument once more so we can continue. I'll flesh out points I think you had some questions about.

1. Good is what "should" be.
2. If something 'should' be, there is a reason for it.
3. If there is a reason for something, that reason may also have a reason for why it 'should' be.
4. All chain of reasoning reduces down to the final question, "Should existence be, or not"?
5. As this is a binary, only one can be correct.

Note on 4: You seemed to imply that number 4 wasn't a given. I'll walk through it.

Lets say I say, "I should help a person in need." Why? "Because I want to alleviate their suffering." Why? "Because suffering is bad." Why? I could go on like this for some time, but at one point there will be the question, "Why should they exist?" We can give a lot of human reasons why they should exist, but this again will drill down into, "Why should humanity exist?" We can give the reason, "We like existing," but we're not asking a personal opinion.

We're asking why it should be beyond our own opinions. We're looking for the calculus of the universe. Gravity does not need our opinions, it is a measurable and repeatable event. Same with the question of morality. What measurable and repeatable event can demonstrate that humanity should exist? The question of 'should' is not a human one. It is an existential one.

Of course, this then leads into the question, "Why should a calculus exist? Why should there be anything measurable?" Whatever the answer there, we finally get into the prime question, "Why should anything exist?" To simplify this further, we get down to the idea of an Aristotelian atomic existence versus the idea of complete nothingness. Should there be something, or nothing? At this point, there is no other reducible option, nothing prior to reference. For without answering this question first, no other 'should' question has an answer. It is the base to build the house, the floor for our legos. :)

With that, I attempt the next set.

6. Attempt to claim that 'nothing' is what should be.
7. If it were the case that nothing should be, and it were possible to find a reason, this reason must exist.
(I'll rewrite the above to be clearer, but kept the original for reference)
7 Revised: If it were the case that nothing should be, there must be a reason.
8. There can be no reason to explain why nothing should be, as there is 'no reason' if there is nothing.
9. Therefore it is not possible to claim that it is good for nothing to exist through any reason. This leaves the binary that existence is what should be. — Philosophim

I did note that this binary only exists if morality exists at an existential level. If of course morality does not exist at this level, this binary does not exist. For our purposes, we're going to assume morality exists. As well, just because we've proven one side of the binary false, it does not mean we haven't shown that the other side of the binary is not also false.

9. Attempt to claim that 'something' is what should be.
10. If it is the case that existence should be, there needs to be a reason behind it.
11. For there to be a reason, there must be existence.
12. Existence is, and has no prior reason for being besides the fact that it is. As such, it is the foundational good. It is the prime reason behind all questions of what should be. It is the prime reason upon which all other moral questions are built upon.
13. Thus, "Should existence be?" The answer is yes. If it is not, then nothing should be and there is no morality. But this leads to a contradiction. — Philosophim

I'll let you take it from there Bob. Keep the vocabulary simple. Do not introduce other moral theories. Even remove the idea of objective and subjective if it helps. Simply take the terms as given and see if the conclusions hold water.

Ok, let’s move on and have some fun! (:

For starters, I disagree with 2, 4, 8, and 12. Let me briefly elaborate one-by-one, and I will let you decided where you would like us to go.

2. If something 'should' be, there is a reason for it.

Three things:

1. If someone claims that ‘there should be <...>’ and that it is just an upshot of their emotions, then they have no reason for it. What is incoherent with that under your view?

2. The chain of reasons has to stop somewhere, so the very foundational reason will have no reason; and that foundational reason may very well be a claim like ‘because there should be <...>’. In fact, this gets your point 12 in a lot of trouble:

3. This seems incoherent with point 12. You say, on one hand, that every claim of ‘something should be’ has a reason underpinning and then claim in 12 that ‘existing should be’ is valid yet has not reason underpinning it: “Existence is, and has no prior reason for being besides the fact that it is. As such, it is the foundational good. It is the prime reason behind all questions of what should be.”--but ‘existing should be’ is the foundational claim of your theory, and it has no reason for it because allegedly existence doesn’t have a prior reason for it.

4. All chain of reasoning reduces down to the final question, "Should existence be, or not"?

I don’t see why this is the case. Moral realists can just have to ground the normative claim in a moral fact. For example, I could say that ‘I should not eat children’ is true because there is a Platonic Form that dictates such and that would be the end of the chain of reasoning. I don’t need to further ask “why exist?” to ground why “I should not eat children” if it is made true by a moral fact. This is unnecessary.

Also, likewise, my example here isn’t about personal opinion and it doesn’t reduce down to “should existence be, or not?”.

I need briefly pause:

We're asking why it should be beyond our own opinions. We're looking for the calculus of the universe.

This is exactly the problem with assuming moral realism without explaining it: what calculus of the universe determines what is morally right or wrong? You seem to think it is “to be or not to be, that is the question”...but what makes this a calculus of the universe and not just a human existential question? The way gravity behaves is clearly rules or laws in the universe, but asking “to be or not to be?” does not seem (by my lights) to have an analogous correlate.

8. There can be no reason to explain why nothing should be, as there is 'no reason' if there is nothing.

This is a non-sequitur: the reason can exist and be true that nothing should exist. The fact that the reason must exist has nothing to do with whether or not that reason is valid such that nothing should exist.

12. Existence is, and has no prior reason for being besides the fact that it is. As such, it is the foundational good. It is the prime reason behind all questions of what should be. It is the prime reason upon which all other moral questions are built upon.

Besides being incoherent with point 2 and that it seems to presuppose a similar non-sequitur like point 8, it having no reason for why it is has nothing to do with whether it is good. That also seems like a non-sequitur.

Great! I've really wanted to bounce this idea off of someone else for some time. Whether it works or not, this will be fun.

2. If something 'should' be, there is a reason for it.

Three things:

1. If someone claims that ‘there should be <...>’ and that it is just an upshot of their emotions, then they have no reason for it. What is incoherent with that under your view? — Bob Ross

I would say that's a reason. "I should help the world because I feel like it" is a reason. The point is I could then ask, "Why should your feelings matter?" In other words, asking the reason behind the reason.

2. The chain of reasons has to stop somewhere, so the very foundational reason will have no reason; and that foundational reason may very well be a claim like ‘because there should be <...>’. In fact, this gets your point 12 in a lot of trouble: — Bob Ross

Yes, it does have to stop somewhere. But a reason does not have to have a prior reason. I'm saying the ultimate reason is, "It is". This is by necessity as there is nothing prior, nor nothing to negate 'what is'.

3. This seems incoherent with point 12. You say, on one hand, that every claim of ‘something should be’ has a reason underpinning and then claim in 12 that ‘existing should be’ is valid yet has not reason underpinning it: “Existence is, and has no prior reason for being besides the fact that it is. As such, it is the foundational good. It is the prime reason behind all questions of what should be.”--but ‘existing should be’ is the foundational claim of your theory, and it has no reason for it because allegedly existence doesn’t have a prior reason for it. — Bob Ross

You would be absolutely correct if all reasons had an underlying reason. I'm noting that we reach a point in which there is no underlying reason, but a foundation. Recall we are assuming morality exists. So if this is the case, and we've reached a foundation, that is what we build upon.

4. All chain of reasoning reduces down to the final question, "Should existence be, or not"?

I don’t see why this is the case. Moral realists can just have to ground the normative claim in a moral fact. For example, I could say that ‘I should not eat children’ is true because there is a Platonic Form that dictates such and that would be the end of the chain of reasoning. I don’t need to further ask “why exist?” to ground why “I should not eat children” if it is made true by a moral fact. This is unnecessary. — Bob Ross

I could just as easily say, "I should eat children because God tells me to." A claim does not make it so. But you make a good point in the fact I have not explicitly stated a "true reason". If morality is true, then the reasoning behind morality must also be true. Meaning we can make claims of reason, but we must demonstrate why they must be.

