Any further reading on that? As is, it seems there is some elaboration missing for this argument to pass.

Analytic truth is defined as the set of expressions of language that are proven completely true entirely on the basis of the semantic meanings that make them true.... Any expression of language that can only be proven true with sense data from the sense organs: "A cat is in my living room right now" are excluded. Also expressions that have unknown truth values such as the Goldbach conjecture. — PL Olcott

So you have a collection of propositions that are trivially true (facts being excluded). In what sense is this an achievement and what does it achieve?

So you have a collection of propositions that are trivially true (facts being excluded). In what sense is this an achievement and what does it achieve? — tim wood

Why would you think that facts are excluded?
The body of analytic knowledge is the subset of the body of analytic truth that is known to be true.
The only things that are excluded are unknown truths.

Any further reading on that? As is, it seems there is some elaboration missing for this argument to pass. — Lionino

I simply define the term {analytic truthmaker} in on the the basis of the existing terms {analytic} and {truthmaker}. Because some analytic truths are unknown I subtract unknown truths from the {body of analytic truth} to derive the {body of analytic knowledge}.

It sounds like you are merely enumerating trivial tautologies that convey no information in being true-by-definition. Give us an example of a non-trivial analytic truth that qualifies as "knowledge".

Secondly, how can non-recursive analytic truth be said to exist? The purpose of recursive grammar is to put into place authoritarian rail-roads called "unbounded quantifiers" in order to show pretend dictate that new analytic 'truths' are derivable from old ones. If our analytic truths contains first-order arithmetic then we run into undecidability but at least have extendable rail roads, else analytic truth is reducible to quantifier-free decidable propositions that have no inferential or normative implications, such as a law of addition being defined but only for the first fifty numbers.

Isn't knowledge supposed to be informative or at very least serve as a normative fiction?

(Going further, how can knowledge be informative if it isn't fallible? Isn't the very concept of knowledge broken?)

I am separating analytic truthmakers from synthetic .........Some of these expressions such as "cats are animals" are stipulated to be true (AKA axioms). Other expressions are proven to be true on the basis of deductions from these axioms..............Any expression of language that can only be proven true with sense data from the sense organs: "A cat is in my living room right now" are excluded. — PL Olcott

As the word "are" has many different meanings, is the expression "cats are animals" true under all possible meanings of "are"?

For example, possible uses of the word "are" can include i) football fans "are" animals, ii) mountains "are" beautiful, iii) recipes "are" difficult, iv) film stars "are" gods, v) apples "are" sweet, vi) EV's "are" moral.

The general problem is that as a word only has meaning in relation to other words, and as any such relation comes down to a personal judgement on behalf of the reader, whether an expression is analytic or not depends on personal judgements rather than absolute truths.

The general problem is that as a word only has meaning in relation to other words, and as any such relation comes down to a personal judgement on behalf of the reader, whether an expression is analytic or not depends on personal judgements rather than absolute truths. — RussellA

I don't really want to delve into the trillions of details until after the architecture is understood and accepted, otherwise I won't be able to make my point until long after I am dead.

Analytic knowledge is entirely comprised of
(a) expressions of language that are stipulated to be true and
(b) expressions of language that are semantically derived from (a).
Try and prove otherwise

Synthetic knowledge is expressions of language that require sense data from the sense organs to verify that they are true. "I see a cat in my living room right now". This is stipulated to be true.

My concern, reading this, is more about what's allowed in than what's left out. Are you wanting analytic "truth" to refer, arbitrarily, to whatever may be stipulated as true in a given language (plus the derivable expressions)? If instead of stipulating "Cats are animals", I stipulate "No cat is an animal" as one of my axioms, does this create any problems? I think it has to, especially since you also speak about this as "knowledge." But knowledge of what? Perhaps this is why the analytic status of a statement like "Cats are animals" is controversial. (On my view, it isn't analytic at all.)

Or perhaps I'm not understanding what you want BOAK to do -- what its purpose is.

My advice is to drop the terminology entirely. Some words and concepts become so overloaded by debate, nitpicks, and lack of consensus that they're impossible to make head roads with and become worthless in discussion. You can convey your ideas that you want in an argument without using the terminology, so that's what I would do.

Or perhaps I'm not understanding what you want BOAK to do -- what its purpose is. — J

BOAK is the model of the actual world along with every detail of human general knowledge.
The BOAK also knows how to perform every aspect of human reasoning including all of mathematical and logical operations.

My advice is to drop the terminology entirely. Some words and concepts become so overloaded by debate, nitpicks, and lack of consensus that they're impossible to make head roads with and become worthless in discussion. You can convey your ideas that you want in an argument without using the terminology, so that's what I would do. — Philosophim

I am merely trying to define the term {analytic truthmaker} on the basis of the conventional meaning of those two terms. I can perfectly specify exactly what is and what is not {analytic} for all those people that have made up their minds that they don't believe in the analytic / synthetic distinction.

