That's not just a gripe. That's a conversation ender. If you have an ethical position that lacks a definition of "ethical," then why should it come as a surprise that the position makes morality irrelevant? — Hanover

Yes and yes. :up: This point keeps popping up like a weed.

Can there be success without the possibility of failure? — Leontiskos

If success means accomplishing your aim, and your aim is to do what you think is best for yourself, then I don’t see how this isn’t an example of success in this case. But maybe I am missing something.

I think most everyone recognizes that it is possible to act and choose in ways that are not in their best interest. Anyone who has experienced regret should recognize this. — Leontiskos

Yes, you can regret afterwards, when you realize that you made the wrong decision, but you don’t purposefully set yourself up for regret. At the time, you think you are doing the best thing for you. Even taking this to the extreme, if someone commits suicide, at the time, they were doing what they thought was best for them, to stop their suffering. Maybe addiction doesn’t fit with the idea of doing what that person thinks is best for themselves, but I’m not sure even about that. At the time, the addictive action brings relief. Even if someone is very selfless and gives up their life to save others, they only do this because they care, and therefore, they are doing it because it makes them feel as if they are good and this is rewarding. If they didn’t give a fig, then they wouldn’t give up their life because it wouldn’t benefit them at all. I cannot think of a situation where someone would do something purposefully against their own best interests at the time as they see it.

They're practical implications of having the belief. I'm asking about the practical implications of that belief being true.

If eating meat is immoral and I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat.
If eating meat is not immoral but I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat. — Michael

"If CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming and I believe that CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming, then I will attempt to reduce CO2 emissions."

"If CO2 emissions are not causing a severe acceleration in global warming but I believe that CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming, then I will attempt to reduce CO2 emissions."

It's almost as if we act on what we believe to be true, rather than on what is true independent of our beliefs. Remarkable. :meh:

3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion. — Michael

I think you misunderstand (3) because you think it means that humans act independent of their beliefs.

non-moral features (e.g. pain, harm, suffering, etc.) — Michael

You beg the question by assuming that these are non-moral features. And you won't tell us what you mean by "moral," so the whole thing's a bust. It's pretty obvious that you think all features are non-moral, and that there is no such thing as a moral feature.

And I'm not necessarily saying that therefore ethical non-naturalism is false. I'm only saying that if it's true then I don't understand the motivation to be moral. — Michael

I'm with . I don't think you understand ethical non-naturalism. You need to find an actual moral theory and critique it, such as Kantianism. You seem to be constructing an incoherent moral theory in your head, which no one holds.

If success means accomplishing your aim, and your aim is to do what you think is best for yourself, then I don’t see how this isn’t an example of success in this case. But maybe I am missing something. — Beverley

Can you aim at something that you can't miss? If I can't miss then I sure don't need to aim. To aim at a target implies that one could miss.

I cannot think of a situation where someone would do something purposefully against their own best interests at the time as they see it. — Beverley

Yes, but morality is not purely about intent. We aim at what seems best, and sometimes we miss. When a hunter is pulling the trigger he believes the bullet will hit its mark. If the bullet misses its mark then he knows he was wrong. He will say, "I thought I was right, but I was wrong."

1. If a) it is the case that one ought not eat meat and b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

2. If a) it is not the case that one ought not eat meat but b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

The practical implication of each b) is each c), but I can't see what the practical implication of each a) is. — Michael

It's very odd to talk about the "practical implication" of truth.

When a human being makes a decision of any kind—moral or otherwise—they always do so for a reason. For example, "The Earth is X distance from the moon because of the parallax measurements I collected."

Now when one says they ought to do something, they have made a decision, and there is a reason for their decision. The reasoning process involves apprehended truth (i.e. that which is apprehended to be true). For example, if the apprehended truths of the parallax measurements are true, and the apprehended truths of the logical inferences are true, then the Earth will be X distance from the moon, and this will inform the amount of fuel needed for a trip to the moon. Or in other words: if the calculations are correct then the conclusion will be correct.

Perhaps this whole thread could be boiled down to a single question, "If you are an ethical non-naturalist, then what is the reason for your 'ought'?" "You say we ought to do such and such, but why ought we?"

That's not an inherently bad question, but I don't think anyone has managed to figure out to whom the question is addressed. Is the "ethical non-naturalist" you have in mind a character in a fiction or a non-fiction book?

It's very odd to talk about the "practical implication" of truth — Leontiskos

Unless, of course, one is a pragmatist.

When a human being makes a decision of any kind—moral or otherwise—they always do so for a reason. For example, "The Earth is X distance from the moon because of the parallax measurements I collected."

Now when one says they ought to do something, they have made a decision, and there is a reason for their decision. The reasoning process involves apprehended truth (i.e. that which is apprehended to be true — Leontiskos

Your notion of truth is just one theory of what truth means. Not everyone who does things for a reason would explain their reasoning on the basis of your theory of truth. For instance, some would say a decision is placing a bet that the consequences of one’s decision will be more or less compatible with one’s anticipations.