So in your example of Plato's forms, I could say, "What's the proof behind Plato's forms?" But lets say that it is true. Plato's forms DO exist. I then would ask, "Why should Plato's forms exist?" Do you see the chain now?

We're asking why it should be beyond our own opinions. We're looking for the calculus of the universe.

This is exactly the problem with assuming moral realism without explaining it: what calculus of the universe determines what is morally right or wrong? You seem to think it is “to be or not to be, that is the question”...but what makes this a calculus of the universe and not just a human existential question? The way gravity behaves is clearly rules or laws in the universe, but asking “to be or not to be?” does not seem (by my lights) to have an analogous correlate. — Bob Ross

Because we're doing a test. We're saying, "If morality, or what 'should' be is apart from humanity, what logically would that be? We must first define it, only then can we apply it. To say that morality exists apart from human opinion but leave it without what that would entail means we don't know what we're talking about.

8. There can be no reason to explain why nothing should be, as there is 'no reason' if there is nothing.

This is a non-sequitur: the reason can exist and be true that nothing should exist. The fact that the reason must exist has nothing to do with whether or not that reason is valid such that nothing should exist. — Bob Ross

No, this is not a non-sequitur at all. Your statement "The reason can exist and be true that nothing should exist" leads to a contradiction Bob. Think about it carefully.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

Logically, that means that there should exist a reason that something should exist.

Alright! This is what I wanted to discuss. Poke at it to your hearts content!

Yes, it does have to stop somewhere. But a reason does not have to have a prior reason. I'm saying the ultimate reason is, "It is". This is by necessity as there is nothing prior, nor nothing to negate 'what is'.
…
You would be absolutely correct if all reasons had an underlying reason. I'm noting that we reach a point in which there is no underlying reason, but a foundation. Recall we are assuming morality exists. So if this is the case, and we've reached a foundation, that is what we build upon.

I think I am understanding better now: you are saying that the “existing should be” is grounded in a the reason that “it is”, which would entail that every normative claim, assuming that’s the most fundamental one, does have a reason. But why think that all normative claims need a reason? Why can’t “existing should be” just have no reason?

For example:

I would say that's a reason. "I should help the world because I feel like it" is a reason. The point is I could then ask, "Why should your feelings matter?" In other words, asking the reason behind the reason.

What if someone just says “well, if you can have no reason for why it is, then I don’t need a reason for why it should be”: what’s the symmetry breaker here?

I could just as easily say, "I should eat children because God tells me to." A claim does not make it so. But you make a good point in the fact I have not explicitly stated a "true reason"
…
So in your example of Plato's forms, I could say, "What's the proof behind Plato's forms?" But lets say that it is true. Plato's forms DO exist. I then would ask, "Why should Plato's forms exist?" Do you see the chain now?

I think this missed my point, although I see what you are saying. You claimed all chains of reasoning boils down to “should existence be, or not?”...but my example clearly, if platonism were granted as true, that this is not true. The point was not that platonism is true, it is that if there are moral facts, then the chain of reasoning for a normative statements ends at the fact that makes it true, and not necessarily “should existence be, or not?”.

Because we're doing a test. We're saying, "If morality, or what 'should' be is apart from humanity, what logically would that be? We must first define it, only then can we apply it. To say that morality exists apart from human opinion but leave it without what that would entail means we don't know what we're talking about.

This doesn’t explain how this is a calculus of the universe: your answer seems to be that we just assume it. I guess this just boils down to me granting it for the sake of the conversation, so let’s just move past that point.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form. In fact, I am glad you wrote this because that is way more precisely what I was trying to convey then what I was saying! (:

So, if you think there is a logical contradiction in that syllogism, then you will have to demonstrate it to me,because I don’t see it. If there exists a reason that nothing should exist, then it totally logically follows that that reason shouldn’t exist either. I don’t see any “p ^ !p” in that argument at all. Let me explicate the logic. I think you think the logic is:

A: p
B: p → !p
C: !p

But this is incorrect, it is actually:

A: p
B: p → q
C: q

“there exists a reason that nothing should exist” != “there should not exist the reason that nothing should exist”, and that is required for there to be a (logical) contradiction in the argument which would be at the consequent of B.

Are you claiming that there is an incoherence, i.e., like a non-logical contradiction, in it, perhaps? Maybe having a reason for that very reason to not exist seems incoherent to you?

But why think that all normative claims need a reason? Why can’t “existing should be” just have no reason? — Bob Ross

First, as I requested, please stop using the term normative so that this stays simple and clear. We're not talking about any claim, but "moral claims". A moral claim involves 'should'. 'Should' requires a reason. If there is no reason, then there is no 'should'. If there is no 'should' there is no objective morality. Remember, we're assuming there is an objective morality, not proving that there is. If there is an objective morality, then there must be a should, and must be a reason.

What if someone just says “well, if you can have no reason for why it is, then I don’t need a reason for why it should be”: what’s the symmetry breaker here? — Bob Ross

There is none. We can substitute this sentence with, "There is no objective morality". The symmetry comes in with the assumption "there is an objective morality".

I think this missed my point, although I see what you are saying. You claimed all chains of reasoning boils down to “should existence be, or not?”...but my example clearly, if platonism were granted as true, that this is not true. The point was not that platonism is true, it is that if there are moral facts, then the chain of reasoning for a normative statements ends at the fact that makes it true, and not necessarily “should existence be, or not?”. — Bob Ross

Platonism's truth has nothing to do with whether it should be. For example, someone kills a baby. I can claim they should not have killed a baby. But its still true they killed a baby. When we say something 'should' exist, we say it that it is preferable that it be versus not be. So we can ask, "Why should Platonism exist?" To answer why Platonism or anything else should exist, we really have to answer the question, "Why should anything exist?" first.

This doesn’t explain how this is a calculus of the universe: your answer seems to be that we just assume it. I guess this just boils down to me granting it for the sake of the conversation, so let’s just move past that point. — Bob Ross

Exactly! I am not claiming at this moment that there is an objective morality, I'm simply noting what an objective morality must necessarily be. After seeing the calculus in the rest of the OP and seeing if it works or not, we can definitely address that point.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form. In fact, I am glad you wrote this because that is way more precisely what I was trying to convey then what I was saying! (: — Bob Ross

We are in agreement then! We can then agree the only logical conclusion is that nothing should not be. Assuming an objective morality, the only thing we can start with then is that something is what should be. With that, we can move onto the next points.

First, as I requested, please stop using the term normative so that this stays simple and clear. We're not talking about any claim, but "moral claims". A moral claim involves 'should'.

Fair enough; sorry, I meant moral claim here.

'Should' requires a reason. If there is no reason, then there is no 'should'. If there is no 'should' there is no objective morality.

I asked why do normative “moral” claims need a reason and you said because “if there is no reason, then there is no ‘should’”: why?

This seems to imply that I cannot assert “one should not torture babies” without an underlying reason; but I clearly can, no?

Platonism's truth has nothing to do with whether it should be. For example, someone kills a baby. I can claim they should not have killed a baby. But its still true they killed a baby. When we say something 'should' exist, we say it that it is preferable that it be versus not be. So we can ask, "Why should Platonism exist?" To answer why Platonism or anything else should exist, we really have to answer the question, "Why should anything exist?" first.

No. Again, I think you missed the point: if platonism were true, then “I should not torture babies” does get reasoned down to “why should anything exist?” or “something should exist”: it is true in virtue of a Platonic Form. I am merely bringing this up because one of your points in your argument was that all chains of reasoning about moral claims boils down to “why should anything exist?”: they don’t.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are noting that whatever moral claims may be true they are not useful to the subject if the subject doesn’t think they should exist; and then you are applying that to existence itself: “to be or not to be?”. But, crucially, it can go the other way around just as easily: “one should help the sick” implies that “one should continue existing”--in this case, the former is not true in virtue of the latter but actually vice-versa.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form. In fact, I am glad you wrote this because that is way more precisely what I was trying to convey then what I was saying! (: — Bob Ross

We are in agreement then! We can then agree the only logical conclusion is that nothing should not be. Assuming an objective morality, the only thing we can start with then is that something is what should be. With that, we can move onto the next points.

