Etymonline is not a reliable resource but the etymology posted this time is basically correct. Regardless of that, by pasting that text, it feels like you ignored half of my text before, or at least did not understand it — admittedly, I am not always easy to understand.

French is a Latin language. — Arne

P1: Arabic is a Semitic language.
P2: The English word 'lemon' comes from Arabic līmūn.
C: The English word lemon comes from Proto-Semitic!

Where is the fallacy?

Perhaps you missed the pivotal point. One cannot learn one's first language from a dictionary. Therefore there is a way of understanding the meanings of words that is not found in their lexical definitions. — Banno

I don't think I missed anything. I made this comment referring to your saying "Look up the definition of a word in the dictionary. Then look up the definition of each of the words in that definition ." This is the way one can become a kind of superliterate. And I never talked about such a thing.

Hence there is a sense of "meaning" that is not found in a dictionary. — Banno

Certainly, this can often be the case. A lot of definitions, I believe, are incomplete. But they still offer the essence, the central idea of a term, esp. for concepts, which is most important.
They also offer different uses of a term according to different contexts. Which is also very useful.

It would be an error, then, to think that dictionaries provide the whole of meaning. — Banno

Certainly yes. But again, I never claimed such a thing.

My main point and why I launched this discussion was that too may people in here believe that disctionaries --and encyclopedias, I forgot to mention them too-- are not useful in philosophy, if not totally useless. So, I would like to ask any person who believes that, if they also reject or consider useless standard lexicon sources regarding esp. philosophy, such as the following, suggested by Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/s1.html):

• Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1999, ed. Robert Audi
  
• Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1976, ed. J. B. Sykes
• Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1925, ed. James Mark Baldwin
• A Kant Dictionary, 1995, by Howard Caygill
• Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 1996, by Simon Blackburn
• Philosophielexikon, 1997, ed. A. Hügli and P. Lübcke
• Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998, entry under ‘Analytical Philosophy’ by Thomas Baldwin
• Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998, entry under ‘Conceptual Analysis’ by Robert Hanna

And Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy itself, of course.

And once more, there is a huge difference between taking the definitions from such sources for granted and/or in an absolute way, and with rejecting or ignoring them totally.

Also, I'm talking esp. about basic, key terms used in a subject of the discussion. And that a "speaker" who is using them has to make it clear what they mean by them and how they use them, either by giving their definition or description and/or (practical) examples of their use.
Which, in most cases, is not ... the case. :smile:

I am not always easy to understand. — Lionino

I agree. You aren't. :grin:

Also, I'm talking esp. about basic, key terms used in a subject of the discussion. And that a "speaker" who is using them has to make it clear what they mean by them and how they use them, either by giving their definition or description and/or (practical) examples of their use.
Which, in most cases, is not ... the case. :smile: — Alkis Piskas

This is interesting because we can take our own case as an example: Our communication through digital marks on the internet. How can the use of words appear here, for example, in a digital philosophy forum? Here there are no practical examples that indicate the use of words, but, similar to a dictionary, we have to work only with marks referring to each other.

This can be constituted as a criticism of the notion of practical meaning that is based on empirical use. Well, the internet space breaks with the direct (live in person), empirical and practical use of words. But not only that, it reaches a greater and global space of understanding, as global as the Internet. In fact, one can speak of greater universality achieved by the digital space. Isn't this universality of meaning (signs or marks referring to each other, abstracted from experience and practical and everyday use) a greater possibility for philosophy?

It is very common in this context (that of philosophy) to say "I say this in this sense"), as a non-normal and non-everyday sense. And the perfect example is the neologism. Using words in their mostly differential and referential sense with respect to other words outside of the many specific contexts that delimit them opens the space for greater intelligibility and understanding. This is very similar to what Saussure called "langue" as opposed to "parole." This nature of words as signs is capable of breaking contexts and uses, offering the possibility of translation, intercommunication on a global scale and the creation of new meanings and uses. And philosophy finds this very useful.

