I wasn't referring to a conscious being either. But it is necessary that this thing be a creator which causes something from nothingness. However the question remains: How does this solitary cause affect nothingness to create something? It is necessary to affect in order to cause. Otherwise we only have succession without causality (that is why saying that one thing is prior to another thing does not tell us anything about causality; if I say that my older brother is prior to my existence that does not mean that my brother be the cause of my existence).

If we accept that affecting nothingness and creating something from it is irrational, then we must admit that this first cause is in the order of coexistence, coexisting with other things that it can affect. But this implies that the first cause is not actually the first cause but a cause between others.

That is why I have said that to correctly state the first cause, it must be stated as a creation from nothing, that is, as a first thing creating a second thing, affecting nothingness in some way. But nothingness cannot be affected. So, the conclusion is that the notion of first cause is also inconsistent. To cause something you need affect something; and to affect something you must belong to the order of coexistence (and it is no coincidence that to represent causality we need planes, Cartesian or not).

Given a circle, where does it begin or end? This not to suggest that being itself is in any way "circular," but instead to note that language very plausibly drives us to conclusions that make sense in language - but that language is not the subject. The trouble arises from the all-too-human impulse to say, "I know!" when in fact we don't.

As to cause, you would seem to want to have a plethora of causes, cause then being a many. I think if you look at each sense of cause closely enough, you will find that each is different. Thus not a one that is a many, but instead a heteronym, "cause," that means different things. Nor can you escape to "agency," because that too yields manys, many different kinds of agency.

"Cause" in this sense is akin to "being" in that both words informally and casually are meaningful and useful. But with these questions we take meaning to the limit, the limiting factor, and are surprised (perhaps) to find the words no longer meaningful, at least in the sense intended. (Thank you Heidegger and Collingwood.)

So is everything either part of an infinite/eternal chain of cause and effect, or alternatively is there some first thing? I don't know. Where does the circle begin and end? At least with the circle we can acknowledge that circles being as they are, the question is meaningless.

Nor can you escape to "agency," because that too yields manys, many different kinds of agency. — tim wood

I do not address agency at all. This theory states noting about it.

So is everything either part of an infinite/eternal chain of cause and effect, or alternatively is there some first thing? I don't know. — tim wood

I don't know either! And yet despite not knowing that, we arrive at the conclusion I posted in the OP. My point is that in either case we end up with a first cause.

There was an unnecessarily long thread a few years ago on the topic of change not requiring time. It was one of those odd threads that apparently pit those with a background in Kant against those who had understood a bit of mathematics.

Does anyone recall it? What's the big mystery about time?

This diagram seemed to cause considerable consternation amongst those who's ideology demanded that change only occur over time:

It changes from yellow to white over distance, not time, you see.

And then Jgill pointed out that

A derivative can describe a rate of change with regard to a non-time variable: dy/dx — jgill

That should have been an end to it.

But there are a number of folk who are dedicated to anachronistic notions. Ideas of causation and change that come from Aristotle or Kant and which have long been superseded.

Much the same thing seems to be happening here.

The absence of an icon next to your name makes it difficult for old folk such as I to spot your posts, as I scroll up and down on my laptop.

If I have understood your post, you would like to define a sub-class of causes, which after Aristotle are to be called efficient causes, and which require change over time. That's fine, but it does not follow that all causes occur over time.

If I have a spring under tension, the force will be give by Hook's Law,

F = − k∆x

Notice that the change is ∆x, not ∆t; the force depends on the distance the spring is stretched or compressed, not on time.

This is the mathematics that is needed to set out the deformation in the cushion. ∆t does not enter into the equations.

I was not disagreeing with your conclusion, only with your argument. I agree that it makes no sense to ask what causes time, and only disagree with the idea that a cause must be prior to its effect.

Generic references to papers are not a discussion — Philosophim

Silly of me to offer some familiarity with the literature.