I think you may have misread my response there: I disagree with you that there is a contradiction in A B C argument you have. In order for there to be a contradiction, there must be something wrong with the form (for logic) or they most be incoherent (in content), I am failing to see that in:

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

What’s the contradiction?

I asked why do normative “moral” claims need a reason and you said because “if there is no reason, then there is no ‘should’”: why?

This seems to imply that I cannot assert “one should not torture babies” without an underlying reason; but I clearly can, no? — Bob Ross

Because that is the nature of 'should' vs 'an action or statement'. I can claim, "One should not torture babies." If you then ask "Why?" there's a reason why we should do X. If I answer, "No reason," then I can come back with, "Well I think we should torture babies". If you ask "Why?" and I answer "No reason." then we shouldn't do X. Why even use the word 'should' at that point?"

If I can claim X should while in the same breath claiming that X should not, then should and should not have no meaning. If should and should not have no meaning, there is no morality. But of course, we're assuming morality exists for now.

No. Again, I think you missed the point: if platonism were true, then “I should not torture babies” does get reasoned down to “why should anything exist?” or “something should exist”: it is true in virtue of a Platonic Form. — Bob Ross

I noted earlier that what I am talking about is a foundation. To prove a foundation exists, you must prove that the foundation is logically true, and that means there is nothing that exists prior. It is true in virtue of its existence and nothing else. I'm assuming we both agree Platonic forms aren't true and not a foundation. If you do believe it to be a true foundation, then please, show me how.

So for example, "Platonism is True because of A. It should exist because it is necessary that Platonic forms exist, and there is no other possible option." If of course there are other options other than Platonic forms, then the chain continues. If you're not seriously demonstrating Platonic forms are the foundation of 'should', just understand we're using "Platonic forms" as an abstract X for a thought experiment about the foundation of 'should' to help you understand the chain.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are noting that whatever moral claims may be true they are not useful to the subject if the subject doesn’t think they should exist; and then you are applying that to existence itself: “to be or not to be?”. But, crucially, it can go the other way around just as easily: “one should help the sick” implies that “one should continue existing”--in this case, the former is not true in virtue of the latter but actually vice-versa. — Bob Ross

No, this has nothing to do with the usefulness to a subject. Humanity isn't even the picture. There is just the question of "Should at least one point of atomic existence be" or "Should nothing be?" That's the foundational question.

But, crucially, it can go the other way around just as easily: “one should help the sick” implies that “one should continue existing” — Bob Ross

Right. Because if I claim, "One should help the sick." A pre-requisite is that one exist. But we're not talking about what one should do at this point. That's a few steps away. We're just talking about the foundation of good if morality is indeed objective.

I think you may have misread my response there: I disagree with you that there is a contradiction in A B C argument you have. — Bob Ross

I never claimed that there was a contradiction.

Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence. — Bob Ross

If objective morality is true (Remember, this is an assumption!), and 'nothingness' has no reason for it to be, then then the only other option is that existence should be.

Hello Philosophim,

Why even use the word 'should' at that point?"

I am noting that one could, which is what I thought your claim was: are you just saying that the word explodes into triviality if we do? Because I agree with that.

So for example, "Platonism is True because of A. It should exist because it is necessary that Platonic forms exist, and there is no other possible option." If of course there are other options other than Platonic forms, then the chain continues. If you're not seriously demonstrating Platonic forms are the foundation of 'should', just understand we're using "Platonic forms" as an abstract X for a thought experiment about the foundation of 'should' to help you understand the chain.

But this isn’t relevant to your claim: it was that all chains of reasoning biol down to “to be or not to be?”, which is clearly false if the chain of reasoning about “should I torture babies?” bottoms out at a platonic form. Sure, you can then start a new chain of reasoning by questioning why that platonic form should exist, but this example violates your claim, no?

But we're not talking about what one should do at this point. That's a few steps away. We're just talking about the foundation of good if morality is indeed objective.

I understand, but your argument claimed in one of its points that all chains of reasoning go back to “to be or not to be?”, but if “one should help the sick” is true then it would follow from that that “one should exist” which means that the former is more foundational in this example than the latter (morally: obviously not ontologically).

I never claimed that there was a contradiction.

You said that “there should be nothing” entails a contradiction, and you presented that ABC argument for it; and I was noting that your argument did not succeed in demonstrating a logical contradiction in positing “there should be nothing”. The reason entails that itself should not exist is not a logical contradiction. This seems to be the crux of your argument.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

I am noting that one could, which is what I thought your claim was: are you just saying that the word explodes into triviality if we do? Because I agree with that. — Bob Ross

One can do anything. But should they? Once again though, we're really not talking about what a person can or should do yet. We're talking about the simple question of whether there should be existence or not.

If there is no objective morality, then there is no 'should' for anything. If there is, then there must exist a 'should'. The assumption here is that there is an objective morality, because we're trying to work out what that would entail if there was. After all, we can't argue for or against an objective morality if we don't know what it would actually be first.

But this isn’t relevant to your claim: it was that all chains of reasoning biol down to “to be or not to be?”, which is clearly false if the chain of reasoning about “should I torture babies?” bottoms out at a platonic form. — Bob Ross

Can you prove that it is?

I understand, but your argument claimed in one of its points that all chains of reasoning go back to “to be or not to be?”, but if “one should help the sick” is true then it would follow from that that “one should exist” which means that the former is more foundational in this example than the latter (morally: obviously not ontologically). — Bob Ross

You're making an abstract thought experiment into a concrete proof. Unless you can prove that Platonism is the end all be all foundation of what should be, this is not a valid point. If you believe that all questions of 'should' do not boil down to the question of whether existence should be or not, please put forward a proof, not a "But what if".

Sure, you can then start a new chain of reasoning by questioning why that platonic form should exist, but this example violates your claim, no? — Bob Ross

If I can continue to ask why should Platonic forms exist, and that reason lies beyond Platonic forms, that is the continuation of the chain, not a new chain. A chain only ends when you arrive at a foundation. A foundation has no prior explanation for its being, it simply exists. When you find a foundation in the line of 'should' questioning, there will be no prior reason to its foundation.

I understand, but your argument claimed in one of its points that all chains of reasoning go back to “to be or not to be?”, but if “one should help the sick” is true then it would follow from that that “one should exist” which means that the former is more foundational in this example than the latter (morally: obviously not ontologically). — Bob Ross

This is the intention I'm trying to convey. If "One should help the sick, one should exist." "Well why should the sick be helped?" Because they should live. "Why should a person live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of, "Why should anything live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of "Why should anything exist?" You're looking up higher for the answers to the questions of why a castle should be built a certain way without first asking the question of why a castle should be built at all.

You said that “there should be nothing” entails a contradiction, and you presented that ABC argument for it; and I was noting that your argument did not succeed in demonstrating a logical contradiction in positing “there should be nothing”. — Bob Ross

I did not read that from your initial post as you seemed to agree with the propositions and conclusion I had put forward. I'll go back to it again.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form. — Bob Ross

You may have forgotten the assumption that we're currently making. That is that an objective morality exists. This means that there is some foundation for 'should'.

After noting point A as a proposition, we go to B. So if it is the case that nothing should exist, it requires that there be a reason that exists. The reason that exists is, "Nothing should exist". If it is the case that nothing should exist, then the reason, "Nothing should exist" should not exist. Thus the conclusion. It is a contradiction for there exist the reason, "Nothing should exist". For if the reason is to exist, there should must be existence.

Since we are assuming that there is an objective existence and that there is a 'should', this leaves us with the only other option in our binary, that existence should be. I hope that clears it up Bob.

If there is no objective morality, then there is no 'should' for anything

I don’t buy this at all (; But I digress, let’s just say I do agree.

One can do anything. But should they?