You are referring to a kind of "constant" use of definitions in a discussion, writing or speech. And your points make sense. — Alkis Piskas

Not necessarily.

However, I have talked about basic, key terms in a duscussion. — Alkis Piskas

Yeah, I'm not referring to defining terms pointlessly either,

And that one must know what the person who is using them means with them, when this is obviously not evident. — Alkis Piskas

If miscommunication is "obviously evident" then something action needs to be taken to address this, that's self-evident. I am just saying that my preferred solution is to phrase oneself differently and abandon the term causing confusion. Alternatively, if it's appropriate, and for key terms it often is, then make the term's meaning the core of the debate.

You can well define "capitalism" as "People selling stuff for money", if this is what capitalism means to you. If you get cricised for it, that would be a mistake. — Alkis Piskas

I can't agree with that. One can't let others define terms however they want. There are many reasons for this, but to focus on the most important one, "truth" only requires a single validation. "It's true that capitalism isn't causing wealth inequality" because capitalism is just "selling stuff for money". You can only dispute that claim by challenging the way capitalism was defined. Then the discussion becomes about "What is capitalism".

Words and terms are public, they're shared, and while they are also used for personal expression, that doesn't mean there's no right or wrong of what words refer to.

The individual who thinks capitalism = people selling stuff for money should be forced to make a choice. Reach an agreement that "People selling stuff for money" doesn't necessarily cause wealth inequality, or be forced to defend the notion that capitalism = "People selling stuff for money".

There are times when I'll allow another to use a term in a way I don't agree with, but that stops once they start concluding from how they've defined their terms.

It's absolutely imperative that we use terms at least somewhat similarly, for the sake of logic, truth and our conclusions. An argument or line of logic can be true or false depending on how the terms within those arguments are understood. Preserving this is far more important than avoiding miscommunication by allowing people to define terms however they want. I'm confident in my doubt that you practice what you preach here, you're too smart for it.

When one looks for the essence of something, its description is always simple. — Alkis Piskas

I'll just say that I disagree, for me, the generic doesn't trump the specific. Philosophy searches for "the essence" because it's big-picture, so there's no alternative, this is a nasty flaw of philosophy, not something to be celebrated or promoted.

Our communication through digital marks on the internet. How can the use of words appear here, for example, in a digital philosophy forum? — JuanZu

What are "digital marks on the internet"? E.g. emojis, icons, buttons, etc.?
Also, what dou you mean by "a digital philosophy forum"? I can think of two kinds of (any) fora: online and offline.

Here there are no practical examples that indicate the use of words, but, similar to a dictionary, we have to work only with marks referring to each other. — JuanZu

Can't really get that either. Undestanding it depends of course on understanding what you described earlier.

It is very common in this context (that of philosophy) to say "I say this in this sense"), as a non-normal and non-everyday sense. — JuanZu

Yes. This is quite logical. We use it in everyday language as well, as a means to avoid a word being taken literally or in the wrong sense, esp. when it has different meanings. At least, those who care about undestanding and good communcation do it. :smile:

What are "digital marks on the internet"? E.g. emojis, icons, buttons, etc.?
Also, what dou you mean by "a digital philosophy forum"? I can think of two kinds of (any) fora: online and offline. — Alkis Piskas

Yes. You can say that they are simply pixel-marks. In any case, in general, due to context limitations, we can only resort to other digital marks to make ourselves understood by other people. In this context we cannot make ostensive definitions, nor can we make gestures with the body, nor resort to the situation that surrounds us and we perceive with our senses. The above are empirical determinations of the context that are supplied and exceeded by the nature of the marks-signs that function even when these determinations (ostensive definitions, etc.) are not presented. We can call them ab-presence marks: Marks that can function without the presence of subjects.