It's almost as if we act on what we believe to be true, rather than on what is true independent of our beliefs. — Leontiskos

That's precisely my point. Moral beliefs matter. Moral facts don't. A moral belief being false has the same practical implications as that same moral belief being true (if ethical non-naturalism is correct).

You beg the question by assuming that these are non-moral features. — Leontiskos

See here:

Very roughly, non-naturalism in meta-ethics is the idea that moral philosophy is fundamentally autonomous from the natural sciences.

...

Most often, ‘non-naturalism’ denotes the metaphysical thesis that moral properties exist and are not identical with or reducible to any natural property or properties in some interesting sense of ‘natural’.

...

Moore famously claimed that naturalists were guilty of what he called the “naturalistic fallacy.” In particular, Moore accused anyone who infers that X is good from any proposition about X’s natural properties of having committed the naturalistic fallacy. Assuming that being pleasant is a natural property, for example, someone who infers that drinking beer is good from the premise that drinking beer is pleasant is supposed to have committed the naturalistic fallacy. The intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions. Moore himself focused on goodness, but if the argument works for goodness then it seems likely to generalize to other moral properties.

Harm, suffering, and pain are natural properties. If moral properties are not natural properties then harm, suffering, and pain are not moral properties.

Perhaps this whole thread could be boiled down to a single question, "If you are an ethical non-naturalist, then what is the reason for your 'ought'?" "You say we ought to do such and such, but why ought we?" — Leontiskos

I'm asking about the ethical non-naturalist's moral motivation.

If CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming and I believe that CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming, then I will attempt to reduce CO2 emissions."

"If CO2 emissions are not causing a severe acceleration in global warming but I believe that CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming, then I will attempt to reduce CO2 emissions."

It's almost as if we act on what we believe to be true, rather than on what is true independent of our beliefs. Remarkable. :meh: — Leontiskos

Indeed, you've got it.

The difference with co2 is that reality will assert itself on the non believer anyway. But what about moral truths that no one believes? What difference do they make?

unless Frank is arguing that since @Hanover's actions are sometimes dubious, we should not pay attention to his opinions concerning ethics — Banno

No, that came out of my attempt to explain my view that ethics is mostly about looking backward and judging actions that have already happened.

There are all sorts of problems associated with trying to face the future correctly that I think are mostly covered by acting out of love for life, love for the human world, and seeing yourself in other people in a Sartre like way.

This thread touches on one of the problems with the forward facing approach.

That's precisely my point. Moral beliefs matter. Moral facts don't. A moral belief being false has the same practical implications as that same moral belief being true (if ethical non-naturalism is correct). — Michael

As far as I can tell this is just a streak of non-cognitivism, but let's look at your reasoning.

Harm, suffering, and pain are natural properties. — Michael

But they aren't. The natural sciences do not study pain and pleasure in themselves, and they certainly do not study pain and pleasure as normative realities. For example, the claim that suffering should be avoided is not within the domain of the natural sciences. Your article hedges precisely where you are begging the question, "Assuming that being pleasant is a natural property..."

In all probability you will be as unwilling to define "natural" as you are unwilling to define "moral," but the notion that the natural sciences study the normative value of pain and pleasure seems highly unlikely. If this is right then the many counterarguments in this thread which you unaccountably label "naturalistic," are in fact not naturalistic.

See here.

I'm asking about the ethical non-naturalist's moral motivation. — Michael

You seem to have skimmed some Wikipedia and SEP articles, constructed a position in your mind, and then constructed arguments against that position. But given that no one holds this constructed position, it seems that all you've done is erected a strawman. Do you know of any philosophers who hold this position you've constructed? It's easy to misread encyclopedia entries on the basis of your own idiosyncratic presuppositions. It's harder to misread actual philosophical positions that have been put forth by actual philosophers.

But they aren't. The natural sciences do not study pain and pleasure in themselves, and they certainly do not study pain and pleasure as normative realities. For example, the claim that suffering should be avoided is not within the domain of the natural sciences. Your article hedges precisely where you are begging the question, "Assuming that being pleasant is a natural property..."

In all probability you will be as unwilling to define "natural" as you are unwilling to define "moral," but the notion that the natural sciences study the normative value of pain and pleasure seems highly unlikely. If this is right then the many counterarguments in this thread which you unaccountably label "naturalistic," are in fact not naturalistic. — Leontiskos

I'm not saying that the natural sciences study the normative value of pain and pleasure. I'm saying that pain and pleasure are natural properties.

You seem to have skimmed some Wikipedia and SEP articles, constructed a position in your mind, and then constructed arguments against that position. But given that no one holds this constructed position, it seems that all you've done is erected a strawman. Do you know of any philosophers who hold this position you've constructed? — Leontiskos

Moore, as explained in that quote in my previous comment, and also from his open-question argument:

Moore’s “Open Question Argument” for the conclusion that goodness is a non-natural property is closely related to his worries about the naturalistic fallacy. Consider any proposed naturalistic analysis N of a moral predicate M. The Open Question Argument maintains that it will always be possible for someone competent with moral discourse without conceptual confusion to grant that something is N but still wonder whether it is really M. Whether goodness is co-instantiated with any natural property or set of natural properties is in this sense always a conceptually open question. If, however, N really was an accurate analysis of M then the question, “I know it is N but is it M?” would not be open in this way for a conceptually competent judge any more than the question, “I know he is a bachelor but is he unmarried?” can be an open one.