I don’t think you quite answered my question, which was:

I am noting that one could, which is what I thought your claim was: are you just saying that the word explodes into triviality if we do? Because I agree with that.

I am saying that one could decide that they should do something without any reason to do it. Anyways, let me just grant your point on this one; because I want to see where this goes.

But this isn’t relevant to your claim: it was that all chains of reasoning biol down to “to be or not to be?”, which is clearly false if the chain of reasoning about “should I torture babies?” bottoms out at a platonic form. — Bob Ross

Can you prove that it is?
…
You're making an abstract thought experiment into a concrete proof.

My point is not that Platonism is true, my point is that moral facts are true in virtue of them corresponding to a state-of-affairs that exist mind-independently; so the reasoning chain ends at that state of affairs when one asks “should one do <...>?”. The platonic form of the good is just an example of that.

It doesn’t matter what the state-of-affairs (that exists mind-independently) is to prove my point.

If I can continue to ask why should Platonic forms exist, and that reason lies beyond Platonic forms, that is the continuation of the chain, not a new chain. A chain only ends when you arrive at a foundation.

And this I think is the true disagreement: the chain of reasoning ends once sufficient reasons are provided for justifying the claim, not when one gets to a foundation. The justification, for a moral realist, for, let’s say, “one ought not torture babies” is that there is a mind-independently existing state-of-affairs which makes that sentence true. Therefore, if they demonstrate sufficiently that there is such a state-of-affairs, then thereby the statement is true and that is the end of the reasoning and justification for that claim. There’s no need to ask “but should I exist?”. As a moral realist would put by denoting sentences in quotes vs. states-of-affairs in non-quotes, if one ought not torture babies, then “one ought not torture babies”.

This is the intention I'm trying to convey. If "One should help the sick, one should exist." "Well why should the sick be helped?" Because they should live. "Why should a person live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of, "Why should anything live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of "Why should anything exist?" You're looking up higher for the answers to the questions of why a castle should be built a certain way without first asking the question of why a castle should be built at all.

Yeah, I see what you mean, but that has nothing to do with any chain of reasoning, from a moral realists’ perspective, for why one ought to do anything.

Perhaps I am just conflating what you mean by “chains of reasoning” with what I am thinking of as “chains of reasoning”: are you not talking about the full chain of reasoning which is required to sufficiently justify, in this case, the moral judgment?

I get that you are conveying that we can ask further morally loaded questions beyond “should I torture babies?” and if they are more fundamental than “should I torture babies?” and they conflict, then we would presumably go with the more fundamental one. So if ‘I shouldn’t exist’ is true and ‘I should go stop that person from torturing babies’, then perhaps I would just kill myself instead of stopping them; and you seem to be just trying to ask “what’s the most fundamental question of morality?” and concluding: “it is to be or not to be”. Is that what you are saying?

If it is the case that nothing should exist, then the reason, "Nothing should exist" should not exist. Thus the conclusion. It is a contradiction for there exist the reason, "Nothing should exist".

I underlined the problem: why is it a contradiction? I totally agree that if ‘nothing should exist’, then that very reason shouldn’t exist. Those two claims do not contradict each other. Perhaps it has to do with:

You may have forgotten the assumption that we're currently making. That is that an objective morality exists. This means that there is some foundation for 'should'.

So it seems like you are presupposing that there must exist something, which is implied by morality being objective, and this contradicts the idea that ‘nothing should exist’ because it would be nothing (hence no objective morality). If I am even remotely close here to the argument, then I would say that the flaw is that the current reality is what dictates what is objectively wrong, and so if there was a state-of-affairs such that there should be nothing, then “there should be nothing” would be true and there would be no contradiction.

I am saying that one could decide that they should do something without any reason to do it. — Bob Ross

The reason they decide they should do something then is because they want to. Which is fine. That would be a subjective morality. 'Should' means there is a consideration between at least two options. When you say, "I should choose A' you implicitly mean, "I should not choose B". If there is no option, there is no should, and there is no morality.

I'm not stating that one has to use the objective morality I'm proposing. I'm just noting that if there is an objective morality, this is what it must logically be. Just because a tool exists, doesn't mean you have to use it.

My point is not that Platonism is true, my point is that moral facts are true in virtue of them corresponding to a state-of-affairs that exist mind-independently — Bob Ross

That's fine, but I'm not seeing why that denies the foundational question of all 'should's' "Should there be existence or not?"

And this I think is the true disagreement: the chain of reasoning ends once sufficient reasons are provided for justifying the claim, not when one gets to a foundation. — Bob Ross

That's the definition of a foundation Bob. When there are no more questions and reasons to be given, you have a foundation. That must be proved.

“one ought not torture babies” is that there is a mind-independently existing state-of-affairs which makes that sentence true. Therefore, if they demonstrate sufficiently that there is such a state-of-affairs, then thereby the statement is true and that is the end of the reasoning and justification for that claim. — Bob Ross

Again, this is all abstract. You keep presenting, "But if they demonstrate sufficiently..." as an argument against what I'm noting. Prove it. Hypotheticals are a disengagement from the discussion that will go nowhere. Give me the justified state of affairs that answers questions all the way to the foundation why one "ought not to torture babies," without demonstrating why we don't need to answer the question of why babies should exist in the first place. You can say, "I can't prove it at this time, so I'll go with what you have for now. It doesn't mean I like it though." That's fine. But if you don't have something concrete, let it go so we can move onto more important parts.

There’s no need to ask “but should I exist?”. As a moral realist would put by denoting sentences in quotes vs. states-of-affairs in non-quotes, if one ought not torture babies, then “one ought not torture babies”. — Bob Ross

But we're talking about objective morality. So I would simply ask, "Why is this proven objectively?" Then they would need to give me a foundational reason why. If I asked, "Why should babies even exist? If they don't exist, they can't be tortured." what would be the answer? You cannot give a subjective answer to a question about objective morality. If we're talking with the assumption that an objective morality exists to find what it would necessarily have to be, you must give me an objective answer. We are not debating at this moment whether there is objective morality. Subjective morality is not in the in the discussion. Within the chain of 'should's' when examining an objective morality, indicate to me why objectively it cannot boil down to the fundamental question I've noted.

Yeah, I see what you mean, but that has nothing to do with any chain of reasoning, from a moral realists’ perspective, for why one ought to do anything. — Bob Ross

We're not talking about moral realism. We're talking about the logical conclusions one has to reach if an objective morality exists.

I get that you are conveying that we can ask further morally loaded questions beyond “should I torture babies?” and if they are more fundamental than “should I torture babies?” and they conflict, then we would presumably go with the more fundamental one. — Bob Ross

Not quite. The fundamental answer to, "Why should humans exist?" Doesn't on its own explain why we should help someone who's sick. But that answer is part of the necessary building blocks to objectively build up to the final question. So lets say someone gave an answer why you shouldn't torture babies, but that answer conflicted with why people should exist. Yes, that particular answer would be contradicted. It doesn't mean that there isn't an answer to why we shouldn't torture babies, its just that answer must not contradict the fundamental answer to why babies should exist.

So if ‘I shouldn’t exist’ is true and ‘I should go stop that person from torturing babies’, then perhaps I would just kill myself instead of stopping them; and you seem to be just trying to ask “what’s the most fundamental question of morality?” and concluding: “it is to be or not to be”. Is that what you are saying? — Bob Ross

No, its more like the question about torturing babies is algebra, but we haven't analyzed the nature of what the number 1 is yet. When talking about morality without the fundamentals, we're students being taught advanced math without understanding the why behind it. The point is to find the fundamental. The fundamental in itself will not lead to the answer in algebra, but it will lead to why we do algebra and give us an understanding of why the question is right, not just because we followed a series of instructions we did not fully understand.

