2. Go back and re-respond to this here and explain why my response doesn't now apply, particularly to (b). Just plug in Moore's definition of morality into (b), and that offers a reason why it matters what you think is moral for a non-naturalist. — Hanover
‘Good,’ then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of that word.
That's a question that would seem to deal with causality, which would tend to require a naturalistic answer.
The difference for someone like Moore would seem to be precisely that you have acted immorally versus morally in any situation, independent of any causation downstream of your actions. As I understand him, which isn't very well, moral facts aren't reducible to natural facts, and so asking about what changes "in the world," outside of your having acted rightly or wrongly doesn't make sense given his premises. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Well, the non-natural moral facts would be involved in the consequences of your actions to the extent that your family won't come to see you because they think you acted immorally. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Hanover
Moore doesn't have a definition. As he says in the Principia Ethica:
‘Good,’ then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of that word. — Michael
Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral? — Michael
That's a consequence of acting contrary to moral beliefs. They won't come to see me because they believe I acted immorally. They might be wrong.
Suffering is still suffering, so why does it matter if it's moral or not?
I'll quote Moore's Principia Ethica — Michael
It is in defining goodness in terms of some natural property – in this case, pleasure – that makes it an ethical naturalist theory. And then, according to Moore, deriving the normative claim that we ought pursue pleasure commits the naturalistic fallacy. — Michael
He describes "the good" as having a variety of objectives, and so it is pluralistic, unlike saying the good = that which increases the most pleasure, which would posit a monistic, essentialist definition of "the good. " — Hanover
But the non-naturalist isn't a moral skeptic. He's a moral realist. — Hanover
And no one is an essentialist anymore. It's like so yesterday. — Hanover
I don't follow why Mill is a naturalist but Moore not. — Hanover
But if people have the moral beliefs they do because of moral facts (at least in part), then there seems to be a clear connection here between evil acts and social consequences. — Count Timothy von Icarus
As long as a hedonist does not purport to derive his 'ought' from natural science, he is not a naturalist. He could do this in two ways: he could argue that pleasure is good, but that its goodness is not an object of natural science, or else he could independently claim that the oughtness that attaches to pleasure is not an object of natural science. In either case he is not a naturalist, and all hedonists I have encountered deny that their valuative/obligatory premises are the product of natural science.
I think you are misreading Moore's argument as overdetermined. The so-called "naturalistic fallacy" depends on his Open Question about the ambiguity of goodness. If that ambiguity fails then the fallacy charge also fails. — Leontiskos
This is true only if you assume that people's beliefs about morality have nothing to do moral facts. But if people have the moral beliefs they do because of moral facts (at least in part)... — Count Timothy von Icarus
So why the motivation to be moral? There are no practical benefits, either for ourselves or for others. Is it entirely a matter of principle?
Isn't it begging to question to assume the correct moral beliefs are distributed such that being correct about them is a 50/50 proposition? — Count Timothy von Icarus
The same seems true with assuming that those who commit immoral acts face no heightened risk of suffering due to later realizing they have acted immorally. — Count Timothy von Icarus
There can be "natural" consequences of immoral acts without morality being constituted by these outcomes. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The same is also true of someone who is falsely convinced that they have acted immorally. In which case it isn't the fact that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer but the belief that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer.
However, a full analysis would show that I believe antibiotics will cure my infection because they will actually cure my infection, that I think my wife cheated on my because she actually cheated on me, etc. The possibility of false beliefs here doesn't negate this connection if there are ways to come to true beliefs. If beliefs are properly related to facts, including moral facts, I don't see an issue here. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I'm concerned about promoting happiness and reducing suffering. I don't care whether happiness or suffering is moral or not. — Michael
If you were a Roman stoic, you would say the latter is tied up in the former. What is the cultural framework within which you're using the word "moral?" You have to have some sort of context, otherwise it's language on holiday. — frank
I'm not working under any cultural framework. I am assuming, for the sake of argument, that Moore's ethical non-naturalism is correct: that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering". As such, it isn't a truism that suffering is immoral. — Michael
You have to have some sort of framework or context for the usage, otherwise there isn't any meaning to your expression. — frank
I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and not cause suffering either way. — Michael
There's an ambiguity in your proposition that "he could argue that pleasure is good". Are you saying that "this is good" means "this is pleasurable" or are you saying that pleasure happens to have the property of goodness? The former is naturalism, the latter is non-naturalism. — Michael
I think it important not to get too caught up in the particular labels used. If you prefer, rather than use the labels "naturalism" and "non-naturalism" we can use the labels "Type X" and "Type Y". — Michael
Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral?
If "this is immoral" means "this causes suffering" then part of my question would contain a logical contradiction: my belief that it is immoral to cause suffering would be true by definition, and so we cannot even ask what would follow if that belief was false. — Michael
But if "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering" then there is no such contradiction and so the question is coherent. — Michael
Now given the assumption that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering", what does it mean to say that it is immoral to cause suffering? — Michael
On some accounts we cannot define the proposition "it is immoral" in any simpler terms. However, given that such claims are intended to be normative, I am assuming that "this is immoral" just means "one ought not do this". At the very least this definition allows us to avoid having to explain why we ought not be immoral.
This then entails that the proposition "it is immoral to cause suffering" means "one ought not cause suffering" (and the proposition "it is moral to seek pleasure" means "one ought seek pleasure"). — Michael
Given that I believe that one ought not cause suffering, what follows if it is a fact that one ought not cause suffering and what follows if it is not a fact that one ought not cause suffering?
The problem I see is that nothing follows in either case. The existence or non-existence of such obligations is inconsequential. It is true that if one ought not cause suffering and I cause suffering then I have done something I ought not, but so what? What is my motivation to obey obligations? — Michael
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