When I talk to you in this forum I do not see your body, nor do I hear your words, nor do I see your gestures, I only see your ab-presence marks-signs in the space provided by the internet. But thanks to the abstraction of these empirical determinations we can establish a more universal, intercontinental, etc. communication. But above all, conceptual communication. And this works in a similar way to how a dictionary works: to make explicit what we want to say we have to use words that refer to other words, without being able to access many empirical and practical determinations of meaning.


Maybe now what I said is more understandable:


“Here there are no practical examples that indicate the use of words, but, similar to a dictionary, we have to work only with marks referring to each other.”


This is why the use of dictionaries is so useful in these contexts (such as in a philosophy forum). That is, a definition through marks is more universal and conceptual (and it is no coincidence that the concept and the universal are related, differentiating themselves from particularity and empirical limitation).


______________________________


However, philosophical discussions are not common as everyday conversations are. That is why I have referred to philosophical discussion as non-normal or non-common discussion. Because in philosophical discussion we work with concepts and the concepts themselves are thematized. It has a universal approach that the everyday use of language does not have. For this, a more abstract and global medium such as ab-presence marks-signs, whether physical or digital, is useful. Dictionaries work well in these contexts because they are composed of the abstract element of the concept: A dictionary can be used to understand another person even in the non-presence of the participants, at a distance (far from gestures, and from various empirical determinations), even when that person has already died.

Philosophy has its own lexicon that's different from politics, for example. — L'éléphant

Do you refer to a particular lexicon, like a specialized dictionary or encyclopedia --e.g. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, etc.-- or a personal vocabulary, based on their own personal meanings of terms?
If it's the first case, what Philosophy lexicon are you using? — Alkis Piskas

Yes, those dictionaries. But also, from the writings of the philosophers themselves, which are not dictionaries themselves. Their books are filled with definitions/meanings.

I can give an example of where words fail.

Say you wake up in the morning and are deciding what clothes to wear for the day.

Is your brain using consciousness, information, thought or ideas? Or any of some other words?
It's really physically one thing but relying on one word gives a false sense of the physical circumstance (mental circumstance) being defined by a single word.

I am just saying that my preferred solution is to phrase oneself differently and abandon the term causing confusion. — Judaka

Yes, if you know that the term is causing a confustion. Which usually you don't or don't care about.

Alternatively, if it's appropriate, and for key terms it often is, then make the term's meaning the core of the debate. — Judaka

This is a good idea.

One can't let others define terms however they want. There are many reasons for this, but to focus on the most important one, "truth" only requires a single validation. — Judaka

What do you mean by "can't let others"? Only a school or university teacher can do that. :smile:
This is equivalent to not letting others having an opinion of their own. Which is totally unacceptable, esp. in philosophy.
There are a lot of ways to disagree with someone else definition or description.

You can only dispute that claim by challenging the way capitalism was defined. Then the discussion becomes about "What is capitalism". — Judaka

You are very right about this. This is happening too often in this and other similar places (forums & communities). Evidently, the only solution for this is to realize that this is happening and just stop talking about that irrelevant, "parasitic" subject. :smile:.

Words and terms are public, they're shared, and while they are also used for personal expression, that doesn't mean there's no right or wrong of what words refer to. — Judaka

No, there isn't. But see, because they are shared, they are public, as you say, their definition has to reflect or represent the common opinion and knowledge regarding them, as well as the basic, essential elements which they are based on.

For axample, "perception" is an essential --if not the most essential-- element when one talks about "consciousness". So the definition of consciousness must not only include it but based on it. From this central point, one can expand it or even rephrase it and talk about related terms, like senses, feeling, etc., which are all part of perception. This is the best way to create commonly accepted definitions. Because it is difficult for one to disagree about an essential element, the root of something, the existence of which can be easily proved. (Difficult, but not impossible, of course. :smile:)

An argument or line of logic can be true or false depending on how the terms within those arguments are understood. — Judaka

Certainly.
(I would only replace "true or false" with "well-grounded or ungrounded" (or "solid vs unstable", etc.), since the first case refers to statements, whereas the second refers to a whole argument or line of logic.)