Perhaps this is why the analytic status of a statement like "Cats are animals" is controversial. (On my view, it isn't analytic at all.) — J

Since we can know that {Cats} <are> {Animals} on the basis of the meaning of these words then that makes is analytical according to the common and simple meaning of the term {analytic}. Think of this as explaining these things to a computer that has no sense data from sense organs.

The controversy centers on whether part of the meaning of the word “cat” is indeed that a cat is an animal, or whether words like “cat” are rigid designators, using Kripke’s terminology. Suppose “water” is a rigid designator in all possible worlds, regardless of whether it’s composed of H2O in all of these worlds. So is it analytically true that “water” is H2O? Different philosophers have different takes on this. I’m suggesting that the same questions apply to “cat” and “animal”. We don’t seem to need the concept of “animal” to refer to cats, or recognize them, or talk about them. As it happens, all cats are animals, just as all water is H2O – in our world. But this, according to Kripke, is an "a posteriori necessary identity," and hence not analytic. We can imagine a different world in which this isn’t so, yet presumably we’d still recognize cats using other criteria – furriness, friendliness, general cattish appearance, etc.

The Stanford EP article on “Natural Kinds” gives a good account of the pros and cons of viewing terms like “cat” as rigid designators, and how this might relate to questions of analyticity.

The controversy centers on whether part of the meaning of the word “cat” is indeed that a cat is an animal, — J

That seem to be like saying how do we know that "12" represents the integer twelve and not a plate of brownies crushed on the floor?

The meaning of the words that have been stipulated using Rudolf Carnap / Richard Montague meaning postulates. The same way that people must be told what words mean so does the formal system. A new born baby makes sounds yet knows no words.

Suppose “water” is a rigid designator in all possible worlds — J

I am only taking the idea of possible words as a verbal model of the actual world.
It is stipulated that water <is> H2O and anyone saying otherwise is wrong.

We don’t seem to need the concept of “animal” to refer to cats, or recognize them, or talk about them. — J

To know all of the general knowledge that humans know we must know that cats are animals.
I am dividing analytic from synthetic slightly differently. Previous divisions have been equivocal so I must correct their error. Anything that can be written down in language <is> stipulated to be analytical. Anything that cannot be written down such as the first-hand direct experiences of the taste of strawberries is empirical.

We can imagine a possible world where "water" is sulfuric acid, not-the-less {water} remains H2O.
The actual words in the BOAK are unique 128-bit integers and {water} is assigned to one of these. Every word in any language referring to the semantic meanings of {water} refers to this GUID.

I am merely trying to define the term {analytic truthmaker} on the basis of the conventional meaning of those two terms. I can perfectly specify exactly what is and what is not {analytic} for all those people that have made up their minds that they don't believe in the analytic / synthetic distinction. — PL Olcott

Alright, I warned you. :)

Is this statement analytic or synthetic?

"Unicorns are horses with horns on their head"

Lets say you say yes. Now imagine that I go to a ranch where a man has glued a curled goat horn on a horse and is calling it a unicorn. Of course, none of us call it a unicorn. Which means are analytic statement wasn't actually true. But maybe we can go back and fix it.

"Unicorns are horses with straight horns on their head that have grown from their body."

Later we find a horse in the wild that has the Shope papilloma virus and it has caused a straight horn to grow out of the back of its head. Since this fits our true analytic definition, its a unicorn right? Well, no. So lets go back again.

"Unicorns are horses with straight horns coming out of their center of their forehead (Does the the angle of the horn matter? What material is the horn made out of?) which is a non-cancerous growth out of their body."

As you can see, for our analytic statement to be 'true', it needs to be based off of actual sense experience. But aren't things that require us to have sense experience to confirm that they are true make it a synthetic statement?

Lets go even simpler with math. 1+1=2. That's analytic right?

Well what is a 1? How do I tell from that sentence alone what one is? Same with two? Don't I have to actually experience what a '1' is first? But if I have to experience what a '1' is, isn't that synthetic?

Its really a question about knowledge. If you're interested, I have a paper I've worked on for years here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There's a summary from the first person besides me who posted that breaks it down perfectly. If you're interested in exploring the details from that summary, feel free to read the rest.

"Unicorns are horses with horns on their head" — Philosophim

Unicorns are fictional animals that are {horses} with {horns}.
The verbal model of the actual world is a set of mutually self-defining semantic tautologies.
This verbal model is stored in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge tree.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)

I will call what I am saying the analytic(olcott) of the analytic/empirical distinction(olcott).
Analytic is typically general knowledge of the world. Empirical is typically knowledge of a specific situation that cannot be confirmed as true without sense data from the sense organs.