Here's the ChatGPT summary of Russell's article for you:

Russell's essay "On the Notion of Cause" challenges the traditional notion of causality. He argues against the idea that causation involves necessary connections between events, instead suggesting that our understanding of cause and effect is based on our observations and experiences. Russell explores the limitations of our understanding of causality, emphasizing the role of empirical evidence and the possibility of alternative interpretations of causal relationships. He questions the absolute certainty of causation and proposes a more probabilistic view, highlighting the complexity and uncertainty inherent in our concept of cause and effect.

And here's the same for the Anscombe article:

In "Causality and Determination," Anscombe delves into the relationship between causality and determination, focusing on the distinction between causes and conditions. She argues that causality involves a certain kind of dependence between events, which is not merely conditional but also explanatory. Anscombe challenges the idea that causality is solely reliant on necessary conditions, proposing that causal relationships entail a direct influence rather than just a conditional connection. She emphasizes the need to differentiate between causes and mere conditions, aiming to refine our understanding of causality and determination. Anscombe's work prompts a nuanced examination of causation, shedding light on the complexities inherent in establishing causal relationships.

There. No need to actually read.

It changes from yellow to white over distance, not time, you see. — Banno

This, however, fully ignores the reality of the observer's gaze moving in time from one spot of the image to another so as to discern the change addressed - without such a temporal motion of gaze, no change occurs.

And then Jgill pointed out that

A derivative can describe a rate of change with regard to a non-time variable: dy/dx — jgill

That should have been an end to it. — Banno

It so far seems to me this will only hold if one upholds the ontology of a block universe, i.e. the eternalism take on time. If so, here, all perceptions that involve time are fully illusional - and these encompass all that can be empirical, rendering all that is empirical to be strict illusion.

Otherwise, it again appears to me that the non-time variable which changes will again require an temporally-changing observer's mind (where time is, for example, minimally defined as a series of befores and afters - here, regarding givens such as ideas) to discern there being any change whatsoever.

If I have understood your post, you would like to define a sub-class of causes, which after Aristotle are to be called efficient causes, and which require change over time. That's fine, but it does not follow that all causes occur over time. — Banno

You've understood my post, yes. And I'm in agreement with your conclusion. In Aristotelian terms, formal and material causations are themselves change/motion-independent and hence not directly dependent on time. This as one example of causation-types not requiring change over time. But the pertinent question for philosophical clarity, if not rigor, will then remain: what is it that one then refers to when using the term "causation"?

--------

BTW, from what I recall, Aristotle species efficient causation to necessitate not merely change, but a change in motion, including those of its commencing and of it stopping. Unlike the notion of change of itself, motion (movement of anything in his terms, which can well be of psychological process, and not merely physical motions) will then appear to entail duration between befores and afters and, hence, the occurrence of time when so generally understood.

It's worth pointing out that the notion of causation at play here is metaphysical, not physical.

And here I am using "metaphysical" in the sense used by Popper and friends, as not falsifiable. Indeed, causation is one of the examples used by Watkins in Confirmable and influential metaphysics, as a "haunted universe" statement. (p.348)

The idea is that every "thing" has a cause. We can parse this as that for every "thing", there exists another "thing" that is its cause.

Leave aside, for the while, that it is not obvious what a "thing" might be - an event, an individual, a state of affairs; This is indeed one of the problems with the Kalum Cosmological argument, and with the notion of cause more generally, but is besides the point here.

Watkins points out that such haunted universe doctrines are neither falsifiable, not provable. For they have the structure of an all-and-some statement: u(x)∃(y)f(xy).

Supose someone proposes as a law of chemistry that for every metal there is some acid that will dissolve it. Can we falsify this mooted law? Well, no, for if we have before us a metal which we have tested with every known acid, it does not follow that there is not, somewhere, another acid that we have not tried, and which will indeed dissolve the metal. Then can we prove the law true? Again, no, since we might never test every possible alloy, amalgam and meld in order to show that they are all dissolvable.

The same applies to the metaphysical doctrine that every "thing" has a cause. We cannot falsify the doctrine, because for a given "thing", that we have not yet identified the cause does not rule out there being one; and we cannot prove it true, for we cannot list and identify every singe instance of a cause.