When one looks for the essence of something, its description is always simple.
— Alkis Piskas
I'll just say that I disagree, for me, the generic doesn't trump the specific. — Judaka

I'm not sure if get this right. Do you consider the essence as generic? And if so, what is the "specific"?

Philosophy searches for "the essence" because it's big-picture, so there's no alternative, this is a nasty flaw of philosophy, not something to be celebrated or promoted. — Judaka

It is true that philosophy focuses on the essence of things. I have forgotten that. I'm talking about and practicing it by habit! :grin:
(Otherwise, I respect your opinion that this cay be taken as a flaw and not something to hail about.)

[Re: "digital marks on the internet"]You can say that they are simply pixel-marks. — JuanZu

I see. That is, like the ink on the paper, the electrons fired on a screen, etc. And like the acoustic waves that words produce when they are uttered. Words are material symbols that can be presented in any and all of these forms.
But what we are talking about and interested in here is the meaning of the words, independently of their form and carrier, i.e. what they convey to us, what thoughts are triggered in us when we perceive them, indiviudally and in combination, as groups. Isn't that right?
(Although the medium in which they are transmitted might also play a role. (See McLuan's theory of "The medium is the message").)

When I talk to you in this forum I do not see your body, nor do I hear your words, nor do I see your gestures — JuanZu

Right, you are talking here about the known disadvantage of the written messages. This is the reason why emoticons and later emojis where created, as a substitute for the mood in which a message is transmitted. (In spoken language the problem is lesser, since we can rely on the tone and pitch of voice. But gestures and face expressions are still missing.)

Anyway, all this is unimportant when discussing on philosophical or scientific grounds, isn't it?

This is why the use of dictionaries is so useful in these contexts (such as in a philosophy forum). That is, a definition through marks is more universal and conceptual (and it is no coincidence that the concept and the universal are related, differentiating themselves from particularity and empirical limitation). — JuanZu

Right. But I consider empirical descriptions --i.e. examples of how a concept works in practice, in life, etc.-- quite important, since they make an abstract idea better undestandable --more concrete and more "visible" and tangible-- by giving flesh and bones to it. They also show that the person using that concept has a solid reality of it, not just a bunch of words and thoughts in his head.

@Fooloso4, @Banno, @unenlightened, @NOS4A2, @Lionino, @Judaka, @L'éléphant, @JuanZu

Here's a video that shows the importance that a known philosopher --Bernardo Kastrup-- gives to definitions and how effectively he handles them:


"All is in consciousness, but not necessarily conscious"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCzbnuCVpEs

In the excerpt below, BK describes the phonomenon of consciousness in relation to reality and mind:

"All reality is in consciousness. It unfolds as a phenomenon of consciousness. That reality is not in a world fundamentally outside mind, outside consciousness. So, for instance, if I hold this statue here, then the concreteness, the color, the solidity I feel, everything I perceive, is an excitation of subjective experience, itself an excitation of consciousness. This statue is not fundamentally outside the field of my subjective experience."

I brought this example to show that talking about "definitions" does not necessarily mean giving an explicit, dictionary-like definition, but also any kind of description that explains the meaning of a concept. In this case, the description also focuses on the essential element of the concept,
--"consciousness"-- which is, perception. Furthemore, BK offers a practical example of the concept, to make it more concrete.

From that, one can easily create a concise, dictionary-like definition, if one wants to. This shows that definitions and descriptions are very close and alternatives in providing the meaning of concepts, in philosophy as in any other field.

This is a very good example of what I was talking about in this topic and during the whole discussion.

Simultaneously, BK's description also supports my definition of "consciousness" which I have put forth quite a few times in here, (and more times elsewhere (recently, in the discussion of "Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?").

So I hope that this satsifies those who need froma a person to provide reference from an "expert" or "professional", as a kind of "proof" --as silly as this may sound-- otherwise, they cannot even acknowledge a definition coming from a "common" interlocutor or "amateur".