So it seems like you are presupposing that there must exist something, which is implied by morality being objective — Bob Ross

Not quite. I am noting that there if there is an objective morality, there is a fundamental 'should' of what should be. There are two options. Either existence should not be, or it should be. The contradiction comes in when I claim that the should, is that existence should not be. But if I claim, "Existence should not be," then the existence of, "Existence should not be," should not be. Meaning all we are logically left with is, "Existence should be".

If I am even remotely close here to the argument, then I would say that the flaw is that the current reality is what dictates what is objectively wrong, and so if there was a state-of-affairs such that there should be nothing, then “there should be nothing” would be true and there would be no contradiction. — Bob Ross

I don't understand what you mean by 'current reality'. There is either existence, or there is not. The question is should there be existence, or should there not. To say something should, is to have a reason why A is preferable to B.

You note here, "...if there was a state-of-affairs such that..." This is a hypothetical again. No if. Is there, or is there not a state of affairs in which there should be nothing? Remember, we're at the last question. Its do or die! What I show is that if we choose, "There should not be" it leads to a contradiction in which the only remaining option is that there should be existence.

That's fine, but I'm not seeing why that denies the foundational question of all 'should's' "Should there be existence or not?"

It is because the very nature of objective morality contradicts your position, unless you are contending with my outline of its nature.

I already outlined it, and you dismissed it as “abstract”; but that is not a valid counter. Either objective morality is like I described or I am misunderstanding it and you have a different view of it.

That's the definition of a foundation Bob. When there are no more questions and reasons to be given, you have a foundation. That must be proved.

Sure, if that is what you mean by “foundation”, but moral judgments are made true by a state-of-affairs which exist mind-independently; and this contradicts your position that the chain of reasoning boils down to the Hamlet question because, like I said, any given moral judgment will be grounded in the morally relevant state-of-affairs that make them true, which would never be existence itself.

Hypotheticals are a disengagement from the discussion that will go nowhere.

This makes no sense to me. If you claim that every moral claim boils down to the Hamlet question and I explain that your assumption of objective morality entails that it boils down to a state-of-affairs (that exists mind-independently) (as per the nature of morality being objective), then I have demonstrated your claim to be false. Instead of addressing my claim, you dismiss it as a ‘hypothetical’.

So I would simply ask, "Why is this proven objectively?" Then they would need to give me a foundational reason why

That reason is that it corresponds with a state-of-affairs that exists mind-independently in reality—that’s where the foundation of the justification of the moral claim would come from, which can’t ever be existence itself: a state-of-affairs is an arrangement of existent things.

If I asked, "Why should babies even exist? If they don't exist, they can't be tortured." what would be the answer?

If morality is objective, then it is necessarily the case that “why should babies even exist?” is completely irrelevant to the truth that “one should not torture babies” as a moral fact. That is what it means for morality to be objective. It is just an irrelevant question to ask. It is a fine question to ask completely unrelated to the moral claim that “one should not torture babies”, but ,again, not relevant to it.

We're not talking about moral realism. We're talking about the logical conclusions one has to reach if an objective morality exists.

I am not arguing against moral realism, we are presupposing it. That’s what it means for morality to be objective: moral realism is true. If you don’t want to import that term, then just swap out ‘moral realism’ in my responses for ‘objective morality’: I am using them interchangeably.

I don't understand what you mean by 'current reality'. There is either existence, or there is not. The question is should there be existence, or should there not. To say something should, is to have a reason why A is preferable to B.

if:

1. morality is objective; and
2. reality has a state-of-affairs (that exists mind-independently) that dictates “nothing should exist”;

then:
Nothing should exist.

Your claim is that there is a contradiction with this, and there isn’t. I am using a hypothetical because that’s the game we are currently playing: if I grant moral is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “nothing should exist”, then nothing should exist. This hypothetical invalidates your claim that “nothing should exist” results in a contradiction. I don’t need to go beyond the hypothetical to prove that.

This is a hypothetical again. No if. Is there, or is there not a state of affairs in which there should be nothing?

Think of it this way. I claim “everyone who kills someone is a murderer”. You say “what IF someone is defending themselves?”. Imagine I say “that’s a hypothetical, so it doesn’t matter: give me something actual”. Is that a valid counter? Of course not! All that you need to do is demonstrate a hypothetical where someone kills someone and it is not murder to debunk my position: I can’t sidestep the process by banning hypotheticals.

Your argument is that there is a contradiction, irregardless of what moral facts actually exist, with positing “nothing should exist”: a hypothetical is all that is required to contend with your claim here, because as long as there is no contradiction with me positing “nothing should exist”, then I am right.

That's fine, but I'm not seeing why that denies the foundational question of all 'should's' "Should there be existence or not?"

(Me) It is because the very nature of objective morality contradicts your position, unless you are contending with my outline of its nature.

(You) I already outlined it, and you dismissed it as “abstract”; but that is not a valid counter. Either objective morality is like I described or I am misunderstanding it and you have a different view of it. — Bob Ross

How does it contradict it Bob? I missed or misunderstood what you were saying then.

Sure, if that is what you mean by “foundation”, but moral judgments are made true by a state-of-affairs which exist mind-independently; and this contradicts your position that the chain of reasoning boils down to the Hamlet question because, like I said, any given moral judgment will be grounded in the morally relevant state-of-affairs that make them true, which would never be existence itself. — Bob Ross

Ok, noting that moral judgements are true, and the definition of truth, doesn't deny the point I'm making. That's just a description of what is true. The contradiction that I point out in the binary demonstrates that within the state of affairs in which we choose between there should, or should not be existence, we are left with the only logical option being, "It should exist".

and this contradicts your position that the chain of reasoning boils down to the Hamlet question because, like I said, any given moral judgment will be grounded in the morally relevant state-of-affairs that make them true, which would never be existence itself. — Bob Ross

Why is it that the state of existence can never be a moral judgement grounded in the relevant state of affairs between existence and nothing existing? I mean, we're here, and we have to make a moral judgement. The objective judgement would be the true decision between whether there should be existence or not right?

Hypotheticals are a disengagement from the discussion that will go nowhere.

This makes no sense to me. If you claim that every moral claim boils down to the Hamlet question and I explain that your assumption of objective morality entails that it boils down to a state-of-affairs (that exists mind-independently) (as per the nature of morality being objective), then I have demonstrated your claim to be false. — Bob Ross

I'm not saying that particular claim is a hypothetical, just when you were noting "If someone did x". The problem is I'm not seeing how the foundation of all true moral judgements negates the ultimate moral question of, "Should there be existence?"

So I would simply ask, "Why is this proven objectively?" Then they would need to give me a foundational reason why

That reason is that it corresponds with a state-of-affairs that exists mind-independently in reality—that’s where the foundation of the justification of the moral claim would come from, which can’t ever be existence itself: a state-of-affairs is an arrangement of existent things. — Bob Ross

And we're talking about the arrangement in which there is at least one existence, or no existence. To first speak about whether existence should be arranged a certain way we must first answer why there should be existence at all. This is the state of affairs. I'm not seeing the issue.

If morality is objective, then it is necessarily the case that “why should babies even exist?” is completely irrelevant to the truth that “one should not torture babies” as a moral fact. — Bob Ross

Why is it necessarily the case? I don't see that at all. I would think that a key building block to demonstrate why one shouldn't torture babies is that they should exist? After all, one could say, "Fine, I'll end the baby without pain then." You didn't torture a baby, but you thought it didn't deserve to exist. We're looking for the objective why behind that. We can't just claim something necessarily is known, it must be proven.

I am not arguing against moral realism, we are presupposing it. That’s what it means for morality to be objective: moral realism is true. If you don’t want to import that term, then just swap out ‘moral realism’ in my responses for ‘objective morality’: I am using them interchangeably. — Bob Ross

There's a very good reason I'm not using the term moral realism. It might not be true. At least, many of the tenants and contexts of it. When speaking about a foundation we should not be concerned where we are going. We're just concerned about noting the foundation first. If that is solid, we build from there. We might end up in moral realism, or not. We're starting super small first, so we assume nothing beyond it.