This is mentioned by way of adding yet another reason to be dubious of the was causation is used in the OP.

Almost forgot:

The absence of an icon next to your name makes it difficult for old folk such as I to spot your posts, as I scroll up and down on my laptop. — Banno

I'll try to work on it after the new year comes around in my neck of the woods. :wink: :razz:

Silly of me to offer some familiarity with the literature. — Banno

Yes, silly of you to think that straw man posts that demonstrate you do not understand the OP would be anything useful or respectable. I read the Anscombe paper and saw what they were talking about didn't apply to the OP. This indicates that you simply posted the papers without YOU needing to think about how it applies to the OP, thus wasting my time. I am also not going to read an entire compilation of Russel's to find the point you think you're making. Point it out to me and how it applies to the OP.

Not only did insult me when I call out your laziness, you ignored my other points like a coward. So Banno, are you going to be one of those people who has spent years reading philosophy, yet sadly can't contribute anything more to a discussion then someone who has never studied it at all?

One sees the image as a whole, not only by scanning it; and Hook's law does not assume a block universe.

2024 must be almost everywhere by now...?

One sees the image as a whole, not only by scanning it — Banno

As a whole, nothing of the image changes. It is only within it that changes occur form one part of it to another.

and Hook's law does not assume a block universe. — Banno

I'll look into it.

2024 must be almost everywhere by now...? — Banno

Not on the pacific side of the Americas ... still procrastinating in preparing for the folks that will show up :grin:

Ouch.

Too much invested, it seems. The cosmological argument is not as straight forward as you supose.

Too much invested, it seems. The cosmological argument is not as straight forward as you supose. — Banno

This is not a proof for God argument. I'm an atheist.

It is only within it that changes occur form one part of it to another. — javra

And this is exactly the point. There is a change over distance.

Not on the pacific side of the Americas ... still procrastinating in preparing for the folks that will show up :grin: — javra

It must be odd to live so far in the past... :wink:

May I ask, Javra, where the insistence that change requires time comes from? Why is it important to preserve this idea? this by way of trying to understand why folk seem so adamant about something that to me seems obviously wrong. Thanks.

Yes, indeed. But it relies on the same supposed logic.

↪Philosophim Yes, indeed. But it relies on the same supposed logic. — Banno

Does it? I'm not sure you understand it at all.

This is not a proof for God argument. — Philosophim

For my part, the issue is that existence can only be rationally concluded absurd in so far as its being is, and can only be, a-rational (beyond any form of reasoning). If infinite causality, then the entire thing in total cannot itself have a cause, but is instead, for lack of a better word, magical in its so occurring - this with all the natural laws, etc., it encapsulates. If, however, one assumes a causal determinism with an initial starting point, then the same issue applies to existence in total: its occurrence is absurd (for the reasons just specified).

This can be an unnerving existential reality/realization for some but, all the same, I see no other rational conclusion to be had.

The OP assumes "a first cause to existence" instead of concluding in the position of absurdism - this as pertains to existence's being as a whole. This, to me, is the pivotal aspect of the disagreement - either with or without the notion of a first cause as God. (And yes, for the record, I deem myself a philosophical absurdist in this specific regard.)

And this is exactly the point. There is a change over distance. — Banno

That, again, requires an observer's changing/moving mind to discern.

May I ask, Javra, where the insistence that change requires time comes from? Why is it important to preserve this idea? this by way of trying to understand why folk seem so adamant about something that to me seems obviously wrong. Thanks. — Banno

I'll get back to you on this early next year my time. :smile:

If infinite causality, then the entire thing in total cannot itself have a cause, but is instead, for lack of a better word, magical in its so occurring - this with all the natural laws, etc., it encapsulates. — javra

Yes, in other words something without prior cause. A first cause as defined by the OP.