Kastrup is more cult figure than philosopher. Idealism has precious few followers amongst professional philosopher.

Consciousness is not just perception, but also involves acting on the world. Consciousness is not passive.

It is not at all clear from what you say what "the meaning of a word" is. You seem to think it is what is given by a definition, but

One cannot learn one's first language from a dictionary. Therefore there is a way of understanding the meanings of words that is not found in their lexical definitions. — Banno

I think you are mostly right. But this:

One cannot learn one's first language from a dictionary. Therefore there is a way of understanding the meanings of words that is not found in their lexical definitions.

Hence there is a sense of "meaning" that is not found in a dictionary. — Banno

and the points you make based on this seem to be shaky. Just because a child learning a language picks it up without reading a dictionary (although some children do read dictionaries), doesn't mean that the meanings of the words the child learns are not roughly represented by what is found in a dictionary and that the definitions contained within aren't really useful. What you are saying about how setting out a philosophical argument with clear definitions is stifling is not the result of linguistics, but rather the simple point that there is some leeway with the way words are used when arguing within different paradigms.

I'm basically saying that the internal logic of an argument is more important than adhering to some sort of arbitrary dictionary - but those words in question, while there is leeway in the way they can be used, must exist within some parameters determined by the larger body in which the argument exists. The way the word is used is more important than any sort of definition one might point to, but the thing has to make sense.

Just because a child learning a language picks it up without reading a dictionary, doesn't mean that the meanings of the words the child learns are not roughly represented by what is found in a dictionary and that the definitions contained within aren't really useful. — ToothyMaw

Of course not. What is shown is that dictionaries can only be a secondary way of understanding a word. Of much greater import is the way the word is used.

I think you agree with this.

Of much greater import is the way the word is used. — Banno

And if you want to know how a word is used, a good current dictionary will tell you the common usages. There is no difference between the idea that dictionaries define words and the idea that dictionaries describe usage. It's the same thing. Although I acknowledge that this is not always understood.

There is however a difference between setting out how a word is used and actually using it.

Just as there is a difference between reading a car manual and driving a car.

There remains a way of understanding how a word is used that consists not in a dictionary definition but in actually making use of the word.

And it is this that will be missed if one places undue emphasis on dictionary definitions.

And it is this that will be missed if one places undue emphasis on dictionary definitions. — Banno

Sure

I think meaning is something that happens to a system of signs. Something that happens to the medium, so to speak. When two sign systems meet, they establish certain relationships where one affects the other actively and passively. These relationships are the meaning. For example, when we read a definition in a dictionary, we are affected by its system and its specific configuration (word order, spacing, syntax, etc.); The meaning is created in this relationship and this is determined as the certain configuring effects in our system of signs. That is, the letters affect our learned and memorized language, they resonate within it and individualize it (and this can be said a fortiori for someone using the language and speaking to us) Not so much in the sense that the medium is the message, but that the message is a relationship between the mediums. And meaning (as something iterable, repeatable, that survives through mediums) depends on the spatial and temporal stability of sign systems and their relationships.

In a dictionary there are usually no "emojis" or the facial expressions of the writer. But this is due to our intention of objectivity and the suitability of the medium for this purpose. Dictionaries have on their part the permanence and durability of ink in some cases, which can transcend the vocal sounds that are carried away by the wind (Socrates did not write, but we know about him thanks to Plato's ink). When we think about objectivity, theory, concept and universality (which characterize science and philosophy) we choose the most appropriate means for its realization. How important was Albert Einstein's mood at the time he first spoke about the theory of relativity? Not very important, in the paper there is no indication of his humor, there is no emoji—just like there isn't one in a dictionary. That is why for the theoretical and universalist intention of science and philosophy the empirical and contingent element is subtracted or abstracted dictionary-like. And what is said about a dictionary can also be said about any medium that gives us a definition or a concept: A paper, a manual, a recorded sound, a recorded explanation from someone, etc.