Your claim is that there is a contradiction with this, and there isn’t. I am using a hypothetical because that’s the game we are currently playing: if I grant moral is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “nothing should exist”, then nothing should exist. This hypothetical invalidates your claim that “nothing should exist” results in a contradiction. I don’t need to go beyond the hypothetical to prove that. — Bob Ross

Lets take it in the reverse case. "if I grant morality is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “something should exist”, then something should exist." That has the same weight and backing as your argument. Basically the hypothetical is equivalent to, "Maybe there's something objective that notes that reality should or shouldn't exist." Your hypothetical is the question Bob. This isn't an answer or counter. Its the same exact question just using different words. "Should there be existence, or shouldn't there?"

So if you believe there is an objective reason why there shouldn't be existence, you can't 'presuppose it exists'. Just like I can't presuppose there's a reason why there 'should be existence'. We're proving it. So far I've presented that its logically impossible for a reason to exist that existence should not exist. If you think this is wrong, then you must prove that there exists a reason that existence should not exist. If you can't, then we go by what we have remaining: logic.

Life/biology is the measure and meaning of all things.

Life/biology is the measure and meaning of all things. — boagie

That's nice, but how does that tie into the OP?

Sorry for the belated response!

How does it contradict it Bob? I missed or misunderstood what you were saying then.

If morality is objective, then moral judgments express something objective.

If they express something objective, then they are true in virtue of corresponding (adequately) to a (mind[stance]-independently existing) state-of-affairs in reality.

If they are true in virtue of corresponding (adequately) to a (mind[stance]-independently existing) state-of-affairs in reality, then the chain of reasoning for why any given moral judgment is true ends at that state-of-affairs—which violates your point that all chains of reasoning bottom out at “to be or not to be?”.

Why is it that the state of existence can never be a moral judgement grounded in the relevant state of affairs between existence and nothing existing?

My point is that all chains of reasoning (about morality) do not bottom out at “to be or not to be?”. Sure, “One should exist” is made true by a state-of-affairs, if it is true, and this particular chain of reasoning would bottom out there.

Likewise, this is why I wanted to start with metaethics, although we skipped passed it, because I think you think that an argument which posits two exhaustive options and proves one leads to a contradiction pertains to objective morality—which it does not. If “one should exist” is a moral judgment which expresses something objective, then there must be a state-of-affairs (which exists mind-independently) that makes it true, which is not the case with your logical argument. Anyways, I digress.

The objective judgement would be the true decision between whether there should be existence or not right?

Only if every moral judgment biols down to the moral judgment “it should exist” or “it should not exist” (or something like that), which, crucially, in order for this to be form of ‘objective morality’, would still require a state-of-affairs out there that makes either one or the other true: not that one leads to a contradiction.

And we're talking about the arrangement in which there is at least one existence, or no existence

Yes, in the case of specifically “should it exist, or not?” and not every moral judgment, which is required for your point that all moral judgments boil down to that question to work.

Also, the arrangement itself would have to be a state-of-affairs with normative ‘moral’ substance.

My point with respect to your argument for “there should be existence” is two-fold:

1. Even if I grant that it proves a contradiction with “there should be nothing”, your argument does not demonstrate any sort of ‘moral’ state-of-affairs in reality that makes “there should be nothing” false (or “there should be something” true); instead, it notes there is a contradiction, which isn’t itself a moral claim: it is an indicative statement. Thusly, your argument presupposes a moral claim that one should not accept a contradiction as true, and this is seems to be what the whole argument (morally) is grounded in; but, crucially, if your argument is within the bounds of ‘objective morality’, then what state-of-affairs entails that one ought to not accept contradictions? Otherwise, you are just being a subjectivist in disguise.

2. I don’t see at all how the reason, that provides justification for ‘there should be nothing at all’, entailing that itself should not exist is a logical contradiction.

If morality is objective, then it is necessarily the case that “why should babies even exist?” is completely irrelevant to the truth that “one should not torture babies” as a moral fact. — Bob Ross

Why is it necessarily the case?

Ok, so I misspoke: it isn’t necessarily the case; but it is possible. Because, with objective morality, the statement “one should not torture babies” is true solely in virtue of some sort of state-of-affairs in reality with moral signification. It is entirely possible that there is a state-of-affairs such that ‘babies should not exist’ and ‘one should not torture babies’. Perhaps you are saying that the morally relevant state-of-affairs within your moral theory has some sort of implication where they are related: if so, then can you please elaborate on how that works (under your theory)?

There's a very good reason I'm not using the term moral realism. It might not be true. At least, many of the tenants and contexts of it. When speaking about a foundation we should not be concerned where we are going. We're just concerned about noting the foundation first. If that is solid, we build from there. We might end up in moral realism, or not. We're starting super small first, so we assume nothing beyond it.

Philosophim, you said we are presupposing ‘objective morality exists’. You can’t presuppose that and say moral realism might be false in your view: that’s like saying we are presupposing water exists but H20 doesn’t.

Lets take it in the reverse case. "if I grant morality is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “something should exist”, then something should exist."

If we are presupposing objective morality exists, then this is abstractly exactly what you would have to claim. This is what it means for moral judgments to express something objective, or for there to be an objective moral judgment. This is why I was wanting to dive into metaethics so I could understanding what exactly the nature of those objective moral judgments are under your view. Instead, we skipped passed it to try and make headway.

So far I've presented that its logically impossible for a reason to exist that existence should not exist. If you think this is wrong, then you must prove that there exists a reason that existence should not exist. If you can't, then we go by what we have remaining: logic.

You haven’t proved it is logically impossible: that’s why I wanted to dive into the syllogism (ABC) you gave. It did not demonstrate any logical contradictions with positing a reason such that it justifies itself not existing.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

If they express something objective, then they are true in virtue of corresponding (adequately) to a (mind[stance]-independently existing) state-of-affairs in reality.

If they are true in virtue of corresponding (adequately) to a (mind[stance]-independently existing) state-of-affairs in reality, then the chain of reasoning for why any given moral judgment is true ends at that state-of-affairs—which violates your point that all chains of reasoning bottom out at “to be or not to be?” — Bob Ross

Yeah Bob, I don't know what you're talking about. Please remove your own language and try to say what you want to say using the language I've put forward.

My point is that all chains of reasoning (about morality) do not bottom out at “to be or not to be?”. — Bob Ross

This again is the part I don't see. Just show me an example, not a hypothetical.

If “one should exist” is a moral judgment which expresses something objective, then there must be a state-of-affairs (which exists mind-independently) that makes it true, which is not the case with your logical argument. — Bob Ross

No, its very clear. If something existed that noted 'nothing should exist' then that existence should not exist. But if that existence should not exist, then 'nothing should exist' becomes 'nothing should not exist'. Its very existence would be a contradiction. And a contradiction cannot be true. Please remove the unnecessary state-of-affairs vocabulary that I do not completely understand, and focus on the very simple example. If it existed Bob, it leads to the fact that the reason itself shouldn't exist.

Philosophim, you said we are presupposing ‘objective morality exists’. You can’t presuppose that and say moral realism might be false in your view — Bob Ross

No, I've read too many 'named' philosophies that end up throwing too much in that I don't agree with. We are not starting at the top and working our way down. We are starting at the bottom and working our way up. Please respect my request to not reference this at this point.

This is why I was wanting to dive into metaethics so I could understanding what exactly the nature of those objective moral judgments are under your view. Instead, we skipped passed it to try and make headway. — Bob Ross

That's ahead of where we are. We're just looking at one thing Bob. Should existence be, or not? That's it. Nothing more than that.

Please remove any vocabulary like state-of-affairs in your next reply so I can understand your point. As it is, I can request that as the OP. Feel free to keep any of your own vocabulary in your head, but translate it down to the language of what we're covering because you're not at where the argument is, you're somewhere else I don't understand.