If, however, one assumes a causal determinism with an initial starting point, then the same issue applies to existence in total: its occurrence is absurd (for the reasons just specified). — javra

This can be an unnerving existential reality/realization for some but, all the same, I see no other rational conclusion to be had. — javra

I think the realization is very important to have and prove. I follow it up with https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1

I think its a fantastic spring board into fun thoughts about cosmology. Unfortunately, because people think this always leads to "God", they shut down from thinking about this apart from God. The attempt here is to get knee jerk athiests and theists out of their focus on their fears on the ends of an argument and to actually think about it from a different perspective.

The OP assumes "a first cause to existence" instead of concluding in the position of absurdism - this as pertains to existence's being as a whole. — javra

No, I welcome the absurdism and form a conclusion from it. Too often the absurdism of reality existing is hand waved without thinking further into it beyond "God or not God". I appreciate the post.

That, again, requires an observer's changing/moving mind to discern. — javra

There's a difference between something's being true and it being discerned. It's true that the colour changes over distance, whether you discern it or not.

And here we are off into realism against antirealism, and the thread goes on...

I'll get back to you on this early next year my time. :smile: — javra

Hippo Gnu Dear.

For my part, the issue is that existence can only be rationally concluded absurd in so far as its being is, and can only be, a-rational — javra

This seems to me about right, although I baulk at existence being irrational - rather it is a given, outside of, or presupposed by, explanation. But that may be much the same point.

I'm not sure you understand it at all. — Philosophim

You borrowed from Anselm but left off "and this we all call god".

You borrowed from Anselm but left off "and this we all call god". — Banno

Really, quit trolling the thread Banno. This goes nowhere near the ontological argument. I expect better out of someone who been here as long as you have. What a shame.

:lol:

Cosmological, not ontological. My mistake - Aquinas, not Anselm. Thanks!

The point is that if you take the entire set of the infinite regress and ask, "What caused it to be an infinite regress?" you realize that's the finite end. It simply is, there's no prior explanation for its being. — Philosophim

There are various ways to form analogues of causal chains in mathematics. One, that I initiated in a publication over thirty years ago concerns composition chains like

${{F}_{n}}(z)={{f}_{1}}\circ {{f}_{2}}\circ \cdots \circ {{f}_{n}}(z)$

In which one desires to formulate the individual functions to produce limits


$F(z)=\underset{n\to \infty }{\mathop{\lim }}\,{{F}_{n}}(z)$


A colleague of mine from the University of Tronheim discovered what is the most relaxed requirements to achieve this result, and went further to prove that as n grows larger and larger all values of z in a region of the complex plane will lead to the same result, that is to say $F(z)=\alpha$

Thus, we have a regression that at each stage begins with a specific z but ultimately all z's in a region give the same ultimate value. Looking at limits here.

"What caused it to be an infinite regress?": The design of the structure.

"you realize that's the finite end": No. That makes no sense, alpha is a limit, not a finite end. The further back one goes the more accurate the observed present day value of alpha. There is no finite end to this regression, only partial ends.

"It simply is, there's no prior explanation for its being" Yes.

If this thread continues I'll describe other analogues of infinite regression, for good or bad.

My understanding is pretty limited (see what I did there?), and this will be wrong, but what I understand is...

So z is an input to a calculation f such that each result of f is then fed back into f to get the next result, and you do this n times? And the question is, what do you get at n? And the interesting result was that regardless of the input the result turns out the closer and closer to a given value as the number if iterations increases...?

The salient bit is that the regression is in the design of the structure of the problem.

And that correlates to what happens with causation as considered in the OP - the regression is implicit in the way causes have been structured, alpha being a limit, not an item, in the causal chain.

Roughly?

Which reminds me of Russell's joke that while every individual human being has a mother, it is a fallacy to supose that therefore the human species has a mother...

The mother of the race is a limit, not an item in the sequence...

But Mitochondrial Eve ruined the joke.

Roughly? — Banno

Bull's eye, buddy :up: :cool:

Fixed-point iteration, i.e. F(z) = z, is the mathematical description of circular causation, which can be considered a non-finite conception of causality that is symmetrical and has no initial-cause, thus also eliminating the causal arrow.