Right. But I consider empirical descriptions --i.e. examples of how a concept works in practice, in life, etc.-- quite important, since they make an abstract idea better undestandable --more concrete and more "visible" and tangible-- by giving flesh and bones to it. — Alkis Piskas

Yes me too.

Every time we apply the concept more broadly (in daily life, in practical examples, analogies, metaphors, etc.) we are doing something that is supposed to be its essence: Universality and its application to many cases at different space and time. And according to what was said above, our theories, concepts, definitions and laws (just like meaning, and other "universal" things that are repeated through space and time) are relationships between sign systems of great stability in space and time. The ink in a dictionary is not carried away by the wind, as can happen with spoken sounds. That is why the dictionary as a written medium is more suitable than speech to realize universality. And a fortiori the same can be said of computers, SSD, "the cloud", etc.

Kastrup is more cult figure than philosopher. Idealism has precious few followers amongst professional philosopher. — Banno

BK Kastrup is one of the main --if not the main-- supporter and defender of idealism, more precisely analytic idealism. What creteria are you using to distingusih "cult figures" from actual philosophers?
And, do you mean that actual philosophers don't care about giving definitions/descriptions of the terms/concepts they are using? Because this was the main purpose I posted this message.

Consciousness is not just perception, but also involves acting on the world. Consciousness is not passive. — Banno

Can you make this a little more clear to me? Do you mean that consciousness contains action?

Therefore there is a way of understanding the meanings of words that is not found in their lexical definitions. — Banno

What is this way?

You open and leave a lot of doors open, Banno ...

when we read a definition in a dictionary, we are affected by its system and its specific configuration (word order, spacing, syntax, etc.) — JuanZu

I think that you are talking about how one uses a language in general and not esp. definitions, which is our subject. Because if one does not follow the grammar and syntax rules of one's language, this will be reflected in everything one says or writes, wouldn't it?

Your ideas on the subject of language sound quite original and maybe there's something really interesting and useful here. However, I admit that they are not clear to me.

In a dictionary there are usually no "emojis" or the facial expressions of the writer. — JuanZu

But emotions are not and should not be part of or belong to definitions. I brought up "emojies" in the context of written language in general.

Every time we apply the concept more broadly (in daily life, in practical examples, analogies, metaphors, etc.) we are doing something that is supposed to be its essence: Universality and its application to many cases at different space and time. — JuanZu

Right.

You open and leave a lot of doors open, Banno ... — Alkis Piskas

Thank you. One does one's best to help.

Can you make this a little more clear to me? — Alkis Piskas

In first aid, consciousness is assessed by obtaining a reaction. Would that philosophers might learn first aid.

What is this way? — Alkis Piskas

Philosophical investigations, §201 and thereabouts.

Can you make this a little more clear to me? Do you mean that consciousness contains action? — Alkis Piskas

You are dealing with an obscurantist who throws a hook and pulls the line bit by bit, and finally you see there was no bait (see here).
Here is the what he quoted:

Not very helpful on its own.
Don't be solicitous. If he had a point to make, he would have stated already.

I think that you are talking about how one uses a language in general and not esp. definitions, which is our subject. Because if one does not follow the grammar and syntax rules of one's language, this will be reflected in everything one says or writes, wouldn't it?

Your ideas on the subject of language sound quite original and maybe there's something really interesting and useful here. However, I admit that they are not clear to me. — Alkis Piskas

Use is part of the meaning but it is not everything. Wittgenstein's theory is incomplete without a theory of the sign. That is why I talk about sign systems. Instead of saying that a system of signs is always being used in order to have meaning, I would say that a system of signs is always in effective relationship with another system of signs in order to have meaning. Thus, taking the example of a book (a book-dictionary), the written marks enter into a relationship with our language sedimented in our memory. But the book cannot be ignored as an active element in the production of meaning. Wittgenstein's theory would ignore the book as an active agent and give primacy to the subject as the producer of meaning as he uses his learned language.