Please remove any vocabulary like state-of-affairs in your next reply so I can understand your point. As it is, I can request that as the OP. Feel free to keep any of your own vocabulary in your head, but translate it down to the language of what we're covering because you're not at where the argument is, you're somewhere else I don't understand.

I will do my best!

Yeah Bob, I don't know what you're talking about. Please remove your own language and try to say what you want to say using the language I've put forward.

The problem is that you haven’t given any vocabulary for this, because you haven’t engaged your theory in anything related to the nature of moral properties and judgments, so there’s nothing for me to translate to.

For example, what is the nature of an objective moral judgment under your view? I don’t think you mentioned it at all in the OP, so what should I translate my language into?

If something existed that noted 'nothing should exist' then that existence should not exist.

Correct.

But if that existence should not exist, then 'nothing should exist' becomes 'nothing should not exist'.

This does not follow: why would this be the case? It is a non-sequitur, by my lights, to say ‘If the existence should not exist because nothing should exist, then nothing should not exist’.

ts very existence would be a contradiction

Why? Please explicate where in the logic there is a contradiction, e.g., !(p ^ p). There’s nothing logically contradictory with something existing that indicates that itself should not exist.

The problem is that you haven’t given any vocabulary for this, because you haven’t engaged your theory in anything related to the nature of moral properties and judgments, so there’s nothing for me to translate to. — Bob Ross

The nature of morality is what 'should' happen. That's where we've started. As I examine proposals of what should be, I ask, "Why should that reason be?" until we chain all the way down to the basic question. "Should there, or should there not be existence?" That's really all there is to it at this point.

For example, what is the nature of an objective moral judgment under your view? — Bob Ross

An objective moral judgement would be a moral judgement that can be logically concluded on no matter the difference in subjective viewpoint. For example, 1+1=2. It can be rationally proven that it works, and no one can justify or prove that 1+1=3. To contrast with subjective, something subjective could be proven for oneself only. For example, "We all like apples." This is something that cannot be rationally agreed upon by all people.

So, for a moral judgement to be objective, its 'should' must be rationally proven despite one's subjective viewpoint. A subjective moral judgement would be, "We should all eat 20 apples a day." Maybe its true for certain individuals, but cannot be rationally proven for all individuals.

But if that existence should not exist, then 'nothing should exist' becomes 'nothing should not exist'.

This does not follow: why would this be the case? It is a non-sequitur, by my lights, to say ‘If the existence should not exist because nothing should exist, then nothing should not exist’. — Bob Ross

Because you're forgetting the first assumption:

1. There is an objective morality

Remember, we're not proving that an objective morality exists. We're stating, "If there is an objective morality, what must its foundation be?" And when we examine this down the chain of 'should's' we are left with the foundational question, "Should there, or should there not be existence?" This is a binary assuming that there is an objective morality. Meaning if one side is false, the other side is necessarily true. If both are false, then there is no objective morality. But that's not what we're looking for. We're saying, "IF, there is an objective morality, which way should the binary logically swing?" I hope that clears it up!

The nature of morality is what 'should' happen. That's where we've started. As I examine proposals of what should be, I ask, "Why should that reason be?" until we chain all the way down to the basic question. "Should there, or should there not be existence?" That's really all there is to it at this point.

I understand, but this has nothing to do with what the nature of objective moral judgments are, which what was pertinent to our discussion of the whether or not all moral judgments boil down to your existential question.

An objective moral judgement would be a moral judgement that can be logically concluded on no matter the difference in subjective viewpoint
…
This is something that cannot be rationally agreed upon by all people.
…
So, for a moral judgement to be objective, its 'should' must be rationally proven despite one's subjective viewpoint.

Firstly, although I am trying not to import my definitions, this is not what objectivity with respect to morality standardly means, and this would, within standard terminology, be a form of moral subjectivism. You are just subjectively stipulating that what one should do is what is rational, and then calling ‘objective’ whatever can be reached as a consensus by people committed to that subjective moral judgment.

Secondly, just to go with your terms here, if all you mean by objectivity is that there is a consensus amongst rational agents, then if your argument for ‘there should be nothing’ being logical contradictory is true then this would be an objective moral judgment by your terms.

But if that existence should not exist, then 'nothing should exist' becomes 'nothing should not exist'.

This does not follow: why would this be the case? It is a non-sequitur, by my lights, to say ‘If the existence should not exist because nothing should exist, then nothing should not exist’. — Bob Ross

Because you're forgetting the first assumption:

1. There is an objective morality

This is where I am not following: how does stipulating morality is objective entail that a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction? How does it entail that ‘nothing should exist’ becomes ‘nothing should not exist’? I am not following. I don’t think this clarified it either:

Remember, we're not proving that an objective morality exists. We're stating, "If there is an objective morality, what must its foundation be?" And when we examine this down the chain of 'should's' we are left with the foundational question, "Should there, or should there not be existence?" This is a binary assuming that there is an objective morality. Meaning if one side is false, the other side is necessarily true. If both are false, then there is no objective morality. But that's not what we're looking for. We're saying, "IF, there is an objective morality, which way should the binary logically swing?" I hope that clears it up!

Please write out a syllogism for why a reason justifying its own non-existence because ‘nothing should exist’ entails ‘nothing should not exist’; because I don’t see how this is being inferred.

An objective moral judgement would be a moral judgement that can be logically concluded on no matter the difference in subjective viewpoint
…
This is something that cannot be rationally agreed upon by all people.

That's kind of what I'm trying to solve here. :) Maybe I won't, but you never know until you try.

Firstly, although I am trying not to import my definitions, this is not what objectivity with respect to morality standardly means, and this would, within standard terminology, be a form of moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross

Call it whatever you want personally. The meaning behind the words being used here are all that matters. As I am using objectivity, its as a rational foundation of morality that can be concluded despite differences in subjective viewpoints. I've already noted that your definition of subjective makes everything subjective Bob, but I agree with its underlying meaning. You've read my theory of knowledge so you should also understand that all definitions come from discrete experiencers. Why I don't use your definition of subjectivity is I find the term becomes so broad as to lose the meaningful contrast that I'm trying to convey. Objectivity and subjectivity in the classical sense are approaches that subjects use to solve problems. As long as you understand that objectivity leaves no wiggle room for the rational subject to disagree, we're on the same page.

You are just subjectively stipulating that what one should do is what is rational, and then calling ‘objective’ whatever can be reached as a consensus by people committed to that subjective moral judgment. — Bob Ross

No, I'm just assuming you'll grant me rationality and logic are the best tools we have to measure reality. This is not an assumption I spelled out, but maybe I should have. If you want me to go into the question of whether we should or should not use logic, I can go into that as well. I leave that to you to decide if that is important at this stage or not.

Secondly, just to go with your terms here, if all you mean by objectivity is that there is a consensus amongst rational agents, then if your argument for ‘there should be nothing’ being logical contradictory is true then this would be an objective moral judgment by your terms. — Bob Ross

Yes.

1. There is an objective morality

This is where I am not following: how does stipulating morality is objective entail that a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction? How does it entail that ‘nothing should exist’ becomes ‘nothing should not exist’? I am not following. — Bob Ross

Not a problem, I'll try again. If this is good, I'll likely edit the OP to make things clearer as well.

1. Morality is what 'should' be, given a choice between two outcomes.
2. Rationality and logic are our best tools at identifying and reflecting reality as accurately as possible.
3. An objective morality would be a morality of what should happen that cannot be rationally or logically countered.
4. Anything that 'should' exist must have a reason that is also concluded by rationality and logic.

But what would an objective morality entail? First, we must assume that it exists to see how if there is some logical necessity in how it would exist.