It should by now be clear that moral truths do not tell us about how the world is, but about how the world ought be. How the world ought be is not somethign found by observation.

agrees.

seems to think there is something more here.

Michael seems to think there is something more here. — Banno

That facts about how the world ought to be have no practical relevance. The world is what it is and will be what it will be and that's that.

It just doesn't matter if we ought or ought not avoid suffering. All that matters is that we want to avoid it, and not because we believe we ought to, but because it's a viscerally horrible thing to experience. We're motivated by pragmatism and empathy.

I don't understand any supposed motivation to obey a moral obligation for its own sake.

↪bert1 agrees. — Banno

Do I? I thought I was agreeing with Michael

How the world ought be is not somethign found by observation. — Banno

What process (if not obeservation) do we come to apprehend moral truths? You may have already said, sorry. I do take it that Michael is arguing against a position you more or less hold. You're a moral cognitivist, perhaps also realist, also a non-naturalist it seems.

It should by now be clear that moral truths do not tell us about how the world is, but about how the world ought be. — Banno

Schopenhauer said the world is never going to be the way it ought to be because that's boring. Thus we have threads on every disaster of the day but none on that thing that turned out really well because everyone was moral as hell.

That facts about how the world ought to be have no practical relevance... — Michael

That you ought not eat meat does have practical relevance. You are simply playing on the word "practical" by limiting it to what "is" the case, and excluding what "ought" be the case.

Do I? I thought I was agreeing with Michael — bert1

It seems you can agree with Michael while not disagreeing with me.

What process (if not obeservation) do we come to apprehend moral truths? — bert1

Notice that this is a quite different question to whether there are moral truths. Indeed, "apprehend" still carries the sense of perception over from the way the world is. I hope Michael is carrying over our previous discussion and still maintains that moral statements are truth apt; here he seems to be saying that they are all false. Yet in the main there is agreement that "One ought not kick puppies for fun" is true.

But he seems now to be mixing in some sort of determinism:

The world is what it is and will be what it will be and that's that. — Michael

Indeed, that appears to be a consequence of the path he is adopting in this thread: that we never make choices.

That alone might be taken to show the account to be in error.

That you ought not eat meat does have practical relevance. — Banno

How?

Indeed, that appears to be a consequence of the path he is adopting in this thread: that we never make choices. — Banno

I haven't said that.

We do make choices. But there are no practical implications of making a moral choice and no practical implications of making an immoral choice. If I choose to eat meat then I eat meat, and whether I ought or ought not eat meat makes no difference to either my choice or the outcome of that choice.

This is unlike, say, whether or not the meat is poisoned. That has practical relevance. If it's poisoned and I eat it then I'm likely to get sick and possibly die.

I haven't said that. — Michael

The world is what it is and will be what it will be and that's that. — Michael

Hmm. Then this might need clearing up.

Can a choice make the world other than it will be?

You see, that we must make choices is what ethics is about. On your account, either we do not make choices, doing only what we would always have done, or the choice makes no difference to the world - has no practical significance.

What I think is going on here - a point I have made repeatedly - is that you are treating our choices as if they were observations about the world - treating our "ought" as "is".

In order to understand ethics, one has to admit to a different approach to the world, one not of passive observation but of active engagement.

At its heart, this is what I think your account misses.

You see, that we must make choices is what ethics is about. On your account, either we do not make choices, doing only what we would always have done, or the choice makes no difference to the world - has no practical significance. — Banno

1. If a) eating meat is immoral and b) I believe that eating meat is immoral then c) I won't eat meat.

2. If a) eating meat is not immoral but b) I believe that eating meat is immoral then c) I won't eat meat.

In both cases I make a choice and in both cases my choice makes a difference to the world. And in both cases the (a)s have no practical relevance. The choice is the same either way and the outcome of that choice is the same either way.

@Banno Can you give an example of a moral truth that Calum does not believe, yet influences Calum's choices?

What's that about? Who is Calum? What do you think this shows?

(a)s have no practical relevance. — Michael

Yes, they do. In the first one, eating meat is immoral. In the second, it isn't. What more practical difference could there be?

But this has been pointed out previously, by several folk including myself.

As I said above,

You are simply playing on the word "practical" by limiting it to what "is" the case, and excluding what "ought" be the case. — Banno

That would be a counter-example to Michael's thesis. I'm just trying to help you Roland.

You've lost me.

practical
adjective
1. of or concerned with the actual doing or use of something rather than with theory and ideas

You've lost me. — Banno

Sorry about that. If you answer the question I'll be able to see if it's a counter example, and that will be interesting.

Duelling dictionaries? Really?

Of, relating to practice or action, as opposed to speculation or theory. — OED

My bolding. One ought not do what one ought not do.

One ought not do what one ought not do. — Banno

OK, so now could you explicate how that can have an influence on a person's decisions?