But emotions are not and should not be part of or belong to definitions. I brought up "emojies" in the context of written language in general. — Alkis Piskas

I understand. What I wanted to point out is that there is a reason why there are no emoji-type expressions, casual expressions and so on. The reason is that there is the intention of objectivity, of the concept and of the universal. I also wanted to point out that according to the theory of the sign that I work on (which refers to the texts of Peirce, Derrida, Saussure among others) it is always, in a certain sense, universalizing: Leaving itself and having effects on the other (in another system of signs), as if becoming a ghost, extending his identity towards the other. The meaning would be the effects of the signs extending their spatiality and temporality. A good book (or a good dictionary) is remembered by many: Its being and its effects seem to transcend its particular spatiality and temporality.

Well, that'll save you from thinking.

Wittgenstein's theory is incomplete without a theory of the sign. — JuanZu

An interesting idea.

The Tractatus is of course a work about signs, much of which was carried over to the Investigations, but a large part of which was dropped. He intended the two books to be read together, the Investigations as a critique of the system of signs Tractatus.

So what is problematic about signs? Simply that there is so much that is not captured by the signs we use, or that changes depending on the situation in which one finds oneself. It might be more accurate to say it is the utterance, not the sign, that holds meaning.

If your case is that language requires both signs and use, then you will not be at odds with Wittgenstein. It would be a mistake to think Wittgenstein did not understand the need for signs. Much of the Investigations concerns the rules and limits of the use of signs.

So again, understanding the relations between signs will leave the language dead. To understand it is to make use of it. Hence the emphasis on language games and forms of life.

The biggest difference I have with Wittgenstein is what I said in my response to @AlkisPiskas:

"Thus, taking the example of a book (a book-dictionary), the written marks enter into a relationship with our language sedimented in our memory. But the book cannot be ignored as an active element in the production of meaning. Wittgenstein's theory would ignore the book as an active agent and give primacy to the subject as the producer of meaning as he uses his learned language".

I claim that there is a certain autonomy of signs that explain how another system of signs is affected. For example, when we read a book, some specific linguistic signs appear in our thoughts and not others. This effect cannot be justified simply by the intentional use of the reading individual without the active intervention of the book. In a certain sense I say that the book writes in the subject and triggers a series of effects that individualize the language we use and with which we think and speak in general. This explains the fact that we can learn new words through a dictionary, without needing to see someone, another subject, using them. This implies that the relationship called "reading" is not saturated by the use learned by the subject. Which explains the possibility of error, misuse and disuse.

In fact, if we follow one of Wittgenstein's theses on private languages, the thesis that there is a public language implies an impersonal and supra-subjective element where a language seems to escape the intentional use of the subject [psychoanalysis is based on this theory]. In this sense, language is a system of signs with a certain autonomy beyond the use of individuals. Which obviously makes it possible to treat language in a more objective way. Is the intentional element necessarily linked to language use? So, if the intentional element is exceeded, we cannot continue talking about use, but, in a certain sense, we must talk about language acting by itself, we talk about a living system of signs, as opposed to a dead one, like that of a machine –but still a system of signs–. It is no coincidence that you speak of something "dead" of a system of signs understood beyond intentional use. I claim that signification always has a dead but totally active face.

So, a Wittgensteinian, eh?
Thank you, Banno. I'll have to look all that closer ...

Have a great new year!

Thank you Lionino for making my life easier by serving to me Banno's reference on the plate.
Well, besides W's usual fallacious and unexpected ideas --here, courses of action based on rules, etc.-- the reference has nothing to do with consciousness and what is its relation with "action", which is what I asked.

As for my being solicitous, well, I'm always open to and interested in new or different ideas. On the condition of course that are supported by pertinent and valid arguments or definitions/descriptions and/or examples. Which, unfortunately, usually does not happen.

Have a great new year!