A. Assumption: There is an objective morality. This will be assumed true for the purposes of this discussion.
B. An objective morality must have a rational and logical foundation to build on. Every moral question must be examined to find the foundational reason underlying its claims. This foundation must necessarily demonstrate there is no reason beyond its own existence.
C. All moral claims must answer this question as its foundation before anything else can be built. "Should there be existence, or should there not?" (Just go with me on this one for now until you get the point. I will gladly return to that debate after we see if the conclusion works assuming this is true)
D. Because A stands true, there are two conclusions that cannot happen.
d1: The 'should' or 'should not' of existence cannot both be true.
d2: The 'should' or 'should not' of existence cannot both be false.
For if both were true or false, then there would be no 'should', no answer to the foundation, and thus no objective morality.
E. Assumption: There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
F. If that is the case, then according to the reason that nothing should exist, that reason should not exist. Thus a contradiction.
Therefore, since 'there should not be existence' leads to contradicting itself, it is false, and 'there should be existence' must be true.

Follow up:

Taking the conclusion above, there is one last test. To ensure that 'should there be existence' is not logically false as well.

G. Assumption: There should be existence
H. This statement is not contradicted by any of the previous statements.
I. There should be existence is not logically proven to be false, therefore it may stand that it is true.
Therefore, if we're assuming that an objective morality exists, the concluded logical foundation of this objective morality must be that 'existence should be'.

Alright, I hope that helped! Again, really great job drilling down on this for me Bob. I hope I'm making this clearer as we go.

You are just subjectively stipulating that what one should do is what is rational, and then calling ‘objective’ whatever can be reached as a consensus by people committed to that subjective moral judgment. — Bob Ross

No, I'm just assuming you'll grant me rationality and logic are the best tools we have to measure reality. This is not an assumption I spelled out, but maybe I should have. If you want me to go into the question of whether we should or should not use logic, I can go into that as well. I leave that to you to decide if that is important at this stage or not.

My point is that your moral judgments are subjective if they are true relative to the subjective moral judgment that one ought to be rational. But, then again, you seem to be defining objectivity in a manner where it is exactly that.

Not a problem, I'll try again. If this is good, I'll likely edit the OP to make things clearer as well.

Thank you, but I still don’t see how you making that inference. Here’s the part I am referring to:

E. Assumption: There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
F. If that is the case, then according to the reason that nothing should exist, that reason should not exist. Thus a contradiction.

This is the part I need a syllogism from you about, not the rest. This is the crux that I don’t get at all. I don’t see how a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction (whether that be metaphysical, logical, or actual). Can you please give me an argument or elaboration for this part?

Just some side questions:

2. Rationality and logic are our best tools at identifying and reflecting reality as accurately as possible.

I just want to note, so far, this is a subjective moral judgment; and is the underpinning of all your moral judgments, thusly making them subjective as well.

3. An objective morality would be a morality of what should happen that cannot be rationally or logically countered.

What do you mean by “rationally or logically countered”? If make a syllogism that is logically valid which contains a moral judgment, is that moral judgment thereby ‘objective’ under your view?

My point is that your moral judgments are subjective if they are true relative to the subjective moral judgment that one ought to be rational. But, then again, you seem to be defining objectivity in a manner where it is exactly that. — Bob Ross

We can revisit this later. For now, I do not believe that one should be rational is a subjective moral judgement. But we have to get the base down first before we build to that. :)

Thank you, but I still don’t see how you making that inference. Here’s the part I am referring to:
E. Assumption: There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
F. If that is the case, then according to the reason that nothing should exist, that reason should not exist. Thus a contradiction.

This is the part I need a syllogism from you about, not the rest. This is the crux that I don’t get at all. I don’t see how a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction (whether that be metaphysical, logical, or actual). Can you please give me an argument or elaboration for this part? — Bob Ross

Sure, let me see if I can.

Lets see how I can communicate the structure more abstractly.

The question is whether at least one thing should exist, or only nothing should exist. "Everything should not exist" is the equivalent of "Nothing should exist".

1. Everything should not exist
2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should exist.
3. There is a proposed reason A, why everything should not exist.
4. Assume A exists.
5. A is part of everything that exists.
6. According to A, A should not exist.
7. if A should exist, then it claims that A should not exist.
8. If A should not exist, then the reason why everything should not exist, A, should not exist.
9 But if A should not exist, then it cannot assert that it should exist.
Therefore A cannot exist without a contradiction.

A contradiction is clear if the assumption of X assumption leads to its own negation. If you still don't see it, can you point out why A does not negate itself?

I just want to note, so far, this is a subjective moral judgment; and is the underpinning of all your moral judgments, thusly making them subjective as well. — Bob Ross

According to your definition of subjective, everything is subjective Bob. Not according to mine. Please use the definition I've put forward for now. It doesn't mean I'm right, it just makes sure we're on the same page. We can discuss which definition should be used after we get through the meat of the argument first.

What do you mean by “rationally or logically countered”? If make a syllogism that is logically valid which contains a moral judgment, is that moral judgment thereby ‘objective’ under your view? — Bob Ross

If you can prove that it is so, then yes. Rationality and logic are the best reflective tools we have about reality. It is in my view, the only way we can meaningfully assess it. Meaning if you have an argument that is air tight rationally and logically, which means it cannot be contradicted by reality in any way, you have an objective moral judgement.

Morality is a meaning or meanings, and completely subjective. There is no such thing as objective morality, yes, there are rules, laws and established norms, and these are understood by like selves on a subjective level. One cannot escape one's subjectivity. Again, the measure and meaning of all things is the property of subjective consciousness. The world in the absence of subjective consciousness is utterly meaningless.

Hello Boagie, thanks for contributing. So an OP like this is setting up a very particular argument and set of vocabulary. Its a 'proof' if you were. You can have your own opinion, but when examining papers with proofs you should look at the premises and the conclusions as your main point of criticisms. So I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm simply asking you to focus on the OP and point out where in the OP its wrong.

So first, the OP is not proving that objective morality exists. Its taking a premise. "Assume objective reality exists, what must that necessarily be?" Why are we doing this? Because I see no proof against there being an objective reality, nor there for being an objective reality.

Again, the measure and meaning of all things is the property of subjective consciousness. The world in the absence of subjective consciousness is utterly meaningless. — boagie

You may be using a different meaning of subjective. Sometimes people confuse 'a subjects view point' with the term 'subjective'. Objectivity and subjectivity are both things subjects can do. As is any word or meaning. Objectivity is an approach a subject can make that results in a solution that is rationally provable to all subjects, despite their subjective viewpoint on the matter. Thus, while subjectively you might beleive that there is no objective morality, can you objectively prove it? Again, I am not proving it in this argument, I am only introducing what it must be if it does exist.

The world in the absence of subjective consciousness is utterly meaningless. — boagie

Subjective consciousness is not the same as 'subjectivity'. For example, it is objectively true that you have a subjective consciousness correct? Or do you view that your own subjective conscious is only subjectively true? If so, that would leave it open to the logical possibility that your subjective consciousness is subjectively false, which is absurd.

Interestingly, if the objective morality I've proposed here exists, objective morality is something discovered, and does not need subjects to have discovered it for it to still be true. Kind of like a tree falling in a forest when no one is around. Yes the terms tree, and the relations between falling, ground etc. would not exist without subjects, but the existence of the action in itself still would be.

In humanities apparent reality there is no such thing as the objective, apparent reality is the subjective experience of the energies that surround us. Apparent reality is a biological readout, the meanings of which a conscious subject bestows upon an otherwise meaningless world. Apparent reality in other words is biological reactions to said energies of ultimate reality. There is no meaning to the world accept what the conscious subject bestows upon it. Ultimate reality is a place of no things, energies, frequencies and vibrations, these processed through biology are the meanings attributed to the world.

A tree falls in the forest, and it does make a sound without the presence of a conscious subject, assuming the tree is not conscious and registering its own demise. Our everyday world, our apparent reality is the outcome of the relation between subject and object, the relationship is an emergence giving experience, knowledge and meaning to the conscious subject, for meaning belongs to the conscious subject never to the object, until such a time as the subject bestows said meaning upon a meaningless world.