Unicorns are fictional animals that are {horses} with {horns}. — PL Olcott

Sure. Replace all I said with actual encounters in the world with people's drawings. Is there a degree of bending we can do with a fictional creature and still keep its identity? When is a unicorn not a unicorn, especially if its a made up creature?

Sure. Replace all I said with actual encounters in the world with people's drawings. Is there a degree of bending we can do with a fictional creature and still keep its identity? When is a unicorn not a unicorn, especially if its a made up creature? — Philosophim

The axioms of the verbal model of the actual world stipulates that unicorns are fictional.

The controversy centers on whether part of the meaning of the word “cat” is indeed that a cat is an animal,
— J

That seem to be like saying how do we know that "12" represents the integer twelve and not a plate of brownies crushed on the floor? — PL Olcott

Well, no. The analogous question with "12" and the brownies would be, "How do we know that 'cat' represents those furry critters we like so much and not [insert wildly unlikely referent]?" We know this because we know how to use the word "cat", just as we know how to use "12". But in neither case is there some further, purportedly analytical fact about animals or integers. That, at any rate, would be how Kripke and others (including me, most of the time) would argue it.

In fairness, the whole analogy is probably questionable anyway, since the status of numbers is so hotly debated. It's not even clear that they do refer. And Kant, famously, thought arithmetic consisted of synthetic a priori truths, arguing that "12" is not contained in the concept of "7 + 5".

Well, no. The analogous question with "12" and the brownies would be, "How do we know that 'cat' represents those furry critters we like so much and not [insert wildly unlikely referent]?" We know this because we know how to use the word "cat", just as we know how to use "12". But in neither case is there some further, purportedly analytical fact about animals or integers. That, at any rate, would be how Kripke and others (including me, most of the time) would argue it. — J

In other words it may be the case that the {living animal} {cat} really is a {plate of brownies crushed on the floor} and everyone thinking otherwise is having a psychotic break from reality?

The only way that otherwise purely random finite stings of characters acquire any semantic meaning is that semantic meaning is assigned to them otherwise they remain meaningless gibberish.

In the BASIC programming language:
100 X = 50
There is zero doubt that the value of X is 50, after the assignment operation has been executed.
The assignment of meaning to words works this exact same way. That the different human
languages assign meanings to different finite strings proves this.

The axioms of the verbal model of the actual world stipulates that unicorns are fictional. — PL Olcott

I understand that. But what is the true definition of a fictional unicorn?

I understand that. But what is the true definition of a fictional unicorn? — Philosophim

Although the verbal model of the actual world already exists it may take millions of labor years to write this all down. This means that we simply understand that the fictional idea of a unicorn has fictional ideas as the root of its knowledge tree.

Although the verbal model of the actual world already exists it may take millions of labor years to write this all down. — PL Olcott

Then it sounds like we don't have a true definition of a fictional unicorn without a lot of work. In which case, is it analytic or synthetic?

Then it sounds like we don't have a true definition of a fictional unicorn without a lot of work. In which case, is it analytic or synthetic? — Philosophim

We simply have the true definition of unicorn that already exists in the verbal model of the actual world. My purpose in this post is to unequivocally divide analytic from synthetic even if this requires defining analytic(olcott) and synthetic(olcott). Then on this basis an {analytic truthmaker} is merely a truthmaker that applies to analytic knowledge.

I take little comfort in the notion that truth is either that which we agree to be true or that which is arguably true. It strikes me very much as another garbage in/garbage out situation.

↪PL Olcott I take little comfort in the notion that truth is either that which we agree to be true or that which is arguably true. It strikes me very much as another garbage in/garbage out situation. — Arne

The actual set of actual human knowledge is encoded such that a computer can apply human reasoning within this body of knowledge that can be written down AKA analytic. The body of knowledge that cannot be written down, sounds, pictures, videos, is the body of synthetic knowledge.

We simply have the true definition of unicorn that already exists in the verbal model of the actual world. — PL Olcott

Right. But that verbal model always boils down to needing something synthetic to understand the terminology at the end of the day. Further, what if you have two different sets of people who have different ideas of what a true unicorn is? That's the problem when you note analytic is 'true'. Its not really true.

My purpose in this post is to unequivocally divide analytic from synthetic even if this requires defining analytic(olcott) and synthetic(olcott). — PL Olcott

I get that. The point I'm making is you haven't unequivocally done so. Look into the history of philosophy about the terms. Its centuries of bickering back and forth with no agreement. My former advice still stands. Let the words die. Indicate the concepts you want in an argument without using the words.

I get that. The point I'm making is you haven't unequivocally done so. Look into the history of philosophy about the terms. Its centuries of bickering back and forth with no agreement. My former advice still stands. Let the words die. Indicate the concepts you want in an argument without using the words. — Philosophim

Synthetic(Olcott) means photographs, videos, tape recordings, sense data from the sense organs.
Analytic(Olcott) means anything and everything the can be stated using formal or natural language.